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ABSTRACT 
New Islamic charities and madrasas in Lucknow, India are promoting Islam as a 
means of development, through revival and reinterpretation of Islamic almsgiving (zakat) 
and ethical teachings on money and community.  Since the partition of India in 1947, 
Muslims have struggled as a beleaguered minority, the largest in India’s diverse 
democracy.  The relative socioeconomic status of Muslims in India is in decline, nearly 
on par with dalits (historically oppressed castes). Critics claim that “Muslim 
backwardness” originates in outmoded commitments to madrasas and illiberal Islamic 
law (sharī’a).  The public views Muslim underdevelopment with alarm, as holding India 
back from being a leader in the global economy.   
This dissertation examines the rise and transformation of zakat in contemporary 
India.  As historical institutions of Muslim welfare and endowments (waqf) decline, a 
new zakat economy is supplanting them. Yet zakat is a distinctly different social form of 
welfare.  The contemporary practice of zakat reveals contradictions that invite 
reconsideration of our ideas about philanthropy, civic engagement, and Islam.  Voluntary 
donations of zakat are a ritual obligation for all Muslims, and people in Lucknow often 
  ix
speak of the spiritual merit that accrues to almsgivers. I explore the paradox of zakat as 
“obligated voluntarism” that is at once selfless and self-interested and analyze the cultural 
implications of such ethics.  While the Qur'an encourages giving in modest secrecy, new 
forms of zakat are not secret but publicly institutionalized and visible. These shifts even 
alter the practice of piety by incorporating a more individually accountable, calculative 
dimension to Muslims’ faith.   
Morality is often imagined to be at odds with capitalism and its focus on profit 
accumulation.  The compatibility of capitalism and Islam, in particular, has been in 
question since Max Weber’s famous inquiry into religions, economy, and ethics.  Yet new 
Islamic charities re-orient Lucknow’s Muslims towards perceived requirements of 
capitalist markets.  This “ethical entrepreneurism” is rooted in Islamic rituals and 
morality rather than dispelling both in pursuit of modernity; zakat entrepreneurs promote 
development as simultaneously economic and moral.  Through ethnography, surveys, and 
close readings of Islamic texts, this study makes key contributions to economic 
anthropology and study of ethics.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORY & METHOD FOR AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF ZAKAT 
“Prophet Muhammad was a ‘Progressive’” 
“Why am I paying more attention to where I spend my zakat [Islamic alms]?  
Remember, Chris, when you asked me this?” Farid1 said.  Earlier that day, I had asked 
Farid why he and many of his family and friends were giving less to the madrasas that 
educated traditional Islamic scholars (‘ulama, sing. ‘alim), and finding other channels for 
distributing their zakat and sadaqah.2 He continued, 
Well, it’s because people are questioning the ‘ulama and their doctrines about 
worldly matters [dunyavī masa’el].  More and more people are questioning them 
today.  Islam has a ‘code of conduct’ that applies whether it’s about religion or the 
world [dīn ya duniyā]. Matters of faith [dīnī masa’el] can’t change, but the world 
[duniyā] is changing. It’s dynamic. It’s changing every day.  So, my point is, why 
can’t our ‘conduct’ change – conduct of ‘ulama, of Muslims – why can’t that 
change from what it was 1,400 years ago? 
 
Farid, the vice president of Itehad Foundation, had become a close acquaintance over the 
months of my volunteering in his Islamic charity, and we were sitting on his porch having 
                                                 
1 All names from my research interviews are pseudonyms, except where noted.  This dialogue is taken 
from a translated interview transcript audio recorded during my fieldwork.  All other quotes are also 
from interview transcripts, unless otherwise indicated, recorded via digital audio or handwritten 
fieldnotes.  All quotes are in Urdu, unless otherwise noted.  Urdu is the first language of the 
majority of Lucknow’s Muslims.  Translations of all quotations in the dissertation from foreign 
languages (i.e. Urdu, Hindi, and Arabic) to English were rendered by me.  Foreign words are left in 
italics following the English (e.g. his Companions [ṣaḥābī]) when readers may be curious as the 
original Urdu.  In Lucknow, it is common for interlocutors to intersperse English words in Urdu 
speech—these are indicated by quotation marks (e.g. ‘reformer’) only where it is relevant to 
meaning.  Underlined words in quotes indicate exceptional spoken emphasis. 
2 Zakat and sadaqah are two of the forms that Islamic charitable giving can take. Zakat (Urdu: zakāt, 
Arabic: al-zakāh) or “obligatory alms” is a term from the Qur’an that has been elaborated in Islamic 
jurisprudence to refer to the compulsory alms required of all eligible Muslims.  Sadaqah (Urdu: 
ṣadaqah, Arabic: al-Ṣadaqah) or “voluntary charity” is also a Qur’anic term but in Islamic 
jurisprudence is specifically refers to gifts or acts of service done out of goodwill rather than 
because they are obligatory.  See chapter three for an extensive discussion of the two. 
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a conversational interview in a mix of Urdu and English.  Although he himself was a 
lawyer, all his direct forebears were madrasa-educated, whom he greatly respected, and 
his family kept high standards of piety common to old city Lucknow.3  I never saw his 
wife and his two daughters appeared only briefly in ḥijāb (headscarves) to greet their 
father after school as we conversed.  But Farid was also one of the many Muslim charity 
workers in Lucknow who sought changes in the way that Muslim donations were 
collected and utilized, particularly by reducing Muslims’ dependence on and support of 
what they called “inefficient” madrasa education.  Farid and others like him were 
donating less to madrasa education – traditionally seen as the ideal recipients for Islamic 
alms, outside of relatives and neighbors – and instead re-orienting their almsgiving to 
new Islamic charities that serve a range of social functions: scholarships for “modern” 
(non-madrasa) education, healthcare, income-generation, vocational training, start-up 
capital for small enterprises, interest-free loans, and relief for the needy and pension 
funds for the elderly.   
Madrasas in India were seen as dominated by a concern with personal conduct in 
everyday affairs as students are encouraged, and at times required, to emulate the Prophet 
Muhammad in matters of dress (e.g. hemlines above ankles for men), hygiene (e.g. use of 
twig toothbrushes [miswāk]), beard length, and so forth.  In Lucknow’s madrasas, 
smartphones that access the internet – a realm of moral turpitude and revealing images of 
                                                 
3 His grandfather has also been an early leader in Lucknow’s Islamic revival movements of the 19th 
century, a founding member of the local center [markaz] of the Tablighi Jama’at preaching society 
and close friends with leading intellectual lights at Dar al-‘Uloom Nadwat  al-‘Ulama madrasa.  “I 
used to accompany him many times to Nadwa, as a kid, to meet Maulana Alimiya [Abul Hasani 
Nadwi]” he once told me.  His family consulted Baḥishtī Zewar, the instructional text by Deobandi 
teacher Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi on a regular basis.  
  3
female bodies – were prohibited, although internet use for scholarly research was 
encouraged.  Farid elaborated, 
But, for example, the first time they got loudspeakers in mosques, some others 
said, ‘This is unholy’.  Yet, now, loudspeakers are in every mosque! In Ajmer 
mosque, they have the most advanced loudspeaker in the world – because they 
need such a ‘PA system’ to lead prayer for millions of people!   
 
Our Prophet was the most modern-thinking man of his time.  He always came up 
with new ideas, and accepted new ideas.  And he was not a chauvinist. So why are 
we chauvinist?  He was a ‘progressive!’  Islam has made charity obligatory 
[wājib]. Zakat is ‘compulsory’ on you! Which other religion in the world does 
this?  That is ‘progressive!’ 
 
His unwavering belief in Islamic tradition as incorporating “progressive” elements was 
exemplified by the “obligation” of zakat, religiously mandated funding for those in the 
community who seek to better it.  But, Farid had lost confidence in the ability of 
madrasas and ‘ulama – alone – to continue to carry on the Prophet’s “modern-thinking” 
spirit of social reform, and they ceased to deserve the bulk of his zakat.   
Madrasas are the organizations that collect the largest share of Muslims’ religious 
charitable donations of zakat and sadaqah in old city Lucknow. But madrasa teachers and 
students are well aware of these critiques.  Lucknow ‘ulama more often than not are 
striving to remain relevant to the 21st century concerns of their fellow believers – 
otherwise, they become at risk for alienating the funding base for their madrasas and 
other institutions.  Were it not for this financial link through zakat, the cloistered worlds 
of Indian madrasas might never have become so susceptible to criticism by the wider 
Muslim public nor motivated to re-adjust Islamic education according to public demands. 
Interrupting his monologue, I mentioned to Farid that some ‘ulama are societal 
reformers, as he undoubtedly already knew.  Some madrasa-educated scholars in north 
  4
India go on to run their own Islamic charities for business development and modern 
schooling, such as Maulana Jahangir and Kalbe Sadiq in Lucknow.  Others such as the 
founders of Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama (known as “Nadwa” madrasa) in Lucknow 
and some of its current students are motivated to establish “modern madrasas” that teach 
Islam in the traditional manner while keeping it relevant to the contemporary world.  
“Yes, we need more ‘ulama like that! We need more ‘ulama to stick their necks out!” 
Farid exclaimed in reply.  Then he asked me, “Look, who is the role model for Muslims?”  
I offered, “The Prophet and his Companions [ṣahābī]?” and Farid enthusiastically broke 
in, 
The Prophet is 100% our role model! Look at his example: Wasn’t he the one who 
stuck his neck out?  Wasn’t he the one who got beaten, who got starved, who 
came out of his comfort zone?  Wasn’t he the one who ‘reformed’!  Even though 
many of them [‘ulama] are talking about taking us back to the sunnah and the 
ḥadīth [traditions and sayings of the Prophet], the ‘ulama are not the ones coming 
out of their comfort zone!  The Prophet himself was a true ‘reformer’!  We need 
more ‘ulama like that!”  
 
Hearing passion in Farid’s tone, I repeatedly underlined the word “reformer” in my 
fieldnotes.   
Although Farid rejected some of the efforts to emulate the Prophet in matters of 
dress and outdated technologies, Farid himself came from a family that had embraced 
earlier movements of Islamic reformism.  
Like other families a hundred years back, our family used to go to shrines 
[mazar]. And maybe we were also participating in heretical innovations [bid’at]. 
Then, my grandfather was a close friend of Maulana Alimiyya [Abul Hasani 
Nadwi, the head of Nadwa madrasa], was told by him, ‘What you’re doing is 
wrong’ and they taught him. That’s how people in our family stopped visiting 
shrines.  
  
By emphasizing the Prophet’s role as a “reformer,” Farid and others like him were 
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responding to deep currents of religious reformism in Indian Muslim society that sought 
to bring Muslim belief and practice in line with the hadith (Arabic, Urdu: sunnah and 
ḥadīth), the traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad recorded as scripture.4  The 
example of the Prophet Muhammad as reformer was not a matter of resisting societal 
changes as heretical “innovation” (bid’at), but of embracing social progress while 
keeping hold of – even strengthening – personal religiosity. 
Our example always must be the Prophet. The study of ḥadīth is very popular in 
India. It keeps us on the right path of Islam [ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm]. But our conduct, 
how we enact the religion [dīn] – that should change!  The religion [dīn] itself 
cannot change. It is complete – you can’t just decide to pray three times a day, 
instead of five times. But our societal commitments – those are what need to 
change! 
 
A key way that Lucknow Muslims embraced societal progress within a framework of 
adherence to Islamic tradition was through zakat – especially the revival and improved 
organization of zakat-giving in order to address perceived underdevelopment in old city 
Lucknow.   
Today’s revival of zakat-giving in Lucknow is in many ways a direct continuation 
of earlier Islamic revivals.  In Farid’s words above, zakat as a “compulsory” form of 
religious philanthropy was viewed by reformers a highly “progressive” instrument for 
reform in society.  Moreover, lack of education in the Muslim community and the dismal 
rates of almsgiving were directly linked for Farid and other charity workers. Properly 
educated Muslims would be able to earn a professional’s salary and also would know 
their Islamic duty to give alms, while a widespread increase in almsgiving by wealthy 
                                                 
4 Sunnah is the “tradition,” or example, of the Prophet Muhammad.  Hadith are “prophetic sayings,” 
or to be precise, the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad passed down via oral tradition.  
The Sunnah draws on hadith but is more normatively encompassing of a concept for Muslims. 
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Muslims would reciprocally subsidize education for others.  Economic development and 
moral reform were in certain ways predicated on each other.  The correct practice of 
Islamic zakat was thus a transaction that fostered personal spiritual progress and 
community progress – or even collapsed the two into a holistic conception of 
“development” that was nevertheless rooted in Islamic ethical teachings and ritual. 
India’s “Muslim Question” 
Since the independence of India and its partition in 1947, Muslims have become a 
beleaguered minority within an increasingly majoritarian Hindu-dominated society 
(Pandey 1999; van der Veer 1994; Hansen 2001).  As a result of the creation of Pakistan 
and the internationalization of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in South Asia, the mass of 
Indian Muslims have been hesitant to organize and advocate in public as Muslims.  Yet, 
self-styled “secular” parties like the National Congress Party and the Samajwadi Party in 
Uttar Pradesh had pro-Muslim policies as a mainstay of their platforms.  These initiatives 
were largely culturally oriented policies: such as teaching Urdu in schools, promoting 
Muslim Personal Law to exempt them from statutes governing Hindus, or subsidies for 
the Hajj pilgrimage.  
Yet, recently such pro-Muslim cultural identity issues have come to be seen as 
nominal efforts in the cause of electoral politics, which have distracted from the deeper, 
structural processes of exclusion from mainstream Indian society.  A 2006 report by the 
Sachar Committee commissioned by Congress Party Prime Minister Manmohan Singh5 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, Singh was the first Prime Minister that was Sikh, the second-largest religious minority 
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showed Muslims to have fallen nearly on par with or below the dalit (“oppressed,” 
lowest, formerly untouchable) castes in many socioeconomic indicators (Sachar 2006; cf. 
Basant & Shariff 2009; Gayer & Jaffrelot 2012). The Sachar Report initiated a sea change 
in India’s political discourse on its Muslim minority.  Although culturally pro-Muslim 
policies remain popular vote-buying tactics by many parties (and are criticized by Hindu 
nationalists as “appeasement” of Muslims who refuse to assimilate), harder economic 
questions have risen to the fore: How are Muslims being excluded from mainstream 
Indian societal and economic institutions? How can they be “developed” and integrated?   
The issue of how to integrate minorities within India’s multi-ethnic, multi-
religious plural society has long been a thorny question, often centering on Hindu-
Muslim relations.  But, the Sachar and Misra Reports with their statistical revelations and 
enumeration of poverty not only shifted the public discourse – they also re-oriented the 
public response.  Re-framing India’s “Muslim question” as an economic one has resulted 
in the remarkable convergence of diverse interests. Leftists were relieved to back welfare 
policies that address real material concerns among Muslims. Right-wing Hindu parties 
have even joined in, calling for development of Muslims and reforms in madrasas to 
foster their “assimilation” into Hindu society. Madrasas have been offered and tentatively 
welcomed some government assistance, despite their valued autonomy from the state and 
mainstream school system.  The Sachar Report did not view the state in India as the sole 
source of welfare, though the impetus for the commission originated in the government. 
“Traditional systems of charity like zakat” and “better utilization of waqf [Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                 
after Muslims.  
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charitable endowment] properties” were two key recommendations of the report 
submitted to the Prime Minister’s office (Sachar 2006: 26), a new national discourse that 
has shaped subsequent policy but also – as this dissertation highlights – has facilitated a 
bevy of new citizen-led initiatives by Muslim social welfare activists.   
It may seem surprising that a government report of India would admit a national 
need for citizen-led welfare, not only in the form of civic associations, but via the revival 
of religious ritual (“traditional systems of [Islamic] charity”).  Yet, in the wake of 
liberalization announced in the early 1990s by then-Finance Minister (later Prime 
Minister) Manmohan Singh, India’s approach to addressing the welfare needs took on a 
different tone.  In sharp contrast to the visions and promises of the Nehruvian 
developmentalist state that dominated the first cycles of economic planning in 
independent India, the government has simply been incapable of addressing poverty 
among its citizens – according to some analysts, astonishingly incapable. Akhil Gupta 
(2012: 4, 29-31) has explored and critiqued the “direct and culpable form of killing made 
possible by state politics and practices” in India.  Contra Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) 
theorization of bare life in modern states of exception, Gupta depicts the lethality of 
extreme poverty in India as occurring “despite their inclusion in projects” of welfare, 
national inclusion, and electoral democratic politics.  Economic reforms since the 1990s 
have only rolled back the already insufficient programs of India’s welfare state, as 
expenditures were cut to reduce federal fiscal deficits.  Some programs, however, were 
expanded, such as employment assistance and food-for-work, while new ones were 
added, such as the Mahila Samakhya that “embodied the ‘enterprise model’ of neoliberal 
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reform” (Gupta 2012: 31, 237-270; cf. Harriss-White 2003).  In short, the Sachar 
Report’s recommendation of zakat and waqf as potential alternative sources of citizen-led 
welfare (and the government’s subsequent efforts in this regard, such as the waqf reform 
bill of 2010) can be read in multiple ways: as official recognition for vibrant traditions of 
mutual aid in South Asia, as distinctly Indian secularism which reaches out to religious 
institutions as a matter of policy, and as the extension of neoliberal governmentality.  
Such celebration of “enterprise culture” has strong roots in India.  Another government 
report of 2008 claimed that “an entrepreneurial trait…has been as much a part of 
everyday living” as much as Hindu philosophies (Gooptu 2013: 10).  Yet, such laudatory 
valuation of the enterprising lifestyle also produces entrepreneurial citizens that “do not 
make claims on the state” and are “prepared to take responsibility…for managing risks 
and vulnerabilities arising from socioeconomic or political sources” (Gooptu 2013: 4).   
In Lucknow, social reformers over the past decade have increasingly lamented the 
Indian Muslim community’s inability to maintain pace with the “progress” of mainstream 
Indian society, as India entered the 21st century with a liberalizing economy and its 
leaders touting a new vision of “Shining India” as an economic superpower and 
influencer on the world stage.  This decline was reaching crisis proportions.  But the 
crisis was not one that was only a result of socioeconomic underdevelopment.  Nor was it 
a crisis affecting only the lower and working classes, and thus one the wealthy could 
ignore.  The category of “backward groups” is a term arising from India’s Constitutional 
provisions for socioeconomically disadvantaged castes and tribes that are singled out for 
intervention by policymakers.  However, reformers in Lucknow interpreted the crisis of 
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“Muslim backwardness” as underdevelopment that is socioeconomic as well as spiritual 
lack of progress.  Many reformers in Lucknow decried the lack of education among poor 
Muslims, but in the same breath many also decried the lack of almsgiving among the 
wealthy, as evidence of the community’s drift away from the core teachings of Islam.  
Such a crisis also provoked fresh and remarkable forms of social entrepreneurism. 
For example, Iqrar (a friend of Farid’s) was one of the original founders of the 
Itehad Foundation in 2006, who later left that organization to begin another one in a 
different neighborhood, which he dubbed the Scholarship Foundation.  In both charities, 
Iqrar had collected donations among his contacts and acquaintances in Lucknow, 
distributing them in an organized fashion to students from deserving families in Lucknow 
in the form of scholarships to attend local English-medium private schools, as long as 
students demonstrated some aptitude and motivation, so that beneficiary Muslim students 
could avoid low-quality Hindi-language government schools.  Iqrar grew up in Bombay 
but married into an old Lucknow family, running a successful business in the city for over 
twenty-five years after his family sent him to the United States for college. These 
foundations he helped start served two primary purposes in his mind: first, to 
productively channel the sympathy he felt for the numbers of heartbreakingly poor that 
seemed to swell larger each year in old city Lucknow; and, second, to productively 
channel zakat he and his friends gave annually, as a more rationally organized form of 
almsgiving than small handouts.   
The Scholarship Foundation had an annual budget of around 1,350,000 rupees 
($25,000) providing scholarships for nearly 500 students studying at all levels from 
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primary school to university.  Most were Sunni Muslim, with a few Shi’a and the 
occasional Hindu student.6 “Don’t madrasas see you as competition, if you are collecting 
zakat – as they do – yet distributing it to students who attend English-medium non-
religious schools?” I once asked in English.  “Not at all. We have good relations with the 
‘ulama,” he replied. Furthermore, he added, there were sufficient Islamic almsgivers in 
Lucknow for many types of charity organizations. The Scholarship Foundation had 
precise accounting and annual impact reports sent by email, which detailed the 
beneficiaries’ attendance and grades – ‘ulama who ran madrasas rarely matched this level 
of reporting and donor-relations. Although madrasas and the Scholarship Foundation both 
collected zakat, they did so from rather different donor populations.  
The Scholarship Foundation, Itehad Foundation, and similar new Islamic charities 
thus commanded respect from Muslim almsgivers that were skeptical of ‘ulama-managed 
institutions and remained at a loss for places to give zakat. Many university-educated 
Muslims like Iqrar and Farid, in fact, had lost touch with ‘ulama and their institutions – 
yet, their humanitarian concerns coupled with a general awareness of Islam’s teachings 
on charity led these donors to seek out local charitable causes.  In the past, such donors 
commonly donated to local causes whenever moved by someone in their immediate 
social circles – which included Hindus and Christians for many donors in Lucknow.  It 
had not actually been the intention of Iqrar to found the organization explicitly as a “zakat 
association,” he explained to me, even though he and other founders were practicing 
                                                 
6 All their donors understood that scholarships in this budget went to needy Muslims, fulfilling 
eligibility requirements for zakat (see chapter five on Islamic law and alms) – but, if a Hindu student 
learned of the foundation, Iqrar would fundraise separately for him or her and grant a scholarship.   
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Muslims. But soon after he and others founded their first new Islamic charity, Iqrar had a 
conversation with a Muslim cleric who in fact encouraged him to ensure that his 
recipients were zakat-eligible and to include a zakat appeal in his fundraising.  
While many of Lucknow’s wealthy Muslims continue to donate to other causes, 
the rise in new Islamic charities during the 2000s – founded for Muslims, by Muslims, 
with explicit appeals to utilize zakat in a productive manner – suggests that educated 
Muslims in Lucknow are increasingly attending to specific socioeconomic problems 
within their own community.  The growing public discourse on “Muslim backwardness,” 
boosted by government reports, has furthermore given diverse constituencies of Muslims 
a new common ground. It has brought university-educated Muslims more closely in 
collaboration with madrasa-educated ‘ulama in Lucknow, sparking new types of 
conversations and practices surrounding zakat.  It also has fostered a new wave of 
spiritual reawakening – specifically centered around zakat – as secularized Muslims 
realize the developmentalist potential of a centuries-old Islamic ritual practice and ‘ulama 
become better able to manage and institutionalize welfare.  
New Islamic Charities in Lucknow 
When I arrived in Lucknow in January 2012 to begin fieldwork on Islamic 
almsgiving and Muslim social welfare, I had spent six years as an international 
development worker in South Asia in Afghanistan, India, and Nepal.  These experiences, 
coupled with years of graduate study, comprised my background knowledge of Islam and 
its practice among South Asian Muslims.  Yet, I was caught by surprise at the intensity 
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with which numerous concerned citizens like Farid of Itehad Foundation were raising 
their voices and seeking to revive zakat-giving and make it better organized on behalf of 
the Muslim community in north India.   Islamic scriptures have represented almsgiving as 
a purificatory ritual focused on the donor.7  Anthropologists have similarly characterized 
Islamic charity as “financial worship” (Benthall 1999) and publically performative piety 
(Deeb 2006: 168-212), emphasizing charity as a virtue and its centrality to individual 
Muslim understandings of their faith.  I term this orientation the “purity ethic” of Islamic 
charity.  In contrast, reformers of zakat like Farid are invoking different sets of Islamic 
scriptures and moral concerns that re-orient the focus of zakat-giving from donors to 
recipients – according to a “developmentalist ethic.”  These developmentalist Muslims in 
Lucknow are less vocal about their own spiritual transformations through philanthropic 
giving, instead inquiring about the life of the gift after it is given: Will recipients utilize 
charity effectively to generate income? Or will it foster dependency and begging – widely 
seen as a vice in Islam?  How can we increase the quantity of zakat being distributed?  
Most importantly, will zakat-giving be able to advance the Indian Muslim community on 
a wider scale? 
In the chapters that follow, I investigate how what I term “new Islamic charities” 8 
have been reforming the practice of zakat in ways that are responsive to the perceived 
                                                 
7 For example, the great jurist Shafi’i (d. 820) wrote of zakat as cleansing of Muslims’ wealth and 
souls that is parallel to ablution before prayer (Hallaq 2009: 231). Scriptures invariably address 
Muslims as alms givers rather than providing guidance for receiving and distributing alms (for one 
exception, see Qur’an 9: 58-60), as I discuss extensively in chapter four. 
8 In this study, “new Islamic charities” are those welfare associations financed through public 
fundraising for zakat and other Islamic religious donations, as opposed to endowment-financed 
organizations (waqf) that have been popular in India and other Muslim societies since the medieval 
era.    
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growing crisis of “Muslim backwardness.”  New Islamic charities became platforms for 
public advocacy to raise others Muslims’ rates of almsgiving.  The revival and reform of 
zakat in Lucknow was focused not only on increasing Islamic philanthropy but on 
channeling it more effectively.  Part of what is “new” about new Islamic charities is that 
Lucknow Muslims distribute zakat in hopes of alleviating poverty, how they go about 
doing so, and how they are discussing it.  Although many of them are new, in the sense of 
recently established since the 1990s, new Islamic charities are also distinct in utilizing 
“new” modalities of management, bureaucracy, and supervision in order to rationalize the 
collection and distribution of local Islamic almsgiving in Lucknow.  Moreover, they do so 
in ways that depart from historical institutionalizations of welfare in Muslim India such 
as endowed foundations (waqf), shrines (dargāh), and madrasas.  
In the past decade, new Islamic charities have begun to spring up in cities like 
Lucknow in greater numbers.  These new Islamic charities have organizational missions 
focused on more immediate welfare needs.  Unlike the schools, orphanages, and hospitals 
that many Muslim elites in an earlier generation endowed, these new Islamic charities do 
not provide continuous services themselves as much as provide financial aid for Muslim 
families unable to afford any school or healthcare or job-skills training to empower others 
to become breadwinners (and eventual zakat donors) themselves.  Unlike the earlier 
model of Muslim welfare organizations such as waqf endowments that relied on 
patronage from one family, these new Islamic charities are lighter organizational 
structures with a broader donor base, liquid resources, and a wider network of 
professional advisors.  Staffing and leadership are divided into professionalized roles, 
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instead of being based on kinship.   
The critique of madrasas, the main institutional target for Islamic almsgiving, is 
that they foster dependency.  Other extant customs of zakat-giving to local beggars and 
alms-seekers were seen as increasing dependency as well. The new Islamic charities do 
sometimes respond to immediate humanitarian needs of the Muslim community, but 
whenever possible their rhetoric and programming targets the “development” of needy 
Muslims.  Their stated goals are to collect and disburse funds in a way that is as 
sustainable as possible, providing beneficiaries with an education or other income-
generation capability. Yet, they seek to do so in ways that also impart to recipients the 
virtues of being a good Muslim.   
This focus on development thus incorporates a parallel effort of moral 
development.  Begging is seen by them as ḥarām (prohibited) in Islam. Moreover, 
poverty is seen as a slippery slope leading to a range of other immoral behaviors, from 
lack of time for prayer and religious study to theft and substance abuse. This concern for 
not only giving alms to the poor but also boosting their income-generating potential, 
along with their Islamic values, is what I term the production of “halal human capital.”  
Halal9 human capital development is the making of zakat beneficiaries into what donors 
consider proper wage-earners and proper Muslims – especially since the new Islamic 
charities are in positions to not only provide humanitarian relief but also training and 
ethical instruction for beneficiaries, while simultaneously monitoring them.   
Zakat as a practice and its role in Muslim society is also changing as a result of 
                                                 
9 Halal (“permissible”; Arabic, Urdu: ḥalāl) refers in Islamic jurisprudence to those actions and 
objects that are permitted for Muslims without risk of sin or impurity.  
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new Islamic charities’ programs.  They represent a clear departure from earlier Muslim 
givers who saw zakat as primarily a transfer of ownership of wealth from giver to 
receiver.   New Islamic charities recognize that basic zakat donations still fulfill the alms-
obligation of the donor; however, they impose upon almsgivers and the Muslim 
community the obligation to make zakat “work.”  The effective utilization of zakat funds 
by the recipient, even after it has brought spiritual merit to the donor, is the focus of their 
reforms.  These reformers believe zakat’s prophetically revealed purpose is the 
alleviation of poverty.  Although they would not criticize others for departing from 
tradition (i.e. as fostering bid’at, heretical “innovation”), the creation of dependency and 
continued poverty in the Muslim communities of India poses a clear risk for un-Islamic 
behavior.   
Moral development targeted not only alms-recipients, but spiritual awakening 
among donors as well.  Many Muslim charity workers believed that they were the 
vanguard of an effort to institutionalize zakat on a scale that had not been seen in recent 
memory, if ever, in India.  But, achieving this level of systematization required a spiritual 
revival among all Indian Muslims who were potentially current or future almsgivers.  
During my fieldwork, I repeatedly heard refrains of “Muslims are just not paying their 
zakat” and “If every person would pay their zakat, then no Muslim would be left in 
poverty.”  Some Lucknow Muslims envision zakat not only as an individual obligation 
upon donors, but also as a “system” (nizām) of welfare economics internally organized 
for just redistribution according to Islamic principles. Thus, the existence of poverty in 
the Muslim community in India, for these reformers, was diagnosed not only in terms of 
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economic policy or welfare redistribution. Rather, Muslim poverty was an indictment of 
the very practice of Islam itself in Lucknow.  The concern of the wealthy for their fellow 
Muslims nevertheless still did not arise only from feelings of group solidarity.  The 
problem of Muslim poverty was also linked to personal piety and was a negative 
reflection on individuals’ adherence (or lack thereof) to the mandatory rates of Islamic 
almsgiving that underpinned the nizām of zakat enjoined in prophetic scripture.    
As a program to reform Islam in India by re-focusing Muslims on zakat, the new 
Islamic charities I profile fit squarely within the series of waves of Islamic reformism 
through India’s history – a theme I return to in chapter two.  While these zakat 
entrepreneurs recognize their departures from earlier modalities of almsgiving in 
individualized forms or to madrasas, their rhetoric nevertheless claims authenticity for 
new Islamic charities as rooted in Qur’anic notions of almsgiving as worship (‘ibadat) 
parallel in importance to ritual Islamic prayer.  In their public relations, new Islamic 
charities at times represented themselves as just another non-governmental organization 
(NGO) that happened to be working primarily for Muslims.   
Yet, to understand them as mere mimicry of development modalities imported 
from “Western” or Hindu-led NGOs would be a gross mischaracterization. Zakat 
entrepreneurs also prioritize their activist work in terms of effecting a broader spiritual 
reform in society – keeping Muslims “on the Straight Path [ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm]” in the 
words of Farid above. Although university-educated Islamic charity workers like Farid 
and Iqrar sometimes singled out members of the ‘ulama as implicated in their diagnoses 
of underdevelopment, the relationships between Lucknow’s ‘ulama and new Islamic 
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charities was characterized by mutual recognition of the need for socioeconomic 
development and new reforms, by collaboration and mutual respect.  Religious leaders in 
Lucknow spoke in support of new Islamic charities despite their role in re-directed funds 
away from madrasa education and towards other social services.  Indeed, ‘ulama were at 
the forefront of some new Islamic charities, even founded some themselves, urging 
ordinary Muslims to broaden their scope of zakat-recipients to include such 
institutionalized welfare associations. These Lucknow clergy thus resemble other Indian 
reformist ‘ulama whose sociopolitical innovations go beyond the conservatism of their 
own communities, while still justifying actions with recourse to scriptural interpretations 
(Zaman 2002; Jeffrey et al. 2008).   
Yet, new Islamic charities are distinctly different from earlier waves of Islamic 
reformism in India. Unlike modernist institutions such as Aligarh Muslim University, 
they imagine their operations as a form of ritual practice, thus bound by myriad 
constraints of shari’a10 on zakat: rates, recipients, utilizations, timing, and modes of 
distribution.  However, unlike traditional organizations led by ritual specialists (e.g. 
shrines madrasas, Muslim Personal Law Board), ‘ulama are not necessarily at the helm of 
new Islamic charities. Their modalities of management, operation, and use of media are 
also distinctly contemporary.  Notions of zakat itself are being reoriented, as new Islamic 
charities circulate and distribute more than just alms. Along with money, they disseminate 
                                                 
10 Shari’a (Arabic: sharī’ah) is often loosely translated as “a way” or “path” and broadly relates to the 
religion and religious law of Islam.  Shari’a is distinguished from fiqh or “Islamic jurisprudence” 
which refers to the academic discussion of divine law and its rulings.  Whereas fiqh is considered 
as a knowable, relatively stable body of juridical rulings and commentaries, shari’a is more of a set 
of divine ethico-legal codes that can only be approximated in human legal and moral endeavors.  
See Hefner (2011) and Hallaq (2009) for extensive discussion. 
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attitudes towards employment and values of self-discipline, thus inculcating new ethical 
subjectivities in other Muslims, which encourage workforce participation. Such practices 
reorient subjectivities of donors, recipients, and the broader Lucknow Muslim public, 
towards the perceived requirements of the contemporary capitalist economy, even for 
women who keep purdah (veiling).  
This reform of zakat is one that is being accomplished, not through theological 
challenge or reinterpretation of scriptures, but through changes in organizational 
management and practice.  While Islamic commentaries on zakat have always discussed 
its meaning as “growth” (also glossed as societal development), in practice Indian ‘ulama 
have emphasized scriptural teachings on zakat as self-purification, intended to inculcate 
certain virtues for wealthy Muslims: relinquishment, sacrifice and obedience towards 
Allah, and modesty.   Stark poverty is not a stranger to South Asian cities and villages; 
despite vast writings on socioeconomic justice in Islam, the Indian ‘ulama have been 
remarkably reticent on socioeconomic questions (Zaman 2012: 221-260).11 
New Islamic charities in today’s Lucknow, by contrast, view their activities as 
enacting the true and correct purposes of zakat, going beyond literal meanings of zakat as 
“purification” to shift emphasis away from the donor and onto the recipients and how 
they will utilize charity to “develop.”  Notably, this shift in ethical imaginary has not 
occurred through charity workers’ direct contestation of Islam’s discursive tradition – by 
and large, matters of jurisprudence in Muslim India remain with ‘ulama, madrasas, and 
                                                 
11 Michael Cook has also written of medieval Muslim societies more broadly, that Islamic injunction 
to “command right and forbid wrong” has historically included “no concern…for what we might 
call social justice” in practice (Cook 2003: 99). 
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shari’a courts. Rather, the shift is embodied in new organizational practices and 
modalities of management.  Their developmentalist ethic emerges in visibly public 
activities such as charity distribution events and “coaching sessions” for students.  New 
Islamic charities may invoke Islamic discourses in their printed materials, fundraising, 
and even sermons, but these narratives do not contest established Islamic religious law 
(fiqh; Islamic jurisprudence) on zakat, but instead justify new organizational forms of 
zakat-giving and -taking that are framed with reference to long-established and generally 
accepted traditions in Islam – halal wage-earning, “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) use of alms, and 
individual accountability to Allah.  They imagine their activities within the authenticated 
traditions of Islam, such that even argumentative scripturalist ‘ulama rarely object to new 
practices.  
With an anthropological eye to how ethics especially form within habitus through 
embodied practices and performances, I focus on two types of socializing institutions: 
education and charity. Scholarships and Muslim private schools funded by alms are 
allowing poor Muslims to avoid government schools (perceived as tainted by Hinduism-
inflected curricula and teacher absenteeism) and become socialized through activities 
guided by reformist Islam and a business-oriented work ethic.  In Islamic charities, 
rigorous application and monitoring procedures are shifting the meaning of alms away 
from a notion of a sacred entitlement for the needy towards becoming an incentive for 
hard-work and accountability among Lucknow's poorer Muslims.  The resulting vision of 
ethical Muslim selfhood is thus one in which disciplinary practices leading to material 
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development and those which help a Muslim achieve spiritual development are often one 
and the same (cf. Deeb 2006, Osella & Osella 2009).   
Anthropological Aims of the Dissertation 
Islam, Development, & Democracy 
My dissertation pivots on of a striking discontinuity between scholarship on 
voluntarism and community development in Muslim societies versus similar studies of 
American society. Associations in the United States, particularly faith-based ones, are 
"one of the most important places in which people learn transferable civic skills," wrote 
sociologist Robert Wuthnow (1999: 333).  By contrast, Muslim faith-based charities are 
regularly analyzed according to their links with political Islamists (Clark 2004, Burr & 
Collins 2006, Alterman & Hippel 2007, Levitt 2008), or even terrorism.  A Lexis-Nexis 
search of the phrase “Islamic charity” reveals that 68% (662 of 970) articles in English-
language news sources from 2000 to 2010 also reference “terrorism.”  Although a 
comprehensive survey of the recipients of Muslim philanthropy worldwide is a study that 
awaits its author, this ethnography aims to provide an account that contrasts with much 
extant scholarship on Islamic charity by analyzing the ritual of zakat as one that is 
transformative at the levels of the moral and the social.   
Projects of global humanitarian development since the late 19th century have 
undergone a gradual process of secularization, representing triumphalist narratives of the 
promise of modernization that reached their peak by the 1970s (Barnett & Stein 2012).  
Despite the origins of organized American and European humanitarianism in the 
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missionary movements of Christian social reformers, the development industry emerged 
through the 20th century as increasingly reliant on the assumption that economic 
development and religious values are at odds.  The theory of secularization (what Weber 
popularized as “the disenchantment of the world”) “may be the only theory which was 
able to attain truly paradigmatic status… [being] shared by all founding fathers of 
modern science” (Casanova 1994: 17).  Policy analysts and social scientists once had 
near-unanimous agreement that economic development and secularization, moreover, 
were mutually reinforcing historical processes.  “Faith in development” seemed to be 
replacing religious faith in countries around the world (Ferguson 1999: 129; Bornstein 
2002; Rudnyckyj 2010).  Material progress was seen as divorced from – or even hindered 
by – spiritual progress.  India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, predicted that due 
to state-led development in India the public role of caste and religion would “whither” 
away (Jodhka 2007),12 although despite such elite views, Indian society by-and-large 
retained a strong focus on spiritual-moral aspects of progress (Copeman 2009).  Yet, for 
Muslim societies, cogent scholarly critiques have since laid to rest this dichotomous 
opposition between, in Daniel Lerner’s phrasing, “Mecca and mechanization” 
(Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 22; Norton 1993; see also Deeb 2006).  In projects of 
global development more broadly, the influence of religious creeds and organizations has 
endured and indeed grown even more salient in the 21st century (Barnett & Stein 2012).  
                                                 
12  “The spectacle of what is called religion, or at any rate organised religion, in India and elsewhere, 
has filled me with horror and I have frequently condemned it and wished to make a clean sweep of 
it” (Nehru 1941). 
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Careful research in the study of religious associations takes stock of the value 
they can have as civil actors in the public sphere, even despite their evangelical or more 
narrowly sectarian affiliations (Wuthnow 1999; on India, see Varshney 2002).  
Historically in both India and elsewhere, religious minorities have often been fervent 
proponents of secularism, disestablishment of religion and state, freedom of conscience, 
and civic debate based on widely shared ethicalized values (van der Veer 2001; Casanova 
2006; Taylor 2007; Ahmad 2009; cf. Habermas 1989, 2006). 13  Secularism has come to 
be understood my scholars as a process of secular/religious differentiation rather than the 
linear decline of religion (Casanova 1994; Gorski & Altinordu; cf. Asad 2003).  The 
differentiation of religion into its own sphere of public activity is linked to important 
changes in ethical subjectivities and public moralities.  As literacy and print help to 
spread direct, unmediated access to religious scriptures, the rivalries of competing 
interpretations serve the “objectification” of personal Muslim-hood as one’s own brand 
of religiosity must be distinguished from others. These discourses are concerned not only 
with piety and orthopraxy (the foci of much current scholarship) but also with “public 
interest” or the “common good” (Arabic: maṣlaḥa) (Salvatore & Eickelman 2004).  
Casanova (1994: 299, 233-234) similarly illustrated churches’ activism against nuclear 
                                                 
13 Contemporary South Asian scholarship has been highly sensitive to this religious genealogy of the 
secular.  “In both the American colony and the Indian colony it is the Christian dissenters who try 
to erect a ‘wall of separation’ between church and state,” van der Veer wrote (2001: 308-9).  Early 
British colonials conformed to a historical pattern of close collaboration with Hindu ritual elites, 
termed the British “Hindu Raj,” and Christian missionaries clamored against this colonial support 
for “idolatrous” religion. Indeed, the division between religion and state was greater in India than 
in Britain itself (2001: 290).  Irfan Ahmad similarly theorizes “a genealogy of secularism from the 
perspective of religious minorities” in India (2009: 15).   
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proliferation and excesses of capitalism as a way that public religion as an ethical force 
“could somehow unintentionally help modernity save itself.” 
In the chapters that follow, I address the question of whether Islamic charities, 
like their faith-based organization counterparts in the U.S., have appreciably positive 
impacts on public ethics.  I discuss factors that led new Islamic charities either to 
reinforce existing prejudicial and identitarian religious divisions (e.g. Hindu-Muslim, 
Shi'a-Sunni) among local Indians, or to foster public norms that promoted civic 
engagement with a multiplicity of divergent “others.” On one hand, new Islamic charities 
reinforce Hindu-Muslim boundaries, leading to further consolidation of group identities 
(such as “the Muslim community”), even among otherwise cosmopolitan Indians who did 
not used to identify primarily as Muslim – such as the secular-minded businessmen in 
chapter seven who only reluctantly revealed the “Islamic” nature of their charities to non-
Muslims. 
On the other hand, Muslim identities and public practice are also becoming 
secularized and ethicalized, as Islamic charities force Muslim leaders to translate their 
faith into public life using terms from development, welfare, and rights discourses. 
Moreover, my data from Lucknow illustrate how international ties of Islamic ideologies 
that are forged through donations have not been a factor in radicalizing the Indian 
Muslim community of Lucknow.  Chapter six discusses the modern aspirations of 
students in Nadwa madrasa, which had institutional and financial links to Saudi Arabia, 
who discussed with me their plans for MBAs, moral leadership in their villages, and 
promoting caste equality. This finding is contrary to other analyses which grimly suggest 
  25
that such international Islamic funds, especially Saudi and Iranian donations, correlate 
with increased local radicalization and even terrorist financing (Sageman 2004, Burr and 
Collins 2006).  New Islamic charities in Lucknow instead construct a form of “civil 
Islam” (Hefner 2000), which affirms civic values that, when done in partnership with 
republican government, can be elaborated into the foundations of modern democracy. 
Islam and the Moral Economy 
Islamic scriptures incorporate a number of specific teachings about economic 
behavior, including the prohibition of usury, guidelines for contracts and transactions, 
inheritance laws, and zakat.  The obligation of zakat – in particular – has been closely 
identified with Islam’s purported “moral economy.”  The concept of moral economy was 
first popularized among anthropologists by James C. Scott, whose intensive early 
fieldwork among Muslim peasants in Malaysia (particularly “rituals of compassion” 
drawn from Islamic tradition and Malay custom) undergirds much of his theorizations – 
even when universalized to a worldwide “moral economy of the peasant” (1976). Scott’s 
(1985: 9-10) Weapons of the Weak opens with a detailed chronicle of Islamic almsgiving 
in Kentah, Malaysia: 
Although responsibility for zakat collection has recently been taken over by the 
provincial authorities, informal zakat payments along traditional lines persist. It 
is…an important supplement to the income of the poor, landless families. Razak 
received a gunny sack of paddy from his eldest brother in Yan, for whom he had 
threshed…From time to time, Razak also asks for small gifts of rice from likely 
prospects…who say he is ‘begging for alms’ [minta sedekah]. 
 
Scott gave the small village at his fieldsite the pseudonym of “Sedeka,” perhaps 
intentionally recalling the Malay word of Arabic origin for Islamic charity: sedekah 
(Arabic: ṣadaqah). In particular, he described Islamic charity as a key religio-ethical 
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resource for the tactics that the poor Malaysian Muslim peasant workers employed 
against the richer land-owners to limit the encroachment of new capitalist labor relations. 
These Islamic traditions of mutualism embedded in Malay communities constituted a 
social safety net that preserved a basic level of subsistence for all peasants (and operated 
as handouts for the unemployed) and mitigated wealth accumulation and materialist 
greed among the rich (1985: 169-173).  Peasants invoked both Malaysians' shared 
religious identity as “Muslims” and a sharply widening class disparity that ran counter to 
notions of local solidarity.  Their moral critiques of landowners were particularly targeted 
at their reputations as Muslims, deploying local Islamic norms to critique landowners’ 
“stinginess” and declining generosity in almsgiving (Scott 1985: 1-24, 169-171, et 
passim).   
Few social scientific studies have examined the everyday practices of zakat. 
Scott’s study marked a major contribution with his opening chapter detailing the 
processes of Islamic almsgiving in a Malay village – yet, this study empirically 
reinforced a view of Islam as an economic system (as well as ethical) that somehow 
opposes capitalism. This moral economy, Scott argued, constituted an alternative ethical 
framework to resist the normative assumptions of industrial capitalism: in pre-modern 
times "ideologically speaking, the cards were stacked against capitalism" (1985: 232-
233). His depictions of the ethical traditions associated with peasant moral economy are 
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drawn from Islam, especially the “rituals of compassion” associated worldwide with 
Islamic almsgiving: fitrah, zakat, Eid feasts, and sadaqah.14  
Anthropologists such as Aiwha Ong have extended such an analysis of Islam and 
a moral economy as resistant to capitalist disciplines of industrial management in her 
Spirits of Resistance (1987).  Ethics derived from both their identity as Malay (kampung) 
and as Muslims, Ong suggested, contrasted sharply with young women’s new roles as 
factory workers, resulting in dramatic spirit possession on the factory floor.  Many spirits 
inhabit the spiritual world of Malay workers, including “syaitan [Satan] of Islamic 
origin.” Spirit possession united laboring women as much as it bewildered foreign 
industrialists like an “American director” who “wondered how he was to explain to 
corporate headquarters that ‘8,000 hours of production were lost because someone saw a 
ghost’ ” (Ong 1987:203).  Although almsgiving is not a focus of Ong’s ethnography as it 
is in Scott’s, she represented Islam as a powerful source of signification for Malay 
spiritual resistance to anti-capitalist social relations:  
The syaitan hovers over the passage of Malay peasants from a moral economy to 
an economy of commodities (Ong 1987: 213). 
   
Yet, Islamic values also disciplined workers, such as “honest [halal] hard work [kerja 
halal]” and patriarchy (1987: 185-187).  While Scott linked Islam – especially zakat and 
sadaqah – to moral economy, and Ong did as well, she remained sensitive to the 
polyvalent expanse of Islamic tradition as containing both spirits of resistance and forces 
                                                 
14 Of course, Scott’s work on moral economy of the peasant (1976) did not theorize this position as 
one identifiable only, or even primarily, with Islam.  He believed such mutuality to be “nearly 
universal” in peasant society (1976: 5). Karl Polanyi (an inspiration for Scott) held this to be 
premodern peoples’ defining feature, “It is the absence of the threat of individual starvation which 
makes primitive society, in a sense, more human than market economies and at the same time less 
economic” (1957:163-164). 
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of industrious disciplining. Chapter eight develops a similar notion of Islamic ethics in 
industrious disciplining, although I lay greater emphasis on zakat’s role in fostering 
ethical entrepreneurism. 
Linking Islamic ethics and a moral economy is not a mere accident of social 
scientists’ interpretation, as there have been numerous Islamic religious leaders who have 
counter-posed Islamic ethics against modern Western capitalist ideologies.  However, we 
should attend to specific historical circumstances in which ‘ulama have deployed Islam 
against market intrusions – namely, within a politics of colonialism.  A seminal scholarly 
critique of Western capitalism titled Our Economics (Iqtisaduna) was penned by Baqr al-
Sadr (d. 1980), a Shi’i religious leader in Iraq. But for his untimely death at Ba’thists’ 
hands, al-Sadr would have been made Grand Ayatollah, the highest authority in Shi’i 
Islam (Aziz 1993). Baqr al-Sadr outlined both a Marxist critique of capitalism and an 
Islamic critique of “Arab socialism.”15 Yet, al-Sadr’s work was not a full formulation of 
Islamic economics; that scholarship came later (e.g. Nejatullah Siddiqi [1983] in his 
Banking Without Interest). Rather, al-Sadr’s (1961: 228) polemic (as a religious scholar) 
is a rejection of colonialism and Western ideologies, in order that Arabs (as a society and 
institutions) “lean towards Marxism” yet remain committed to Islam’s “authority” rather 
than that of a communist party. Maulana Maududi of British India (d. 1979) formulated 
very similar notions of an Islamic economy, in even more detail than al-Sadr (Nasr 1996: 
103-106).  Yet, the genealogy of Maududi’s ideas (even more so than al-Sadr’s) was 
                                                 
15 Baqr al-Sadr wrote that Islamic economics is the ideal “Third Way,” based on “moral practices…of 
inner restriction and invisible supervision” from shari’a, in contrast to Western “individual 
freedoms” that are the seeds of inequity that ultimately undermines the economy (al-Sadr 1994 
[1961]:xxxv). 
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rooted in his formative years as a journalist and anti-colonial agitator (Nasr 1996: 14-17). 
Irfan Ahmad (2009b) has shown how Maududi’s theorization of the modern “Islamic 
state” emerged more from his experience of the colonial British state than from any 
medieval Islamic scholarship on the caliphate.  
Many academic studies of contemporary Islamic finance, which has emerged 
since the 1970s, reinforce the differentiation of an “Islamic economy” from mainstream 
global capitalism. As Timur Kuran (1996: 438) has written, Islamic banks, according to 
proponents, exist to “help prevent Muslims from assimilating into the emerging global 
culture whose core elements have a Western pedigree.” Of course, the literature on 
Islamic banking and finance has made tremendous contributions in highlighting 
contemporary Muslims' innovation in adapting faith to modernity and their technocratic 
aptitude in creating instruments for investment which remain popular even among (non-
Muslim) American and European financiers (Kuran 1996, Maurer 2005, Hefner 2006, 
Tobin 2015). Yet the more unfortunate political fallout of the Islamic banking 
phenomenon, as some scholars also note (e.g. Tobin 2015), is that this assertion of Islam's 
ethical economy serves – ultimately – to celebrate Muslims civilizational distinctiveness 
from what is otherwise regarded as the amoral capitalist “West,” in an echo of political 
scientist Samuel Huntington's (1993) discredited and dichotomized notion of the “clash 
of civilizations” (cf. Hefner 2000: 4; Fox 2005). 
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Studies today, however, have continued to reinforce a close association between 
Islam and an anti-capitalist moral economy.16  Charles Tripp's Islam and the Moral 
Economy provides a sweeping overview of major Muslim thinkers on economy, 
economic development, and contemporary markets. However, his account is framed in 
terms set by the 20th century intellectual critics of colonial and post-colonial capitalism, 
such as Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, Baqr al-Sadr of Iraq, Maulana Maududi and Muhammad 
Iqbal of India:  capitalism is “the problem” and Islam is “the solution” (Tripp 2006: 11). 
In Tripp’s analysis, capitalism was a foreign import to these social critics, inseparable 
from the invading colonialist powers that had decimated the political authority of Muslim 
rulers and from the materialism that was hastening the erosion of Islamic values.  In the 
words of the Indian Muslim modernist Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), capitalism was 
“barbarism” and constituted a “moral vacuum” arising from “ruthless egoism…gradually 
killing all higher striving” (Tripp 2006: 32-33, 35-36).  Tripp portrays “Muslim scholars 
as united in common…because of the capitalist transformation” (2006: 44).  When Tripp 
did discuss “accomodationist” views on capitalism, such as Islamic intellectuals’ 
promotion of Islamic economics and banks, he framed their efforts as “essentially 
Keynesian” and “derivative” of Western notions of “development” and “efficacy” 
originating in “terms defined in the discipline of economics in Europe” (2006: 114-116).  
The rich tradition of Islamic moral norms enjoins Muslims toward profit-making, pious 
work, and calculative accumulation (both spiritual merit and capital), as discussed below 
and throughout this dissertation. Ultimately, however, Tripp’s work overlooks much of 
                                                 
16 See Rodinson (1978), however, for an alternate view of the historical compatibility of Islam and 
capitalism.  
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this tradition. By elevating the terms “Islam” and “moral economy” to equivalency 
(joining them in the title of his book), Tripp effectively identified Islamic morality 
primarily with anti-capitalist ethics – rather than with Islam’s purview that includes ethics 
supportive of commerce and capitalist competition within the framework of shari’a 
normativity. 
Market Islam 
Such a view linking Islam and moral economy, however, can obscure the very 
real, historical affinity between Islamic ethical and intellectual discourses and market 
capitalism.  Commercial terminology permeated the Qur’an itself (Turner 2010: 155). As 
Maxime Rodinson (1978: 14-18) has shown, Islamic teachings on the importance of 
earning an income originate in Qur’anic scriptures; indeed, his analysis of the Qur’an 
argued it is more encouraging of “rational” market-oriented action than scriptures of 
other world religions.17 Rodinson’s history instead traced the slow capitalist development 
of the Middle East to political weakness of its governments and economic distress. Peter 
Gran’s (1979) Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt 1760-1840 went further to argue that 
the revival of neoclassical logic within genres of ḥadīth (prophetic sayings), kalam 
(theology), and fiqh (jurisprudence) as the underpinning of a new “balance between faith 
and reason” lay the groundwork among Muslim merchants for industrial revolution – 
although industrialization later stalled due to political realities.   
                                                 
17 "There are religions whose sacred texts discourage economic activity in general," wrote Rodinson 
(1978: 10-14), "[but] this is certainly not the case with the Koran [Qur’an], which looks with favor 
upon commercial activity, confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices and requiring 
abstention from trade during certain religious festivals,” and later, "The alleged fundamental 
opposition of Islam to capitalism is a myth." 
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Max Weber is famous for contrasting the mystical ethics of Asian religions with 
Protestantism, concluding that the latter was particularly conducive to a worldly moral 
concerns and asceticism that made up the generative roots of European capitalism.18 
Notably, however, the lack of affinity Weber observed between Islamic ethics and 
capitalism was the result of his interpretation of Middle Eastern history at a particular 
epoch, when “Islamic institutions were incompatible with capitalism because they had 
been dominated by a long history of patrimonialism” (Turner 2010: 148).  Accordingly 
applying Weber in 20th century Indonesia, Clifford Geertz’s Peddlers and Princes placed 
Islamic ethics of this-worldly capital accumulation for pious ends at the heart of the 
nascent rise of capitalist activity in the Javanese bazaar.19  
The growing anthropology of “market Islam” is the richest repository of analysis 
pointing to a different relationship between the Islam and varieties of capitalist 
economies.  Much of this research reveals the highly significant role of Muslim traders 
and business-people in fostering local varieties of market capitalism (Sloane 1998; 
Hefner 1998; Osella & Osella 2009; and Rudnyckyj 2009, 2010).  For example, Filippo 
and Caroline Osella's (2009) work with Muslim entrepreneurs in Kerala, India pointed to 
their Islamic almsgiving as linked to their idealization of an “Arab modernity” distinct 
from a Western one and the concomitant ethical emphasis on “moral connectedness” with 
                                                 
18 Yet, Weber’s theses about the connection between religious beliefs and capitalism, as Bryan Turner 
(2010) illustrated, are subject to wide variations in interpretation – ranging from assertion that the 
Protestant Ethic entails the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of capitalism, to 
a materialist view (favored by Turner) of how beliefs are shaped by socio-economic contexts.   
19 Geertz (1963: 127) illustrated how merchants’ “piety” constituted “ethical justification of secular 
economic activity” just as “evangelical Protestantism” did in Weberian analysis (cf. Bellah 1957 on 
Japan).  However, their lack of efficient institutions (“entrepreneurs without enterprises”) led 
ultimately to development’s stagnation and “massive intervention of highly centralized 
government” might be necessary (Geertz 1963: 79). 
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the Muslim community through public service as business leaders’ moral “duty.”  The 
Osellas present reformist Islamic pieties as permitting capital accumulation, for the good 
of the Keralan Muslim community as well as individual entrepreneurs.  The result is a 
Muslim public ethic oriented towards reproducing their own individual work ethic and 
self-made successes among the local poor, to further integrate Muslims into India’s post-
liberalization economy and global marketplace. Daromir Rudnyckyj (2010) has 
chronicled Indonesia’s human resource trainers who represent Islamic rituals as 
conducive to ethical values that echo those Weber identified with the spirit of capitalism, 
such as hard work, individual accountability, and self-discipline.   
The burgeoning research on market Islam joins other scholarship on the varieties 
of capitalisms in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.  Taken together, these studies are 
reminders that just as modern capitalism does not have only one Protestant genealogy, 
neither is there one view of the articulation of Islam and capitalism in Asian Muslim 
societies.  Each defining characteristic of modern capitalism is dependent on social 
structures that “embed” and facilitate it (Hefner 1998: 29-30; cf. Granovetter 1985). 
“Network capitalisms” of Asia arose that were structured, for example, in Taiwan along 
lines of kinship as family businesses or through guanxi gifts made as investment loans 
(Hamilton 1998).  Any links between Islam and capitalism (such as those discussed here) 
must be contextualized for the ways the particular forms of Islamic market ethics are 
grounded in local social contexts.  
Building upon this work in market Islam, I argue that the roots of capitalism 
among Muslim communities of Asia go deeper than previously thought, beyond networks 
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of Muslim merchant families to networks of ‘ulama (for parallel analysis of Muslim 
religious scholars and their institutions, see Njoto-Feillard forthcoming).  The “zakat 
entrepreneurs” in this ethnography represent a diverse assortment of Lucknow Muslims 
who innovate in the realm of ethics in multiple ways: madrasa students seeking to go 
beyond the historical religious occupations of imām (preacher) and ustād (teacher) in 
order to market themselves and their Islamic education for utilization in new economic 
niches, businessmen who seek to re-orient the spending of zakat towards economic 
development rather than mere charity, ‘ulama who distribute zakat as a double-barreled 
intervention of moral and material development for the Muslim poor. Ethnographies of 
market Islam, thus far, have focused on merchant or industrial classes as adopting and 
circulating business-oriented Islamic teachings, such as individual responsibility, work 
ethic, pious capital accumulation, and halal (interest-free) investments.  In their efforts to 
institutionalize and reform zakat, however, ‘ulama were at the helm of developmentalist 
charities and modern madrasas.  These ‘ulama are publicly engaged faith leaders who are 
concerned about the place of Muslims in the modern world (Zaman 2002), belying 
portrayals of them as of reactionary scholars clinging to tradition.  Where existing studies 
of market Islam have focused exclusively on owners of businesses – who are arguably 
self-interested and personally invested in Islamic virtues that discipline laborers – this 
dissertation analyzes the practices and rituals that suffuse Muslims of diverse 
backgrounds in old city Lucknow: laborer, merchant, beggar, literati, and ‘ulama alike.  
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Weber, Islam, and Ethics 
This ethnography of zakat in Lucknow poses significant questions in economic 
anthropology, following upon prior work analyzing the articulation of religion and 
economy.  Max Weber is famous among social scientists as the theorist of the origins of 
capitalism, religions and their institutionalization, the modern era and its telos of 
rationalization, and the world’s “disenchantment.”  This study is similarly concerned with 
describing aspects of the expansion of market capitalism in 21st century India, the 
institutionalization of zakat and rationalization of Islamic charity, and the category of the 
secular in the public and private lives of modern Muslims.   
Yet, this dissertation engages with an often overlooked aspect of Max Weber’s 
oeuvre – his preoccupation with ethical values.  While this is a study based in economic 
anthropology, it also pushes the boundaries of that subfield by incorporating recent 
groundbreaking work from virtue ethics in Islam and the anthropology of moralities.  The 
ethical concerns of zakat reformers like Farid that are an indication of the deeply moral – 
even spiritual – nature of (otherwise) economic development (cf. Bornstein 2005; 
Rudnyckyj 2010; Barnett & Stein 2012).  Policymakers and experts often represent 
economic development as a moral good (or at least morally neutral) given its potential for 
liberating human potential (Sen 1999), although recognition of development as an 
extension of power, politics, and cultural domination increasingly fuels critiques 
(Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Easterly 2007).  In many anthropological accounts, 
economic development also fosters the expansion of capitalism that disrupts local 
moralities and gives rise to religious revivals that resist it (Comaroff 1985; Comaroff & 
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Comaroff 2001).  Islam and capitalism in this regard have been posed as oppositional 
bases of social relations – particularly through analysis of Islam’s “moral economy” 
(Scott 1976, 1985; Tripp 2006) – even though Islam and capitalist developments have a 
more complex relationship (Turner [1974] 2010; Geertz 1963; Rodinson 1978; Gran 
1998; Mittermaier 2014).   
Anthropologists are beginning to reveal surprising convergences between Islam 
and capitalism through examination of their ethical entailments – particularly the ethics 
of Islamic charity.  Similar in thrust to Rudnyckyj’s (2010) work on Indonesia, 
ethnographies of the Middle East have examined the convergence of neoliberalism20 with 
Islamic charity practices (Atia 2013; Mittermaier 2014; cf. Baylouny 2010).  Mona Atia’s 
study revealed how Islamists’ charity activism in Egypt aimed to turn “the poor” into 
productive laborers and supported the privatization of welfare in the wake of economic 
reforms.  This merging of Islamic and capitalist subjectivities produced a blend that Atia 
terms “pious neoliberalism.”  Furthermore, Egyptians who sought to make their Islamic 
charity “work” better, in Amira Mittermaier’s analysis, applied neoliberal calculative 
reason to their own piety practices.  Understanding their charity as “trading with God,” 
Muslims revealed the influence of capitalist rationality in almsgiving.  Yet, their 
understanding of the economy was one that extended beyond this world by bringing the 
Hereafter into the equation, illustrating how Islamic discourse also destabilized 
                                                 
20 Neoliberalism can be viewed as a form of post-Keynesian capitalism, in which the state and the 
“management of crisis” have become instruments of capital accumulation by the wealthy (Harvey 
2007).  While derived from capitalist logics and thus inseparably tied to the expansion of the 
market economy, neoliberalism can be identified with its effects on culture and the individual as it 
extends calculative reason and market imperatives beyond the realm of the economy into 
previously untouched realms of social life.   
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capitalism and its logics (Mittermaier 2014: 276).21  In short, in the view of these 
scholars, the revival of privatized Islamic charity can be analyzed as an effect of 
neoliberalism.  
The anthropology of neoliberalism in many ways echoes Weber’s dark view of 
modernity and its telos of rationalization as an “iron cage” (in this regard, it differs from 
more upbeat assessments of late capitalist globalization; Ortner 2011).  Neoliberalism in 
this view is embedded in a darker narrative with its own immoral (or anti-moral) yet 
inexorable agenda dominated by an ideology whereby “market exchange is an ethic in 
itself” (Harvey 2007).   Although scholarly accounts of neoliberalism inveigh against 
characterizations of it as “monolithic” (e.g. Peck & Tickell 2002), what is unitary about 
neoliberalism is the pessimistic normative frame assigned to it as a particularly nefarious 
manifestation of late capitalism.  Neoliberalism also has normative and ethical 
entailments that are made clear in pessimistic accounts of commodification and 
dispossession of public resources and people’s labor.22  Anthropologists accordingly have 
described the impact of the “culture of neoliberalism” (Comaroff & Comaroff 2001) on 
local communities in uniformly dismal normative terms (e.g. Ferguson 2002; Li 2007; 
Gregory 2007).  In such accounts, no realm of social life analyzed by anthropologists 
appears as safe from neoliberalism’s deleterious effects.  For example, as Rudnyckyj 
                                                 
21 This process is thus comparable to the devolution of public welfare to the civic-minded “moral 
neoliberals” of other places and faiths (Muchlebach 2012).   
22 Neoliberalism also can be said to derive its normative force from the moral approbation assigned to 
liberty and freedom.  Proponents of neoliberalism celebrates the “free market” as a moral good, 
even when the expansion of liberties is restricted to those already possessing wealth, as when 
policymakers and business leaders facilitate privatization and commodification of goods and bend 
the state to legislate on behalf of further capital accumulation for the “good of the economy” 
(Harvey 2007: 159-164).   
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concluded of neoliberalism in Indonesia, “this cold calculative reason may in fact be 
tightening its icy grip on our souls…and our spirits” (2010: L487).23  This dissertation 
addresses the ritual of Islamic charity and its transformations in light of its articulation 
with the larger capitalist economy in ways that chart the effects of (perhaps neoliberal) 
calculative rationality and marketization.   
But was Weber’s own view of capitalist modernity as dark and cynical as the 
phrase “iron cage” suggested?  He borrowed the term “disenchantment” from the poet 
Friedrich Schiller to describe secularization and rationalization, suggesting that Weber 
had a more sanguine – rather than cynical – view of modernity that partook somehow of 
Schiller’s own Romantic ideal (Scaff 2014: 159).  It seems like no accident that the man 
widely regarded as the prophet of secularization maintained a fascination with the 
spiritual that is clearly evident in his own masterpieces on world religions.  “Values” and 
ethics as a form of “a conduct of life” were primary themes throughout his work.  Weber 
himself wrote of his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, “My central interest 
was not the increased expansion of capitalism, but rather the development of the 
humanity created by a coincidence of religiously and economically conditions.”  He 
described his inquiry as focused on a certain “ethical lifestyle which was spiritually 
adequate to the economic level of capitalism [and which] signified its victory in the souls 
of human beings” (Hoffman 2007: 172).    
Finally, as he described in his essay “On ‘Objectivity’, Weber approached ethics 
as plural in nature.  His view of ethical values took them to be “irreducible” and always 
                                                 
23 Citations with page numbers prefaced with “L” refer not to actually page numbers but Kindle 
Locations in the e-book version. 
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subjective, requiring an interpretive methodological approach that remained open to 
multiple varieties of ethical norms deriving from the same origin (Kalinowski 2012: 39).  
My usage of the “purity ethic” and “developmentalist ethic” are inspired by Weber’s 
sociological concept of “ethos,” which he defined in The Protestant Ethic as “not the 
ethical doctrine of a religion, but that form of ethical conduct upon which premiums are 
placed” (Kalinowski 2012: 41).  This view of Islam is one that does not prioritize the 
“doctrine” as orthodox tradition, despite some Lucknow Muslims’ own presentation of 
shari’a as a unitary code of religious law.  My ethnography remains sensitive to multiple 
“ethics” within Islam that are each derived from authentic (often scriptural) tradition, but 
which carry different degrees of emphasis for different Muslim believers. 
Departing from much anthropological work on neoliberalism, this ethnography 
illustrates the resilience of ethics and their moorings in local traditions.  I seek to 
counterbalance the uniformly negative normative tone in accounts of neoliberalism, by 
offering a study of Islamic charity as a sub-economy that articulates with capitalism 
rather than being subsumed by its logic.  Although Nikolas Rose (1999: 23, 214) 
identified “techniques of calculation” with a certain neoliberal “morality of numbers,” I 
take seriously the proposition that calculative rationalities have alternative origins beyond 
those that gave rise to today’s accountants, corporate auditors, and the glorified bean-
counting algorithms of investment finance.  Instead, my ethnography suggests various 
other sources for calculative rationality, as illustrated by my analysis of Islamic teachings 
on “accounts” (hisāb) for “spiritual merit” (thawab) and zakat as they are elaborated in 
“economic theologies” (Mauss 1960: 55).  As Weber (1958: 24) himself emphasized, it 
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was Calvinist theology and its existential angst over the lack of knowable certainty in 
heavenly salvation that gave rise to the “norm of calculability” as the “regulative 
principle of a technically rationalist modernity” – and not the other way around.  I 
repeatedly show how Islamic teachings on zakat, even as they invoke calculability, are 
inextricably tied to Islam’s monotheistic insistence on the incalculability of Allah’s 
generosity and grace (cf. Mittermaier 2014).   
Ethnographies of Muslim piety in a Foucauldian vein recently have emphasized 
the operation of “power” through religious discourse, most prominently Saba Mahmood’s 
influential study in Cairo (also Hirschkind 2006; Rudnyckyj 2010). In many ways 
Foucault and these anthropologists represent the best in current anthropology, especially 
as they have brought a methodological sensitivity to virtue ethics and returned a 
sensitivity to Aristotelian (not merely Bourdieuean) habitus within anthropology.  
However, their definition of moral selfhood begs further theorization. The “self is socially 
and discursively produced, an effect of power rather than the progenitor of these 
operations” (Mahmood 2005: 33).  This ethnography, while recognizing the effect of 
authority, tradition, and history in disciplinary discourses, nevertheless remains sensitive 
to moral selfhood as “progenitors” of moral action as an aim in itself.  The self is an 
effect of power but also the effect of moral pursuits. Foucault’s famous inquiries into 
power/knowledge and ethics traced their genealogies in Western civilization through 
institutions such as medical hospitals, psychiatric institutes, universities, research 
institutes founded on the notion of advancing science as a “good” in itself – were not 
these social institutions (despite their disciplinary effects) that at least in part arose out of 
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moral sentiments?  While anthropology’s focus on power, oppression, and the “suffering 
subjects” of such modalities of discipline has been – and remains – urgently needed and 
fruitful, so is the consideration of “the moral” and “the good” as indications of culturally 
inflected ideas about what humans most value (Robbins 2013). 
Lastly, I also emphasize the continually plural nature of ethics, even amidst the 
expansion of capitalist relations, in contrast to accounts of neoliberalism as a normative 
force uniformly aligned with greed and commodification.  While this study describes the 
rationalization of Islamic charity according to a “developmentalist ethic,” which re-
orients Muslim subjectivities towards capitalism, it lends nearly equal emphasis to the 
continued vitality of a more traditional “purity ethic” that eschews excessive and unjust 
accumulation of wealth.24  New Islamic charities may be furthering the rationalization of 
zakat and forms of (perhaps neoliberal) calculative reason.  Yet the techniques of moral 
self-formation that they foster nevertheless still are linked to affective (even “irrational”) 
faith in Allah and submission to divine command. 
Methodology & Positionality 
The Foci of this Dissertation 
My data are drawn from three types of field sites: Islamic charity organizations, 
the bazaars of old city Lucknow, and madrasas.  Four organizations formed the primary 
backbone of data-gathering – three charities and one madrasa.  Over the course of 
                                                 
24 My emphasis on the plurality of ethics also allows for the existence, for example, of additional 
ethical interpretations of Islamic teaching on zakat beyond the two described here, which would be 
nevertheless equally authoritative and valid for Muslims. 
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eighteen months of research in Lucknow, from January 2012 to August 2013, I 
volunteered for at least two months at each charity, joining charity workers in their 
offices and activities.  At Nadwa madrasa, rather than volunteering, I took part-time 
lessons with a senior instructor for three months and joined students in their hostels, 
prayer-times, dining stalls, evening leisure, and occasionally classrooms.  From there, I 
branched out from each case study organization to interview associated patrons and 
donors in their houses around Lucknow.  
I utilized four different methodologies. I employed series of semi-structured 
interviews with all charity workers (five to ten interviewees per organization) and many 
donors (at least ten per organization).  Second, I acquired, translated, and analyzed all 
public relations and fundraising materials for each charity; I also gained working 
knowledge of their annual budgets and expenses through oral interviews and financial 
reports prepared for donors.  Third, as a volunteer, I engaged in ethnographic observation 
for all types of charity activities, participating in and making recordings of key 
organizational activities: fundraising events, distribution of welfare, office administration, 
grant-writing, awareness-raising (as in the opening vignette).  In the madrasa, I took 
lessons from a senior instructor and met with other instructors alongside students, joined 
weekly prayers and heard sermons, and slept and ate in the hostels (once staying at 
Nadwa for ten days in June 2013 while between apartments) discussing students’ studies 
and personal lives late into the night.  Fourth, I performed two formal surveys. The first 
was a bazaar-based survey of Muslim shopkeepers not affiliated with my case study 
organizations, with an interview protocol of about thirty minutes, to gain a broader idea 
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of almsgiving practices in Lucknow (N = 25; see chapter three for more detail). The 
second survey was of a cross-section of Nadwa students in order to ascertain 
demographics, motivations for attending madrasa, career goals, and knowledge about 
zakat and social service activities as taught in Nadwa (N = 25; see chapter six for more 
detail).  
The old city bazaars of Hazratganj, Aminabad, and Chowk formed a wider 
cultural milieu from which I also collected data and drew larger conclusions.  Throughout 
my year and a half, I lived in the midst of old city Lucknow’s open-air bazaars, first in 
Hazratganj (from January 2012 to April 2013) and later for three months in Aminabad 
(from May to August 2013), while traveling multiple times a week to Chowk.  When I 
was not volunteering with a charity or studying in madrasa, I was on an ethnographic 
news beat in the bazaars, visiting shopkeepers, mosque preachers, poets and other literati, 
political party workers, journalists, and the staff of Sanatkada, old city Lucknow’s most 
successful community development NGO. These observations, therefore, are largely of 
the customary or (as some might term them) “traditional” zakat practices in Lucknow, 
which occur outside of the formal institutional settings of organized Islamic associations.  
Educated, Urdu literate Muslims in old city Lucknow are the focus of my 
dissertation research, especially Islamic reformists. Every Urdu literate Muslim I spoke 
with were aware of and influenced by reformist Islamic discourses, such as the writings 
of ‘ulama of Deoband or the oral teachings of Tablighi Jama’at or the Shi’a revival led by 
the khandan-i ijtihad in the colonial era (Jones 2011). Although, it was only in Nadwa 
madrasa that I encountered Muslims deeply familiar with specifics of reformist 
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scholarship or active and vocal proponents of scripturalism. By contrast, ordinary 
Muslims in this research who were not educated at a reformist madrasa incorporated 
reformist teachings into their everyday lives based on what they learned at home or from 
friends or family members, but they did not seek out or promote such teachings. Sufi-
inclined Muslims, identified in South Asia with the Barelwi sect (maslak), I define as 
those who attended Barelwi masjids or visited a pīr (holy man, saint) at shrines regularly, 
and these also live in Lucknow and are the majority of Muslims in India.  But in my 
experience most Barelwi Muslims were migrants from rural areas arriving in recent 
decades. Among the networks in which I lived and researched I encountered very few 
Barelwi Muslims, as I focused on Lucknow’s established urban families and institutions 
connected to Islamic reformist mosques and madrasas (“If there are any [Barelwis in 
Aminabad], we don’t know them” an informant told me). Sunni Muslims provide the 
dominant discourses on Islamic charity, and for the most part Shi’a religious teachings 
either repeat the same themes reviewed in this dissertation or remain silent on them. At 
this level of generality, the conclusions and implications of this dissertation apply to 
Muslim almsgivers throughout old city Lucknow.   
“Charity” itself, as I operationalize the term in this dissertation, refers to 
transactions intended to assuage financial hardship for which there is no repayment, 
either actual or expected, in any form. I take “Islamic charity” to be those charity 
transactions which the donors (not necessarily the recipient or another) categorizes as 
directly motivated by their beliefs in Islam, or as those charity transactions made to 
Muslim organizations. Zakat (Arabic: al-zakāh) refers to almsgiving obligated upon all 
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Muslims by Islamic scriptures, while sadaqah refers to voluntary charity that is not 
mandatory but highly encouraged.  Among Shi’a Muslims in Lucknow, khums is 
mandatory almsgiving that proceeds according to different stipulations of the Shi’a 
(Jafari) school of law, but is usually viewed as categorically parallel to or encompassed 
by the notion of zakat.  
Almsgivers and the institutional forms of collecting and distributing Islamic 
charity are the focus of this study.  I do so not because the recipients of Islamic charity 
are uninteresting or unimportant, but for reasons of scope, methodological approach, and 
a degree of ethical hesitancy.  Recipient practices and voices do enter the narrative on 
multiple occasions, most prominently in chapter six devoted entirely to madrasa students 
as beneficiaries of Islamic charitable giving, as well as in chapter three on critiques of the 
developmentalist ethic and in chapter eight..  Islamic scriptures and ethical teachings 
themselves address Muslims almost exclusively as donors, rather than as recipients, 
providing countless pages of guidance across Qur’an, hadith, and commentaries on how 
to give charity while very little on how to receive it (one exception is Qur’an 9:58-60; see 
chapter four for further discussion).  Thus, in my ethnography primarily focused on the 
discourses and practices of zakat as a ritual in Islam, it made methodological sense to 
prioritize donors and institutions that collect and disburse funds.  Second, limitations of 
time and resources made extended participant observation and interviews with recipients 
difficult.  Researching with Lucknow’s poor and needy certainly would have required 
large investments of time to elicit and record their subaltern voices (to whatever degree 
possible; Spivak 1988).  Another certainty is that the way recipients conceptualize and 
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represent charitable donations is quite distinct (at times vastly different) from the way 
donors do so, and the processes by which charity is given and distributed (as well as 
monitored) are also subject to divergent ethical evaluations by donor and recipient, as I 
discuss at the end of chapter three.  While not elaborated in this dissertation, I observed 
considerable evidence for what the Subaltern Studies school has termed the 
“incommensurability” of experience between those in Lucknow who donate and many of 
those who receive. 
Finally, as Joel Robbins (2013) has pointed out, anthropology’s interest in the 
earlier trope of the radical Other (primitive to our modern) has come to be replaced by 
“the suffering subject” as a disciplinary preoccupation with another type of radical Other.  
Some of the best anthropology today is emerging from such study of subjects living in 
pain, in poverty, or under conditions of violence or oppression (e.g. Kleinman & Das 
1997; Hansen 2001; Das 2006; Fassin & Rechtman 2009).  Yet, unbalanced attempts to 
investigate subalterns and their problems are at risk of falling into a vein of 
“anthropology of abjectness” (Gupta 2012: 25).  In this ethnography, I follow Robbins in 
pursuing what he terms an “anthropology of the good.”  If we take the project of 
anthropology as inquiry into the human condition, what we value, and what lends 
meaning to our lives, then moralities, gifting, and hope for progress (to mention the three 
arenas of Robbin’s anthropology of “the good”) provide fruitful lines of inquiry.  
Methods in the Anthropology of Ethics 
 ُمُھُمَحْرَی َنوُمِحا َّرلا َمَّلَسَو ِھَْیلَع ُ َّrا ىَّلَص َّيِبَّنلا ِھِب ُُغلَْبی وٍرْمَع ِنْب ِ َّrا ِدْبَع ْنَع  ِضَْرْلأا يِف ْنَم اوُمَحْرا ُنَمْح َّرلا ْمُكْمَحْرَی 
 ِءاَمَّسلا يِف ْنَم 
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“Abdullah ibn Amr reported: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be 
upon him, said, ‘Those who are merciful will be shown mercy by the Most 
Merciful Allah. Be merciful to those on the earth and the One above will have 
mercy upon you…”  
  -- The Ḥadīth of Mercy 
Mufti Anas, my instructor in Islamic law at the Nadwa madrasa in Lucknow, 
finished reciting in Arabic from memory the Hadith of Mercy, then its translation in 
Urdu.25 Hadiths are a mainstay of the traditional curriculum of study in Indian madrasas 
based in rote memorization of scriptures.  In a tradition going back centuries, before any 
madrasa student begins study of hadith the instructor initiates the first lesson by reciting 
the Hadith of Mercy, giving its chain of transmission26 and providing a brief exegesis.27 
Mufti Anas continued speaking to me after his recitation: 
Allah has this attribute [of mercy] attributed to him numerous times [cognates 
include: al-rahman, al-rahim]. So many times.  In the Qur’an, hadith, and 
everywhere, Muslims say ‘In the name of God, the most compassionate [al-
rahman] the most merciful [al-rahim]’…So, here, the Prophet is instructing us to 
be merciful.  Even with animals.  Utilize animals for work, for example, but treat 
them well too, with good food and water. Those you eat, don’t kill them harshly, 
but gently. You who are ‘those on earth’ – including other people and animals too 
– be merciful to others, ‘and the One above will have mercy upon you.’  
 
You have lived in Afghanistan and you must have seen that much suffering 
happens there, for Muslims and others.  But you must have also seen that there is 
much mercy shown, even amidst suffering!  That is where you first learned Islam, 
                                                 
25 Urdu was the language in which Mufti Anas and I always conversed in the three months of part-
time lessons I took with him in the madrasa.  The Urdu translation of the above hadith, he gave as, 
Jo log raḥam karte un par Allāh raḥam kare. Tum zamīn wālon ko raḥam karo tā keh upar wāla āp 
ke upar raḥam kar den. 
26 The chain of transmission (isnād) is series of scholars who have passed down a particular hadith, 
beginning with the companion of the Prophet Muhammad who was present for the event described 
in the oral tradition, through the most recent teacher of the hadith. The isnād has a symbolic 
importance that is nearly equal to the historical importance of the hadith’s content, for as medieval 
Muslim scholars often said, “knowing hadith reports means knowing the men” who knew the 
Prophet (Messick 1993: 24). 
27 On the role of the Hadith of Mercy in the transmission of scriptural knowledge in Muslim 
educational networks, see Jonathan Brown’s (2009: 5) discussion. 
  48
you said, and where you first had the idea to study Islamic charity.  That must 
have been because you saw the teachings of mercy in Islam at work 
there…present in so many places. 
 
So, you are here with me to study the jurisprudence of Islamic charity [fiqh al-
zakāh].  It’s a foundational practice [bunyādi ‘amal] [of Islam]. A pillar [rakan].  
We do these because Allah simply ordered it, as with all five pillars…But with 
any practice, you should also understand its spirit [ruḥ], its basis [bunyād], its 
purpose [maqṣad].   
 
Doing something based on Allah’s order, that’s good. But it’s better to understand 
it completely. If someone wants to practice zakat without understanding it – that’s 
fine.  No problem.   But he won’t gain full surety [itmīnān].  He won’t gain full 
knowledge of its aim, its spirit.  It will only be routine.  Just like breakfast!   
 
“Just like breakfast,” routinized charitable giving is as common in Lucknow as 
ubiquitous begging in the crowded bazaars.  Many routines are performed relatively 
unthinkingly, because we have to do them for one reason or another and the habit thus 
became established, like eating breakfast. What Mufti Anas termed “doing something 
based on Allah’s order” might also be termed a “divine command” view of morality in 
the philosophy of ethics (Lichtenberg 2009, Adams 1999).  Yet, as he explained to me in 
my first lesson in the seminary classroom, a virtuous act such as zakat involves far more 
than simply the physical act that fulfills divine command and gains merit in the Hereafter 
– its spirit (ruḥ) and purpose (maqṣad) beg deeper understanding.  Moreover, zakat is not 
something that can be performed once, it is repeated annually until habituated. Nor can it 
be performed without intention, as there is a risk in becoming slave to routine and 
treating Islamic ritual “just like breakfast” – as mere routine.  I later asked a madrasa 
student about this first lesson. Why was the mufti insistent on beginning with mercy? 
Why start our intellectual studies with a prophetic tradition on the importance of merciful 
acts and (among other things) being compassionate to animals? Was there a link?  The 
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student explained that in Islam, they were taught in madrasa, mercy (raham) is the 
foundational part of adab (good character), and adab must come before ‘ilm 
(knowledge).  Without good character, a student of Islam will not have the motivation 
and composure to acquire correct knowledge, nor the wisdom to apply it. That was why 
all traditional madrasa studies begin with this Hadith of Mercy. 
My approach to an anthropology of the ethics of zakat has a strong focus on virtue 
as morality that is both habituated and discursivized.  Virtues are aspects of an 
individual’s character that become habituated as regular practices or embodiments, in 
one’s habitus (Aristotle 2000; Taylor 1989; MacIntyre 1986; cf. Bourdieu 1977).  My use 
of habitus is more reminiscent of Aristotle, Taylor, and MacIntyre than of Bourdieu 
(1977), as the latter’s conceptualization relates primarily to structural and class positions 
of individuals as they are embodied as dispositions.  I define virtues according to three 
primary traits, which guide their application in the methodology of this dissertation.  
First, virtues in the Aristotelian sense, are habituated in that they must be practiced; “It is 
from playing the lyre that people become good and bad lyre-players…from building well, 
people will be good builders” (Aristotle 2000: 24).  Moreover, virtues are never 
completed but always in the process of being learned and perfected; virtuosity in the 
sense of “great skill” is the aim.  Routinized rituals enacted “just like breakfast” may be 
part of a Muslim’s good habits, as I learned in madrasa, but they are unlikely to be 
further, more deeply perfected.  Second, virtues are performative, in that their practice 
also incorporates performed representations as inner ethical ideals.  In contrast to moral 
beliefs of a confessional nature, performative virtues mold our inner states according to 
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our outward expressions with each reinforcing the other in what Mahmood has termed 
“exteriority as a means to interiority” (2005: 129-30).  In other words our moral 
characters are partly formed through faking it until we make it, as the performances come 
to define selfhood.  The Hadith of Mercy is not enjoining an emotion (“love thy 
neighbor”)28, but a practical action (“show mercy”) that is also simultaneously a character 
virtue (“be merciful to those on Earth”).   
Third, virtue as it was taught to me by Mufti Anas is not only habituated but also 
discursivized. Centuries of Islamic scholars have spilled ink in discussing the divine 
injunctions to act morally in one’s own life, and to forbid the wrong and command the 
right for others in society. The five schools of Islamic jurisprudence represent conflicting 
yet equally valid opinions and are thus institutionalized reminders of the on-going 
discursive nature of Allah’s moral commands.  This discursivized Islamic ethics stands 
contrast to the belief that shari’a is a static “Islamic law” codified permanently.  My 
notion of “virtuous concerns” incorporates such discursive multi-vocality (in the sense of 
tradition as debate or “an argument extended through time”; MacIntyre 1986: 12).  
Ordinary Muslims themselves also recognize that zakat is such a complex, rich tradition 
comprised of myriad “concerns” to the degree that individual choice variation in 
                                                 
28 Charity as a Christian virtue incorporates both the notion of love as a duty (or commandment) and 
love as an inclination, leading Christian theologians to expend considerable effort in countering the 
identification of “love” as a mere emotion, instead emphasizing that the Second Commandment 
teaching “love thy neighbor” is to be done in practice, not by just feeling or saying it.  Thomas 
Aquinas defined it as “doing good to someone” (Lichtenberg 2009: 20; emphasis mine). Kant 
endeavored to place “duty” as the foundation of ethics in his Metaphysics of Morals, eschewing a 
legitimate role for “inclination” or mere feelings of love that happened to coincide with a person’s 
moral duty to act with benevolence towards others, even enemies. A fleeting inclination was not a 
consistent enough foundation on which to base ethical behavior (Green 1992). For further 
discussion, see Ronald Green’s Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt. 
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emphasis of some concerns over others an inherent part of correct Islamic almsgiving.  
Yet, the most correct forms of Islamic practice are those informed by religious learning to 
the greatest extent possible. Although the mufti did not emphasize it in this lesson, the 
pursuit of knowledge is an essential aspect of Islam.  Even though adab (good character) 
must precede ‘ilm (knowledge), as the student above had explained to me, it is clear in 
the mufti’s explanation that knowledge – gained through inquiry, study, debate, and 
reflection – is clearly a pre-requisite for virtuous character.   
It is in this sense that my approach to ethics in anthropology goes beyond that of 
some contemporary anthropologies of ethics, including the pioneering and influential 
approach of Saba Mahmood.  For Mahmood, ethical discourses are “historically specific 
sets of practices and moral injunctions that are delimited in advance” such that individual 
subjectivity is “not a private space of self-cultivation but an effect of a modality of power 
operationalized through a set of moral codes” (2005: 28).  By contrast, the subsequent 
chapters detail a variety of moral discourses on zakat (I describe two: the “purity ethic” 
and the “developmentalist ethic”).  These ethics of zakat are linked to authoritative 
traditions (e.g. shari’a, fiqh) and institutions (e.g. madrasas) but are also contested and 
debated by individual Muslims in Lucknow.  Moreover, my presentation of these zakat 
ethics illustrates how almsgivers learn and adopt such sets of virtuous concerns in 
piecemeal fashion, at some times and not others, and with idiosyncratic interpretations – 
similar to how we each dress ourselves in clothing in individualized ways amidst strong 
cultural inducements of fashion and morality. The piecemeal and idiosyncratic adoption 
of virtuous concerns stands in contrast to Mahmood’s analysis of actors’ wholesale 
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“inhabiting” of ethical discourses as modalities of power.  In contrast to this view of 
ethical discourses as all-encompassing, my dissertation emphasizes the inevitability and 
necessity of individual idiosyncrasy (in both agentic and accidental acts) in attempts to 
apply moral codes within one’s own life.   
Liberalist notions of moral agency often identify it with deliberative acts of 
individual “free will” against hegemony.  I will argue, however, that the moral agency for 
Muslims in Lucknow is best conceptualized as a “picking and choosing” (Lambek 2013) 
among the diverse ethical obligations that comprise the complex tradition of shari’a and 
other norms.  Moralities – not unlike clothes – are not cut from whole-cloth nor does 
anyone (neither moral authorities nor ordinary people) always attend to each minute 
detail.  Nor do moralities (or clothes) necessarily constrain individual liberty: depending 
on the (moral) cloth from which they are cut, moralities may be tight-fitting and 
uncomfortably constraining of free action or merely rest loosely upon a person. Often, the 
morals we display command esteem and facilitate our freedom of access in situations, for 
example, that show us to be just the person for the job. However, moralities (as with 
clothes) are always constraining in one way: they are difficult to change at a moment’s 
notice and furthermore become matters of ingrained habit over days, months, and years 
of repeatedly conducting ourselves in the same outfits.  Thus, habit, what is available in 
our moral wardrobe, and individual interpretations of what looks “good” – these matter at 
least as much as culturally authoritative discourses and injunctions.   
Finally, I should distinguish my approach to moralities of exchange from that of 
classic economic anthropology.  Durkheim and Mauss viewed transactions as a most 
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basic form of social relations, with the economic effects of the division of labor as 
derivative of humans’ primary yearning for solidarity.  “Moral facts” for Durkheim 
partook of the essence of society – of primitive society’s “collective consciousness” or of 
modern society’s “law” or “rules for action” guiding individuals in interdependence and 
specialization (1974: 35). Theorists of discursive power-knowledge are more in line with 
this strong culturalist view:  Mahmood’s (2005) application of Foucault illustrated 
women activists in Egypt and their “choice” to subjectify themselves within authoritative 
Islamic discourses, representing Cairene piety activists as not departing much from 
tradition (as they undoubtedly did; Schielke 2009, 2010).  At the other methodological 
antipode from these “oversocialized” approaches, the “undersocialized” orientations such 
as neoclassical economics have viewed social institutions primarily as aggregates of 
myriad individual behaviors (Etzioni 1990).  Economists trained in mainstream research 
traditions of the 1970s and 1980s managed to marginalize institutionalists, interpretive 
economists, and others that appealed to sociocultural variables (Hefner 1998: 5-6). Some 
fervent proponents even attempted to elaborate “economic approaches to human 
behavior,” based on principles rooted in scarcity and rational choice (Becker 1976), 
which represented the epitome of “undersocialized” orientation (Hefner 1998: 6-7).  This 
dissertation seeks a middle ground between these methodological poles. 
My analytical focus on “virtuous concerns” that lie at the interstices between 
individuals and social structures is a hallmark of my anthropological approach to ethics. 
Subjectivized knowledge can diverge radically from the original symbols and meanings 
of the wider culture. These uneven flows of cultural knowledge are very important in this 
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study, and throughout I have kept the focus on one ritual practice in Islam – zakat – in 
order to highlight the prismatic scatter of interpretative meanings that emerge from one, 
seemingly clear-cut scriptural command to give alms.  The rich tradition of zakat in India 
encompasses many virtuous concerns, and individual Muslims in Lucknow each 
prioritize them differently. Fredrik Barth’s (1993:343) notion of “concerns” – defined as 
the “precipitate of the experience of living” – are the useful theoretically because they 
signal the way our values as individuals derive from cultural discourses (“traditions of 
knowledge”) and ongoing social engagements even as we imagine them as our own, 
personal concerns.  Barth’s (1993: 97) distinction between traditions of knowledge and 
concerns recognized that people’s acted-upon concerns are commonly “individual 
interpretations” and even “misperceptions” of cultural values, rather than a direct 
isomorphic inculcation of those moral codes.  
While culture will never completely socialize individuals into particular 
subjectivities (Kleinman 1988; Hefner 1998:4-5), certain concerns nevertheless 
predominate over others in the local cultural milieu.  Moreover, shared “concerns” guide 
the construction of culture by individuals, as repetition of certain social processes (and 
not others) constructs and reproduces enduring forms of social organization through 
repeated transactions (Barth 1993: 340-342). This view of culture as essentially 
transactional (Barth 1993) also implies that culture emerges from multi-vocality and 
knowledge remains multi-vocal (Bakhtin 1981).  This dissertation thus lays 
methodological priority on transactions – transactions of virtuous concerns through moral 
education and transactions of monies – in an effort to account for a diversity of individual 
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and institutional actors.  Yet, just as money creates hierarchy as wealth remains forever 
spread unevenly, certain moral actors are socializing agents and authorities (e.g. ‘ulama, 
the wealthy, the social elite, the state – each in their own way), as I describe throughout 
this dissertation. Discernible patterns of virtuous concerns emerge in this dissertation in 
“ethics” of Islamic almsgiving: a purity ethic, a developmentalist ethic, and others not 
explored by this study.  The thrust of this dissertation is defining and describing these 
zakat ethics in Lucknow as well as the institutions and discourses that promulgate and 
shape them.  
Data/Intelligence, Espionage/Ethnography: Anthropology in Muslim Societies 
Each Friday that I sat in the mosque of Maulana Jahangir in Aminabad (profiled 
in chapter eight), listening to his sermons, I heard the same litany of prayers first in Urdu 
and then in Arabic (after which congregants all intoned Ameen):  
For the health and spiritual welfare of those gathered (Ameen), for Muslims in 
Kashmir (Ameen), for Afghanistan (Ameen), for Iraq (Ameen), for Muslims in 
Myanmar (Ameen), for Muslims in Syria (Ameen), for Muslims in Palestine 
(Ameen), that Palestine be saved from Israel (Ameen). 
 
It was no mistake that each of these prayers was for other Muslim communities perceived 
as under attack.  The Indian Muslim community itself felt very much “under attack” 
(humāre upar hamlā kiyā jā rahā hai), a phrase I heard often in my interviews referring 
to multiple threats: the majoritarian Hindu forces perceived as instigating riots, structural 
discrimination in India, or perceived indiscriminate police arrests in the name of 
“security” and “anti-terrorism.”  In this context, Indian Muslims seemed to have a 
heightened sense of solidarity with oppressed co-religionists.  Yet, as the rest of this 
dissertation describes, Indian Muslims in Lucknow rarely perceived their own oppression 
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in absolute terms as religious-based discrimination, instead terming their community as 
beset by “backwardness,” lack of educational opportunities, and in need of development.  
The prayers, after all, did begin with a supplication for the “health and welfare [falāḥ]” of 
the local community.  
 Globally, however, there did seem to be strong military forces at work against 
Muslims in other nations, which impacted my reception as I began fieldwork.  Culturally, 
my background was understandable and welcome: though an American, I was one who 
married into a South Asian Muslim family and who prayed, fasted, gave zakat, and 
studied in madrasa alongside my Lucknow informants.  But, political concerns are 
ultimately what determined my role as an outsider-anthropologist more than my position 
as a cultural outsider, as Ahmad (2009: 31-34) also observed of his own fieldwork among 
north Indian Muslims. I lived in Muslim-dominated parts of old city Lucknow with my 
wife for a year and a half, and in general my positionality can only be described in terms 
of the widespread hospitality and welcome we received. I expected difficulty – and my 
advisers warned me of difficulties – in convincing Indians to open up about their personal 
faith and finances.  However, on the contrary, I was never at a loss for interviewees and 
secured contacts in each aspect of my research.  Yet, I still encountered suspicion in 
surprising places.  In each neighborhood that I volunteered with organizations, my work 
was received in a similar pattern of initial excitement, someone’s lone voice of suspicion, 
then finally the entire organization would rally in response to this doubter.  The lone 
voice of suspicion each time accused me of being linked to American intelligence 
services; otherwise, what possible explanation could there be for being embedded and 
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asking so many questions?  These suspicions ranged from humor, as in the new Islamic 
charity Itehad Foundation when the director introduced me at the first member’s meeting, 
“Here’s Chris, everyone! He’s come from the CIA to volunteer with us,” as rolls of 
laughter ensued.  He later confided in me that his attempt to lighten the mood had in fact 
been based on one member’s suspicious questioning about whether my research was 
espionage-related.  Among the Shi’a communities in which I conducted research, in 
another less humorous instance, an article appeared in a neighborhood Urdu newsletter 
that described me among other foreign researchers coming to Lucknow (I myself knew of 
over a dozen international scholars during my time) to investigate Shi’a Muslims on 
behalf of foreign governments, mentioning my own dissertation topic on zakat in 
particular.   
With little understanding of the goals of ethnography among my local contacts, it 
was no surprise to me that (in their view) the practice of data-collection could elide into 
intelligence-gathering and the role of the ethnographer could elide into espionage.29  My 
approach remained sanguine. I faced such obstacles head-on and openly assuaged 
anyone’s potential concerns.  I was upfront about my own deeply personal interest in 
Islam, about my affiliations, and my project’s goals and then allowed others to judge for 
themselves.  Informants invariably collaborated, to a person.  After perhaps a joke or two, 
everyone in Lucknow understood the importance of greater scholarly attention to what 
they considered a positive and (relatively) unthreatening aspect of Islamic activism.  
                                                 
29 Anthropologists in the United States wrestled with the same issues during my time in the field, 
seeking to erect barriers between these categories that were moral, occupational, and 
methodological (e.g. American Anthropological Association 2007). 
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Overview of Chapters 
Moving on from the overview contained in this Introduction, chapter two 
describes Lucknow’s old city and its Muslim population, particularly with regard to the 
dominant traditions of Islamic education.  This chapter also depicts the growing concern 
over economic “backwardness” among Muslims, which Muslim public institutions and 
waqf endowments have failed to address, and I chart the rise of new Islamic charities 
preaching the virtues of zakat as a way to simultaneously advance Muslims’ material and 
moral progress.   
Chapter three provides an overview of zakat as a foundational ritual practice in 
Islam, from intricate scholarly teachings on zakat transmitted in madrasas to the basics of 
its everyday practice in old city Lucknow.  Zakat provides a trope for my broader 
approach to the anthropology of Islam that views Islam as “tradition” that is both 
discursivized and embodied. Moreover, the diversity of teachings on zakat also 
introduces my methodological use of “virtuous concerns” to analyze the ethical-legal 
code of shari’a that – while perceived as unitary “divine command” – encompasses an 
astonishing range of contradictory and variegated normative discourses, signaling my 
approach in the emergent anthropology of morality. This chapter also lays the foundation 
for my analysis of two modes of zakat in Lucknow, the traditional “purity ethic” and the 
more recent “developmentalist ethic,” a dichotomy which I attribute to the fact that 
Lucknow Muslims tend to prioritize different sets of virtuous concerns according to their 
association with either madrasas or with new Islamic charities. 
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 Chapter five describes the modern institutionalization of zakat initiated by 
colonial-era madrasa fundraisers, which was made possible by print and has progressed 
with digital technologies.  Modern Muslims have greater agency over where and for what 
purposes they give zakat.  But the new modes of accounting in the course of ensuring 
financial accountability also allow donors to document their spiritual merit and have 
contributed to the “objectification” and individualization of Lucknow Muslims’ 
religiosity (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996). 
  Chapter six explores the effects of the turn to zakat as the primary mode of 
financing Indian madrasas, supplanting waqf-based elite patronage.  Not only have zakat-
donors ensured that madrasa maintain (even increase) their numbers in contemporary 
India, but this modern system of public financing has expanded their donor base, giving 
rise to more public accountability and emplaced madrasas within India’s 21st century 
economy as filling the continued demand for ‘ulama in religious occupations.  Yet, 
madrasas fall short in maintaining the standards of management and efficiency that many 
Indian Muslims expect, which leads madrasa students to pursue further education in 
universities and leads new Islamic charities to re-direct almsgivers’ zakat donations 
towards more rationalized modes of welfare.  
Chapter seven describes the new Islamic charities of Lucknow founded by 
businessmen animated by the developmentalist ethic. It profiles their associations and 
promotional activities aimed at the revival of zakat among wealthy Lucknow Muslims, 
and illustrates modalities of management and institutionalization of zakat in new Islamic 
charities and their consequences for intended beneficiaries. 
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Chapter eight profiles a new Islamic charity run by a member of the ‘ulama, a 
Deobandi preacher who was engaged in the socioeconomic and moral reform of 
underemployed Muslims in Lucknow’s old city bazaars. His utilization of zakat seeks to 
reform poor Muslims' moral characters and re-form their economic behaviors as part of 
the production of what I term “halal human capital.” 
The Conclusion unpacks the larger implications of the shifts in zakat that began 
with changes in madrasa fundraising and are culminating in the new Islamic charities.  A 
series of transformations has been initiated by the zakat entrepreneurs of Lucknow. I 
discuss the transformation of zakat and how it has re-inscribed Muslim piety with a view 
that spiritual progress is predicated on material progress.  I also highlight the 
transformation in the Indian Muslim community, discussing whether they do indeed 
represent India’s “new Untouchables.”  Finally, I reflect on how this ethnography of 
zakat updates anthropology’s conceptualization of moral economy with a view of 
markets as ultimately embedded in moralities that circulate just as money does. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MUSLIMS IN LUCKNOW: INDIA’S OTHER AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 
Introduction: The Lucknow Clocktower 
 
Figure 1: Lucknow Clocktower and Husainabad 
The Lucknow Clocktower (ghanta ghar) rises up two hundred feet into the air 
over the neighborhood of Husainabad, said to be the highest clocktower in India. Its 
orderly, measured time-keeping is juxtaposed against the chaos of traffic passing through 
the nearby Rumi Gate (roomi darwaza) that was the historical entrance to Lucknow city 
from the direction of Istanbul, known to the Persianate world as Room or “Rome.” Built 
in 1881 in the capital of the areas known to the British as the United Provinces of Awadh 
and Agra, the Lucknow Clocktower was a monument to the recent British victory in the 
1857 rebellion sparked within garrisons of Indian troops in Lucknow and elsewhere. 
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However, as the clocktower was constructed at the orders of the local nawab (regent, 
lord) of Awadh, including Persianate motifs of the nawab’s court, it also recalled the long 
tradition of cosmopolitanism and foreign ties among Lucknow’s aristocratic population. 
At the height of its glory, Lucknow indeed was counted among the greatest cities of the 
world, its magnificence attested by India’s tallest clocktower and architectural marvels.  
Yet, for decades, the Lucknow Clocktower has been stopped, the hands frozen. 
No one had deigned to repair it – neither the heirs of Lucknow’s royal rulers that erected 
it nor the current elected government of Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state of which 
Lucknow became the capital city. Today, to many residents and observers, the city is 
overly burdened by its history – frozen in time just like its Clocktower. History not only 
appears as nostalgia for a bygone civilized culture (tehzib), but also as a burden upon 
those who wish to escape traditional institutions and identities for the aspirations of 
modernity. A resident of Lucknow, a young man in his twenties when asked why he 
intends to leave his birth city, put his complaint in the captivating words, "there is just too 
much history here.”30 
But history also appears in contests, in revisions, and in alternate visions 
presented in the hopes that re-casting what once was will affect what is to be. History can 
appear as visibly present yet unnoticed in Lucknow – like the stopped clocktower gone 
unrepaired – with vestiges of the past continuing to influence current events in unseen 
ways, unnoticed as residents of Lucknow continue everyday with their lives or move on 
to other parts of town or parts of the world. Particularly in the neighborhoods termed “old 
                                                 
30 Raphael Susewind, personal communication, March 13, 2013. See also Susewind & Taylor 
(forthcoming).  
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city” (Urdu: qadimi Laknau, Hindi: purani Laknau) that lie mostly south of the Gomti 
river, residents may endeavor to leave history behind them but nevertheless it remains an 
everyday presence. 
In 2011, a team of citizens thus arranged private funds to get the clocktower 
ticking again.31 Their efforts breathed life into a bygone monument – and illustrated the 
agency Lucknowis have in making the past present.  This agency can also be seen in 
processes of ritual and revival that I describe, as the agency that makes tradition modern 
in Lucknow and elsewhere in India.  This agency has been grasped by and utilized the 
zakat revivalists and their new Islamic charities of Lucknow’s old city bazaars. 
The first section of this chapter traces the history of Lucknow, as it is remembered 
and remade in ways that continue to shape the city’s social institutions today, with a focus 
on the rich tradition of Islamic knowledge transmission in the city.  The second section 
introduces the urban neighborhoods of old city Lucknow in which this dissertation 
research occurred and the Muslim welfare institutions that have served them in the past 
and today.  New Islamic charities are on the rise as a result of Muslims’ disenchantment 
with waqf charitable endowments and with madrasas. Yet this new generation of Muslim 
reformists working in new Islamic charities retained a focus on the “correct” practice of 
zakat that relied on the continued vitality of Islamic education supported by waqf and 
madrasas, even as they critiqued them for inefficiency.  The third section on methodology 
discusses the fruits of urban anthropology in India, particularly the methods of this 
dissertation in old city Lucknow.  The fourth section considers India’s national discourse 
                                                 
31 Rai, Rajat. 2011. “Defunct Historic Lucknow Clock Tower Ticks Again.” India Today. 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hussainabad-clock-tower-lucknow-ticks-again/1/163568. 
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on Muslims – the nation’s archetypal Other – and how public debate in the 2000s has 
shifted to frame the Muslim minority as “backward” and holding 21st India behind in its 
march towards progress and development.  In a process that I term (an)Othering, 
government policies and public discourse are now re-inscribing Muslims as a minority 
long marked by religious difference and now also marked (in yet another way) by 
socioeconomic difference. 
Contemporary Lucknow: “Life with Too Much History” 
The citizens who repaired Lucknow’s clocktower are not the only ones to make 
and remake history, causing antiquity to tick-tock again in the present moment.  This 
dissertation describes a parallel process of making history present, detailing the 
(re)invention of tradition of zakat to address Muslims’ socioeconomic “backwardness” in 
21st century old city Lucknow.  While India is known in social history for such 
“modernity of tradition” (Rudolph & Rudolph 1967), actors in Lucknow make history 
present – and urgently so. Lucknow is a capital city of India’s Hindi heartland, where 
social forms constructed as “historical” or “traditional” resonate powerfully. Lucknow is, 
moreover, perceived as a crucible of national-level Indian politics. Six out of thirteen 
Prime Ministers of India have hailed from former Awadh.  Lucknow and its surroundings 
are key constituencies for taking the electoral pulse in the Hindi heartland of north India.  
Thus, identitarian uses of ritual and tradition become politicized in Lucknow beyond 
levels that are otherwise typical of a state capital in India.  
Lucknow is the setting for this dissertation on the re-invention of zakat, where one 
  65
in four citizens is Muslim and Islamicate heritage has run deep since the 18th century.  
Lucknow has historically been relatively free of communal violence but experienced 
periodic sectarian uprisings, and it contrasts with many other Indian metropolises, even 
nearby Aligarh, which have seen repeated communal violent outbreaks (Varshney 2002; 
Brass 2003).   Legends variously attribute the origins of the name Lucknow to 
“Lakshman” the brother of the Hindu god Ram, or to the ancient “Lakhsman" Tila of old 
city (Hjortshoj 1979: 17), or to “Lakhna,” the builder of Macchi Bhavan palace (Sharar 
2001 [1974]: 37). In contrast to these legendary associations with Hindu rulers, Lucknow 
is also known as home to the “Muslim” court of the nawabs, “leading to the perception 
that the city was the court” (Wilkinson-Weber 1999: 14). In fact, Lucknow did not exist 
as a true city until the arrival of the Asaf al-Dawlah in 1775, the nawab who moved the 
seat of the Awadh government there from Faizabad in 1775 (Hjortshoj 1979: 20). 
European visitors from the 18th century onwards marveled at its palaces and bustling 
commercial life, but consistently remarked upon its squalor and poverty among 
Lucknow’s underclass (Llewellyn-Jones 1985: 11-12; Talwar-Oldenburg 1984: 11).  
Lucknow is remembered in the popular imagination of its inhabitants as a city rife 
with “too much history” for good reasons.  First of all, the Lucknow of history truly was 
a world-class city – and those who know its past take pride in Lucknow’s moments on the 
global stage.  Lucknow of the 18th and 19th centuries surpassed Delhi as “the most 
fabulous court city in the subcontinent” (Talwar-Oldenburg 1984: 213).   In 1856, its 
population was reckoned at one million, and it remained the “largest city in India except 
for the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay…as late as 1870” 
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(Trivedi 2010: 13).  Lucknow was thus larger than any city in America at the time, almost 
half the size of London, the largest city in the world.32  During this age of empires, 
Lucknow retained territorial and cultural integrity long after 1700 when its patrons, the 
Mughal court in Delhi, began to decline.  Since founded as the nawab’s capital in 1775, 
Lucknow was a site of cosmopolitan blending of world civilizations under the urbane rule 
of the nawabs that is still visible in the art and architecture today: Edwardian verandas 
grace local houses that also have square Hindu-temple door-frames, a Japanese pagoda 
covers a manor’s outbuilding, and Persian motifs etch numerous mosques built during 
that era.  The nawabs hired French as teachers, tailors, and merchants, while protecting 
local industries and economy with a tariff wall in 1773 against the East India Company’s 
expansions (Trivedi 2010: 13-15). Literati have contributed whole genres to Hindustani 
and Urdu, shaping the development of north Indian literatures (Petievich 1992, Naim & 
Petievich 1997, Bard 2002, Trivedi 2010). Lucknow’s courtly elite included a well-
organized Shi’i class of transnational financiers whose religious donations grew Iraq’s 
shrine cities into two of the most socio-politically influential hubs of the Middle East 
(Cole 1988).  
Second, Lucknow’s past is very much an Islamic past.  Lucknow is distinct 
among Islamicate Indian cities for its global centrality in Islamic knowledge production 
since the 18th century through today. The sheer number of famous scholars and schools 
that had Lucknow as their home rivals Delhi, despite the latter’s preponderance of 
                                                 
32 New York’s population had just passed 800,000 people in 1860.  See U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1860 
https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab09.txt  
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political influence and courtly patronage.  As Francis Robinson (1977: 300) wrote, 
"Though the city was part of India, it was also part of a supra-national Islamic world in 
which men and ideas circulated with great freedom.” Quoting Abdul Halim Sharar, the 
20th-century chronicler of Lucknow’s past (Sharar 2001 [1974]), he added, “Persians 
here showed themselves in their true light. Thus Persian culture, which had been nurtured 
in the stately and majestic laps of the Sassanid and Abbasid dynasties, permeated the 
society of Lucknow.” The ‘Ulama of Firangi Mahal in Lucknow taught Greco-Roman 
humanities subjects of grammar, logic, philosophy, and rhetoric (a mainstay of Perso-
Arab Islamic education), with greater emphasis than they receive in madrasas today. 
Both Sunni and Shi’a clergy studied at Firangi Mahal and went on to advise the nawab’s 
court as jurists and counsels (Robinson 2001). The collection of texts that came to be 
taught as the madrasa “curriculum” all over Muslim India was standardized by the 
Maulana Nizam al-din Muhammad (d. 1748), the leading scholar of Firangi Mahal 
(Robinson 2001; cf. Zaman 2003: 65-68). With the leadership of Islamic scholars in 
Lucknow, Delhi, and Hyderabad, India attained hitherto unknown prominence in the 
Islamic world, leading Albert Hourani to label the 18th century as the “Indian Century” 
of Islam’s history (Metcalf 1982: 9).  
The madrasa founded as the Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama in the 1890s is one 
of India’s most famous – purportedly the country’s largest after recently surpassing 
Deoband in student numbers (Zaman 2002: 160). Nadwa was part of the Sunni Islamic 
revival of the late 19th century, established just after the madrasa at Deoband and shortly 
before a third sister seminary in Saharanpur, UP. While the leadership Deoband 
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emphasized Persian in their curriculum, Nadwa’s fame is built on its unparalleled 
instruction in classical Arabic.  Nadwa’s leaders designed the institution explicitly with 
an eye towards Arab ties, claiming to even have improved upon the outdated management 
and instruction in Egypt and Saudi; one of the founders Shibli Nu’mani (d. 1914) 
pronounced Arab madrasas as sub-standard, including al-Azhar (Hartung 2006: 138).  
With a motto of “synthesizing the profitable past with the useful modern,” Nadwa sought 
to reform Islamic education with colonial modalities of management (Moosa 2007), 
although the curriculum soon was indistinguishable from Deoband’s except for the 
Arabic language emphasis and slightly better English instruction (Zaman 2002: 72).  Yet, 
the seminary remained a leading light in the international stage of Islamic scholarly 
learning.  When a young Moroccan student named al-Hilali33 arrived at al-Azhar to study 
in 1917, his mentor an “Azhari...Egyptian scholar described the education as being much 
more organized and therefore effective" in India and counseled him to travel onward to 
Lucknow. He proceeded to study at Nadwa with a world-class Yemeni scholar, then left 
after graduation to teach in the Grand Mosque in Mecca, before returning again to 
Lucknow as Nadwa’s Arabic instructor (Hartung 2006: 138).   
However wide-ranging its international influence, Nadwa’s impact has been most 
pronounced in India, consistently providing unity and leadership for the nation’s diversity 
of Indian Muslims. Forging strong links with India’s non-madrasa university system, 
Nadwa graduates often studied simultaneously for doctorates in Arabic Literature in 
                                                 
33 Taqi ad-Din al-HIlali (d. 1987) was “one of the most luminous personalities in contemporary 
Islamic history” (Hartung 2006: 138) for his English translations of the hadith collection Ṣaḥīḥ 
Buhari and (with Muhammad Muhsin Khan) a preeminent English translation of the Qur’an. 
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Lucknow University, and gradually by the 1950s Nadwi ‘ulama were heads of Arabic 
departments in all state universities in India and in many universities abroad such as in 
Saudi and the Emirates. The founders "claimed to represent almost all the prevailing 
brands of Indo-Muslim reformist scholarship,” with instructors from both Hanafi and 
Shafi’i mazhahib (schools of jurisprudence) and all major Sunni sectarian orientations: 
Ahl-e Ḥadīs, Deobandi, Tablighi, Aligharian modernist, and Barelwi (Hartung 2006: 
150). Nu’mani and others behind the “council” (nadwa’t) that later established Nadwa 
seminary envisioned their movement as one where “all are involved and all are invited.”  
But for an early spat,34 Shi’i ‘ulama would have potentially continued to be included in 
the Nadwa movement (Jones 2011: 56).   Nevertheless, Nadwa remains a leading light, 
ensuring that traditionally educated ‘ulama continue to have a role in leadership of 
Muslims at an all-India level.  Since the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board was 
established in 1973, the head of Nadwa has always customarily served as its president, in 
its role as the main government-recognized mouthpiece for Muslims to lobby policy-
makers and administer legal matters within the community.  
Twelver Shi’ism is often represented as transnational religious tradition globally 
centralized in Najaf and Karbala, Iraq and Qom, Iran. However, Lucknow’s Shi’i elite 
came to define a distinctly “Indian” Shi’ism. Patronized by the nawabs, Lucknow Shi’a 
emphasized certain ritual formulations to a far greater degree than the Middle Eastern 
                                                 
34  Justin Jones (2011: 55-56) found it remarkable that the conflict that expelled Shi’i representatives 
did not originate as Shi’a-Sunni, but rather as an attack by some Barelwi ‘ulama on Deobandi 
‘ulama involved with Nadwa, saying that they collaborated with “kāfir Shi’a.”  The incident was 
seen to undermine Nadwa’s legitimacy in India at large, and “in a moment of weakness” the 
founders made the unfortunate decision to break ties with Shi’a.  Most interestingly, the Barelwi 
‘ulama – often perceived as inclusive and sufi-leaning – were the initiators of such anti-Shi’a 
sentiment, rather than the purportedly puritanical Deobandi ‘ulama.  
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roots of their ancestors. The “Great” (baṛa) Imambara of Lucknow built in 1784 to house 
the Muharram majlis rituals represented not only the nawab’s utilization of Shi’ism as 
their legitimizing ideology (Cole 1988) but also represented a clear departure from 
similar Iranian religious structures.“ There were no clear precedents for the Great 
Imambara.  Thus, it is a highly original concept” in global Shi’ism (Keshani 2003: 249). 
Associated rituals, such as the mourning meetings (majlis) and elegy (marsiya), 
developed in Lucknow along distinctive trajectories (Naim 1983, Bard 2002). Moreover, 
Lucknow’s Shi’i revival of the late 18th century led Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divides and to 
a notion of doctrinal groups as entirely separate “communities” with their own public 
identities (Jones 2011: 27-28, Freitag 1989: 142). ‘The divisive nature of some Shi’i 
practices, especially cursing the caliphs honored by Sunnis and forbidding Hindu 
celebrations during Muharram, encouraged the growth of an incipient communalism” 
(Cole 1988: 93). The result was the emergence of a distinctly “Hindustani” Shi’ism 
identified with nawabi Lucknow more so than being either Indo-Persian or British 
colonial (Jones 2011:20).  
Third, Lucknow is a setting for key colonial encounters on the subcontinent in 
historical portrayals that live on today in popular imaginaries, particularly “The 1857 
Mutiny” (discussed below). In other, less military, colonial encounters the city’s history 
writ small has been a stand-in for Indian developments writ large. Seema Alavi’s (2008) 
narrative of the encounter between British and Indian Muslim medical traditions based on 
the Greek texts by Avicenna was based in Lucknow, as was Joshi’s depiction of colonial 
north India’s middle-class modernities (Joshi 2001). Portrayals of art and architecture of 
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Lucknow’s past abound as illustrations of the subcontinent’s colonial hybrid aesthetics 
(Markel 2010; Llewellyn-Jones 1985). Colonial modernity itself only arrived as a 
“fractured modernity” in Lucknow with the forces of history looming so strongly (Joshi 
2001). 
The contemporary city meanwhile became the political crucible of independent 
India. Six out of thirteen Prime Ministers of India have hailed from former Awadh. 
Lucknow and its surroundings are key constituencies for taking the electoral pulse in the 
Hindi heartland of north India. Lucknow was home to the quickly alternating 
governments of the Samajwadi Party (SP) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav and the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) led by Mayawati, India’s first Dalit Chief Minister. Both are icons of 
the “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003) of lower castes that transformed Indian politics in 
the 1980s and ‘90s (cf. Omvedt 1994). Mayawati, moreover, has shaped the urban 
landscape of the city with statues, memorials, and parks in homage to Dalit leaders – an 
architectural political statement that has reverberated all over India. 
Chronicles of Lucknow have played their part in shaping genres of English 
historiography and the discipline of history itself. The Rebellion of 1856-57 and 
historical accounts of the bloody resistance in Lucknow loomed large in British 
imagination at home, lending historians to theorize the role of popular literature in 
defining images of colonialism for English society in the wake of rising mass literacy 
(Chakravarty 2005). For the writers of India’s nationalist historiography in the 1950s and 
‘60s, the particularly “nationalist” or “popular” character of 1857-era Awadh was a 
heuristic representation for the spirit of the nascent Indian nation (Sen 1977, Chaudhuri 
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1965, Datta 1967, cf. Majumdar 1957). “The mutiny” also figured in Marx and Engels’ 
(1975) application of historical material dialectics to critique imperialist exploitation. 
Ranajit Guha’s pathbreaking study that launched the subaltern school in scholarly studies 
relied heavily on revising the typical colonial depiction of the 1857 Rebellion (Guha 
1983, Bhadra 1985). Sandria Freitag's (1990) book was a landmark in social history, 
bringing “public culture” – Lucknow’s built environment, the collective activities of 
festivals, religious events, crowds, rites, sacred spaces and times – as an addition to the 
historian’s methodological toolkit (cf. Habermas 1991, Haynes 1991, Burke 1997, Hunt 
1989). Freitag’s work on Lucknow was also an early sign of historians’ and 
anthropologists’ productive exchange of analytical concepts, such as communities and 
symbolisms (Freitag 1989: 146; Turner 1969; Geertz 1973) and visual culture (Freitag 
2014, Mitchell 2014).  Lucknow as a “city with too much history” has accordingly 
influenced the very discipline of history itself in the American academy. 
Modern-day Lucknow broadly retains the character of model colonial city (King 
1976), with the new Lucknow facing off with the old city across the banks of the Gomti 
river, and life on either side proceeds according to different notions of space, order, and 
morality.  New city Lucknow comprises the area to the north and east of the Gomti river 
with more suburban enclaves in Aliganj and Indira Nagar, excepting the centuries-old 
settlements of Daliganj and Hasanganj on the north bank that are home to craftspeople, 
wage laborers, and the educational institutes of Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama, 
Taluqdars College, and Lucknow University, as well as the military enclave to the south 
known as Cantonment.  
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Topographies of Muslims and Local Welfare in Old City Lucknow 
Figure 2: Lucknow city showing the Shia & Sunni population & religious institutions 
connected with Moharram (Census of India 1961) 
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Old city Lucknow has three sections loosely known by their main commercial 
hubs: Chowk to the west, Aminabad to the southeast, and Hazratganj (“Civil Lines” on 
the above map) to the far east (Mukherjee and Singh 1961; Hjortshoj 1979; Wilkinson-
Weber 1999).  The Aminabad section of old city (centered around Aminabad bazaar but 
including surrounding residential clusters from Qaiserbagh in the north to Charbagh in 
the south) has grown in the 20th century with the influx of migrants, containing the 
highest proportion of Hindus in the three old city neighborhoods (Wilkinson-Weber 1999: 
1-2).  Hazratganj is the newest bazaar of old city and remains home to Lucknow’s most 
expensive retail real estate, while Chowk area is a hub of wholesale selling and as 
Lucknow’s oldest bazaar is dotted with the monuments of the nawabs.  Each section of 
old city was built up by subsequent rulers who moved the hub of urban commercial 
development roughly eastward along the Gomti River: Chowk in the 18th century (e.g. 
Rumi Gate and Imambaras constructed in 1784), Aminabad-Qaisarbagh in the mid-19th 
century (e.g. Safed Baradari “White Palace” completed in 1854), and Hazratganj that 
was re-modeled by the British to resemble London’s Queen Street in the 1860s and 1870s 
(Llewellyn-Jones 1985).  As a series of markets (ganj), old Lucknow is reminiscent of a 
“caravan-serai” (Llwellyn-Jones 1980: 95).   
All three neighborhoods of old city Lucknow are characterized by separations and 
enclosures. In this regard, built spaces of old city for some observers invoke the idealized 
model of an “Islamic city” despite nestling in the heartland of India (Wilkinson-Weber 
1999: 2; cf. Gilsenan 1983, Kostoff 1991, Abu-Lughod 1987). Labyrinthine and narrow 
lanes (galliyan) connect members of the same ethnic, religious, and family groupings 
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while oftentimes dividing them from others; mansions (haveli) of old city enclose wide 
expanses of courtyards; inside such houses, as well, men’s areas (mardana) were 
separated from women’s (zanana) and many families retain the gendered patterns. 
However, the more recent, poorer urban migrants to Lucknow have reshaped life in 
Aminabad bazaar areas of the old city and slum settlements of new city Lucknow, living 
more openly in the apartments and open streets (Hjortshoj 1979: 65-66; Wilkinson-Weber 
1999: 2; Susewind & Taylor, forthcoming).  
Lucknow’s population is approximately 25% Muslim and old city Lucknow has 
significantly higher proportion that approaches half the population in some streets and 
pockets.  Although official data on religious demography remains inaccessible at any 
small unit of analysis than “district” (and Lucknow comprises only one district), Raphael 
Susewind (forthcoming) has utilized an innovative method of deducing religious 
affiliation for Lucknow citizens based on their last names as registered on the electoral 
roll, using a computer algorithm that guesses with a relatively high aggregate accuracy 
(for additional corroboration, the resulting map graphically represents the official 
statistics on hajj pilgrims as well).   Susewind’s resulting map shows the density of the 
Muslim population in old city, and starkly sparse drop in Muslims residing across the 
river in new Lucknow.  An exception is the areas of Daliganj and Hasanganj just across 
the river, still considered part of old city, where many Muslim students vote from Nadwa 
madrasa.  Other pockets are former Muslim villages now surrounded my new 
development, such as the area around the Barelwi madrasa Warzia Madaris.  Old city 
Lucknow, moreover, still vividly displays its historically famous cosmopolitan character, 
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as the map shows new Lucknow to be more segregated than old city into Hindu-Muslim 
(i.e. more grey-shaded mixed-Muslim neighborhoods in old city, while more black-
shaded Muslim-majority areas and lighter-shaded Hindu-dominated areas populate new 
Lucknow). 
 A few major Islamic institutions of Lucknow are also marked.  Most of these are 
the famous Shi’i monuments of Chowk: the Jama Masjid (“Friday Mosque), Great 
Figure 3: Muslim electors, Hajj pilgrims, Islamic Institutions 
(from http://lucknow.raphael-susewind.de/) 
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Imambara, the madrasa and imambara of Ghufran Maab (Jones 2011), and Dargah Hazrat 
Abbas.  Sunni institutions market include: Nadwa madrasa, the old and now uninhabited 
mansion complex of Firangi Mahal in Chowk, the nearby “new” Firangi Mahal headed 
by Maulana Khalid Rashid, and the Barelwi madrasa frequented by both Shi’a and Sunni 
and located furthermost to the east in new Lucknow. 
The Transformation of Muslim Social Welfare in Old City Lucknow  
I went to pick up my shirts at Sonia Tailors in Janpath Market, Hazratganj bazaar 
of old city Lucknow one hot July morning during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in 
2013.  There was a line, then I got a phone call, keeping me there for nearly thirty 
minutes.  In that time I counted no less than twelve men dressed as ‘ulama entered and 
left the store. The door creaked and slammed as each traveling madrasa fundraiser 
(known as safeer or chandah lene wāla) came and went. Whichever of the two counter 
clerks was least busy would exchange words with the fundraiser, slip him a 100 rupee 
donation (chandah), and take the receipt presented to him in return, concluding by 
exchanging assalamu ‘alaikum in greeting – all the while dealing with the current 
customer.  A non-Muslim acquaintance once asked me why so many white-shirted, skull-
capped young men canvassed the bazaars during Ramadan, and indeed even some 
Muslims in Lucknow were unclear about the details or extent of this chandah fundraising 
system. But what surprised me was not the number of fundraisers, but the generosity of 
the storekeeper in giving 100 rupees ($1.85) (which does, of course, explain why this 
store saw so many visiting fundraisers). I had been interviewing eight madrasa 
fundraisers that year, in some cases permitted to follow along with them to a few stores, 
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in my investigation of how and why Muslims so many pay their zakat to madrasas and 
new Islamic charities, which are more anonymous, rather than simply to relatives and 
local alms-seekers known to donors already. This section highlights the historical shift 
from waqf to zakat as a primary institutional vehicle of Muslim welfare in India. 
In prior centuries, under India’s Mughal rulers and other Muslim emperors such 
as the Ottomans, waqf was the main institutional channel for charitable financing of 
madrasas and other Islamic institutions (Singer 2002, 2008; Kozlowski 1985; McChesney 
1990; Arjomand 1998; Hefner & Zaman 2008). As landowners, medieval Muslim 
charitable donors generally made bequests of land and property in the form of waqf. Such 
waqf landed endowments became a regular legal practice recognized by Islamic judges as 
early as the 12th century CE for establishing schools, mosques, water fountains, soup 
kitchens, or other welfare institutions. The Taj Mahal is one such waqf (a collection of 
waqf properties, actually) with rent income from shops in Mughal times used in the 
upkeep of the mausoleum, mosques, and guest houses on premises (Kozlowski 1995: 
359). India since pre-colonial times has had a significant number of waqf properties in 
towns and cities with historical Muslim populations. “It is interesting to note,” Said Amir 
Arjomand (1998: 11) wrote in his history of Muslim public law, “that it was the non-
Koranic waqf …and not the Qur’anic norms of charity – sadaqah and zakat – that became 
the legal foundation of philanthropy in Islam.”  
Waqf, however, has been in severe decline in India since colonial times, with its 
faded irrelevance only increasing after Independence.  Most Indian Muslims view waqf 
properties as underutilized properties, if not completely gone to waste.  Many waqf 
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endowments have ceased to exist as charitable endowments altogether, absorbed by 
Indian government heritage projects or encroached by land developers or squatters.  
Reformers have called for reform of the government policies on waqf, and a recent bill in 
2013 was a step in this direction.  Yet, waqf lands are still far from providing a significant 
source of welfare for ordinary Muslims and their religious causes.  In Lucknow, 
informants reported that local waqf properties had largely been seized by the British after 
the military takeover in 1857, though some remained under control of the state-run Waqf 
Boards.  Much of the waqf land that remained privately controlled in Lucknow was under 
the aegis of the Husainabad Trust, a mammoth heritage organization that looked after 
most of Lucknow’s famous monuments such as the Great and Small Imambaras, the Shi’i 
Jama Masjid, the clocktower, and many mosques.  Even the Husainabad Trust was short 
on funds (siphoned off by corrupt managers, many speculated) and all recent major 
restoration work only occurred on the initiative of private citizens, such as individuals I 
met who revived the Jama Masjid and the clocktower.  
Today, however, zakat is rapidly on the rise, with more Muslims worldwide 
giving ritual zakat charity (76%) than performing daily ritual prayers (63%), according to 
a recent study by the Pew Research Center (2012).  In Lucknow, I found that payments to 
madrasas and their ‘ulama were the most systematic and common Islamic charity 
transactions, comprising the majority of all zakat payments by ordinary Muslims in the 
old city neighborhoods of Lucknow. Increasingly replacing waqf, zakat giving since 
colonial times has constituted a decidedly transformative system of public financing for 
Muslim education and social welfare in India.  Where waqf represented courtly rulers’ 
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extension of control via patronage, zakat is a decentralized financing strategy that not 
only pools resources from a wider range of affluent Muslims but also is transformative 
for the individual donors as they are knit more closely to local civic causes and cross-
class transactions.  Although the madrasas (particularly Deoband)35 pioneered the use of 
zakat as a grassroots fundraising tactic, as I describe in chapters five and six (Metcalf 
1982: 96-97; Alam 2003), the new Islamic charities emerging in recent decades are 
cornering more and more zakat funds each year. 
Case Study Organizations: The New Islamic Charities and “Modern” Madrasa of Old 
Lucknow  
 Of the three new Islamic charities in which I volunteered, one was based in 
Aminabad (Society for Divine Welfare) and two operated throughout old city (Itehad 
Foundation with offices in Hazratganj and the Scholarship Foundation with offices in the 
new city suburban area of Aliganj), while Nadwa madrasa perched on the northeast bank 
just across the Gomti river from the old city proper.36  All lay within a twenty-five minute 
bicycle ride.  People in each of these new Islamic charities imagined themselves as 
partaking of a centuries-old ritual in Islam, collecting and distributing zakat, but they 
were also aware that their organizational forms and impact-oriented management 
contributed fresh ideas and practices to 21st century Lucknow society.   
Itehad Foundation is the new Islamic charity that most resembled “giving circles” 
                                                 
35 The official history of Deoband described its early financing system, in Urdu as Tārīkh-i-Dar–u-
Ulum Deoband: Bar- i- saghir key musalmānon ka sab sey bara karnama (Rizvi 2005).  
36 Itehad Foundation and Taraqqi Foundation are pseudonyms, while Society for Divine Welfare 
(Anuman Falah-e Darain) and Scholarship Foundation (by request) are the original names.  All 
persons are identified by pseudonyms, except for public figures (by request) such as Maulana 
Jahangir Qasmi of the Society for Divine Welfare.   
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in the United States (Eikenberry 2009), in which a group of well-to-do concerned citizens 
gathered on a weekly basis to pool funds and collectively decide how to distribute them 
via the institutional vehicle of a registered charity.  Itehad Foundation traced its origins to 
a chance train meeting between two foreign-educated Lucknow men in 2004 (one of 
which was Iqrar) who struck up a friendship while discussing their personal practice of 
funding local children from their (Muslim) communities in attending private English-
medium schools.  They founded Taraqqi Foundation in 2004 with about fifteen people 
attending planning meetings in Aminabad. In a few years, the charity was funding 
hundreds of Muslim students. Yet, in 2007-08, minor personal differences drove the 
members of Taraqqi Foundation to divide into two further giving circles:  Scholarship 
Foundation (led by Iqrar) and the Itehad Foundation (both profiled in chapter seven).  The 
original Taraqqi Foundation did not have significant enough activities to include in this 
dissertation.  Like giving circles in the United States (Eikenberry 2009), Itehad 
Foundation and Scholarship Foundation are the most democratically run forms of new 
Islamic charities in Lucknow, solving local community needs about which the members 
are acutely aware while also enhancing civic education and voluntarism to them. Both 
have loose hierarchies, electing leadership positions such as President and Treasurer but 
in practice making all decisions by consensus.   Both have no formal office space, instead 
operating out of the self-owned company offices of their businessmen leaders.  Donor 
support bases as well as beneficiaries are flung throughout Lucknow, giving these new 
Islamic charities a city-wide presence but only a meager impact or fame in any one 
neighborhood.  Members inevitably arrived to their weekly meetings in shiny cars.  When 
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I ever asked around from locals in Aminabad or Chowk if they knew of Itehad or 
Scholarship Foundation, no one did, and only a few had heard vague echoes of 
philanthropic activities by “some businessmen based in Hazratganj.”  Yet, as I outline in 
chapter seven, they had significant impact in aiding deserving students and in boosting 
their modernist Muslim members’ personal piety practices and linkages with ‘ulama and 
other Muslims in Lucknow. 
 The Society for Divine Welfare (Anujman Falah-e Darain) was based out of a 
mosque on Chickmandi street in the Aminabad bazaar, founded in 1992 by the mosque’s 
preacher (imām) Maulana Jahanagir Qasmi.  Bicycling down narrow alleyways too tight 
for automobiles, I visited the Society daily in July and August 2012 and twice a week 
thereafter. As I arrived, where two alleys intersect, a blast of heat wafted from two nearby 
curry restaurants. To add to the commotion (and food options) two biryani carts jut into 
the sidewalk, their drab wood frames no more decorated than a workbench but topped 
with brightly colored umbrellas to ward off sudden monsoons. Youth on fancy 
motorcycles roar by way too fast in the crowded strip, along with goats, their kids, cows, 
stray dogs, burqa-clad women, loincloth-clad old men we would call “uncle,” and their 
kids.  Jahangir’s three sons lived with him in the upstairs of the mosque, and after I met 
with their father, we often sat on the curb drinking tea and chatting with those passing by, 
which is how I got to know the staff, volunteers, and beneficiaries of the Society so well.  
Unlike the charities just described, Jahangir’s Society has been very well-known in 
Aminabad for almost twenty-five years. Most days involved only an hour of work on his 
charity organization for Jahangir; “Once the people were ‘brainwashed’, I prepared their 
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minds, there has been very few stresses [parishaniyan] in running this organization,” he 
told me.  Nearly all his donors are long-established ones, who pay their zakat to Jahangir 
each year without any reminders or active fundraising, except the street-side stall 
decorated with the Society’s banner under which Jahangir sits each evening after 
nighttime (‘isha) prayers during Ramadan to collect donations (“zakat is over 98% of our 
budget,” he explained). Daily activities required negligible effort and cost, such as the 
free medical clinic, the Qur’anic school for boys, the lending library, and the sewing 
skills center for unemployed women are all operated by workers trained and given small 
stipends by Jahangir. Four times a year, the Society organized highly formal distribution 
events (taksim-e emdad) in which the bulk of the Society’s aid monies were expended, 
described in detail in chapter eight, and these were the only other activities that require 
significant effort from Jahangir.   
The campus of Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama sprawls along the crest of a slope 
rising up from the northeast bank of the river Gomti.  Since the construction of this 
campus in 1906, Nadwa has overlooked a wide swath of the city-scape of Lucknow’s old 
city across the river.  New Lucknow, such as the neighborhoods of Gomti Nagar and 
Aliganj, have filled in behind Nadwa as urban development ballooned to the north and 
east – effectively making Nadwa the geographical center of this expanding metropolis. 
Yet, despite geographical centrality, Nadwa is sidelined in the social imaginaries of many 
contemporary urbanites. Many forward-thinking Lucknow residents view this madrasa as 
a relic of the past. Those who were not students or faculty of Nadwa rarely entered, or 
gave sustained attention to Nadwa, whether Muslim or not.  In recent years, this 
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institution also has become only more societally isolated. Suspicions of Islamic militancy 
have grown, especially in the 1980s and ‘90s as radical Hindu marjoritarianism was on 
the rise.  In 1995, the Lucknow police launched a nighttime raid on Nadwa, startling 
terrified students from their beds, searching campus buildings, and confiscating files and 
computers in a hunt for suspected links to militant activities (Sikand 2005: 288-289).  
Authorities turned up nothing.  In the 2000s, nonetheless, suspicion of Nadwa and other 
madrasas as “dens of terror” only intensified (Sikand 2005: 270). During the time I was 
researching Nadwa for my dissertation, in May 2013, there was a crude bomb thrown at 
the gate of the madrasa, but the loud noise, fear, and ensuing tightened security (with the 
help of Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav’s government) were the only lasting effects (Times 
of India 2013).   
For many ordinary north Indians, the madrasa and the “traditional” Islamic 
identity it is perceived to represent seem increasingly out-of-place in 21st century 
Lucknow.  Yet, madrasas in India are increasing in number, size, and budgets – largely 
due to rising zakat contributions made through subscriptions (chandah) from ordinary 
Muslims, especially residents of urban areas.  Madrasa students are also gaining literacy 
in Arabic, Urdu, and Hindi and other useful skills as well as social capital, as evidenced 
by their continuing ability to gain employment in mosques and new madrasas opening in 
towns and cities throughout north India – illustrating that the traditions of Islamic 
learning for which Lucknow has long been famous, remain relevant in India’s 21st 
century economy.  Although madrasa students may yearn for the level of schooling 
provided in elite English-medium schools, that education is out of reach of most of 
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India’s under-classes; madrasas as an autonomous, self-financed educational system 
provides the Muslim minority with a real alternative to the inefficient (at times corrupt) 
government school system, an option that dalits and other underprivileged minority 
groups do not have (Jeffrey et al. 2008). 
History, Islamic Reformism & Societal Reform in India 
The move by Muslims worldwide to authenticate and personalize their religious 
identity is part of what is more broadly known as “Islamic revivalism” or “reformism.”37  
Although the tendency in scholarship on the Middle East has been to spotlight religious 
revival occurring in the 20th and 21st centuries, historians of Muslims in South Asia have 
discussed significant revival and reform in India since the mid-19th century (e.g. Metcalf 
1982; Zaman 2002; Sikand 2006; Jones 2011).  These processes have also proceeded 
along a somewhat different trajectory than those within Islam's heartland of the Middle 
East.  While Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori have analyzed Islamic revival in terms 
of “objectification” of Islam, the idea among Muslims that “their practice of the faith 
could be brought into question.”  Eickelman and Piscatori have also argued for the 
modernity and recency of Islamic reformism by claiming that this notion “would not have 
                                                 
37 This dissertation takes “Islamic reformism” to be a useful – if somewhat vague – term, although 
one must bear in mind concerns over generalizability and politics of its usage (Osella & Osella 
2008a: 248).  As I utilize it, “Islamic reformism” refers to the reform of individual behavior, 
beliefs, and social norms according to perceived fundamental religious principles (Lapidus 2002, 
Metcalf 1982, Robinson 2008). The study of Islamic reformism in India is furthermore rooted in 
excellent social history on the “modernity of tradition” (Rudolph & Rudolph 1967, Metcalf 1982). 
It encompasses a broad range of initiatives within Islam in India (to say nothing even of the 
parallel processes among Hindus and Christians, or among Muslims elsewhere), yet it is a useful 
term for distinguishing the family resemblances amongst such movements, which otherwise get 
mislabeled as “political Islam” or “fundamentalism” in myopic analyses of oppositional politics 
(see the volume dedicated to this discussion by Osella & Osella 2008a).   
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occurred to most people...before the mid-1970s” (1996: 38; cf. Geertz 1968: 106). 
However, the madrasa at Deoband in north India was doing precisely that over a hundred 
years earlier. Founded in 1867, Deoband was and remains globally recognized as a 
reformist institution committed to (among many other aims) eradicating un-Islamic 
practices, bringing into question the faith practices of Indian Muslims such as shrine 
worship and other syncretized Shi'a-Sunni or Hindu-Muslim elements. 
Processes of Islamic reform are nearly as old as the history of Islam in India.38 
Richard Eaton’s approach to explaining conversion to Islam in India posits a phase of 
“reform” that gradually, but inevitably, follows “accretion.” Accretion occurred as 
Muslims migrated to South Asia, but rather than impressing orthodox Islam directly upon 
locals they came to be woven into India’s diverse social fabric.  Given India’s existing 
culture of shrine worship, for example, Eaton (1999: 118) refutes the notion that Islam in 
India primarily spread through Sufi saints as “missionaries” evangelizing directly while 
alive, as Thomas Arnold (1974 [1896]) and many colonial historians had argued. Rather, 
terming saints’ tombs “the most important agents in the Islamicization process,” and 
emphasized their impact on local Indian religious life after death.39 Meanwhile, the 
                                                 
38 Despite the emphatic focus of recent social science of Islam upon the late-20th century Islamic 
revival, mass movements of reformism have occurred worldwide throughout Islam’s history.  See, 
for instance, Hurvitz (2002) on Ibn Hanbal during the Caliph’s 9th century inquisition (mihna), 
Berkey (2003) on the “recentering and homogenization” of medieval Sunni Islam in the 11th and 
12th centuries, or Geertz (1968: 107) on the turn of the 20th century shift from “religiousness to 
religious-mindedness” in Indonesia.  What is remarkable about “modern” Islamic revivals are their 
utilization of print technologies and mass-based forms of organizing (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996, 
Eickelman & Anderson 1999), as I discuss in chapters five and six. Yet, print capital was a 
characteristic of the Islamic revivalism at Deoband as early as the late 19th century. 
39 Many Indians adopting Islam did so piecemeal, through shrine rituals, adopting Muslim names, 
then further rituals, and finally constructing mosques (Eaton 1999:112-115). The agricultural 
innovations brought by foreign migrants, such as the wheel and the plough, represented a socio-
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‘ulama and some Sufis always urged “universalist” Islam, but because the literate class 
remained the primary link between Islam in South Asia and that of the Middle East it was 
not until technologies of mass travel and mass communication that widespread reform 
movements emerged. If shrines led to Islam’s initial accretion, ships and print enabled the 
“reform” as the “second order of integration” of Islam into the subcontinent.  In urban 
centers such as Delhi in the early 18th century, a significant scriptural revival popularized 
hadith study beyond the old elites, led by Shah Waliullah (Eaton 1999:120-121)40 – a 
Waliullah had also studied in Mecca alongside the Hanbali teachers of Muhammad Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab the eponymous proponent of Wahhabism (Voll 1975). 
The late 19th century saw Islamic reformist movements arise with an urgency and 
vibrancy not seen before in India. The madrasa at Deoband (est. 1867) was the most well-
known center of this modern Indian Muslim reformism, but madrasas founded in 
Lucknow (est. 1889) and Saharanpur (est. 1867) partook of a similar impetus. They were 
partly responding to the new perceived challenges of colonial rule.  Deoband and other 
modern reformist movements sought – for the first time – the creation of a new, broad-
based and inclusive Indian Muslim public identity (Metcalf 1982:335).  Although prior 
emphasis on hadith study had already impacted formal Islamic studies among elites (e.g. 
Shah Waliullah in Delhi, the formation of the Nizamia curriculum in Lucknow), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ecological inducement that spread Islam to Indian residents around Muslim shrines. This leads 
Eaton to suggest, “Islam, in India at least, may properly be termed more a religion of the plough 
than a religion of the sword” (1999:120). 
40 Eaton’s model applies to the rural peripheries of West Panjab and East Bengal, outside the Hindu 
population centers of Brahmin political rule in India’s heartland.  Yet, other processes of 
conversion still occurred in these areas as well, such as the wholesale adoption of Islam by castes 
in Gujarat and Sind or the conversion of urban elites in Lucknow, Hyderabad, and Allahabad 
(Eaton 1999:123). 
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leaders of this widespread social transformation sought to ground the identity of ordinary 
Indian Muslims in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.  Being Muslim took on a 
new meaning.  It would “no longer suffice to have been born into a Muslim family or 
have a Muslim name, one’s ‘Muslim-ness’ was to be a self-conscious decision that was to 
be based on knowledge of the demands of the faith” (Sikand 2005: 54).  The ordinary 
Muslim came to be regarded by reformists as the new “defender of the faith,” rather than 
the deposed Mughal rulers. Deoband, a small town 150 kilometers from Delhi, was the 
epicenter of this groundswell, chosen in part to re-orient madrasa education towards this 
intended larger rural audience and in part to distance from British-controlled cities. 
The new institutions that emerged were among most influential and notable 
effects of the 19th century reformist movements. These represented not only a renewed 
scripturalist emphasis on the fundamentals of the faith but also "produced a virtuosity in 
new techniques of organization and communication" to transform personal piety (Metcalf 
1982: 335).  New madrasas were the most visible institutional presence.  By 1900, 
Deoband had nearly forty affiliate seminaries throughout north and eastern India, 
growing to over nine thousand madrasas by 1967 (Metcalf 1982: 136). No Muslim 
network of this sort or extent had ever pervaded so deeply into the public sphere in India.  
Today, estimates of the number of madrasas in India are high, varying widely between 
thirty thousand and half a million madrasas (Metcalf 2007: L1413)41 – over one hundred 
thousand seems most likely.  More are continually being opened.   
Other institutionalizations paralleled and facilitated the spread of madrasas. Urdu 
                                                 
41 Citations with page numbers prefaced with “L” refer not to actually page numbers but Kindle 
Locations in the e-book version. 
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replaced Persian as the lingua franca of madrasa-educated Muslims countrywide (with 
the exception of Kerala) spread through print.  In the process, religious instruction went 
beyond the madrasa curriculum to accommodate a wider range of mediums for 
instruction.  Basic primers written by Deobandi ‘ulama became a common packaging for 
disseminating their teachings on shari’a, especially targeting women and household 
audiences not attending madrasa (Ingram 2013).  Oral instruction by the Tablighi Jama’at 
(“preaching society”) that went mosque-to-mosque and door-to-door had a momentous 
effect in taking reformism far beyond literate circles (Sikand 2002; van der Veer 2004).42  
Most pursuant to this ethnography, networks of grassroots financing were 
organizational innovations (modeled on British associations and fundraising) that 
facilitated Islamic reformism, paralleling and enabling the other institutionalizations 
mentioned here.  (Madrasa financing is the topic of chapter five). My point here is that 
the associational landscape of many Indian Muslims communities was radically 
transformed – organizationally, linguistically, politically, and financially. Yet, madrasas 
were only a portion of these new institutionalizations, which ultimately extended Islamic 
reformism far beyond their classroom walls.   
Scripturalist “back to the basics” approaches have an ironic tendency to “open up 
more debates than they close” in Muslim India, as Filippo and Caroline Osella observed 
                                                 
42 The nature of the “public sphere” in India is subject to some debate. Partha Chatterjee (1993) 
argued for a reformulation from European notions of public/private, suggesting India embodied 
another kind of divide between material  (public) and the spiritual (private), partly as a result of 
colonial rule and British policies of noninterference in “native religion.” The conception of the 
public sphere in colonial India that emerges from Van der Veer’s 2004) analysis of the Tablighi 
Jama’at is, interestingly, one that recognized the “secret” activities of oral preaching as 
nevertheless beyond the “private” realm of family and therefore simultaneously religious, public, 
and a space to be critical of the state (like civil society).  
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(2008a: 250-251).  Despite the clarity and unity that 19th century Islamic reformists 
presumed would follow from rooting Indian Muslim identity in the commonly agreed-
upon scriptural canons of Islam, an astonishing variety of late 19th century reform 
movements sprang up.  Prior to the multiplying of reformist and counter-reformist 
movements (such as the Barelwi), the desires of Indian Muslims to unify as an ‘ummah 
were (naively) imagined to be hindered primarily by geography, such that Muslim 
solidarity was perceived as fractured by geography – e.g. separated by distance and the 
admixture of local customs by the unawakened. The heady belief in pan-Islamic unity 
endured through the 1920s in the anti-British Khilafat Movement (Minault 1982; Qureshi 
1999).  As the 20th century advanced, however, the reality became clear that fractures in 
the Indian Muslim community were primarily doctrinal, as geographical and even caste 
differences receded. Some local groups experienced irreparable institutional fissures over 
ideological differences in the pursuit of scripturalist reformism (such as the bifurcation of 
a madrasa described by Arshad Alam 2008). Such polarizations of madrasas pervaded 
society and today continue to shape identities, even those of ordinary Muslims not 
educated in madrasas, as distinctively Barelwi, Deobandi, Nadwi, Jama’at-i Islami, or 
Tablighi – to name only some of the sects merely within Indian Sunni Islam.  Shi’a 
groups represent further pluralization.  Sectarian differences often were vituperatively 
exclusionary, at times precluding the ability to identify as one community of “Indian 
Muslims” (Osella & Osella 2008b).  
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The Sachar Report:  “The Muslim Community” & Poverty in the Statistical Gaze of the 
State   
A major theme running through this study is the categorization of the Indian 
Muslim minority in government and public discourses.  During the decade of the 2000s, 
activists became increasingly vocal and concerned about the socioeconomic conditions of 
many poor Muslims throughout India.  The government of India, as well, commissioned a 
report that garnered impressive media coverage widespread and public concern, titled The 
Social, Economic, and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India: A Report 
by the Prime Minister's High Level Committee. Known as “The Sachar Report” after the 
committee’s chair Justice Rajindar Sachar (2006), this government report aggregated 
unprecedented amounts of data that compared average health, education, and economic 
indicators of Muslims to other Socio-Religious Communities (termed SRCs in the report) 
in India.  The Sachar Report, released in 2006, was commissioned by the Prime Minister 
of India, Manmohan Singh, partly to shore up the ruling (via coalition) Congress Party’s 
ailing reputation among its Muslim vote bank, as the right-wing Hindu BJP cut into its 
Hindu base and socialist parties lured away Muslim voters, and partly to respond to the 
perceived systemic roots of the communal violence that was tearing the country apart 
(Jodhka 2007, Basant 2007; Kalam 2007; Gayer & Jaffrelot 2012).  
But, its main findings identified a nationwide problem of “Muslim 
backwardness,” with data reporting that 31% of Muslims in India live in poverty, second 
only to the groups classed as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) which is 
the Indian bureaucratic parlance for castes formerly known as “untouchables” (now as 
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dalits) and for aboriginal tribes. The Sachar report, by examining trends over time, found 
that partly due to government affirmative action, the average literacy rate of SC/ST 
groups has been rising more rapidly than the literacy rate of Muslims in the past two 
decades (Sachar 2006: 52-54). The Muslim community as a whole was likely to become 
India’s most socially deprived (or “backward,” in the language of the government report) 
socio-religious community in the near future.  The report, with a level of analytical 
precision uncharacteristic of many run-of-the-mill government documents, partially 
unearthed social-structural antecedents for the current Muslim “backwardness.”  Identity 
markers of once-proud Muslim nationalists who won India’s independence in 1947 were 
increasingly looked upon with suspicion, such as topi and fez hats, beards, and kurta 
shirts (cf. Chakrabarty 2002). As Gyanendra Pandey (1999: 611) remarked in “Can a 
Muslim be an Indian?” Muslims after 1947 “had to prove they were loyal to India and, 
hence, worthy of Indian citizenship” despite being born there.  Madrasas, educational 
institutions that had imparted knowledge to the nation’s founding fathers (including 
Hindus such as Ram Mohan Roy), as well as the Urdu language itself was sidelined – 
even the Constitution of India in Article 351 proscribed that Hindi should increasingly be 
Sanskritized.  Government education despite being promised as a right free of cost to all 
citizens also came to be inflected with Hindu themes and Sanskritic registers, as a result, 
was less desirable and less effective for Muslim families.  For example in 1947, 8.5% of 
Muslim women attended college (higher than the comparable rate for Hindu women), 
down to just 2.4% today in 2012.43  Moreover, particularly with regard to attitudes toward 
                                                 
43 See the Government of India’s NCMEI (National Commission for Minority Educational 
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modern education and women’s social position, the very religion of Islam was blamed, as 
public discourse represented religious conservatism of Muslims as the historical “burden” 
holding them back from development, obscuring other historical trends (Sachar 2006: 
20). 
Yet while such descriptive statistics in and of themselves surprised the Indian 
public, given Muslims historical political domination in India, two implicit effects of the 
report had even more far-ranging impact on the societal imaginary. First, the 
accomplishment of the Sachar Report and the unprecedented political force behind it was 
that these dismal statistics, although known to experts for decades, were now asserted in 
what one academic called a “candidness and a forthright manner” – and it was this new 
attitude towards the well-known plight of Muslims that “came as a big surprise” (Kalam 
2007:  843).  In contrast to earlier panels of experts reporting on socioeconomic declines 
among India’s Muslims (e.g. the Gopal Singh Report), the political fallout from the 
Sachar Report has been serious and long-lasting, spurring responses from the Congress-
led government in power 2004-2014 and from the subsequent BJP government (albeit 
less enthusiastically) that gained control in 2014, and from state governments across 
India. 
Second, a subtler conclusion of the report was the idea that Muslims all over India 
can – and indeed, should – be categorized bureaucratically as a singular unit, “the Muslim 
community.”  Indians who are also Punjabis, Keralans, and Bengali (regional identities); 
Qasais and Ansaris (caste-like groups); speakers of Urdu, Kashmiri, and Bhojpuri; proud 
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  94
residents of cities such as Varanasi, Calcutta, or Lucknow; farmers, artisans, drivers, and 
IT professionals; pious and non-practicing – this diverse mix of people was collapsed into 
“the Muslim community” in the Sachar Report for the first time.  This simple 
categorization required considerable effort and creativity in assembling data from other 
sources, many of which had never before disaggregated Muslims from others.44 Through 
the release of the Sachar report, and its successor Misra (2007) report, the government in 
India was not merely statistically highlighting the current (and future) socio-economic ills 
of Muslims in India.  The reports, as a result, effectively reified the category of “the 
Muslim community” in government discourse and public imaginary.  The resulting 
reification has been called into question by many analysts, such as political scientist 
Stephan Wilkinson (2007: 833) for obfuscating the causes of the poverty afflicting 
Muslims and the degree to which they are “specific to Muslims...or better addressed by 
general anti-poverty or educational programmes.”  Nevertheless, the Sachar Report had 
enduring effect on public discourse.  It was a clear legitimization of the view that 
prejudice against Muslims in India was not restricted to occasional flashes of riot 
violence but lingered in structurally embedded violence as well (Kalam 2007).   
Now that such detailed statistics on poverty are produced and acted upon by the 
Indian state for all groups of Indians, bureaucratic categories out of confessional faiths 
have gained currency in government discourse, alongside geographical and linguistic 
groupings. The Sachar Report was commissioned by the government (and popularized by 
                                                 
44  This disaggregation occurred on the basis of names, by a review panel that examined, for example, 
bank rolls and selected the Muslim-sounding names (Dr. Abu Saleh Shariff, personal 
communication, January 2014).  For a discussion of identifying Muslims in India by their personal 
names, see Susewind 2014. 
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media and civil society) after a tough two decades of religious violence and Hindutva 
assertion (Hansen 2001).  This was not a coincidence.  But why bureaucratize "Muslim" 
as a category within state and public discourse precisely at a time when others call for 
reducing religious divisions and identitarian politics?  The enemy of secularism is not 
religion but majoritarianism.  In this way, Indian policymakers and political philosophers 
tacitly argue, Indian secularism is committed to the rightful inclusion of religious 
minorities within Indian democracy, a process which entails quantifying and constructing 
religious communities as confessional categories.  Jodhka (2007) reflected on the irony of 
strong support from the Indian political Left for the Sachar Committee 's treatment of 
“religious identity...[as] a relevant category in state policy and perspective on 
development,” given the Left's Nehruvian history of eradicating “backward” beliefs 
through understandings of deprivation based on class.45   
The state in India proceeded to launch an unprecedented number of welfare 
schemes to address the problem of “Muslim backwardness.”  Most of these schemes 
emerged from a piece of legislation passed in 2006 shortly after Sachar Report was 
tabled, termed the Prime Minister’s Fifteen Point Programme.  Nearly all schemes 
targeted education, reflecting Indian policymakers’ fetishization of modern educational 
institutions as inevitable engines of “development” and “freedom” despite crippling 
                                                 
45 Irfan Ahmad (2009:12-18) offered the explanation that secular policies worldwide have their 
genealogies rooted – not in Enlightment humanism's perceived opposition to religion per se – but 
rather rooted in protecting the rights and identities of religious minorities from the majority. 
Pivoting off Marx's "On the Jewish Question,” T.N. Madan has presented the politics of the 
religious minority as the idiom for Indian Muslim politics, illustrating how in both Europe and 
India “one of the key actors is religious minorities” in secularizing government policies to protect 
their right to belief – yet, for Jews (as well as Indian Muslims) “secularism was not an all-
encompassing philosophy” allied with narrow humanism in opposition to religion (Ahmad 
2009:14-15). 
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inefficiencies and structural inequities (Jeffery et al. 2008).  For example, schemes 
rewarded Muslim girls’ academic achievement with scholarships, encouraged adult 
education with stipends, offered subsidies that made the English-medium private schools 
with higher quality instruction more affordable for deserving Muslim families, and 
targeted madrasas for “modernization” (Sachar 2006: 176-188; Basant & Shariff 2009).46 
Indian political culture was shaped by the Sachar Report by this forceful new 
statistical definition of "the Muslim community,” a category carved out of disparate 
ethnic and linguistic peoples of India who all (for different reasons) happened to identify 
as Muslim and which had never been assembled into one group before in government 
records.  The Sachar Committee Report contributed heavily to this categorization, but it is 
one that has also been taken up, circulated, re-figured, and re-inscribed in reality and 
upon those individual Muslims encompassed by what is becoming an increasingly 
bureaucratized designation.  Thus, it is no mistake that new Islamic charities emerged in 
Lucknow from myriad levels of society, founded by Muslims from a wide range of 
demographic backgrounds yet who all shared a common diagnosis of the problem.  
Muslim charity workers in Lucknow had adopted a Sachar-influenced lens as the primary 
way of viewing "their community": as one in socioeconomic need.  For decades in the 
late 20th century, it was simply,  
hard for the voices raised on [socioeconomic] issues to be heard. Muslims 
themselves and other Indians committed to secularism had made religious issues 
central to debates so that socioeconomic discrimination and disadvantage have 
largely been ignored. (Metcalf 2008: L1379).  
                                                 
46 See the website of the UP Minority Welfare Department for a list of schemes, 
http://minoritywelfare.up.nic.in/english/programs.htm 
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Until the mid-2000s, socioeconomic ills simply did not rank high on the bevy of 
“problems” enumerated by Muslim civil society activists.  Instead, Indian Muslim civic 
assertion swirled around issues broadly conceived as “minority identity issues” (Aiyar 
and Malik 2004), such as securing legal exemptions for Muslims from India’s Civil Code 
in matters of family law (Larson 2001; Engineer 1987), advocating Muslims’ civil rights 
amidst strict security and anti-terror apparatus (Hansen 2001; Ahmad 2009; Hartung & 
Reifeld 2006), and returning Urdu as a language of government and education (Brass 
1974).   
Conclusion: Muslims as India’s Other – and (An)Other 
 The Sachar Report has been criticized on many grounds, not least of which is the 
contention that its very premise was to compare “socio-religious communities” according 
to socioeconomic indicators was a grave mismatch.  Religious difference was not a 
powerful explanation for economic differences.  Particularly because bivariate analyses 
were primarily used in the Sachar Report’s analysis, rather than multiple regressions, 
there was no way to know if indeed the discriminatory trends in fact show a targeting of 
Muslims per se or rather of historically underserved groups who happen to be Muslim 
much of the time (Wilkinson 2007: 833).47 To a degree, this criticism is irrelevant for 
welfare activists – regardless of whether it is an accident of history or active 
                                                 
47 Steven Wilkinson’s point in his analysis of the Sachar Report’s statistics is that religious 
discrimination of Muslims qua Muslims in fact explains very little of the Sachar Report’s findings, 
despite the introduction framing the problem as such.  Muslims in the south, for example, are much 
less “backward” than those in the northern states. Sachar Report itself noted, “there are states like 
Tamil Nadu where Muslims do better in all sub-groups and states like Kerala where the differences 
across socio-religious communities are minimal” (Wilkinson 2007: 53).   
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discrimination on religious groups at work that denies many Muslim groups economic 
opportunities in Indian society, they decry the current conditions.  Moreover, despite this 
mismatch, the resulting political discourse has been quite successful in re-mapping the 
Muslim minority as a community defined by economic backwardness.  Even news media 
articles on stemming the perceived rising tide of Islamic terrorism regularly reference a 
need to address poverty and lack of education among Muslims; while the BJP is known 
for increasing state surveillance of Muslims, the party’s top leaders also call for “reform” 
of madrasas and socioeconomic development for poor Muslim communities.48  
 Before the Sachar Report employed unprecedented statistical tools and aggregated 
datasets to construct figures on “the Muslim community” in India, this designation (while 
symbolically powerful) simply did not exist in biopolitical49 terms as an enumerated 
population.  Invocation of “the Muslim nation” as a spiritual community has been 
historically common, yet the ascription of statistical characteristics to Muslims 
collectively facilitates a conceptualization of the group as an object for intervention, a 
process Foucault terms “problematization.”  Previous symbolic representations of Indian 
Muslims and the community boundaries relied on ritual beliefs and practices, allegiance 
to Muslim rulers, and visible markers of religiosity; while still extant today, such semiotic 
categorizations must also contend with powerfully politicized notions of “Muslim 
                                                 
48 For example, see Rediff News (2013), “Government funded madrasas shouldn't impart religious 
training: BJP,” September 6, 2013, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/govt-funded-madrasas-
shouldnt-impart-religious-training-bjp/20130906.htm  
49 Biopolitics, as the capacity of modern states to directly quantify and manage people as whole 
“populations” rather than as individuals through statistical techniques, gave new disciplinary 
technologies of subjectivation to modern states (Foucault 1990). Yet it never quite reached the 
point of being a “completed” theorization in Foucault’s works (Agamben 1998:5-10; see also 
Fitzpatrick 2005:85-87).    
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backwardness.”  Statistics enable normalization, the abrupt transformation of a wide 
range of variety within a population into a numerical average. “The normal is discovered” 
and the normal becomes “the prescriptive” in the move from collections of diverse 
individuals to “a population,”  Foucualt (2003: 253) wrote (on biopolitics of welfare in 
India, see Gupta 2012:14-16).  Alongside the Hindu majority that dominates the 
increasingly affluent Indian economy and the rapidly ascendant lower castes, the Muslim 
minority is being forced to face hard evidence of its economic disparity.  Without this 
gaze of the non-Muslim state, the socioeconomic condition of this Muslim minority 
population (in comparison to the majority) would not even be a visible “problem.”   
 Historians have elucidated processes that over centuries formed Muslims as a 
strongly differentiated Other in South Asia, perhaps the most religiously diverse region of 
the world; numerous scholars described the “construction of communalism” in South 
Asia, tracing the origins of the very definitions of “Hindu” and “Muslim” to the colonial 
encounter (van der Veer 1994, 2001; Pandey 2001; Jalal 2002), or even to specific court 
cases in which British judges were forced to define which Indians belonged to which 
religious community, Hindu or Muslim, in administering colonial law (Purohit 2012).  
Yet, the process I describe here that reached its nadir in the Sachar Report is one that 
initiated a re-making of the India’s largest religious minority into a marginalized 
population defined by yet another modality of difference.  If communalism has Othered 
Muslims as the archetypal marker against which the independent (Hindu) Indian nation 
defined itself during colonial and post-colonial eras, then problematization of Muslims as 
India’s poorest and most backward citizens is a process of (an)Othering that layers 
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socioeconomic difference upon religious difference.   In order to define 21st century India 
as an economic superpower, as millions of Indian “citizen-consumers” are desperately 
doing (Fernandes 2006), the new image of Shining India requires a foil.  The figure of the 
“subversive Muslim,” once the scapegoat of yesterday’s Indian postcolonial nationalism, 
has conveniently re-emerged as the “backward Muslim” holding India back from taking 
its rightful place in the globalizing, affluent 21st century world.  Most significantly, the 
equation of backwardness with the Muslim community galvanized Islamic reformists in 
Lucknow, leading to a growing clamor for shoring up the foundations of the Muslim 
‘ummah – with a fresh focus on the economics and ethics of zakat. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“CHARITABLE” INTERPRETATIONS: 
READING ZAKAT IN ISLAMIC SCRIPTURES & TRADITION 
Introduction 
Ahmed was the clerk of firearms store on one of the main roads of Lucknow’s 
Aminabad bazaar, whom I interviewed during a systematic survey of donors:  
Chris:  Which of these is the most important reason you give alms?50  
Ahmed:  It's Allah's order [hokum].  That's why! In place of these three 
reasons you are asking me, you only need one. “Nothing” is the 
reason! Just follow the order. Who needs a reason? 
 
I was performing this survey during Ramadan in Lucknow, July 2013.  But, even when I 
did not explicitly seek them out, I nevertheless encountered similar views.  On another 
day, I sat outside Lucknow's oldest mosque waiting to meet someone inside as he finished 
up extra (nafli) Friday prayers, when another worshipper approached and began chatting 
with me. Curious to find I was a researcher, he inquired about my research, then after 
hearing my response he exclaimed,  
What’s that [kya bat]?  You're writing a book on zakat? Why?! What's there to say 
about alms?  You just give 100 rupees here, 500 rupees there, and it’s done [bas]! 
That's it! 
 
Moreover, in a third instance, a close acquaintance who was both a madrasa graduate 
('alim) and Ph.D. frankly told me,  
                                                 
50  My survey question was worded (in Urdu):  “We have discussed each of these reasons separately, 
but please tell me which of these three reasons is the most important reason you give alms:  #1 Aid 
to the poor, #2 Avoiding punishment in the Afterlife, #3 To purify or protect my wealth from harm, 
or #4 some other reason.”  I selected these three reasons for the close-ended survey questionnaire 
after months of preliminary open-ended interviews of donors regarding the most resonant 
motivations behind their almsgiving.  
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Your [Ph.D.] topic [of zakat] is an excellent one... But it's one month of work; 
that's all [bas]...Read in a book what is the system of zakat in Islam. Don’t ask 
what the ‘ulama say.  Then, just write that down. 
 
For the last man in particular, who deeply understood my project and motives as well as 
the academic process (at least with regard to literature, his PhD discipline), the assertion 
of “the system as zakat” as a set of obligations so clear-cut that it is possible to “just write 
that down” came as a distinct surprise.  For these three informants and many others, the 
Islamic teachings on zakat are themselves quite clear.  In their view, it is Muslim 
preachers and scholars who may convolute the issues, or ordinary Muslims who may 
misunderstand (deliberately or out of ignorance) what is otherwise a clear order (hokum) 
of Allah. The obligation itself is indisputable.   
A year and a half of fieldwork and study for three months in Nadwa madrasa by 
this time had given me deep familiarity with the variety of teachings on zakat and the set 
of reasons why it was obligated.  I was increasingly convinced me that donors gave zakat 
according to distinct (yet different) ethical rationalities, which I theorized arose from that 
the two “ethics” of zakat I was observing each arose from different sources of authority, 
and inhered in different demographics of Muslims.  I designed my survey of donors and 
their reasons for giving during that Ramadan 2013 in order to discover how these 
understandings of the zakat obligation fit with various social groups.  While the typology 
of the purity ethic and developmentalist ethic frames the latter half of this dissertation, in 
this chapter I explore the surprising contradiction between the actual complexity of 
discourses on Islamic almsgiving in Lucknow and the taken-for-granted and habitualized 
orientation towards zakat-giving as “Allah’s command.” Ahmed and others articulated a 
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sentiment I heard numerous times:  almsgiving is not complicated, the obligation to give 
charity is foundational in Islam and in little need of deep introspection or understanding, 
because Islamic law is clear and authoritative on this injunction.  
This perception of zakat as “Allah’s command” is one that is common far beyond 
Lucknow, being what is termed in the philosophy of ethics a “divine command” 
orientation (Lichtenberg 2009).  In anthropology this notion is quite common as well. 
Durkheim viewed “moral facts” to be “rules for action” that functioned in society as a 
form of “law” regulating collective behavior and organizing society to manage and 
reduce conflicts (1984[1893]:xxv).  Thus, morality in the Durkheimian approach is above 
and beyond individual actors, coursing through societal structures and constituting the 
collective consciousness he saw as constituting “culture.”51  Individuals’ relationship to 
the societal obligation was relatively clear-cut, as they were seen as having directly 
internalized the spirit and authority of the community through enculturation and ritual.  
This view of ethics has remained popular long after Durkheim, Michael Lambek (2013) 
wrote, and it takes the moral as coterminous with “the obligatory.”  Yet my orientation 
within the anthropology of morality analyzes ethics primarily as virtues (MacIntyre 1984, 
Foucault 1990, Taylor 1990, Faubion 2011, Lambek 2010) – as I outline in this chapter’s 
conclusions. Although this chapter incorporates an eclectic assembly of data from texts, 
interviews, sermons, conversations, and ethnographic observations, the goal is to provide 
                                                 
51 Durkheim (2005) did recognize a role for the individual within the collective constructions of 
morality, which he theorized in his work on “dualism” of body and soul. The body, however, was 
largely opposed to morality, which “unsettles the instincts and inclinations that are most deeply 
rooted in body” (2005: 37).  This dualism is less consonant with my own emphasis on embodied 
virtue ethics and on individual moral agency in choosing between virtuous concerns extant in 
societal disourses.   
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a unified overview of the virtuous concerns over zakat that are held by Lucknow’s 
Muslims.  My data illustrates how virtuous concerns are habituated but also chosen by 
individual moral actors through conscious and unconscious “picking and choosing” that 
is necessitated by the variegated nature of shari’a ethics (Lambek 2010).  I explore how 
moral behaviors of Muslims proceed as a form of navigating all these concerns within the 
Islamic traditions on zakat-giving with discernment and judgment, rather than theorizing 
moral action through a lens of the adherence to obligatory codes formed by relations of 
power (Mahmood 2005).  In other words, while I recognize the authoritative weight of 
“tradition” and how Lucknow Muslims learn from moral authorities such as parents, 
peers, and religious leaders (Foucault 1990, Faubion 2011), the focus of this chapter is on 
how individuals selected concerns from within an internally diverse Islamic discourse 
and then inculcated them as habitualized and embodied comportments over years of 
repetition and practice. 
The first section complicates notions of “charity” as given voluntarily, out of love 
and goodwill, by analyzing the foundational Islamic belief of zakat as an obligatory 
requirement – yet, one characterized by myriad obligations rather than one clear-cut 
normative rule. This concept of zakat as paradoxically obligated voluntarism is what sets 
it apart from other traditions of philanthropy and advances Western scholarly 
understandings of giving based in a Judeo-Christian moral framework.  The second 
section discusses the rates, thresholds, and calculations of obligatory alms across Sunni 
and Shi’a sects, referring to scriptures and jurisprudence in the Hanafi and Jafari schools 
while continuing to interweave ethnographic vignettes lest the people become lost amidst 
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the arithmetic. This section ends with discussion of the notion of “spiritual merit” 
(thawāb), using Marcel Mauss’ (1960) phrase “economic theology” to describe the 
calculative logic of zakat that spans the seemingly disparate realms of the financial and 
the spiritual (cf. Mittermaier 2014). This section continues to explore the dichotomy of 
zakat as both obligatory and voluntary: taken literally, it is a precise and obligatory 
calculation, but in a broader theological sense the calculations induce a virtuous cycle of 
voluntarism and generosity – virtues that are themselves incalculable. Third, Islamic 
scriptures include highly specific instruction on “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) recipients of zakat. The 
fourth section introduces the popular belief in keeping anonymity and secrecy in Islamic 
almsgiving, even as giving publically is also permitted and even encouraged under 
certain circumstances.  This tension remains an important element throughout this 
dissertation, but in this section below I focus on how donors interpret and manage their 
attempts to give anonymously.  
Overall, this chapter has three goals.  It gives an overview of zakat that is 
prerequisite information for later chapters, which discuss the institutionalization of 
almsgiving according to the purity ethic (in madrasas) and the developmentalist ethic (in 
new Islamic charities) given Lucknow’s socio-political context.  Second, this chapter 
queries extant assumptions about shari’a, belying a common perception (in Lucknow and 
beyond) that “Islamic law” is static and unitary in its commands. Third, the study of zakat 
reflects on how individuals understand Islam, how they learn and form pious habits, and 
how such habits are re-formed continuously through self-study and social ties – before 
the rest of the dissertation turns to examine associations as the primary unit of analysis.  
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The ethnographic snapshots in this chapter provide just such a glimpse into 
individualized processes of religious learning and the inculcation of religiosity through a 
physically performed ritual such as almsgiving.  
Charity is a Virtue, Zakat is an Obligation  
The call to prayer (azan) sounded clearly above the rooftops of Aminabad bazaar 
one Friday during the holy month of Ramadan in July 2013. Since it was Friday, the 
weekly congregational prayer would be held, accompanied by a sermon. At the gate of 
the masjid, a line of beggars was already forming, squatting at the dusty entryway with 
scarves or bowls laid out to collect spare change from mosque-goers. I recalled my close 
acquaintance in Lucknow, educated at madrasah as well as India’s top universities, who 
fondly told me his father’s habit of taking him to masjid.  As a boy, he was allowed to 
give whatever coins were in his father’s wallet to the alms-seekers. Inside, the masjid was 
filling to the brim with rows of men who work in shops or live around the bazaar (women 
were allowed, in a curtained-off section, but chose to pray Friday prayers at home due to 
crowding, as was the custom in nearly all mosques in Lucknow). I sat near the back. A 
father prayed his supererogatory (nafli) prayers before the congregational prayer a few 
feet from me. In the relative silence before prayer, the man’s small son, wearing an 
equally small white cap on the crown of his head, ran circles around his dad. He then 
jogged in place, legs pumping in staccato on the marble floor of the masjid. The small 
boy then flung his forehead on the floor, rapidly mimicking his father’s prostrations. His 
pent-up exuberance contrasted sharply with the stoic prostrations of his father. The 
muzein (prayer caller) came inside from giving the call to prayer, then sat down next to 
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the boy. The muzein pointed didactically at another praying man, obliviously prostrating 
in silence.  In a gentle whisper, the muzein described the steadiness and correct pauses of 
praying man’s meditative bowing to the boy, while the father nodded.  
The sermon that began after the call to prayer ranged across a number of topics 
related to Ramadan and the approaching Eid al-fitr. Maulana Jahangir, the preacher of 
this masjid, dwelled especially on teachings related to Islamic charity. Muslims prefer to 
give more charity during Ramadan, as scriptures teach that its spiritual merit is multiplied 
by seventy during this month. He instructed the congregants: 
Give the best of your wealth in zakat!  Give zakat, give sadaqah, and help others 
in the name of Allah! This hadith instructs us to give charity, give charity 
[ṣadaqah do, ṣadaqah do]. Our Prophet, the messenger of Allah, blessings and 
peace be upon him, said, ‘Whoever wishes to save himself from hellfire must give 
sadaqah, even if it be a half of a date.’ You also should give alms, give charity, if 
you wish to be saved from the hellfire. It doesn’t matter how much you give. 
Even if it is only two rupees [$0.04] then still you should give charity. 
 
The last quote was a hadith, a saying of the Prophet Muhammad, which I heard numerous 
times during my research.  Though this was an ordinary day at the mosque, it illustrates 
how zakat is an act of ritualized worship, encouraged by religious discourses as ‘ibadat 
(Urdu: worship) alongside other obligatory Islamic rituals such as prayer.  Charity 
occupies a central place in Islam.  Islamic teachings on worship, ethics, and economics 
alike induce Muslims to cultivate virtues of service to others, of fairness in business, and 
of generosity in transactions; to inculcate habits of contributing to public welfare; to 
worship by donating alms; and to avoid materialism, avarice, and usury so that others 
may share in worldly wealth – all of which constitute “charity” in a broad sense. As seen 
in the sermon above, however, the Islamic notion of almsgiving as ‘ibadat goes beyond 
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mere humanitarian urgings to be charitable and of service to fellow human beings.  Indian 
Muslims discuss and practice charity in numerous other ways that they likely do not 
consider worship, such as a regularized contribution to their children’s private school or a 
passionate donation to a political party or other activist cause.  Yet the discourse and 
motivations associated with zakat as financial worship were distinct from these other 
motivations (although these moral concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
Lambek 2013: 2).   
Charity is often imagined as a voluntary act of goodwill. Muslims in Lucknow 
have similar ideas of charity as voluntary (including zakat, but also encompassing non-
obligatory charity such as sadaqah), in that Muslims have great latitude in deciding 
when, how, to whom, and how much to give. But in an ironic twist this presumed 
voluntary act is also an obligatory act in Islam, ritually proscribed as zakat. This 
obligation has its origins in one verse of the Qur’an, according to Muslim scholars: “Oh 
Muhammad! …Out of their wealth take charity [ṣadaqah] in order to purify them” 
(Qur’an 9:103). Many scholars, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have argued for a 
translation of zakat as "alms-tax" (e.g. Hallaq 2009; Maududi cited in Nasr 1996:104; 
also Sayyid Qutb cited in Maurer 2005: 27) to reflect this sense of obligation.  In this 
view, zakat is identified with justice more than with love, and is radically distinct from 
Western notions of “charity,” as donations made out of goodwill and pathos. Other verses 
in the Qur’an urge Muslims to “give charity” but this verse 9:103 permits the Prophet 
Muhammad to “take charity.”  Since this verse is in fact addressed towards the Prophet 
Muhammad, and not to individual Muslims themselves, the obligation of zakat is 
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sufficiently clear-cut so as to be externally imposed upon ordinary Muslims by the 
Prophet, his representatives, and his political heirs, if necessary. As “alms-tax” as well as 
charity, Islamic jurists have often read this verse as divine sanction for the obligation of 
zakat to be paid ideally to a legitimate government exchequer for distribution to the 
needy.52  Nadwa madrasa teachers represented this interpretation to me and other students 
as the majority view of the Hanafi school, based on references contained in the 
Hidayah.53 
A glaring question remains, unresolved even in jurisprudential and scholarly 
debates: zakat is a clear, even enforceable obligation – but obligation to whom?  Is this 
obligation an obligation of Muslims to Allah alone or to temporal institutions?  Even 
within the body of Islamic jurisprudence itself, zakat is thus quite difficult to categorize 
as an obligation. The dichotomous divide between zakat-as-tax and zakat-as-worship 
remains as a tension in traditional jurists’ writings.  The Nadwa madrasa curriculum, for 
example, teaches zakat in two different “subjects,” which correspond to two different 
areas of Islamic jurisprudence: first as ‘ibadat in the basic Hanafi manual of fiqh al-
Mukhtasar (“The Summary”) by Abu’l Hasan al-Quduri (b. 362), and later as financial 
                                                 
52  The Kharijites in early Islam, for example, split with the mainstream Muslim community on this 
issue, claiming that the verse 9:103 in the Qur’an instructed zakat be paid only to the Prophet 
Muhammad and not his heir, the first Caliph Abu Bakr, who reigned at the time in 632 CE.  This 
historical event has been discussed extensively; e.g. Kelsay (2007: 36).  
53   The Hidayah directs Muslims to pay zakat to the public institutions of no other political leader 
but the Caliph, specifically mentioning Khawarij, or those sects who have renounced the authority 
of the Caliphate, as institutions which cannot receive valid zakat even if they are financially 
deserving (Marghinani 2006: 163).  
 For a more modern treatment by a traditionally educated jurist of Islamic law, see Yusuf 
Qaradawi’s (1999: 13-14) Fiqh al-Zakāh.  
 For an excellent discussion of Islamic governments, zakat, and just war in modern contexts rooted 
in this scriptural injunction, see Kelsay (2007: 36).    
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transactions (mu’amalat) in Kitab al-Kharaj (“Book of Taxation”) of Abu Yusuf (d. 798).  
Wael Hallaq (2009: 231) spoke of this same dichotomy when he wrote, “among all the 
‘branches’ of the law, zakat is unique in that it has a dualistic character” as worship 
(‘ibadat) and as transactional jurisprudence (mu’amalat).  In this respect, zakat is 
categorically distinct from other Islamic topics, most of which fall more clearly into the 
categories of either personal worship or societal affairs.   Social scientific analyses have 
made effective use of distinctions between “privatized” and “public” religion (Casanova 
1994). Distinctions have also been applied to aspects of shari’a that (once 
recontextualized in unprecedented ways) can fit into modern notions of either “public” 
law as it has come to be codified by modern states or “personal” considerations of 
morality and worship (Messick 1993; Hallaq 2009: 374-380; Metcalf 2009: L3700-3800; 
Hefner 2011: 11-25).  However, this dissertation endeavors to analyze zakat as straddling 
and even obviating such dichotomy. It is well worth teasing out an understanding of 
Islamic charity that remains sensitive to the ways in which zakat-as-transactions and 
zakat-as-worship are deeply imbricated, even unified in practice, despite the tendency of 
commentators (Islamic jurists included) to necessarily speak and write of zakat with 
reference to one aspect of its dichotomous nature or the other: either as “obligation to 
Allah” and thus “religious” or as an “obligation to fellow Muslims” and thus as a 
“political” or “social” concern.54  
                                                 
54  For further illustrations of the contemporary relevance and severity of this dichotomy, see for 
example Dr. Yusuf Qaradawi’s (1999:xxxiii) view that, “If we were to re-sort issues of 
fiqh  according to contemporary standards, we would classify zakah as part of the socio-financial 
system and not with the pure worship. Similarly, when we talk about law, we talk about zakah as 
part of the financial law of the state.” 
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The Right of the Poor  
The Qur’an insists on the right (haqq) of the poor to receive zakat, as a sort of 
logical corollary to the obligation upon the alms-giver.  The community of true believers 
consists of “those upon whose property there is an agreed right [haqq ma‘lum] for the 
beggar and the destitute” (Qur’an 70:24-25, cf. 51:19; cited in Bonner 2003: 14).  A 
hadith also holds that, “A beggar has the right [to ask] though he may be riding on a horse 
[and thus appearing as a wealthy nobleman].”55  While the basic teachings on wealth and 
charity are similar across all three Abrahamic faiths, sharing the idea that “all wealth is 
God’s” and that charity should be given so as not to shame the recipient, the Qur’an is 
“most emphatic” on these injunctions, and particularly emphasizes charity as the right of 
the poor more than the scriptures of Christianity and Judaism do (Benthall 1999:35-36).  
Muslim scholars were more likely to be familiar with charity as the right of the 
poor, than were ordinary Muslims, and this “right” was leveled as a primary critique of 
organized charities perceived as selectively or conditionally distributing alms (discussed 
in chapter seven).  Among the madrasah-educated men who knew of it, one man educated 
at Firangi Mahal spontaneously quoted the above hadith of the beggar on a horse in an 
interview, as did two students at Nadwa madrasa and the Deobandi preacher profiled in 
chapter eight, Maulana Jahangir.  The Firangi Mahali man and I were discussing the 
“correct” recipients of zakat (discussed further in Recipients, Collectors, and the 
Systemization of Zakat below), to which he replied,  
Hamid:  It’s important [who the recipient is]. But, really, any needy person 
– we must help them.  
                                                 
55  This hadith is recorded in Abu Da’ud (1984), Book 9, Hadith 1661, narrated Ali ibn AbuTalib. 
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Chris:   Any needy person? You must help them? 
Hamid:  Yes, exactly. In Islam, I heard about the [haqq] mahfoom. 
Mahfoom means, that if someone comes and asks for money, even 
if he is sitting on a horse, then you should not question him!  Don’t 
say, ‘Oh he’s not needy [because he owns a horse]. Somebody is 
asking you for it, so you must give.  
 
By mahfoom, Hamid meant m’alum as discussed above – the Arabic/Urdu words 
mahfoom (understood) and m’alum (known) are similar, but the concept he cited is well-
referenced in Islamic legal scholarship (see Bonner 2003:14). 56   
Zakat and Muslim Membership in the ‘Ummah 
Auntie Amina was my neighbor in the Aminabad bazaar, the matriarch of a Sunni 
middle-class family known to others as devout but worldly. Her husband sold insurance 
and their children were educated and had moved outside the state or abroad to make 
better salaries.  Her story is illustrative of the individual zakat obligation incumbent on 
the property of women and men separately even when a married couple’s finances are 
joined.  
Auntie:  There’s a madrasa in our home village [outside Lucknow].  We [as 
a husband-wife couple] pay the yearly expenses for one boy there. 
It used to be 2,000 rupees [$37] to cover all their food and 
expenses for one year – now it’s 6,000 rupees [$112].  Our 
daughter lives in Jeddah [Saudi Arabia] now and she supports three 
boys! [The daughter receives a substantial teacher’s salary at an 
international school]... 
Chris:   Is it you or your husband that mostly pays your zakat?  
Auntie:  Both men and women must give their zakat [individually]! It’s 
obligated [farẓ hai].  Between us [my husband and I], I do it for 
myself. But actually “Uncle” [her husband] is so sidi [simple, 
naïve] that I have to do it all. And only I know how much gold I 
                                                 
56   However, this teaching is strongly balanced in the minds of Lucknow Muslims with another 
important teaching: the prohibition on begging. Numerous times, the Prophet Muhammad 
prohibited Muslims from begging. There are a few exceptions, such as Muslims afflicted by dire 
need or debt; for a full discussion see Mattson (2003). 
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have – how much jewelry, how much gold. When one’s wife says, 
‘I have this much gold, so please give this much zakat,’ then one 
has to give it. 
Chris:   So you as the wife tell your husband, and he’ll pay it?   
Auntie:  Yes, my husband still has the financial responsibilities.  
Chris:  And for “savings” [cash in their bank account], he knows how 
much you have? 
Auntie:  Yes, he pays the zakat on our savings.  
 
Auntie’s story is illustrative of the unanimous opinion from Islamic jurisprudence that 
zakat is incumbent upon each Muslim as an individual.  Not only are women allowed to 
hold property separate from their husbands in Islam, a principle enshrined in Muslim 
family and inheritance laws since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, women are 
expected to pay their own zakat on property separately as well.  In the example above, 
Auntie Amina’s adult daughter became obligated to pay her zakat as soon as she had her 
own paycheck, and thus had wealth under her personal ownership (before that, as an 
adult, she also would have been obligated to pay zakat on her wealth but presumably had 
no wealth). While in practice in Lucknow, household finances were often managed by a 
head of household, zakat was still discussed as an individual obligation even if the 
husband or father paid everyone’s collectively at once.  In all conversations that I had, 
women in Lucknow chose on their own where to pay their zakat. 
Denial of the zakat obligation is one of the very few routes to apostasy in Islam. 
To be considered a Muslim, belief in the obligation to give alms is one of three necessary 
ritual markers of identity, along with the Islamic creed and prayer.  Verse 9:5 of the 
Qur’an on those (re)turning to the fold of Islam reads, "But if they repent, establish 
prayers, and practice zakat, they are your brethren in faith" Here, “repent” is taken to 
mean the renunciation of polytheism through uttering the Islamic monotheistic creed 
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pronouncing the oneness of God (tawhīd) and belief in Muhammad as prophet.  But, this 
teaching contains an important distinction between belief and practice. As a criterion of 
membership in the Muslim community, what is necessary is the belief that giving zakat is 
a central part of being a Muslim, a ritual obligation.  The actual practice of zakat is not 
the litmus test.  Moreover, a Muslim who gives charity as mere charity does not pay 
zakat – unless the giver also makes a conscious intention to give alms as zakat. As my 
instructor in Nadwa madrasa put it during our first class on the jurisprudence of zakat, 
discussing the Kharijites who refused to pay their zakat obligation to the first Caliph Abu 
Bakr in 632 CE: 
It was not only the issue that some Muslims wanted to collect zakat on their own 
[and not pay the Caliph]. It was also that they thought zakat was not obligatory 
[farẓ]!  If anyone denies [the existence of] the duty [farẓ’iyyat] of zakat, saying 
that obligation has finished, then he was not a Muslim, Caliph Abu Bakr said.  
This is a basic foundation [aṣlī bunyād] of Islam.  
 
The instructor’s point was that merely not practicing zakat was insufficient to disqualify 
anyone from membership as Muslims; rather, their belief in the obligation of zakat was 
the determining factor.  This belief could otherwise be represented as the intention 
(niyyat) that is made when enacting the ritual of zakat: an intention to fulfill an obligation 
(and thus belief in that obligation) versus an intention to merely go through certain 
physical motions.  “For example,” the instructor continued,  
If a man understands prayer to be obligatory [farẓ], but he can't pray it all the 
[mandated] times, he's still a Muslim. And if a man always prays ṣalāt [obligatory 
prayer] on time, and is very organized about going to the masjid to pray, but he 
understands that prayer is not obligated [farẓ], then he's not a Muslim! …With 
regard to any aspect of the religion [dīn], which has been proven with evidence to 
be obligation [wājib], any one who denies that will be an unbeliever [kāfir]. 
 
The example is particularly illustrative, because he taught this point by way of a counter-
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example, showing that even if Muslims correctly performed the physical acts of 
obligatory ritual such as ṣalāt prayer (or zakat), but did so without holding a belief in its 
obligatoryness, they would fail to fulfill this jurisprudential condition of being Muslim.  
The ritual duty of zakat is thus efficacious on two levels: as alms and as performance of 
membership in the Muslim community.  Almsgiving in Islam as ritual performance, 
therefore, encompasses both the obligation to give and the obligation to believe in the 
obligation to give.  
On a different note, the distinction between orthopraxy and orthodoxy has been a 
key theme of Islamic studies. My discussion of zakat here also speaks to the common 
assumption that Islam prioritizes practice over beliefs in doctrines in various ways.  
Ritual obligatory practices in Islam have been emphasized as signifying Muslim identity. 
William Cantwell Smith famously observed,  
There is no word meaning ‘orthodox’ in any Islamic language. The word usually 
translated 'orthodox', sunni, actually means rather 'orthoprax', if we may use the 
term. A good Muslim is...one whose commitment may be expressed in practical 
terms that conform to an accepted code (1957: 28). 
 
This association of Islam with orthopraxy has continued in contemporary academic 
writing (e.g. Gauvin 2005, cf. Asani 2001).  However, any preoccupation with Muslims’ 
seemingly emphatic prioritization of “practices that conform” overlooks the predominant 
importance of intention (niyyat) in Islam.  Niyyat is the necessary link between belief 
(and thus orthodoxy) and practice (and orthopraxy) – a link that presents a more 
complicated picture than William Cantwell Smith has.  Analysis of zakat as ritual must 
take into account its practice, as most scholars do, but also incorporate the “inner” aspects 
of zakat-giving, including the mere belief in its obligatoryness and the intention to give. 
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Belief may even signify more than practice.  (See the section Intention below) 
Voluntary Giving & Zakat 
In reality, among Muslims in Lucknow, accusations of apostasy were rarely if 
ever leveled against others based on non-payment of zakat. In this way, zakat retained a 
sense of voluntary choice.  In every single interview with almsgivers, I asked and was 
told by interviewees that they would never assume that a neighbor was not paying zakat, 
nor even presume to check up on them.  Almsgivers, rather, more often replied that the 
obligation of zakat felt to them as a “privilege,” to be so generous, or as recognition of 
this existing privilege they felt as a result of blessings showered upon them by Allah. 
However, other donors said that, while they would not accuse someone of disqualifying 
themselves as a Muslim, they would easily exhort others who they thought were not 
paying, “if they would not over-react” or “if they were friends.”    
Tahir, was a Sunni businessman, neighbor of mine, and also involved in the Itehad 
Foundation.  He once explained how he above typical rates of zakat out of a self-admitted 
sense of privilege, focusing on the urgent concerns of who was most in need rather than 
precise calculations, 
Chris:  You run a “foundation” [a charity organization] with your friends, in 
which you pay your own money. 
Tahir:  (in mixed English and Urdu) I don’t actually take out my as per exact 
calculation of the shari’a. I’ve never done that.  See, if it [our foundation 
budget] comes to maybe say 10,000 rupees short that year, and I have 
maybe 8,000 rupees, then I pay that and find the rest from other people.  
 
It’s about need.  Anybody can easily pay 2.5% [the rate of zakat on cash 
for Sunni Muslims]. When income tax in a place like India is 30%, then 
2.5% is not a big amount. But, when you think about what the need is – 
we have to take care of that need! The need of the hour may be 50,000 
[rupees], and we have to worry about how can we take care of that 50,000! 
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We have to get that number of people that will be able to donate 50,000, 
and even if we only gather together 25,000 then we have to put that much 
in to our projects at least. And at least that seed capital will help [us raise 
more money].  
 
Indeed, most people [that I know] just roughly estimate their zakat [in my 
experience].  Then they give close to what that estimate is. Of course, I 
have a tax return, and I could look at that and calculate it [exactly], but we 
[my wife and I] don’t do that. I just guess.  
Chris:  (nodding in agreement) Yes, I understand. Zakat is so complex, with 
different percentages for different types of wealth— 
Tahir:   No, no. It’s not that complicated a calculation! I just don’t do it. …The 
One up there in heaven has given me so much [Upar wāle ne mujhe bahut 
dīyā]. I even pray, ‘Please make me great enough to help others.’ If I get 
something, I feel as if I should be ready to share with others.  
 
In short, the obligation of zakat occupies a loftier place in Lucknow Muslims’ 
ethical imaginary than a mere legal obligation, or “tax.”  The point of this analysis is to 
clarify assumptions that Islamic law is clear-cut and simple as a rule that believers blindly 
follow – despite being represented this way by some Lucknow Muslims such as Mr. 
Ahmed the clerk in the opening vignette (to say nothing of how “creeping shari’a” is 
represented by non-Muslims in the USA). While zakat is a required payment, the 
obligation of zakat-as-worship signifies much more.  In particular, the tension between 
voluntarism and obligation remains – indeed, the polyvalent nature of zakat contains both 
meanings.  Many Muslim donors spoke of the zakat obligation as a choice they must 
make – a choice they wanted to make, out of gratitude for having wealth, while others 
lived in poverty.  Others represented the divine command to give alms as an obligation 
that would be unimaginable not to fulfill, although these self-described rule-followers 
like Mr. Ahmed the clerk were a lesser proportion of my interviewees.  Either way, the 
choices of when, how, to whom, how much, and why to give (the “voluntary” nature of 
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zakat) retain critical importance and lend symbolic value to zakat as ultimately an 
individual choice and an individual responsibility.  In the second vignette, Tahir the 
businessman clearly believed he was far exceeding his annual zakat quota in donations to 
his local foundation (and he surely was); however, he was not able to say so with as much 
certainty as the Brigadier Khan (discussed below) who calculated zakat in his account-
book. In contrast to Muslims who set aside their exact zakat by meeting the 2.5% quota 
and perhaps a little more, Tahir’s voluntarism is more laudable, in one sense, for being 
motivated by his desire to fill others’ economic needs rather than balance his own 
spiritual account (as a calculative “economic theology,” discussed below). But, if zakat 
were a tax, Tahir’s estimation would not satisfy tax auditors, and in his interview his tone 
conveyed to me a sense of uncertainty that he was doing the right thing by only 
estimating.  
Although this section has delved deeply into the very real dualism of zakat 
present in shari’a and other reflective discourses, in practice this dichotomy was 
overlooked or remained implicit.  Thus, while zakat is distinguished from sadaqah in 
Islamic law, in daily life Muslims often discussed them interchangeably or by merely 
using general terminology such as paisa dena (giving money), chandah (regular 
donations), khairat (charity in a broad sense), madad karna (providing aid).  Through 
mere observation, as well, there was rarely any way for me to tell if Muslims in Lucknow 
intended their charitable donations as zakat or sadaqah. For example, if they knew they 
had already met the annual zakat quota, gave a negligible amount not worth counting, or 
gave to a recipient ineligible for zakat, they would give charity as sadaqah.  Despite 
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making a necessary jurisprudential distinction between zakat (as obligated at specific 
rates) and sadaqah (as voluntarily given and uncounted), scholars of Islamic law highlight 
the inseparable continuity between zakat and sadaqah. In Islamic jurisprudence and 
common parlance alike, zakat technically may either refer to the specific obligatory alms 
upon wealth (zakat al-mal) or – somewhat metonymically – to ritual charitable giving 
generally speaking. The texts I studied in Nadwa emphasized that zakat is merely 
obligated as one of the five pillars to induce Muslims to give charity freely and 
generously.  As charity is a form of financial worship, zakat is only the beginning, a 
doorway, or the “head” of such almsgiving, while sadaqah in the broadest sense of 
generosity and service is the ultimate virtuous goal (Nadwi 2000, Maududi 1963).  
Rates and Calculations 
A year into fieldwork, after I had already completed three months of madrasah 
study on the Islamic law of almsgiving, I met a Muslim man who was also a chartered 
accountant via a mutual friend.  He worked in a large accounting firm in New Delhi with 
many wealthy clients.  Chatting together, I jokingly said that my study of zakat proved it 
more complex than the federal tax code.  He replied in complete seriousness to my joke, 
“Oh, it is true. I get clients who approach me to assist them calculate their zakat!”  While 
I never met a donor in Lucknow who utilized an accountant’s services, it is true that 
calculating alms according to Islamic jurisprudence can be an involved process.  
“On silver, one-fourth of one-tenth is due,” reads the hadith that establishes the 
rate of zakat as one-fortieth or 2.5% annually.  For contemporary Sunni Muslims, this 
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2.5% is the fixed rate due on money, since silver coins were the money of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s day, and on ornaments from precious metals such as silver and gold 
jewelry. Notably, zakat for Sunni is a rate on assets, as opposed to a tax on income.  Thus, 
a Muslim who is independently wealthy pays zakat each year as a percentage of her total 
assets, even if she has no earnings (and thus pays no income tax).  In addition to jewelry 
and money, zakat is also due on livestock (roughly one out of every forty animals) and 
crops (at different rates of 5% and 10%) but these types of property were irrelevant for 
most urban-dwelling Lucknow Muslims.  Any property that is necessary for daily living – 
basic clothing, one house, one horse or car, (in some interpretations) jewelry worn daily – 
is not liable for zakat. These are not financial assets as wealth, but rather are the quotidian 
necessities of life. Rarely, a dissenting view crops up that zakat is not obligated on cash 
or modern items, instead interpreting the above hadith literally as mandating zakat only 
on silver, gold, crops, and livestock; yet, in Lucknow, no one I met ascribed to it.   
The minimum amount of wealth upon which zakat is liable is known as the nisab 
(“threshold”, Arabic, Urdu: nisāb). Each type of property has a different nisab; for 
example, a hadith set the nisab for gold (widely regarded as equivalent to money today) 
at twenty dirhams.  Nisab functions both as a threshold above which Muslims are wealthy 
enough to be zakat donors and as sort of poverty line below which one is eligible to 
receive zakat.  Along with the many other instances where exact numbers are specified in 
Islamic scriptures, nisab lends an air of mathematical systematicity to the teachings on 
zakat (see chapters seven).  In conversations I had in Lucknow with some charity 
workers, these numbers – 2.5% for zakat, 20% for Shi’a khums, 85 grams silver (“twenty 
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dirhams”) is the nisab – were suggestive of a sort of divine algorythim with a reassuring 
specifity that invoked the underlying rationality of the zakat calculation.  Far from a mere 
ritual of worship, zakat for these reformers was a calculation with its own truth concealed 
not only in words and deeds of the prophets, but also in numbers. 
Rates in Shi’ism 
 Twelver Shi’a Muslims in Lucknow pay alms that they also may call zakat, but 
much more significant for Shi’a are the khums payments. For their zakat, they have 
interpreted the above hadith requiring 2.5% on silver restrictively to apply only to silver 
(and gold) coins.  Shi’a interpreted the hadiths on livestock and crops as Sunni do, 
however, paying the same zakat rates on these assets.  Zakat, in the end, is a relatively 
minor aspect of almsgiving for Shi’a in Lucknow.  Although, I did have conversations 
with Shi’a madrasa students from rural areas who said that, especially in prior 
generations when most wealth was kept in jewelry, grains, and livestock (all subject to 
zakat), the annual zakat payments were more significant for their families, but they still 
did not approach the level of khums.  
 Khums (Arabic: a fifth), by contrast, is the most significant aspect of almsgiving 
for Shi’a. “Whatever profits you may gain, assign one fifth to Allah, the Prophet, his 
relatives, and also orphans, the poor, and needy travelers,” a verse in the Qur’an (8:41) 
instructs Muslims. This verse is interpreted by Shi'a as the duty to give alms as one-fifth 
of profits.  For Sunni, “profits” here has meant only the spoils of war or treasure.  Khums 
is paid on profits made in a given year, and thus is only paid once on property acquired 
(e.g. cash earnings, surplus grain) and only after expenses are subtracted.  It is not exactly 
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an income tax, as it is surplus wealth (after expenses) from which khums is paid rather 
than gross income. However, khums is distinct from zakat in that the amount of khums 
rises and falls with income while zakat payments rise and fall with a Muslim’s assets – at 
least for those types of properties that are not specifically listed in the scriptures (precious 
metals and coins, gemstones, grain, and livestock), which constitute nearly all wealth 
today.   
 For example, to distinguish zakat and khums, I posed this hypothetical case to a 
senior madrasa student at Sultan-i Madaris57 in Lucknow:    
Imagine a nawab [Mughal prince in Lucknow], who possesses vast wealth in 
property, jewelry, and artwork but these are largely defunct properties from which 
he receives no rent beyond what is needed for upkeep.  He also receives a small 
stipend [wazifah] from the court, paid through the British resident [as was the 
colonial practice, continued in independent India for a few decades].  He is Shi’a 
[as the nawabs, in fact, were].  His stipend is so small, that it equals his regular 
expenses exactly – all of it is spent on food, basic clothing, and daily incidentals.  
He pays no khums!  Each year he keeps the same amount of wealth. 
 
“Correct,” Wasi the student, replied, “if you assume he has already paid his khums for his 
wealth in the years he first received the properties, no khums is obligated [wājib] because 
he has no income and thus no surplus profit.” I continued:  
But, now, imagine the nawab is Sunni.  He has no surplus income but vast 
property.  For nearly all of his wealth, zakat is due:  his business assets; his 
ornamental jewelry; and his bank accounts.  Only the one house he lives in and 
car he drives are exempt from zakat.  Each year he will pay 2.5% of his wealth in 
alms, until it is nearly gone! 
 
“Correct,” Wasi said.  A Sunni would pay less in zakat in the year he acquired surplus 
monetary wealth (2.5% of the value minus nisab) but pays this rate annually and thus 
gives more alms over the long term, while a Shi’a pays more upon acquisition of 
                                                 
57  For a history of the madrasa Sultan-i Madaris see Jones (2011). 
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monetary wealth (20% of surplus value after expenses) but never pays khums again after 
this initial outlay.  This is a common rule of thumb in fiqh manuals, Wasi once explained 
to me, “Once you’ve taken khums out from it, on that property khums is not obligated 
again” (al mukhamas o la yukhamas). After permitting me my hypothetical, he blurted 
out, “But, look, Chris! This wouldn’t happen. The nawab can give voluntary charity 
(sadaqah) and other charity (khairat; Persian for “charity”), even though no khums was 
obligated!  No one, especially a rich man, would be able to avoid giving at least 
something!”  His emphatic indignation conveys a tension in jurisprudence on almsgiving:  
no matter how carefully one attends to the specifics of guidelines, they are meant to be 
taken as a whole and not “gamed” as a system. Obsessing too closely over the rules and 
loopholes (as I did), this student felt, may even lead one to forget the summation of 
shari’a injunctions as simply intended to encourage philanthropy and welfare provision. 
Economic Theologies: Zakat and Thawab 
Brigadier Khan was a semi-retired officer in the Indian Army, a Sunni who lived 
in Lucknow’s Cantonment neighborhood, a well-manicured residential neighborhood 
exclusively reserved by the government for army staff who worked in the nearby military 
base that was the central command headquarters for the national army. I knew his family 
socially for months before I asked him to give an interview on almsgiving, which was 
one of a handful I conducted in English at his request.  Before our conversation had gone 
far, he called his daughter to bring him his worn leather journal as we sat in his living 
room, interrupting the interview to show me exactly how he went about figuring his alms 
payments each year.  The journal in his familiar fingers opened easily to the back page, 
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where he pointed out a long column of numbers. This accounting was an exact record of 
his alms annually for over five years. It listed rows of numbers next to scrawled notes for 
each recipient, such as “[a name] – the neighbors,” “madrasa,” “orphanage.”  He then 
pointed to where, at the top in a margin, there was an equation calculating the percentage 
of his assets (2.5%).58 Brigadier Khan’s list of alms gifts from last year, when summed, 
exceeded the obligated zakat amount by thousands of rupees (nearly a hundred dollars).  
“Ever since I received my first paycheck of income as an army officer,” he explained, 
“I've been keeping record of my zakat on the back page of my diaries.”  I asked, “Did 
someone in your family teach you this?” He replied, “No. It’s just because I wanted to 
know – it’s for myself. But many other people I know have some sort of record for 
themselves.” I thanked him for volunteering his personal charitable finances, then 
resumed my interview: 
Chris:   Who do you prefer to give your zakat to? 
Brig. Khan:  We mostly give to poor people that my wife comes into contact 
with, who she knows and visits or who come to the house.  
Chris:  Have you ever regularly supported someone with annual, 
consistent zakat donations?  
Brig. Khan:   My wife has done this. She selected an adopted a portion of a 
madrasa’s budget, in the first town where my army posting was, 
and we pay that monthly to the administrator of the madrasa.  
 
But we generally prefer most of all to support widows and orphans, 
among the needy people we support. In fact, all of the families that 
we are giving charity to these days are those which we no have no 
father.  
                                                 
58 Although I learned in the madrasa that zakat is calculated as a portion of surplus assets after 
subtracting the nisab threshold, I noticed that Brigadier Khan merely took the percentage of his 
full surplus assets without subtracting. Many Muslims in Lucknow when describing their alms 
payments also neglected to mention that they subtracted nisab. I rarely presumed to correct them. 
Many Muslims undoubtedly subtracted nisab before calculating their zakat. For a few people, 
however, if the issue did come up, they replied that this was one way that they habitually over-pay 
in their calculations to be on the safe side.  
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He was a strong supporter of madrasah education although he did not have formal 
religious schooling himself.  As a donor, he preferred more informal modes of giving, 
such as to the regular stream of alms-seekers that knew to appear at his address, rather 
than to organized charities doing education or relief work.  
Not all Muslims in Lucknow used an accounting ledger (I interviewed only a 
handful, including Brigadier Khan, who did so). Others set aside their best estimate of the 
required amount of cash in a small cloth purse during the holy month of Ramadan, 
distributing small amounts from that zakat purse as they went about their days in the 
bazaars and while visiting relatives, neighbors, and masjids, while still others merely kept 
track in their heads.  Some set aside 2.5% from each paycheck, but this habit was rare, 
and only two interviewees reported it. Still others gave their best estimate, trusting that 
their intuitive generosity more than satisfied almsgiving dictates in the Qur’an rather than 
relying on exact calculations to the rupee.  
Zakat ledgers, real or imagined, parallel an oft-mentioned account kept by Allah 
for each Muslim, known as hisāb (account) that tracked one’s measure of thawāb 
(reward, recompense). During Ramadan, Muslims commonly repeated, acts of merit 
including zakat accrue seventy times the amount of thawab as during other months.  
Khalid, the young owner of a computer store and a devout Sunni, regularly detained me 
for tea and discussion of Islam (a favorite topic of his) the few times I visited to have 
electronic repairs done. Once, he launched into this narrative on thawab:  
Your thawab is adding up from the day you’re 10 years old [approximately 
puberty, the age when Islamic ritual obligations fall upon boys] – before that, only 
God knows [what effect deeds have].  Your thawab “points” go up and down.  
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Each person has such a hisab. You’ll show up on Judgment Day [qayāmat] with 
your book of thawab [thawāb kī kitāb].  
 
As he spoke, he gestured dramatically, tracking his hands upwards and downwards along 
with “thawab points go up and down” as a financial analyst does on television, and 
tucking an invisible “book of thawab” under his arm as he described appearing before 
God on Judgement Day.  After finishing his dramatic narrative on thawab, he continued 
by describing his zakat-giving practices for me. Khalid was a most precise almsgiver, one 
of the few interviewees who reported habitually setting aside zakat out of each paycheck.  
Despite the financial metaphor implied in thawab, every almsgiver I spoke with took a 
more expansive view of zakat-ledgers, regularly overestimating alms (even grossly 
overestimating zakat payments, as a rule, as Tahir did above).  The possibility of 
calculating zakat to the rupee and paying only the prescribed amount was never 
mentioned, not even as a critique of others’ practice.59  
To use a term from Mauss (1960: 55), the “economic theology” of zakat and 
thawab is one in which alms are exchanged for spiritual merit.  Most Muslim givers, 
however, were not as precise record-keepers as Brigadier Khan or Khalid in the computer 
store – perhaps these two men in particular were predisposed to arithmetic precision, 
given their respective professions.  Nonetheless, the calculative aspect of zakat in the 
spiritual realm was a widespread motivation. An economic theology of zakat encouraged 
almsgiving for the donors’ own sake.  Alms that left their hands could still easily be 
viewed as fulfilling a self-interested desire for salvation.  
                                                 
59  However, for discussion of generous almsgivers who criticize other almsgivers who keep pay their 
zakat “to the cent,” see Mittermaier’s (2014) account of “trading with God” in Egypt. 
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Moreover, the “calculation” of zakat in exchange for thawab was inevitably 
spoken of – not as a one-to-one exchange –but as a reward multiplied manifold.  I heard 
this spoken of in numerous interviews, but Naheed of Itehad Foundation put it well. 
“People think that if they have 100 rupees in their pocket, and they give 10 rupees to 
another person, then…they have 90 rupees left – No!” Nahid said to me in English mixed 
with Urdu, and shaking his head in disbelief.  He continued, “We should say that if we 
give 10 rupees, then in sha’ Allah [God willing], we will have 90—no, 900 rupees 
returned to us [tabādale mein milegā]!” He was incredulous. Zakat was crucial, in this 
view, as a result of the spiritual merit it accrued, or in other words, for the sake of the 
donor’s relationship with God. Nahid went on, “People are obviously forgetting their 
religion [dīn]. Even if they are giving charity, or doing Islamic work they are growing 
apart from the dīn!” The spiritual value of zakat to the donor is believed to far outweigh 
any financial gain from the donated amount. 
The notion that zakat brings “reward,” returning spiritual wealth to alms-givers, 
however, was also subject to criticism. While still recognizing the utility of thawab as 
motivation, Muslims committed to systemic change decried the narcissism inherent in 
simplistic economic theologies of zakat. At a dinner party, one retired government worker 
interrupted my description of research,  
There is no unity in the Muslim community today. Everybody gives [zakat] on 
their own, with little thought to broader organization. No one gives zakat, except 
just to get thawab. Muslims these days just do everything just to get thawab! 
 
This assertion was immediate refuted by the other guests, who refused to accept that most 
Muslims give alms “just to get thawab” and cited multiple other motivations and 
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examples. Although he was quickly contradicted by everyone at the table, the man’s point 
stuck.  Others agreed that thawab allowed some donors to give shortsightedly.  It is this 
idea of “gaming” the calculations that Wasi in our interview above had also decried, as an 
unfortunately result of applying calculative logic to almsgiving that is meant to have 
broader spiritual and societal implications.  
Recipients, Collectors, and the Systemization of Zakat 
Islamic scholars consider Sura al-Taubah of the Qur’an, the ninth Sura, to have 
been revealed in nine years after the Prophet Muhammad’s migration to Mecca and to 
have restricted the definition of alms more than ever before in the Abrahamic tradition, 
systematizing zakat as a mechanism of redistribution in the new polity of Muhammad in 
Medina. 60 Forms of the word zakat appears in chronologically earlier verses (e.g. 23:1-4, 
27:1-3, and 31:3-5) from the Meccan period before Muhammad’s migration (the Hijra) to 
Medina, but the connotation was no more than common charity.61 At least three verses in 
this Sura al-Taubah were particularly salient in restrictively defining zakat as 
systematized obligatory almsgiving.  Verse 9:5, as discussed in the Obligation section,62 
made the zakat obligation a condition of membership in the Muslim community. Verse 
9:105, also discussed above,63 provided Prophet Muhammad and his political heirs with 
                                                 
60 The discussion in this section relies on the lessons taught in Nadwa madrasa on zakat 
jurisprudence, except as noted via citation of other sources, and I rely especially on the Urdu 
translation of Quduri’s al-Mukhtasar, al-Hidayah, and the chapter in Urdu written by Abul Hasan 
Ali Nadwi (2000) “Islam ka Iqtasadi Nizām” (“The Economic Order of Islam”).   
61 Although the words zakat and sadaqah are used interchangeably in the Qur’an, a traditional 
consensus in Islamic law makes a distinction between zakat as referring only to mandatory alms, 
while sadaqah refers to voluntary charity. 
62 “If they repent and establish prayer and give zakat, they are your brethren-in-faith”  
63  “Oh Muhammad!...Out of their wealth take charity [ṣadaqah] in order to purify them” 
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divine sanction to levy the obligation of zakat upon individual Muslims.  Verse 9:60 
defined (only) eight categories of eligible zakat recipients, such that zakat given to others 
would not be able to be counted for Muslims’ annual zakat quota.  
 
Figure 4: Eight Categories of Zakat Recipients (from Benthall 1999) 
First, “the poor” (al-fuqara) refers to those with some earnings but not enough to 
live on. Second, “the needy” (al-miskin) are those impoverished Muslims who have 
nothing and are in immediate, dire need. Third, the collectors (al-‘amilin) are “employed 
to administer the funds” through collection and distribution of zakat. Fourth, “those 
whose hearts have recently been reconciled” (al-mu’allafati qulubuhum) includes two 
groups: recent converts to Islam and non-Muslim allies when the followers of the Prophet 
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Muhammad were politically weak.64 Fifth, “those in bondage” (al-riqab) are slaves kept 
by Muslims, paid zakat by their owners in order to free them.65 Sixth, debtors (al-
gharamina) are those for whom debts (if incurred legally and not by prohibited spending) 
far outweigh assets, making the debtor impoverished, and almsgivers may take on or 
forgive such debts as zakat. Seventh, “in the cause of God” (fi sabil Allah) also translated 
as “in the way of Allah” historically had a specific meaning of jihad.66  Eighth, 
“wayfarers” (ibn al-sabil) are travelers in need of support, even wealthy travelers without 
access to their wealth. 
The eight categories, despite being listed in scripture with such precision, remain 
subject to divergent interpretations across the five schools of Islamic law and also 
contested by Muslim revisionists through the present day.67 Muslims in Lucknow 
overwhelmingly attended to only the first two categories of recipients: the poor and the 
needy.  I recorded relatively few instances of Muslims – either individual almsgivers or 
                                                 
64  This latter non-Muslim portion of “hearts who have recently been reconciled” is said to have 
lapsed after the time of Muhammad in traditional Hanafi jurisprudence. See al-Hidayah by 
Marghinani (2006:289). 
65 This category is considered to have lapsed in contemporary society where slavery is not an issue, 
the instructor in Nadwa madrasa taught. For an alternative South Asian Muslim scholar’s view that 
this category may be used for freeing prisoners burdened by fines, see Maududi (1963).   
 Freeing slaves through zakat reflects a concern in early Islam with gradually reducing or 
abolishing the practice of slavery. On slavery in early Islamic history, see Turner (1997: 13). 
66 Our instructor in Nadwa madrasa taught this traditional meaning, referencing numerous other 
verses where “in the way of Allah” referred to jihad (e.g. Qur’an 3:146) and the views of past 
scholars.   
For contemporary treatment of Islamic jurisprudence on jihad, see Kelsay (2009: 118 et passim).  
By comparison, Qaradawi (1999) interprets this category in a more general sense to include giving 
zakat for such activities as building masjids in non-Muslim countries. 
67 For an extensive review from legal studies, see Powell’s (2009) excellent article discussing 
comparative interpretations among the five schools.  For a more anthropological take, see Jeremy 
Benthall’s seminal research (1999, 2007).  Muslim traditional sources are too numerous to list; a 
few of the most comprehensive analyses from contemporary scholars include Qaradawi (1999), 
Maududi (1963), Akhram Nadwi (2007).  
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organized charities – mentioning the other categories by name. Prisoners (“those in 
bondage”) were a category attended to by two charities I encountered.  Collectors, also, 
was a debated category in many charities (discussed below).  
In fulfilling the command to give zakat to “the poor” and “the needy,” many 
donors were concerned with how poor or needy Muslims were in Lucknow and who were 
(or were not) most deserving. In contrast to the concern over precise calculations, for 
example, Tahir in the vignette above was estimating his zakat each year but was 
passionately motivated to spend considerable effort in meeting the needs of those around 
him.  He recognized the divine obligation, and in other conversations with him I learned 
that he ideally would like to find the time to add up his annual contributions.  However, 
his view lent more urgency to the moral imperative of zakat as a tool for economic 
redistribution, one that operated in an organized and systematic fashion.  
The concern to give to the “the poor” sometimes invoked an anxiety among 
Lucknow almsgivers over whether or not alms-seekers were actually “poor” or “needy.” 
This anxiety was regularly discussed and people went through significant lengths to 
mitigate it, through investigating potential beneficiaries. New Islamic charities 
institutionalized procedures for assuaging this anxiety, utilizing donor relations materials, 
beneficiary application forms, and annual reports, and madrasas did so to some degree as 
well (although ‘ulama often lacked the management acumen to produce documents and 
reporting of the same caliber as university-educated charity workers).  New Islamic 
charities were able to recruit members and fundraise effectively by employing strategies 
that played on this anxiety over “correct” recipients that were truly “needy” or “poor” as 
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the Qur’an had instructed.  Yet donors that were not associated with new Islamic charities 
often had a more sanguine perspective: “Allah knows best” (Allāhu ‘alim) or “God 
knows” (khudā jānne) was the response I heard from some such interviewees. Indeed, 
traditionally, such a concern over proper recipients has been less of an issue.  The 
Deobandi scholar Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi wrote in his widely read primer Heavenly 
Ornaments (Bahishti Zewar), 
[If] a person has a doubt as to whether a certain person is rich or poor, zakat 
should not be given to him until it has been ascertained whether he is eligible to 
receive zakat or not.  If zakat is given to him without ascertaining his financial 
position, the person should check with his heart and see to which side his heart is 
more inclined. (Thanawi 1999: 156) 
 
Although Thanawi – and ‘ulama I studied with in Nadwa madrasa – recognized the 
importance of correct recipients, the traditional jurisprudence on zakat recognized the 
limitations of donors’ resources and time in ascertaining beneficiaries actual conditions. 
The balance of ‘ulama opinions, rather, sought to remove potential obstacles to zakat-
giving stemming from such doubts so as to encourage Muslims to give as freely as 
possible. 
The fact that such specific guidelines about eight specific categories of zakat 
recipients exist at all lends immense credence to the notion of zakat in Islam as a system, 
as divinely revealed but also rationalized and comprehensively logical framework for 
economic redistribution.   As the former principal and one of the greatest scholars of 
Nadwa, Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (d. 1999), wrote after citing the two verses 9:5 and 9:60 
above,  
And so immediately thereafter the entire system [nizām] of zakat was established 
and its elaborate provisions and particulars were determined. All the necessary 
  133
administrators and collectors for gathering it were appointed. (2000: 50) 
 
Nadwi notably singles out the third category of eligible recipients – collectors of the 
funds – as particular evidence of systemization and the attempt to constitute a true 
professionally managed social welfare system.68  This teaching is a well-established part 
of the Nadwa madrasa curriculum.  Ordinary Muslims not educated in madrasah also 
spoke of zakat not only as simply alms-giving, but as the root of a larger system of 
economic welfare, such as the businessmen of Itehad Foundation in chapter seven.  
 Various rulers throughout history and today have proclaimed legitimately Islamic 
governments and accordingly instituted modes of utilizing zakat for public welfare, while 
other governments – even those which claim to be implementing shari’a in other arenas – 
have not dared institutionalize the authority to collect zakat (Powell 2009).  Yet what is 
left of this system in Hindu-majority India?  As our instructor in Nadwa madrasa 
commented during lessons,  
There is some difference of opinion [ikhtalaf] on this, because there is no Muslim 
government [hukūmat] [in India] today…These are two of the opinions.  Some 
say only the [Islamic] government can appoint collectors [‘amalin].  
 
While…people have established organized Islamic charities [baytul māl] or a 
madrasa to which people give donations [chandah], these people are not in this 
category [of collectors or ‘amalin], and you can’t give them your zakat. 
 
Others have a different opinion [ra’y].  They say, whether a system from the side 
of an [Islamic] government exists or not today, Muslims can establish collection 
on their own. [Thus} madrasa staff should collect zakat.  Or organizations can 
operate like this [and collect zakat].  This is a system [nizām] of collection and 
                                                 
68 The verse spelling out zakat beneficiaries (Qur’an 9:60) was revealed after the peace treaty of 
Hudaybiyah in Medina, at a time when the Muslims were successfully establishing an organized 
polity and acquiring new territories across Arabia (Maududi 1967).  See also Fred Donner’s (2010: 
43-49) discussion in his book Muhammad and the Believers for historical context. 
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distribution, however it is organized, and you can give zakat to them.  These are 
the two opinions.  
 
Some donors in Lucknow appreciate the professionalization of Islamic charity and 
support organizations that pay their staff from zakat (like Maulana Jahangir in chapter 
eight and Shi’a organizations that I encountered in Lucknow).  Organizations, like those, 
that took a small share of zakat donations before distributing the bulk of it for 
beneficiaries also included traditional madrasahs and the growing number of “modern” 
Islamic schools. Unpaid distributors who volunteer to collect zakat from almsgivers, of 
course, are quite common and are not considered ‘amalīn (paid collectors) but are 
discussed as wali (legal representatives), especially in Shi’i jurisprudence (Calder 1981, 
1982).69   
Yet, in practice, many Muslims were loath to give zakat to paid collectors.  As the 
mufti described, many Indian Muslims believed in the idealized representation of zakat as 
a “system” administered by a central authority and paid collectors but refused to believe 
that any worldly institution (especially in India) was legitimate enough to inherit this 
responsibility once granted to the Prophet Muhammad and Rightfully Guided Caliphs.  
While India obviously was not a true Islamic government (Islāmī hukūmat) or caliphate, 
madrasas still had some claim to societal leadership among Muslims. An alternative view 
among some donors who did donate to madrasas was that their donations were not zakat 
but rather sadaqah (paying zakat instead only to local poor Muslims directly), and thus 
they did not concern themselves with shari’a criteria on zakat-giving and associated 
                                                 
69 Traditional Hanafi jurisprudence, however, which allowed payment of collectors, includes 
provisions that categorically deny giving zakat to wealthy Muslims, sayyids, your dependents, or 
non-Muslims. See al-Hidayah of Marghinani (2006:289-292). 
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questions of which worldly institution might be legitimate.  Nevertheless, the collectors 
of donations for madrasas (safeer, ‘amilin) still struggled to design effective appeals that 
establish themselves as trustworthy and Islamically legitimate collectors of zakat – as I 
explored at length in chapter five.   
 Prioritization of kin, orphans, widows, neighbors, and one’s own servants as zakat 
recipients was a much more commonly discussed topic among Muslims in Lucknow.  
Interviewees I spoke with were less concerned (or cognizant) of the eight categories of 
eligible recipients, listed in only the one Qur’anic verse that has provoked so much 
jurisprudential scholarship.  Instead, ordinary Muslims were much more emphatic about 
the importance of giving to relatives, orphans, widows, and proximate needy people like 
neighbors and household servants, repeated numerous times in the Qur’an (e.g. verses 
2:83, 2:177, 2:215).  Some organizations were devoted purely to caring for these groups, 
such as the orphanages of Anjoman-e Islah-e Muslimeen in Aminabad (discussed below 
under Intention) or All-India Shi’a Orphanage in Lucknow and a widows’ fund 
established by Maulana Jahangir (chapter eight).  Organizations also served as 
intermediaries for almsgivers to give anonymously to relatives in need, without the 
twinge of shame or entanglements associated with receiving charity from family, which is 
the theme to which I now turn. 
Anonymous Giving & Secrecy 
A popularly known Islamic teaching on almsgiving is that zakat is to be given 
modestly and, ideally, anonymously or even in secret.  This moral valence contributed 
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further to the sense of zakat as “worship” in which the donor transacted directly with 
Allah and hid his or her charitable activities from others as much as possible – including, 
if possible, the recipients themselves.  All madrasa graduates and most other Muslims in 
Lucknow paraphrased (or recited from memory) familiar verses in the Qur'an which teach 
that religious charity is best given secretly and is invalidated by public comment, 
"reminders of generosity,” or other verbal injuries to recipients' dignity. One of these 
Qur’anic verses I discussed above (2:264), "Oh Believers, cancel not your charity by 
reminders of your generosity, or by injury.”  Another verse (2:271) warns almsgivers, "If 
you disclose [acts of] charity, even so it is well, but if ye conceal them, and make them 
reach those [really] in need, that is best for you: It will remove from you some of your 
[stains of] evil.”  A hadith was universally popular among Lucknow Muslims, "Give from 
your right hand so the left will not know"  (Bukhari 1956: 504), and I heard this hadith 
recited to me more than any other.  This hadith was often the only one mentioned to me, 
if ordinary Muslims repeated any hadith in our interviews.  When I asked Uncle Husain 
my neighbor about Hindu charity (dān) he replied, 
What is there to tell? …The purpose of that is just so they can get their names on 
a stone at the mandīr (temple). That’s it. It’s not right. Whereas, zakat you give 
from the right hand so the left won’t know. And, you shouldn’t feel that you will 
get something in return. 
 
The ethics of secrecy surrounding almsgiving in Islam, some Muslims told me, are one 
key criterion that distinguishes zakat from Hindu and other non-Islamic charity.70   
 Of course, the Qur’anic verse above does begin by clearly stating, “If you disclose 
                                                 
70 Hindus themselves, of course, do not view dan in this way, and anthropologist Erica Bornstein has 
detailed the religious teachings on “detachment” (tyag) when giving dan as part of efforts to escape 
from the cycle of death and re-birth in the material world (2009: 624). 
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[acts of] charity, even so it is well.”  Giving openly is considered by many Muslims to be 
acceptable, for the presumed benefits in encouraging others to also act charitably.  In 
chapter eight, I provide an in-depth analysis of this verse and the theme of giving in 
public by Maulana Jahangir, and how organized charitable distributions serve this 
exhortative function as reminders for other donors and would-be charity distributers.  
Here, however, I wish to merely highlight that public giving has some basis in scripture.   
There are two aspects to giving modestly and secretly.  First, the donor may do his 
or her best to preserve their own anonymity, in demonstration of their rejection of the 
public recognition that often comes with philanthropy.  But a second aspect relates to 
donors’ acceptance and encouragement of practices which hide the identity of those who 
take out their alms to obscure the zakat gift as in fact another type of gift, or to de-
emphasize or overlook the financial neediness of the recipient rather than call attention to 
their potentially shameful poverty (as I discuss further below).  
In order to preserve the donor’s own anonymity, Muslim almsgivers utilized a 
wide variety of approaches.  Madrasa fundraisers who collect alms told me that their lists 
of donors and the amounts given (which they are required by the administration to keep, 
for financial transparency) are often full of the name “Abdullah,” which translates in 
Arabic as “servant of Allah” and customary pseudonym for Muslims who do not wish to 
be identified for their good works.   
When previous social ties already existed, such as between neighbors or family, 
then preserving secrecy took on a different dynamic.  The Qur’an encourages giving to 
relatives and close neighbors (Qur’an 2:177, 4:8, 4:36, 8:41, 30:38; and various scholarly 
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writings, e.g. Marghinani 2006: 294-5), and nearly all donors accordingly prioritized 
these recipients.  Modesty in the form of anonymity was, of course, impossible.  Donors 
had a variety of creative responses.  “My mother is very clever when she gives her zakat 
to our neighbors who she knows are needy,” a young Muslim acquaintance of mine in 
Lucknow told me in an interview in English. His family was relatively well-off but lived 
on a street in old city Lucknow that is dotted with make-shift shanty homes. “She 
bunches up the rupee notes, clenches her fist, and sometime during the visit just waves 
her hand over her friend’s purse and drops them in. Sometimes the other woman doesn’t 
even notice! Or, more often, she just doesn’t say anything to my mother and ignores it.”  
A man who owns a gun shop told me, “We don’t push our zakat on people that we know, 
and I’ve told my wife not to do that. If we give to them, we say only ‘We’ll pay for that’ 
but we don’t tell them it’s zakat because they’ll feel bad.”  When hiding their identity as 
the donor was impossible, many Muslims responded by hiding the nature of the gift as 
alms.  Or they responded by severely downplaying the actuality of any donation at all.  
A conversation with a group of women almsgivers that I recorded in an interview 
in Urdu reflects the difficulties and tensions of giving anonymously: 
Shahnaz:  Very few people say ‘thanks’ when you give to them. 
Amina:   Yes, only perhaps one or two in a hundred come and thank a 
neighbor for their zakat. It’s sad, because we expect people to have 
manners. 
Hamida: But we don’t expect [ummīd nahin rakhe] thanks! 
(All chime in at once) 
--No! No! --We have no expectations of them.  --Whomever 
you’ve given to, you’ve given it [de gaye hain]. 
Chris:  Well, maybe someone just comes on their own to thank you— 
Amina:   ---then we really like it. (The women stay silent for awhile.) 
Hamida: But we don’t like it too much. Because no one should be able to 
find out [if you gave charity]. 
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Shahnaz: We always try…to give such that no one else knows. Because we 
don’t want ‘thanks’ or expect it. 
 
As in this conversation, donors found the injunction to give secretly to be an extremely 
important one, as it preserved their sense that their alms were given unconditionally and 
without expectation of reciprocal return in the form of gratitude.  However, some 
remained pragmatic enough to express honestly to me (as these women did) that the 
emotional reward from a recipient who offers their thanks has a powerful and pleasing 
effect.   
This awareness, however, spurred the women in the example above and many 
others to increase their endeavors in preserving anonymity in almsgiving.  Shahnaz even 
went further, criticizing the public giving of organized charities that distributed financial 
aid in public forums for an audience:  
Zakat shouldn’t be given in public, such as [names local organizations]. That’s 
insulting.  I’m just telling my opinion, here. But if some organization does this, 
there will be twenty other people [receiving aid] who find out their personal 
issues: Who is coming here for help? He is coming here, and so are she and he.  It 
will affect their honor [‘izzat].  One should instead give them a sense of self-
respect. 
 
Shahnaz’s use of “insult” recalls the Qur’anic verse to not follow charitable giving with 
reminders of it or similar injury to a recipient’s sense of honor and self-respect. 
The possibility of hiding one’s identity as a donor by giving to organizations, 
even those that distributed publically or otherwise registered and monitored their 
beneficiaries, remained an attractive option. The director of one of the businessmen-led 
charity organizations in which I volunteered told me: 
Donors often come to us and want to fund a family member’s education.  But they 
don’t want the family to know.  So they give us the money and we approach the 
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family and tell them only that ‘someone’ has told us you may need help. They 
usually accept. This happens all the time.  Perhaps ten to fifteen of our students 
(over 300 in total) I can think of are funded like that. 
 
Using an intermediary in this way, for large zakat payments (such as those for school 
fees) in particular which carried heightened potential for shaming family members, was a 
strategy I heard of from two organizations’ donors, and a growing number of charity 
organizations in Lucknow seemed also to be facilitating anonymous giving among family 
and close associates. 
 Actively monitoring recipients, “reminding them of generosity” (as in the 
Qur’anic verse above), or a donor who otherwise followed up on those to whom he gave 
charity was seen as particularly morally suspect for many ordinary almsgivers, even 
worse than merely allowing one’s alms-gift to be openly known.  After volunteering with 
organizations who monitored the recipients of zakat, I included a question on monitoring 
as well in my semi-structured interviews with individual donors around the bazaars and 
neighborhoods of old city Lucknow.  Every respondent had a strong opinion on this 
question. Most, but not all, Muslim donors not associated with organized welfare 
associations were expressly opposed to the idea of following up after zakat was given.  
As the owner of a lucrative shop explained to me,  
Some mullahs say that you must tell [recipients] that what you are giving them is 
zakat.  I don’t agree.  No, not at all.  Why degrade a person?  And I’m not even 
that staunch a Muslim and I take an extreme position on this! They shouldn’t even 
know why you help them...You shouldn’t even follow up with them after you give 
it.  You have to just trust them. 
 
I later interviewed his clerk, Ahmed, a man from a much lower socioeconomic status yet 
still literate whom the owner introduced to me as a staunch Muslim: 
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Chris:  Have you ever investigated or done some sort of follow-up to see 
what recipients did with the zakat you gave them? 
Ahmed: No. No.  
 
Another man, presumably a customer waiting in the corner, blurted his objection across 
the room from our interview: 
Customer:  You don’t go and see if they’ve spent it in the correct [ṣaḥīḥ] place, 
or anything?! You don’t go and see what they do?! 
Ahmed:   No. No. Of course not. [sounding very annoyed at the 
interruption.] This is just not my issue.  [The zakat] is his right.  
Should I take that away? What would I ‘check up’ on?! What 
should I do? 
Customer:  You don’t think this is like an ‘investment’ that we should check 
correctly where it goes? What if he took your money and went and 
drank alcohol? Went and gambled? 
Ahmed:  First and foremost, it [is meant] that zakat will ease the situation of 
a poor man [gharīb adhme keh ḥalāt kaif karega].  Also, I don’t 
know any drunkard [sharābī] and I wouldn’t give to them.  Lastly, 
if he wants to go and drink tea [using the zakat], if he wants to do 
whatever, that’s his right! 
 
In addition to merely the potential for injury to recipients’ dignity, this passage illustrates 
a further argument against monitoring or following-up: that zakat is also the right of the 
recipient, as discussed above.   
For these storekeepers in the open-air bazaar, however, as opposed to donors who 
give privately from their home, giving visibly was nearly unavoidable.  Although it was 
public, in the sense that it occurred in the street, the ubiquity of charitable giving and the 
mechanical, often silent, character of these donations created an atmosphere in which 
alms practices, I argue, were basically “hiding in plain sight.” When I would have days of 
interviews in the bazaar, I regularly sat with a young storekeeper whose family owned 
Haji Sweet Shop.  At a major intersection in a densely Muslim area (and directly in front 
of a mosque), his store attracted numerous alms-seekers.  He occasionally turned beggars 
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away but more often asked them which sweet they would like or just dished out 
whichever dessert was plentiful and fresh from the counter. All the while, he kept an 
uninterrupted conversation going with me. (n.b. South Asian sweets are not mere candies; 
they can be quite healthy for the undernourished, containing milk solids, nuts, lentil and 
flours, and dried fruits.) Once, a man approached the storefront but answered the sweet 
offerings only with silence, until my friend the shopkeeper simply changed tactics and 
slipped him a ten-rupee note instead without exchanging a word.   
This wordless exchange emphasizes a characteristic of the mundane charity I 
often observed in public: the silence.  The transactions were so habitual that very little 
contextualizing verbal exchange was needed.  No questions asked by the giver, no needs 
enumerated by the taker; nor even (as in the sweet shop case) conversation to clarify even 
when the alms-seeker had an apparent specific need in mind, such as a need for cash over 
calories.  Partly, this absence of conversation was mere efficiency, motivated by a desire 
to be rid of mendicants as fast as possible. In a plumbing fittings shop on Friday after 
prayers, the shopkeeper asked me to tend the wares while he stepped out for errands. 
Sitting in his seat, I fielded five alms-seekers in less than forty-five minutes. Centrally 
located shops had dozens of beggars a day (which swells to hundreds in the holy month 
of Ramadan); even back-alley stores had one or two alms-seekers every hour.  
Yet for these Muslim donors, giving in silence is also a sign of preserving the 
secrecy and anonymity in charity transactions. I often sat with a florist's son, a madrasa 
student, in his back-alley flower shop.  Even though the business was going through a 
few bad years, and the family was not obligated to give zakat, he gave rupee coins to the 
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dozen beggars that came each day. “I don't know whether these beggars are Muslims, and 
I won't ask them, either.”  Other donors in my interviews echoed his sentiment.  
Silence by the givers is mirrored in the takers. Mendicants do not need to speak 
much, if at all. Even for the few beggars that approached mumbling words, I would ask 
the shopkeepers what they had said and usually neither of us could make it out. Most 
mendicants were silent. The exceptions that proved the rule were blind mendicants whose 
disability made it impossible for them to approach separate shops' doorways and wait, as 
others did to signal alms-seeking. I followed a blind beggar down the street for a few 
blocks, recording his iterative petition in Urdu, which translated as:  
Dear brother, give charity [khairat], zakat, sadaqah! Alms gives [you] life. Please 
help and ease the mind (mizaj) of a mendicant (faqir). Allah alone accepts your 
wealth. He is the lord. Allah will give you good business.” 
 
Other alms-seekers at times also spoke their petitions at times, but less audibly – blind 
beggars tended to be the exception that proved that silent beggars are proper alms-
seekers.  Hindu beggars also would preserve modesty in asking for donations. The other 
exceptions are beggars in Lucknow’s new markets and malls frequented by particularly 
wealthy locals and tourists, or in cities like Delhi and Mumbai. 
Although it is counterintuitive, I suggest that these data are ethnographic 
illustrations of how the silence and anonymity associated with traditional almsgiving is 
reinforced despite the highly public nature of common charity in the old city’s bazaars.  
Despite the visible acts of giving in each storefront, no one would single out these 
storekeepers as particularly generous; their charity had little public status-value, as even 
storekeepers with yearly losses (like the florist) dole out coins. The donors are never 
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singled out for donations. Recipients are not questioned about their needs or identity.  
Many beggars have no identity, especially women in Persian-style mesh face-coverings 
(burqa) or Arab-style veiled robes (niqab).  In the storefronts and mosques of Aminabad 
bazaar, charity literally is hiding in plain sight, as is often the case with the public 
anonymity of urban crowds in India (Froystad 2006). This unquestioning, unconditional 
aspect of anonymous public giving was a significant result of the habitualization of 
charitable giving, which strongly contrasts with new Islamic charities inquiring into 
personal details of applicant beneficiaries and placing conditions upon who could apply. 
As a methodological aside, I was concerned before setting out for fieldwork that 
the injunction to secrecy in Islamic almsgiving would present me with sizable difficulties 
as an ethnographer. Some people did in fact try to excuse themselves from my request for 
an interview by saying zakat payers should not speak of their zakat as that would 
constitute boasting, or potential “reminders of generosity” (cf. Qur’an 2:264) if news got 
back to their recipients.  Prepared for this response, I explained the tight IRB regulations 
already constraining my ability to share data and identifiers.  Once I did so, potential 
interviewees (to a person) agreed that the regulations upon me to not share information 
were in fact stricter than theirs.  Moreover, the Deobandi preacher Maulana Jahangir 
(profiled in chapter eight) explicitly gave his clerical opinion, as a sort of a fatwa, 
confirming that interviewees’ participation in my PhD project for scientific purposes was 
acceptable as it accorded with a general Muslim desire to promote a better understanding 
of Islam.  
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Intention: The Inner Dimension of Almsgiving  
The president (nazim) of Nadwa, Maulana Rabey Hasani, and other senior 
instructors at Nadwa gave a daily afternoon lecture series in a nearby village of 
Raebarilly, which is the home village of the Hasani family that founded the madrasa.  I 
attended with other students during Ramadan 2013.  The lectures all focused on hadith 
exegesis, and one hot day in July we sat in the masjid listening to Maulana Bilal Nu’mani 
Nadwi explain the “Hadith of Intention” – one of Sunni Islam’s most well-known hadith 
– after reciting it from Arabic by memory: 
‘The rewards of the deeds are according to intentions [‘amal kā dāromadār niyyat 
par hai]’ this hadith reads. If you don’t do something with intention, then you are 
not rewarded for it in Islam – the results will be also unintentional [is kā natījeh 
bhi bī niyyat natījeh ho]. A student came to me the other day and asked, ‘What is 
the most primary purpose [aṣlī maqṣad] of Islamic education [dīnī ta’līm]?’  He 
was a senior student [voh fazilīat mein thā]! I said, incredulously, ‘If you have 
been studying all these years without intention [bī niyyat] then you are also 
studying without result [bī natījeh]!  The results you get only come from your 
intention!’  For example, some people want to proselytize [da’wah], some want to 
produce scholarship, and so forth. 
 
Maulana Bilal then went on to give the example of “charity” (sadaqah) and how there are 
a multitude of acts that can signify charity (cf. Muslim 2:2198). Recited a hadith in 
Arabic, then continued in Urdu with the explanation: 
Doing acts properly with [charitable] intention is also sadaqah – even going with 
intention to your wife [to have sexual intercourse] is sadaqah.  Even putting a 
morsel of food in your wife’s mouth with intention is sadaqah. 
 
No ritual act in Islam is complete without a conscious act of willing, or “intention” 
(niyyat). A Muslim can simply go through motions of prayer, for example, but only if the 
intention has been made to do ṣalāt (obligatory prayer) will the prayers be accepted by 
Allah, according to traditional jurisprudence.  The same is true for ritual almsgiving.  The 
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intention is what distinguishes zakat from other charitable transactions to the deserving 
poor that do not count for a Muslim’s obligatory alms quota.  
By way of overview, 
in the course of describing 
Islamic jurisprudence on 
almsgiving, I identified at 
least eleven criteria 
necessary for zakat-giving to 
be “accepted by Allah” (in 
the words of my informants 
and the texts they read).  
These criteria mostly outline a proper form for zakat as a relationship between proper 
givers (three eligibility criteria) and proper receivers (four eligibility criteria) according 
to proper procedure (four criteria).  See Figure 4 for review of the criteria that I compiled, 
according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence; in the Shi’i school of Jafari fiqh, the 
main difference is that giving to sayyids (descendents of the Prophet Muhammad) is 
required for a portion of khums given by Shi’a, while among Sunni it is forbidden.   Other 
Sunni schools of law have slight differences from the Hanafi (e.g. zakat is obligated on 
wealth owned by minors, to be paid by their parents, and the insane; Powell 2009; Hallaq 
2009: 232).71 
                                                 
71  This discussion reflects criteria that are important for Muslims in Lucknow. Actual Islamic law 
includes further criteria. For example, Hallaq (2009: 232) lists five “logical conditions” for assets 
Figure 5: Criteria for Correct Zakāt 
Donor Requirements Recipient Requirements 
• Adult, not minors 
• Of sound mind 
• Above the poverty 
threshold (nisāb) 
• In need, according to eight 
categories (Qur’an 9:61) 
• Muslim, with some 
exceptions 
• Not a financial dependent 
of donor (or vice versa) 
• Not a sayyid,  
Procedure Requirements 
• Rate (e.g. 2.5% on surplus monetary assets) 
• Time period: Annually  
• Full transfer of ownership 
• Intention (niyyat) to give as zakāt 
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Ten of the criteria relate to external criteria.  Yet the inner criterion of intention 
was at times the ultimate determinant of zakat’s ritual efficacy. Intention could be the 
defining criteria that superseded the accidental violation of other criteria. According to 
the majority opinion in Hanafi jurisprudence, if the donor's intention is to give alms to a 
recipient who appears eligibly needy then regardless of what happens afterward the alms 
are considered valid zakat.72  This focus on donors’ intention restricts the determination 
of alms’ efficacy to the period of time while it still remains in the donor's hands (a stark 
difference from concerns among members of new Islamic charities, who partook of a 
more “developmentalist ethic” and expressed anxiety that their alms were not “correct” if 
not given to the right people for the right ends).   
For example, at the oldest orphanage in Aminabad, and Lucknow's most famous, I 
spent time visiting with the children and administrators during the month of Ramadan 
and observed three sacrifices, where goats were given to the orphanage as charitable 
donations for the children's meals (which are otherwise always vegetarian).  “Do you tell 
the children who donated the sacrifice, and ask them to pray for him or her?” I asked after 
the second sacrifice. The director laughed briefly, as if that seemed an inordinate request, 
and said, “No, nothing like that.”  I further inquired, “Isn't it the blessings of the 
recipients that motivate donors to give?” He replied, “Well, that is a natural thing! Of 
                                                                                                                                                 
on which zakat is mandated: 1) fully owned, 2) capable of growth or profitable trade, 3) in excess 
of subsistence, 4) free of impediments, such as debt.  
72  This is the majority opinion for the Hanafi school of law, which predominates in South Asia and 
was taught to me at Nadwa madrasa. Yet a minority opinion, just as valid and consistent with the 
beliefs of some Muslims in old city Lucknow (whether they are aware of the scholarly opinion 
itself, or not), holds that if a donor finds that a portion of their zakat has been paid incorrectly then 
it must be paid a second time. This minority opinion is attributed to Abu Yusuf (Marghiani 
2009:291). 
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course, if someone fills our need, a prayer slips from our heart [dil se du’a nikālega]!”  
But, then he continued emphatically, 
But that's not the point [the goal; maqṣad]! The point of charity is simple – I’ve 
already explained this to you. It all depends on the intention [niyyat] of the donor. 
If I give, my intention should only be to sacrifice [a goat] and give it away.  This 
was not the donor's intention, ‘I’ll now go distribute the meat [within the 
orphanage]’. What happens after he gifts it, that is all secondary. 
 
The director of the orphanage, who has spent his life associating with various Muslim 
givers coming there for charitable sacrifices, largely refuted the belief that charity would 
have reciprocal benefits in the form of “prayers from the heart” made by gratitude-filled 
recipients. In this case, it was unclear if the donation was strictly zakat or rather voluntary 
charity (sadaqah). Nevertheless, he was uncomfortable with the notion that religious 
giving brings reciprocal returns from the recipient.  He chose instead to invoke the 
common concept of donor’s intention (niyyat) and explain charity's power with reference 
to the donors, and their intentionality as heard by Allah during the act of giving. It is the 
intention in the donor’s heart that makes zakat purificatory and efficacious, not the 
prayers of the recipients.  His colleague broke in afterward to add, “Islam is often about 
intention [niyyat]. Everything depends on niyyat.”  The colleague’s words served to 
remind me that, in Islamic law on ritual practice, the efficacy derives from intention as 
well as from external criteria. 
Habituating Zakat, Learning Virtue 
Like other ethical habits, traditions of charity must be learned. Regular prayers 
proffered quotidian opportunities for charity, with lines of a dozen or more alms-seekers 
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(either beggars or volunteers for various causes) waiting outside mosque gateways at the 
end of each weekly congregational prayer and often during the five daily prayers. One of 
my neighbors mentioned above fondly remembered his father giving him rupee coins to 
donate each week when he was first old enough to begin attending prayers.  As Asad 
(1986: 15-17) reminded anthropologists of Islam, “orthodoxy” is “not a mere body of 
opinion but a distinctive relationship of power.”  Wherever Muslims have the power to 
claim, regulate, uphold, or require “correct” practices (as orthodoxy) and condemn 
incorrect ones, we must take account of such authority as it shapes the extant notions of 
what is or is not Islamic “orthodoxy.”  Thus, the authoritative teaching of Islam might be 
framed as “a modality of power operationalized through a set of moral codes” (Mahmood 
2005: 28; Foucault 1990).  These didactic relationships are seen in vignette of Friday 
prayers in Maulana Jahangir’s mosque above (the son encouraged to pass coins to the 
beggar, the sermon, and the informal lecturing of the muzein). However, I also depart 
from such clear identifications of religious virtues with hierarchical relations of 
discursive power. Individual Muslims chose and navigated the myriad of virtuous 
concerns by pedagogically inculcating such virtues of almsgiving within themselves: self-
study, interpreting scriptures on their own, re-working religious authority, and tailoring 
what they learned to their everyday realities.  
Daily travel and routine errands quickly become occasions for charitable giving as 
well.  Children growing up in Lucknow learned to give charity to beggars as they rode in 
open-air cycle rickshaws, especially with their mothers. “In the bazaar or on the 
street...my mother generally gives one or two rupees. My mother kept telling me [since 
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childhood], 'We should help out the needy' ... Charity was a part of life every day,” a 
Muslim businessman Mujtaba told me when I asked him if, and where, he had “learned” 
to give charity.  A distinguished colonel in the Indian army (not the Brigadier Khan in the 
vignette above) also told me he learned of the tradition of charity in Islam early, “On the 
lap of my mother.”  Faisal at Itehad Foundation told me both his mother and his 
grandmother “played the most important role” in his adopting service and charity 
activities. These answer echoed the responses of most other Muslim almsgivers who cited 
their mothers as role models for charitable giving.  Taking zakat “from my first 
paycheck,” a notion I heard in multiple interviews including the vignette of Brigadier 
Khan above, illustrates what is many Muslim donors’ first experiential encounter with 
zakat. Although Hanafi jurisprudence, the dominant school of Islamic law in India, only 
obligates zakat upon “adults” (baligh) who have reached the age of maturity, three 
interviewees who received paychecks (for example, doing translations as a high school 
student) all recall their parents instructing them to remove 2.5% for charity.  
 Habituation of almsgiving was a theme that Muslim givers viewed in both 
negative and positive lights. On one hand, as Mufti Anas said when beginning our first 
lesson in the madrasah, some Muslims give unreflectively “just like breakfast,” perhaps 
not allowing the deeper meanings of Islamic almsgiving to permeate their consciousness. 
Yet neither Mufti Anas nor others would criticize anyone for unreflective almsgiving – at 
least they are giving.  
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Conclusion 
In my first lesson with the Mufti Anas at Nadwa described in chapter one, he 
explained the obligation of almsgiving in Islam as both a divine command and as 
embedded within Islamic scriptural teachings, “We [give zakat] because Allah simply 
ordered it, as with all five pillars.”  But, as the mufti also emphasized, almsgiving is best 
when “understood completely” in terms of “knowledge of its aim, its spirit” – in other 
words, as embedded within an authoritative discursive tradition.  Charitable giving is as 
common in Lucknow as the ubiquitous begging in the crowded bazaars, which even a 
casual visitor encounters daily, and many people in Lucknow give alms unthinkingly and 
routinely (“just like breakfast”). What Mufti Anas termed doing something “because 
Allah ordered it” might also be termed a “divine command” view of morality in the 
philosophy of ethics (Lichtenberg 2009) and is a common view in Lucknow.  However, 
despite this common view of religious obligation as a sort of “rule for action,” my data 
illustrate a far deeper and more complex sensibility that encompasses a myriad of moral 
concerns.  By providing an overview of the diversity of virtuous concerns related to 
zakat, I demonstrate how a simplified, static view of “Islamic law” belies the actual social 
processes of inculcating virtues into one’s character.  Distinguished from Durkheimian 
views in four ways, I take virtues to be: (a) part of individual habitus, (b) plural sets of 
virtuous concerns, (c) analyzing moral obligations as occasions for voluntary choices 
rather than the antithesis of free agency, and (d) over time habitualized and embodied as 
part of moral character.  
First, these very same informants’ clear-cut statements concealed their own 
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complex and highly developed understandings of zakat – for example, when Ahmed the 
clerk is challenged by a customer, he defends a complex belief in “charity as a right,” as I 
discuss below.  These instances were expressions of what Bourdieu (1977: 19, 167) 
termed a doxa, or “discourse of familiarity” that “leaves unsaid all that goes without 
saying” by virtue of being implicitly understood. Doxa are traditions, but this “tradition is 
silent, not least about itself as a tradition,” thus being neither orthodoxy nor heterodoxy.  
While building on his insights in how doxa informs the habitus, I also go beyond 
Bourdieu’s framework of habitus as primarily class-based, replacing it with a more 
expansive Aristotelian notion of habitus from virtue ethics and recent work in the 
anthropology of morality that emphasizes how ethics are inculcated by agents through 
uniquely personal series of continuous practices and habits.  
Moreover, if the “system of zakat” were contained in (only) one book, if all 
Muslims in Lucknow agreed on its tenets, or if it were a mere unquestionable divine 
command, then it would be taught as such at India’s top madrasas such as Nadwa and 
indeed be possible to “just write that down” – but that was not the case.  The obligation 
of zakat in practice was not singular, as a divine command to either be followed or 
liberatingly rejected, but rather I observed it to be a myriad of obligations, among which 
Lucknow Muslims had to navigate and choose.  I term these various understandings of 
the obligations of zakat as “concerns” (Barth 1993), to highlight how these virtuous 
concerns were not only plural but also are not direct isomorphic representations of 
society’s moral codes. Concerns that guide zakat-giving were individual interpretations 
of Islamic moral codes, passed on and taught through Islamic scriptures and their 
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commentaries by ‘ulama but always subject to contradictions, debate, and mutually 
agreed-upon areas of divergent opinions.  To illustrate this point ethnographically, the 
following sections take up a certain concern (e.g. proper recipients of zakat) in Islamic 
scriptures and proceed to explore how these teachings are understood (or not) among 
‘ulama in the madrasa and ordinary Muslims alike.  My exploration of these discourses 
follows the family of approaches within the anthropology of Islam that take it to be a 
“discursive tradition” (MacIntyre 1988, Asad 1986, Zaman 2002, Bowen 2013).    
Third, virtuous concerns are a useful analytic because the plural nature of ethics 
necessitated individual choice rather than precluded it.  Individual almsgivers described 
their zakat practices as constant negotiation between what they saw as competing 
concerns, such as whether to give directly to the poor or to a more sustainable 
organization or whether to follow up to see how a recipient used zakat or to merely give 
with the best intention without then risking “insult” or immodesty.  As Michael Lambek 
wrote, the “judgment” that is typical of ordinary ethics involves a constant weighing of 
virtuous concerns, “rather than (Kanthian/Durkheimian) rule or obligation” and merely 
the decision to conform or break it (2010: 28).  Put another way,  
The relation between freedom and rule or convention is evident also in the 
mundane fact that people are regularly faced with deciding which of several 
commitments or obligations to give priority to.  
 
As a trivial example, we may feel relatively obligated to spend holidays with 
family but relatively free to decide whether to spend Christmas with our own 
parents or those of our partner, and free also to rationalize the fact that we’ve 
decided to stay at home this year, go to Mexico, or convert to Islam instead 
(Lambek 2013: 3). 
 
Lambek’s notion of “pragmatic judgment” (phronesis) stems from an Aristotelian view of 
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ethics as immanent to social action. Discerning the good is less of a deontological process 
of appealing a priori to transcendent norms, and more of an arduous endeavor. As seen in 
Lucknow Muslims’ competing notions of what constitutes the “correct” or most 
normatively ideal utilization of zakat, the deceptively simple act of giving one’s money 
away becomes a real chore, as almsgivers employ precise methods of accounting, 
struggle to investigate potential recipients, contort their words and gestures in the very act 
of giving to make zakat less “damaging” for the receiver.  As Mutfi Anas instructed, “it’s 
better to understand [zakat] completely…its spirit, its basis, its purpose” otherwise its 
practice will only be “routine.”  Being a proper almsgiver in Lucknow, more often than 
not, involved information-gathering as well as self-reflection prior to decisions to give.   
 Yet to turn to the fourth point, zakat became a habitualized act once an almsgiver 
had satisfactorily made up his her or mind as to what virtuous concerns guided their 
giving.  Many informants were first introduced to Islamic charitable giving in childhood 
by their parents, and thus had long ago cultivated a virtue of almsgiving according to 
years of reflection – donors to madrasas, whose families had done so for generations, are 
the best examples of this reflective routinization.  However, most interviewees also 
recognized that they could be doing more, calculating more precisely, or giving with a 
more pious frame of mind – the virtues of worship such as zakat was perceived as always 
perfectable, rather than completed.  At the end of each Ramadan, the time when the most 
charity was given in Lucknow, Muslims greeted each other with phrases such as “May 
Allah accept your fasting and your worship [Allāh āp ka rozah aur āp kī ‘ibādat qābūl 
farmāye],” which served as a reminder that even the purportedly “correct” performance 
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of Ramadan rituals still depended on Allah’s mercy.  
 My approach to the anthropology of morality also re-visits the characterization of 
Islam as a “discursive tradition” (Asad 1986). Anthropologists of Islam have emphasized 
the methodological importance of beginning our analyses with recognition of texts, or “as 
Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to 
the founding texts of the Qur’an and Hadith” (Asad 1986: 14). As Bowen described this 
approach  
Many anthropologists studying Islam today start from the socially embedded 
chains of human interpretation that link today's practices across societies and over 
time…Whether with respect to politics, prayer, or purification, Muslims justify 
what they do by tracing contemporary understandings back to originating and 
authenticating acts. This way of looking at Islam thus starts from people drawing 
on textual traditions to inform social practices…This new anthropology of Islam 
has placed an increased emphasis on religious texts and ideas, but only as they are 
understood and transmitted in particular times and places (Bowen 2013: L164-
168, L184-189).  
  
The value of methodologically approaching Islam as “tradition” is indisputable, in my 
mind. However, I wish to bifurcate the treatment of tradition into “discursive tradition” 
and “embodied tradition,” in order to draw on recent anthropology of embodiment and 
virtue ethics (Deeb 2006, Taylor 1990, Faubion 2011).  
Embodied tradition is an important point of departure for an anthropology of 
Islam because we are often seeing Islam being altered in the processes of habituation. In 
the course of embodiment, Islam as a tradition comes to be modified in ways that are not 
primarily the result of discourses and debates among scholarly ‘ulama and ordinary 
ideologies of popular – for example, in the evolving effects of the Hajj on contemporary 
Muslim religiosities, as it transformed through air travel, population growth, and 
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localized infrastructure-development by the Saudi state (Bianchi 2013) or in the 
individualized interpretations of the proper recipients of zakat described in this chapter.  
As such changes are not initiated by discursive argumentation (nor at times, even explicit 
at the level of discourse), they may be missed by such a methodological focus.   
My approach, however, is not a call to revive the methodological prioritization of 
“folk” or “everyday” Islam(s) over and above “orthodox,” scriptural, or “Great” tradition 
(e.g. El-Zein 1977, Gilsenan 1983, Das 1984, Ahmad 1981).  Islamic reformism is by 
now ubiquitous (even banal) in India, and ordinary Muslims themselves speak explicitly 
of orienting themselves towards scriptural practice in their daily lives – analytic 
approaches that utilize a little-great dichotomy of tradition are quite obsolete. When 
ordinary Muslims in Lucknow sought to inculcate teachings of “correct” Islam (however 
imagined) through regimes of study, regular habituated practices, and opening themselves 
to proximate social cues and incentives with the help of friends and local institutions, 
then these acts constituted the process by which discursive tradition was transformed into 
embodied tradition.  Or, alternatively, in childhood the acts were learned through 
emulation and repetition, only to later be post-hoc justified through reference to 
discursive tradition that was imagined as ontologically (if not actually) prior to the act. 
This view of embodiment need not relate purely to flesh and blood persons, but as I will 
discuss in chapter five it also relates to materializations of Islamic tradition in objects, 
and how these represent and re-shape didactic discourses, such as calligraphic zakat 
receipts, documentation, and the role of hard cash in conditioning Muslims’ calculative 
economic theologies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE PURITY ETHIC: 
ZAKAT & THE VIRTUOUS PARADOX OF “OBLIGATED VOLUNTARISM”  
 
 
Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it…cf. Koran, Sourate II, 265 
-- Marcel Mauss (1960: 82, 188) 
 
Those who spend their wealth in the Cause of Allah, and do not follow up their gifts with 
reminders of their generosity or with injury, their reward is with their Lord…Kind words 
and forgiving of faults are better than Sadaqah (charity) followed by injury. 
-- Qur’an, Suras 2:262-3 (trans. Muhsin Khan) 
 
Perform as-ṣalāt (prayer) and give zakat, and lend to Allah a goodly loan. 
-- Qur’an, Sura 73:20 
Introduction 
The notion that the gift contains the potential for “damage” far pre-dates Marcel 
Mauss’ ([1925] 1960) The Gift, as seen in the Qur’anic verses (2:262-3). Muslim scholars 
since the time of the Prophet Mohammad have only reinforced and elaborated on this 
warning that gifts can be inherently “injurious.” According to mainstream Islamic 
teachings of madrasas and their ‘ulama in Lucknow, zakat is not typified by 
anthropological notions of “the gift” as one that damages the recipients. Throughout my 
fieldwork as well, many Muslim donors (at least, those who were not involved in 
developmentalist charity associations) had imbibed such teachings and endeavored to 
represent almsgiving not as an exchange between haves and have-nots, but as a  
(re)payment to Allah in which the actual recipient of physical alms is necessarily 
occluded from the field of ethical consideration.   
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The central goal of this chapter is to introduce what I term the “purity ethic” in 
Islamic almsgiving: a set of virtuous “concerns” and teachings about zakat that motivated 
Muslims to conceptualize the giving away of their own wealth to others as an act which 
essentially is of great purificatory benefit to them, as donors.73 It also evidences a moral 
concern with the potential “injury” or shame to those needy Muslims who take charity, 
and I illustrate how donors followed certain ethical criteria in hopes of mitigating these 
damaging effects of the gift.  Regardless of whether almsgivers actually accomplished 
this (I made observations of numerous donors speaking in ways that constituted 
hierarchical status claims over poorer recipient Muslims), my point for this chapter is that 
such virtuous concerns of the purity ethic did inflect zakat-giving in Lucknow in ways 
that distinguished them from Maussian cosmologies of reciprocal gift-giving.  This purity 
ethic was conceived of in numerous ways that many Muslims in Lucknow shared with 
other traditionally educated Muslims around the world: as a divine command to financial 
purity that is enforceable in the Hereafter, as “purification” akin to washing away 
impurities and sins in this world (Benthall 1999), as “a loan to Allah” (cf. Mittermaier 
2014), and as bolstering belief in monotheism and the donor’s relationship with Allah).  
Such concerns have always been extant in sources of Islamic tradition and were passed 
down via madrasah-based scriptural studies.  However, the purity ethic emerged with new 
emphasis in the 19th century as Islamic reformist movements revived and popularized 
                                                 
73 Bornstein’s (2012: 27) analysis of humanitarian work in New Delhi tied donors’ beliefs in 
disinterested charity to Hindu ideas of “relinquishment” (tyag), illustrating how these virtuous 
concerns are in no way particular to Islam.  However, as this chapter describes, the articulations of 
virtuous concerns about zakat, their perceived origins in interpretations of scriptures, how they 
shape historically specific enactments, and how such concerns come to be institutionalized in ways 
perceived as “Islamic” are all particular to the Lucknow Muslim communities I describe.  
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notions of moral reform rooted in expressions of piety of ordinary Muslims.  This chapter 
concludes by tracing its historical emergence in texts authored by leading scholars of the 
Deoband and Tablighi Jama’at movements.  
In Lucknow, I identified elements of the purity ethic most clearly in my 
interviews with Muslim givers who came from urban, Muslim reformist families but who 
were not members of the new Islamic charities that propounded and institutionalized a 
more developmentalist discourse.  Accordingly, much of the data in this chapter are 
drawn from my casual acquaintances in Lucknow such as neighbors, informants in the 
bazaar during periods of participant observation, social contacts from mosques that I 
frequented, and referrals from contacts in new Islamic charities. The purity ethic, for 
these donors, was a discourse that entangled egoistic interests with societal interests, and 
merged personal gain with socializing processes of community-identification.  This 
chapter’s conclusions attend to the social and ethical construction of selfhood in self-
interest as zakat embodies the paradox of obligated voluntarism.  Inculcating the virtuous 
concerns of zakat played a foundational role in the formation of moral selfhood of donors 
as “Indian Muslims” concerned for others in their community. 
North Indian Gift Economies:  Hindu Dan and Islamic Protective Charity  
North India has been particularly fertile ground for anthropologists to analyze 
gift-giving (dān).  Gifting is an assertion of unequal hierarchy if the taker finds himself 
unable to reciprocate (Mauss 1960: 40-42).  The Hindus of north India have articulated an 
explanation for this “damage” to recipients’ status, naming it explicitly as “poison,” in 
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contrast to other cultures that Mauss studied that implicitly understood it as an unspoken 
gift obligation. In vernacular terminology for what is essentially Mauss’ theory of the 
gift, the potential for bad luck inheres in the gift as “poison,” which is then passed on to 
the receiver who retains the poisons, unless they in turn make presentations of gifts.  
Continuing to be a giver of gifts thereby rids oneself of impurities or “poisons” contained 
in the karma of gift exchange.  The spiritual return for the gift was perceived to accrue to 
the donor in the form of blessings or good karma that would ward off misfortune (Raheja 
1988, Parry 1994; see Laidlaw 2000 on the Jain).  
Muslim religious life in Lucknow, quite similar to other Indian groups, is 
punctuated with highly public and regular festivals.  Nearly every one is an occasion to 
give charity, for the sake of the traditions learned and passed down for generations.  The 
highly public and ubiquitous presence of charitable acts ensures that Lucknow Muslims 
consider charity to be interwoven with other banalities of daily life. Many gifts were 
considered unrelated to the specific Islamic scriptural teachings on zakat.  In north India 
among Muslims, there were ideas of charity as protective against misfortune (ṣadaqah 
tahfuz) similar to Hindu notions.  Sadaqah, as voluntary charity, was perceived as a gift 
freely given out of the goodness of one’s heart.  But the lack of apparent material 
reciprocity from others was a prime concern for Muslims in Lucknow who gave sadaqah.  
While anthropologists have discussed the problem of non-reciprocated gifts as patronage, 
social distinction and “centrality” (Raheja 1988), or even claims to “masculine prestige” 
(Osella & Osella 2006: 92-93), Muslims in Lucknow address this concern by adhering to 
a familiar north Indian cosmology in which there was always a spiritual reciprocal return 
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for charitable gifts:  Charity among Muslims in north India was said to ward off the “evil 
eye” (nazar).  In the following series of ethnographic examples, I draw parallels between 
Muslims’ ideas about “the evil eye” and Hindu notions of “poison.”  
Uncle Hussain and Auntie Amina were my landlords and neighbors for four 
months of 2013. As a Sunni family who migrated from rural Uttar Pradesh to Lucknow, 
they were known in Aminabad bazaar as a pious, upwardly mobile middle-class family 
who prayed, fasted, and gave alms, but (as they themselves related) were no more 
charitable than any other practicing Muslims in old city. Sadaqah tahfuz was often given 
when coming into some good fortune, at the start of a risky undertaking such as travel or 
a new business venture, and (especially) at life-course events like the birth of their 
granddaughter – which involved both risk and good fortune.74 One form of this practice, 
“taking off the evil eye” (nazar utarna) involved circling the head of the recipient of alms 
with rupee notes multiple times (often at least three, I noticed) which accomplished a 
“taking off” (utarna) of any ill effects of jealousy or “evil eye” (nazar), before giving it 
to them. The very verb utarna (to take off) applied to this act of circling three times is 
suggestive of the cosmological impurities that adhere to the money that will be gifted to 
others.75 Then, the cash was set aside and given to the local poor or street beggars later in 
the day.  The ritual act of protective charity could be performed by anyone, and was 
usually not a ritual specialist.  Indeed, at pre-wedding celebrations (e.g. dholkī, mehndi) 
                                                 
74 Giving charity is not the only form of avoiding nazar, and South Asian Muslims also employ 
amulets (ta’wiz) or simply hide wealth and good fortune from others’ jealousy. See, for example, 
Werbner (2003: 223-224). 
75 Givers of dan among Gujars of north India also saw this practice as “protective,” bringing security 
to themselves and (when done as part of a village ritual) to the entire village (Raheja 1988: 20). 
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or weddings I observed guests approach the bride and groom with cash notes, sometimes 
circling their heads with the notes, and deposit the cash in a dish for future donation to 
the poor. Nazar utarna was a healing practice common among Hindu and Christian 
groups as well, although the objects used by them to circle the head are not always 
money intended for charity (e.g. raw liver, Flueckiger 2006: 177). 
Alternatively, Muslims simply distributed charity with the intention of bringing 
protective blessings, without the ritual display of circling heads or lifting the evil eye.  
Auntie one day over tea, knowing I was always interested in charity, volunteered a story 
of how “charity saved my brother” (ṣadaqah se mere bhai bach gaye), which I 
paraphrase:   
My brother gave a hundred-rupee note to a wandering beggar (faqīr; perhaps seen 
as a holy man) before setting out to transport a piece of machinery.  But while he 
was driving his truck later he fell asleep at the wheel and had an accident. 
Although the collision sliced his car in half, he himself was lifted out of his seat, 
bent in half, and thrown through the window to land safely on the ground without 
a scratch! 
  
Auntie Husain then related her brother's immediate explanation: It was the faqir to whom 
he had given alms who (in spirit form) had lifted him to safety.  “Sometimes these things 
happen. Sometimes there is a prayer [of gratitude] lodged in someone's heart when you 
give alms to them, and it slips out [to Allah]” and that prayer rescues you, she explained.  
Moreover, it was significant that the faqir’s prayer merely “slipped” from his lips, rather 
than intended as a sort of spiritual service that might take the form of a transaction, thus 
partially negating the purportedly pure intentions of the donor and perhaps disqualifying 
it as charitable goodwill (cf. Parry 1994).  
Folklore among Lucknow's Muslims, in addition to real-life stories, are a crucial 
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medium for constructing and maintaining this cosmological force of prayers and poisons 
that are gifted along with charity.  Another time, Auntie related to me a “Tale of the Tight-
Fisted King” (kanjūs raja kī kahani), a story with which many people were familiar:   
The tight-fisted raja kept an exact accounting of his entire household, including 
the flour bought in the market.  Each meal he counted the number of flatbreads 
(roti) served to ensure that no grain went missing. But the king's cook was as 
clever as she was kind-hearted, and while she rolled out roti each day them she 
pinched a pill-sized ball of dough from each flatbread, and from every twenty-five 
or so pilfered dough-balls she formed another flatbread. A faqir (mendicant or 
holy man) lived outside, and she handed this extra flatbread to him every day 
through the skylight in the ceiling. The king went to war, and in a losing battle 
ended up out-numbered.  Fighters with swords surrounded him, then rushed to 
attack, but as they did so, small pieces of sticky bread-dough appeared on his skin 
as each enemy blade struck him. Instead of the king, the bread-dough was cut 
wherever a sword landed. He escaped home. The raja told his incredulous wife at 
dinner the story of how bread pieces had saved him. His cook standing nearby 
then piped up, saying that it was she who daily had pilfered a pill-sized dough-
ball from each flatbread, cooked it into a new bread, and given it to the faqir.  He 
was so elated, he exclaimed, 'Sadaqah has saved my life!' 
 
This folk tale is particularly salient, as it truly represents the protective blessings as a 
reciprocal return for the raja’s property given as charity.   In Lucknow Muslims 
understanding of zakat, for example, almsgiving may in fact result in Allah’s future 
favor; however, it should not be directly anticipated as such lest the donor compromise 
their purity of intention.76 Yet for this (clearly selfish) raja of lore, there is no mistaking 
the protective blessings of the faqir as intercession of Allah on behalf of a good-hearted, 
charitable man, because the raja was just as surprised as anyone that portions of his 
wealth had also been consolations for the local beggar.  
                                                 
76 There is, however, a teaching on zakat that states that even if someone else (such as a wife or 
servant) has paid zakat from a person’s property without his knowledge, then it is still considered 
valid zakat (Marghiani 2006).  Although I did not hear Lucknow Muslims discuss this teaching, 
only having studied it in texts, it illustrates a partial elision of the notions of zakat and sadaqah as 
not completely distinct.   
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These vignettes all partake of a cosmology in which recipients’ prayers (du’a) are 
a reciprocal benefit for the giver that guards against misfortune, parallel to the Hindu 
notion of givers ridding themselves of potential misfortunes believed to reside as 
“poison” in gifts.  The central belief underlying the assumed mechanism of protective 
charity is that the donor was shielded as a result of the prayers of gratitude by the alms-
taker.  The more in need an alms-recipient was, Auntie explained to me, then the stronger 
the prayer will be that escaped from his or her heart upon the surprise occasion of 
receiving a donation. When I asked Auntie exactly how protective charity works, she 
elaborated further on this belief, clarifying her perception of charity's limited (but 
effective) power,  
“If you give sadaqah and some troubles [parīshānī] are about to come your way, 
then they will still happen but their effect will be reduced [asr kam lagegi]. You'll 
be saved [bach jaoge]. Because the things which Allah has decreed [maqrār kiye] 
will happen, they will happen for sure. But, because of the sadaqah, their effect 
will be less.” 
 
As with other Muslims I spoke with about charity’s cosmological powers, Auntie Husain 
maintained first and foremost her belief in Allah as the Lord of the Universe (rab al-
amīn).  The monotheistic centrality of an all-powerful Lord necessitates such an 
adjustment to the otherwise pervasive Hindu belief in north India in the “poison” of the 
gift: instead, the reciprocal benefits to the charity-giver result from the spiritual blessings 
of prayers to Allah that slip from the hearts of those whose needs are fulfilled by charity. 
Beliefs regarding protective charity among Muslim givers have been similarly 
documented by ethnographers working throughout India (e.g. Fazalbhoy 2006; Osella & 
Osella 2006: 92).    
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A Note on Syncretisms in South Asia 
 The literature in anthropology of South Asia (especially in past decades) has been 
rife with discussions of syncretism. The parallels between Hindu beliefs in “poison” of 
gifts in north India and Muslim protective charity that I observed seem to represent just 
this sort of syncretic encounter.  But I stop short of terming this parallel a syncretism.  
There is no doubt that India has long been home to a multitude of faith traditions, 
adherents of which have adopted each others’ practices and even creeds.  As Francis 
Robinson’s (1983) critique of Imtiaz Ahmad’s work in Indian Islam has argued, the 
politics of naming social forms as “syncretisms” and “religions” are never inseparable 
from India’s nationalist politics and culture wars.  Imtiaz Ahmad (1981) wrote that 
syncretic Indian Islam is an entity distinct from other “foreign” practices of Islam, and is 
thus more “hybrid” and “tolerant.”  However, Robinson and Peter van der Veer (1994) 
cautioned that linking popular Muslim practices with Hinduism can feed into Hindu 
nationalist efforts to represent Islam as outside the proper pale of the Indian nation – 
except where Muslims have adopted “Hindu” Indian customs (cf. Das 1984).   
The “poison” in the gift associated with Brahmins in Benares (Parry 1984) and 
Gujjars (Raheja 1988) when placed alongside protective charity among Muslims in 
Lucknow, should not be simplified as a “syncretic” merging of practices from two 
discrete religions77. Equating these beliefs even in scholarship could constitute a 
                                                 
77 From another perspective, the existence of these parallel Hindu-Muslim beliefs could reflect what 
Marcel Mauss argued (from ethnographic examples drawn from a diversity of societies) is a more 
or less universal human perception of reciprocity. There is a “justice” inherent in the “morality of 
the gift”: a cosmological belief in balanced and just exchange that suggests gifts given will 
(somehow) be repaid (Mauss 1960: 17-18). 
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poisonous vitriol of its own seeping into charged politics of Indian nationalism. 
Analytically, I view “syncretism” as a place-holder, or a term that merely indicates a 
possible instance of otherwise inevitable and ubiquitous processes of mixing and sharing. 
In South Asia, syncretisms are so common as to be banal, and identification of them 
serves the purposes of actual scholarly analysis less than those of cultural politics.  
The Purity Ethic: Cleansing Wealth, Cleansing the Soul 
Ritual purity is a perennial necessity for every Indian Muslim to fulfill this-
worldly requirements in worshipping.  Washing off impurities from the skin and clothing 
is a requirement before prayer specified in Islamic law.  Known as “ablutions” or wudhu, 
it illustrates this-worldly importance of purification in Islam. Purification is also part of 
next-worldly requirements in order to avoid punishment in the hereafter (for example, 
giving the dead body a full bath [ghusl]). The conceptualizations of purity among 
Muslims in north India differ from those of their Hindu neighbors. Many north Indian 
Hindus mid- to lower-caste ranks (varna) are perceived as remaining in an unclean state 
shy of full purity on a permanent basis throughout their lives (i.e. due to an occupation or 
lifestyle involving meat or leather).  The difference for Muslims in India, is that the 
degree of ritual purity required of Muslims is the same for each and every Muslim, 
whether that activity is eating, earning, or performing their quotidian worship obligations 
such as daily prayers or cyclical fasting days.  Purity in Islam is more of a binary (halāl 
versus ḥarām, bā-wuẓū versus bī - wuẓū) in contrast to the sliding scale of purity across 
graded hierarchy of caste-based occupations in classical Hindu scriptures (Vedas) and 
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common practice (Marriot 1968, Dumont 1972).  Moreover, purity in Islam is imagined 
in north India, if not as a constant state, then at least as a perennial one, which any 
Muslim can reach in a matter of minutes through washing (or perhaps after a short 
number of days, if one is waiting until menstruation is over).  
As a brief aside, “caste does not exist in Islam,” informants in Lucknow 
occasionally told me.  While my fieldwork progressed, however, I observed occasions in 
which Muslims attended to boundaries of caste-like communities, most overtly of course 
in marriage arrangements (see also Basant & Shariff 2009: 4-5).    ‘Ulama even became 
involved in making marriage arrangements on a regular basis, and I knew of one Nadwa 
graduate who also achieved city-wide fame among Lucknow Muslims (and a steady 
income) through his match-making business.  Among his first questions for grooms— 
and brides-to-be inquired into the caste (birādari).  While caste-like status distinctions 
among Muslims are inflected by broader Indian notions of purity and hierarchy, they are 
not directly analogous to Hindu notions (to say nothing of the variety of orientations to 
caste amongst Hindus; cf. Raheja 1988; Rao 2009).  At least one study has empirically 
illustrated how caste among Muslims is more fluid over time, constituting more of a 
social form of “elective ethnicity” (Ali 2002).  Filippo and Caroline Osella (2000) have 
illustrated how upwardly mobile groups such as the Izhava that were once stigmatized as 
Hindu untouchables have attempted to escape social exclusion through conversion to 
Islam.  Others have chronicled low-caste “dalit Muslim” political assertions that are 
simultaneously calling attention to and upending extant caste hierarchies among Muslims 
(Sikand 2006).   Conceptualizations of financial purity in Islam incorporate a vast range 
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of ethical teachings on zakat, wealth, modesty, and status. While relevant and imbricated, 
South Asian caste beliefs are far from being a central influence on Indian Muslim ideas 
about financial purity.   
Islamic law instructs Muslims to cleanse wealth of any impurities from activities 
such as gambling, before their death.  Muslims also pay alms to purify their wealth each 
year.  In many conversations I had, Lucknow’s Muslims regularly described to me the 
basic meaning of zakat as “purification.”  For example, during interviews with over fifty 
Muslim donors, I asked if “my wealth will be cleaned [apnā māl pāk karegā],” to which 
they all responded affirmative. Many donors even repeated this answer, “my wealth will 
be cleaned” in answer to my further prompts about other important reasons they gave 
alms.78 One store clerk gave it as the answer to every prompt, by the end declaring 
impatiently, “Look. I believe this much, that if you give zakat, your wealth will stay 
purified [pāk rehegā].” 
One donor, and only one donor, that I interviewed early in my fieldwork extended 
the idea of purifying wealth even to insinuate that inadvertent financial irregularities were 
rectified by zakat-giving. This man was a businessman who also gave to Itehad 
Foundation (see chapter seven).  He explained in English as part of a long response to my 
general question about his views on almsgiving,  
Donor: Also, most of the time, when you have lots of things, lots of wealth, you 
are also caught up [financially] in a lot of good things and a lot of bad 
things. Just to take care of that ill part [of our finances], most of the time 
we all want to also do something good to help [i.e. give charity]—Just 
                                                 
78 Prompts included:  “I give my zakat… a) to help the poor, b) to avoid punishment in the afterlife, 
and c) so that my wealth will be protected.” 
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to—What should I say? Just to balance that [ill part or irregularity] with, 
well you know— 
Chris:  Donating something? 
Donor: Yea, yea. 
 
This man viewed zakat’s “purifying” power as even extending to potentially irregular 
financial dealings, presumably inadvertent misuse or acquisition of funds in his business 
or his personal finances that he was not aware of.  However, he was the only one to bring 
up this issue, despite my including a question about it in my subsequent year of 
interviewing.  The idea of donating ill-gotten money to charity is well-established in 
Islamic law, although not in the same sense that this man proposed.  Earnings from 
prohibited (ḥarām) sources such as illegal activities such as gambling, selling alcohol, or 
fraud (notwithstanding how a Muslim should come into such funds) are to be all donated 
to the poor. This practice of giving alms as “expiation” (kaffārah) is distinguished in 
Islamic jurisprudence from zakat.79 However, it is easy to see how they might be 
confused.  
The Arabic term for almsgiving (al- zakāh, Urdu: zakāt), a verb, means “to 
purify” as one among the various meanings of the root word (Qaradawi 1999: 3).  Use of 
the word zakah in the Qur'an, in fact, switches between both meanings of “purification” 
and “alms,” twice utilizing the word zakah according to its meaning as “purity” (verses 
18:81, 19:13), while employing it thirty other times to mean “almsgiving.”  In another 
verse (9:103), the Qur'an orders Prophet Mohammad to collect charity in order to 
“purify” (using the verbal cognate of zakāh: tuzakkeehim) the wealth of Muslims.  In this 
                                                 
79 The literature on Islamic banking regularly discusses this sort of “cleansing” of wealth due to 
profits from interest (ribah), which is prohibited in Islam.  See Maurer (2002) and Tobin (2015).  
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sense, ritual almsgiving and ritual washing have been considered parallel acts of 
purification.  For example, the famous jurist Imam al-Shafi’i (d. 820) wrote extensively 
on the resemblance of zakat and the ablution (wudhū, tahara) required before prayer 
(Hallaq 2009: 231). 
Islamic law sets for the requirements for obligatory almsgiving, more precisely 
than injunctions to give charity in either of the other two Abrahamic faiths Judaism and 
Christianity.  Wealth (Arabic: mal) that is beyond what is necessary for living expenses, 
what we might call savings, or surplus assets, is impure unless the tithe of zakat is paid 
from it one year after acquisition. Impure wealth (on which zakat has not been paid) 
carried to one's grave may result in dire consequences in the hereafter. In my interviews, 
many Muslims familiar with scriptures referenced hadith in which the Prophet 
Mohammad explained that such gold would be used as red-hot brands upon the skin of 
those who did not pay alms (Bukhari 1956: 2:489).  Mrs. Khan, for example, told me in 
our interview that such wealth might “turn into snakes and beetles which will bite me in 
my grave” (cf. Bukhari 1956: 2:485).    
When I began study of Islamic law at Lucknow’s largest madrasa, Nadwa, the 
mufti (jurist) who was my instructor began on the first day reading aloud80 a speech by 
Maulana Maududi (d. 1979), the founder of Jama’at-i Islami: 
The meaning of zakat is purity [pak] and cleansing [safai]. Allah said to give to 
the poor for this reason, that in this way that wealth [mal] will get purified. And 
with that wealth, the person himself will get purified. (Maududi 1963: 5)81 
                                                 
80 Madrasa education in India is primarily based on recitation of texts and (often) rote memorization 
of them.  In a typical lesson, instructor (or a student) reads texts verbatim, pausing occasionally to 
parse difficult words or explicate deeper meanings. 
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The mufti repeated the last statement for emphasis.  Even though the passage explicitly 
mentions “give to the poor,” the mufti did not provide any context to this idea within a 
socioeconomic framework – nor even mention “the poor.” Rather than highlighting 
donations as economic development to beneficiaries, or at least as rudimentary alleviation 
of some of poverty’s harshness, the mufti’s lesson went on to emphasize the boons 
almsgiving brought to the donor, in a manner that I later discovered was typical of ‘ulama 
and students at Nadwa: 
Whoever doesn't take out their wealth and give to the servants [bande] of Allah 
[i.e. Muslims], his wealth is [left] unclean [na-pāk]. Along with his wealth, his 
soul [nafs] will be unclean.  Unclean, because he has so much ingratitude [ehsān-
farāmosh] filling his soul, is so miserly [dil tang], so selfish [khudgarz], so 
wealth-worshipping [zār-parast], even though God [khudā] has given him more 
than is really necessary and done him so much favor [ehsān].  Can such a man 
expect to have a connection [wasta] to Allah, to do any good act [naikī]? No. He 
has an unclean heart, whoever hoards [jamah kare] wealth in this way.  
 
Donors who give alms have their souls cleansed of base desires and win Allah’s favor. 
Those who fail to give are denied spiritual connection to Allah. The emphasis here is on 
the sins of a Muslim who neglects almsgiving, and upon the virtues that are exercised 
through the mere act of almsgiving.   
The mufti closed the book and summarized the lesson, “You should accept Allah’s 
favor of giving you so much wealth and not be ungrateful. Give happily to those poor 
brothers, as Allah gave it to you also with love [mohhābat].”  His point, in distilling 
introductory ideas about zakat, emphasized a view of almsgiving not as payment of 
                                                                                                                                                 
81 Maulana Maududi’s works are normally not taught in Nadwa, or other madrasas not founded by his 
party. Maududi’s religious credentials as a madrasa graduate have been questions by top scholars at 
Deoband and his work on zakat Ḥaqīqat-i Zakāt was written for a general audience rather than 
madrasa students. This latter reason, however, is why the mufti thought it was a good place to 
begin our course, before we later moved on to scholarly works taught in the madrasa. 
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charity nor a financial transaction where the donor is losing money and the recipient 
gains it, but rather a spiritual act that brings the donor closer to Allah. Indeed, if zakat 
represents a transaction at all between two people, the mufti’s words “give happily…as 
Allah gave to you” illustrate that zakat is merely a metonym for Allah’s beneficence, a 
virtuous act of gratitude enacted by spreading divine blessings to others.  This semiotic 
construction of zakat represents it not as a charitable payment between two Muslims, but 
rather a symbolic re-payment to Allah in recognition of originary gifts from the divine 
that have already made the donor wealthy (but not ungrateful). 
Finishing my madrasa studies, I then wanted to gauge whether what the mufti 
taught, that almsgiving purified donors' souls by teaching them to not be ungracious, 
corresponded to everyday Muslims' beliefs, if ordinary Muslims viewed almsgiving as an 
exercise in forming virtuous habits.  On the survey for donors I administered in Ramadan 
(July) 2013, I inquired into the “reasons” (vujūhat) behind giving alms.  One reason I 
tested was “My wealth will be made pure (pāk)” through almsgiving, to which everyone 
(n = 26) replied “yes.” Clearly, the basic definition of zakat as “purification” is a 
pervasive concept in Luckow. Another reason I tested related specifically to the moral 
purification of the donor's character and soul: “Almsgiving teaches me to part with my 
wealth, to not be greedy (dil-tang) or wealth-loving (zār-parast).” However, it was very 
difficult for respondents to voice agreement with what was essentially a re-phrasing of 
my lessons in the madrasa, and most answered “no” to disavow that this reason motivated 
their almsgiving.  One storekeeper responded, “They are lying if they say that reason.”  In 
a group interview with women donors, no one agreed that warding off greed was a reason 
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to give alms. One woman added, “That idea never even occurred to me!” while a second 
broke in, “We're doing this [only] for Allah. Allah alone [is the one who] gave us this 
wealth, as the first woman chimed in, “Because Allah gave us this wealth, that's why we 
give alms.”  The gun store clerk, cited above, also disavowed this reason. However, when 
I re-phrased the question in two parts, he answered a) Does almsgiving create a habit of 
not being greedy (dil-tang)? with “No” and b) Does it teach you to part with your wealth 
more easily? with “Yes.”  In short, ordinary Muslims in Lucknow perceived that zakat 
purified their wealth, but it was uncommon for donors to view almsgiving as formative of 
virtues or as cleansing the soul of greed. Ordinary Muslim givers did not explicitly 
subscribe to the metaphorical view of alms' “purification” of the soul from greed; they 
consistently articulated a more literal view that alms purified wealth alone.  This 
particular scholarly teaching did not resonate even among more educated or reflective 
givers.  For example in in-depth interviews, I pushed interviewees to explain what it 
means specifically to say that “alms make wealth pure (pak),” but no one articulated this 
further, beyond reminding me that zakat means “purification.”82   
What, then, is “impure” about wealth before alms is paid?  Mary Douglas (1984) 
reminds us not to seek literal interpretations of purity that emerge from religiously 
symbolic systems. It is perhaps not surprising that Lucknow Muslims had difficulty 
explaining what was “unclean” (na-pāk) about wealth, even though Muslim scholars 
often discussed these issues in their writings and teachings. “That idea never even 
                                                 
82 Except one respondent, who discussed how almsgiving ensures wealth is protected (from theft, 
loss; see Protection section above which discusses voluntary charity as opposed to mandatory alms 
such as zakat). However, all other respondents refuted this belief, saying that alms does not ensure 
safety; whatever Allah wills, will happen, good or bad. 
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occurred to me!” the woman had exclaimed. The reason, I surmise, was that she knew 
Muslims who gave alms and were also greedy, and knew people too poor to give alms 
who were also not avaricious, so how could zakat cleanse the soul of such vice?  
People construct portions of material reality as unclean because they are “out of 
place.” Ritual purity of objects is a semiotic practice for the repetitive learning of ethical 
systems.  As Douglas explained, “Food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave 
cooking utensils in the bedroom, or otherwise out of place, 
Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering 
and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate 
elements” (1984: 36-37).  
 
Douglas, after discussing a Hindu rule on purity, wrote, “The more deeply we go into this 
and similar rules, the more obvious it becomes that we are studying symbolic systems” 
and not actual dirt or contagion (1984: 36).  Hoarded wealth does not directly cause greed 
anymore than food-spattered clothing causes disease, yet both are considered unclean in 
their respective ways. 
Taking Douglas’ perspective on purity, the ethics at play in zakat-giving need not 
be something that ordinary people can easily articulate – as I first thought embarking on 
my survey.  Ordinary people perform purifying rituals according to religious rules, even 
as they also invoke ethical rules.  However, I stop short of arguing – as Douglas does – 
from a structuralist position that notions of purity rooted in zakat are re-inscribing some 
sort of “symbolic system.”  The reality is far more complex that a unified notion of 
structure and moral system suggests. My discussion thus far of the internal diversity of 
virtuous concerns within the ethics and practice of zakat have shown the “rules” of zakat-
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giving to be more polyvalent than structurally determining.   
The important issue is one of moral pedagogy as it emerges in surprising daily 
practices. Muslim scholars depiction of the purificatory effect of alms by analogy to 
virtuous habits and cleansing the soul of vices such as greed have, in effect, inserted a 
moral pedagogy into ordinary Muslims’ daily lives. Notions of impure wealth are 
quotidian reminders of Islamic moral teachings on money. While avarice does not come 
up in regular conversation, Lucknow Muslims' views of impure wealth (e.g. hoarded 
wealth, or wealth not purified through almsgiving) and the need to pay zakat served as a 
regular reminder of the more elusive, inner virtues of Islamic ethical teachings.  
As in the interviews I quoted, my questions about alms were often a clear cue for 
respondents to repeat (unprompted) the Islamic maxim that “All wealth comes from 
Allah,” and that God is the ultimate “Owner” (al-mālik) of all worlds, an idea familiar in 
madrasa teachings (cf. Nadwi 2000: 5; Qur'an 25:33).  This idea of Allah as “owner of all 
material things in the world” (rabbi l-ʿālamīn; Qur’an 1:2) is a core belief underlying the 
central Muslim doctrine of radical monotheism (tawhīd). Indeed, Mary Douglas could 
easily have been speaking about Islam rather than Judaism when she wrote that rules of 
purity are “like signs which at every turn inspired mediation on the oneness, purity and 
completeness of God” (1984:58).   
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The Historical Turn towards the Purity Ethic 
The Rise of Publicly Funded Muslim Institutions in the Colonial Era 
The colonial era in India saw the emergence of the first widespread systems for 
collectively organized Islamic almsgiving in India.  The coming of the British 
precipitated a wide-ranging impetus for religious reformism, which resulted in a 
reshuffling of socio-economic opportunities. Due to withdrawal of the Mughal patronage 
streams, more grassroots and supra-local systems of financing sprang up to replace them. 
'Ulama after the British takeover in 1857 began consciously advertising their institutions 
as ideal beneficiaries for zakat through mass fundraising campaigns. The seminary at 
Deoband pioneered intricate arrangements for collecting alms from a broader range of 
people than ever before (Metcalf 1982: 96-97, 136). Invocation of Islamic almsgiving 
also served another anti-colonial agitation: the Khilafat Movement.  During the decades 
of the 1910-20s, Mahatma Gandhi engineered the first experiments in anti-British civil 
disobedience with the help of prominent Muslim clergy, in order to protest the British 
attempts to depose the Ottoman Caliph as the symbolic figurehead of Muslims 
worldwide, especially by providing financial support through fundraising appeals framed 
with Islamic symbols such as zakat (Minault 1985; Qureshi 1999).83  
Flows of funds in this era partook of the Islamic paradigm of individual 
almsgiving – whether for local educational use or foreign aid to Muslims in Turkey.  For 
both Deoband and the Khilafat Movement, ‘ulama issued fatwas that made it permissible 
to give zakat over long distances, instead of locally as preferred in Hanafi jurisprudence.  
                                                 
83 Although the caliph nevertheless abdicated in the end, he remarked that Indian financial assistance 
was significant and always “made our affairs a bit easier” (Qureshi 1999:53, 57-59).   
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Rather than being inseparable from the polity as it was in the Prophet Mohammad's time 
and subsequent Islamic dynasties such as Ummayid, almsgiving in colonial India was 
reinvented as a tool for anti-colonial struggle, and was embedded within autonomous 
institutions of Indian civil society, which were both religious and civic nationalist in 
nature.  
Reformist Discourses of “Self-Purification” 
 Concomitant with the burgeoning associationalism among Muslim publics in 
India that shaped their public activism, which established networks of new madrasas with 
an explicit program of Islamic reformism founded at Deoband, Lucknow (the Nadwa 
madrasa), Saharanpur. One aspect of this revival was what has been termed an “inward 
turn” (Metcalf 1982: 5-9; Robinson 2000: 115), an emphasis on scriptures as the 
authoritative roots of Islam, turning inward in a back-to-the-basics move to textual 
origins. Before the advent of the British colonial presence, emphasis on the study of the 
canonical hadiths had already begun to grow stronger, led by Shah Waliullah of the 17th 
century (Voll 1975: 39; Sikand 2005: 48-51).  But the fresh threats perceived in the loss 
of political power to the British and the looming perceived danger in the Hindu majority 
led Deobandi ‘ulama to strive to anchor Muslim identity “inward” in the community, with 
a host of popular Urdu-language primers and magazines that both focused on personal 
pietistic reforms and maintaining vast networks of grassroots donors and alumni.   
This scriptural revival also served to individualize and internalize Islam in India 
into more private forms and personal concerns, in order to preserve it in a time of societal 
upheaval.  Instead of a Mughal court productive of Islamic scholarship and Muslim 
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culture, the individual members of the Muslim public now were entrusted with its 
survival and reproduction at every level.  Financially, this meant reorganizing almsgiving 
to support newly emergent Muslim associations. Religious learning shifted from elite-
sponsored institutions (such as waqf-based madrasas; Kozlowski 1985, 1995; Robinson 
2001) to networks of private madrasas and basic Urdu primers easily digestible by the 
rapidly more literate public. The rise of a new missionary movement, the Tablighi 
Jama’at also contributed to the formation of a Muslim public sphere constructed – not 
through courtly patronage for scholarship – but through oral didactic preaching and door-
to-door evangelizing (van der Veer 2004), a feat that spread Islamic discourses into 
households throughout India.  Spiritually, Muslim reformists perceived that theirs was an 
age of “decline” of the ‘ummah and one in which the “ultimate cause of the present 
troubles [was] typically attributed to one’s own moral corruption” (Metcalf 1982: 5).  
Thus, the need for mobilizing individual pieties and exhorting Muslims to self-
improvement and spiritual self-purification became an urgent priority of the Deobandi 
‘ulama.   
Almsgiving became a prime target for leveraging the proper ethical self-
cultivation in ordinary Muslims. Deobandi ‘ulama around the turn of the 20th century 
shifted from explaining the legal minutiae of zakat to ordinary Muslims to impressing 
upon them the importance of almsgiving for moral self-transformation.84  While this shift 
did not involve reinterpretation of traditional scriptures, there was a degree of selectivity 
in highlighting key themes already extant in Islamic ethical teachings on zakat.  During 
                                                 
84 For a parallel argument of zakat instruction as a form of moral transformation for 19th century 
reformists, see Brannon Ingram’s (forthcoming) article.   
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my research, Lucknow’s urban reformist-minded Muslims consistently referred me to the 
same two Islamic reformist authors. One source was the writings of Ashraf Ali Thanawi 
(d. 1943), especially Baḥishtī Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments) 85 written in 1905 and his 
pamphlet titled Islām mein Faẓa’il-i Zakāt (The Virtues of Alms in Islam).  The second 
was the Faẓa’il-i Ṣadaqah (The Virtues of Charity), which is one volume of the larger 
opus Faẓa’il-i ‘Amal (The Virtues of Deeds) written by Muhammad Zakariyya (d. 
1944).86 Towards the latter half of my fieldwork, when I read them, I myself noticed 
similarities between the themes of these texts and the patterns I observed 
ethnographically among individual almsgivers, in particular three didactic themes: 1) 
obligation, 2) secrecy, and 3) purification. Donors inclined to the purity ethic adhered to 
these three concerns more than other concerns, and even resisted assertions by more 
developmentalist-minded Muslims that zakat-giving should proceed any differently. 
First, the obligation of almsgiving was emphasized a self-disciplinary tool for 
inculcating new virtues of economic practice, to be practiced regularly and in certain 
ways.  Some of these new virtuous ways of zakat-giving incorporated print technologies 
that first appeared in India in the 19th century, such as receipt-books and reproducing 
                                                 
85 Baḥishtī Zewar occupies a particular pride of place among Urdu-literate Muslims. Since its 
publication, it has become traditional in many Muslim families to gift this text to a new bride.  
Many of its teachings relate to everyday and household matters on which Islamic inunctions have 
some bearing, and it was one of the first texts specifically addressed towards Muslim women (as 
Thanawi himself says in his introduction) as well as other Muslims.  For an in-depth treatment of 
this text, see Barbara Metcalf’s (1990) edited translation.  See also Ansari (2010) and especially M. 
Qasim Zaman (2008) biography of Thanawi.  
86 Authored by Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalvi (d. 1982), an influential scholar of the 
Tablighi Jama’at founded by his uncle, the Faẓa’il-e A’mal has been the key instructional text of 
that preaching society in their missionary activities across India and the world.  The section on 
charity and zakat, titled Fazail-e Sadaqaat, is comprised of a simple numbered list of verses from 
the Qur’an and then hadiths, each with brief lines of interpretation.  
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calligraphic stamps (see chapter three).  This emphasis went beyond the fiqh notion of 
zakat as a mere ethical-legal responsibility to Allah, and even beyond the political 
signification of membership in the Muslim community.  Although Thanawi’s Baḥishtī 
Zewar is focused on a broad variety of Islamic matters, the opening three didactic stories 
of this book (based on hadith) each are focused on reiterating the obligation of charity.  
The first story Thanawi tells is of a man who blindly follows the orders of Allah (“from a 
cloud in the sky”) to give one-third of his crops to charity, one-third to his relatives, and 
one-third in savings, and thus receives divine reward. The second hadith similarly tells of 
an angel who lays a curse on two men who do not give charity but rewards a third who 
gives charity freely.  The third hadith vividly describes foodstuffs kept by miserly 
women, rather than given in charity, which turns to stone. Out of all the hadiths that 
Thanawi could have chosen to introduce such a work he himself imbued with great 
significance, these three didactic hadith do not merely emphasize the jurisprudential 
guidelines of zakat as a portion equal to 2.5% of assets that is obligated upon Muslims.  
Rather, they exhort Muslims to give generously and freely, beyond the juridical 
guidelines, which historically have occupied so much attention in Islamic fiqh 
scholarship. Those who do not give, the hadiths teach, will suffer immediate and 
physically harsh consequences – a threat of bodily discomfort seemingly intended to 
entice the reader instead institute the correct, embodied habits of regular charitable 
giving.   
Ethnographically, donors like Ahmed the clerk in chapter five were passionate 
about the obligation of zakat as “Allah’s order [hokum]” and nothing more.  The 
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obligation was so oft-emphasized for these donors, as to invoke the responses of 
incredulity that zakat was even complex enough a topic for a dissertation.  One incident is 
particularly illustrative of the mechanical, even unthinking way in which many Muslims 
gave alms. When I arrived for an interview with an elderly storekeeper in Aminabad 
bazaar, I inquired, “May I ask you a few questions about zakat, sir?”   Apparently hard of 
hearing, he wordlessly responded by reaching his hand into his money pocket. I self-
assuredly interjected, “Oh, are you showing me the place you keep those alms?”  The 
elderly man remained silent and forcefully shoved a wad of rupees into my palm, then 
waved me back out the door. I protested that I was a researcher, not a beggar, but he 
persisted “You're collecting alms for others, are you not?” until his grandson intervened, 
“This man is writing a book, grandpa. He mentioned zakat because his topic is zakat!” 
 Second, scriptural teachings on zakat as a purificatory act of “worship” have been 
highlighted by Islamic reformists in India to lend a sense of the donor in direct and 
unmediated relationship with God (cf. Mittermaier 2014).  This constructs almsgiving as 
efficacious based on its effect on the donor, while de-emphasizing the actual recipient of 
alms in favor of a view that almsgivers are imagined as (re)paying Allah.  The Qur’an 
repeatedly teaches Muslims to view charitable giving as if the donor transacts with Allah 
(Kochuyt 2009): “Give alms and loan to Allah a goodly loan” (verse 73:20, cf. 2:245, 
5:12, 64:17, and 57:11).  This verse is one highlighted in Zakariyya’s Faza’il-i ‘Amal (he 
lists it as Sura 33 on charity), for which he provides extensive commentary on imagining 
zakat as a transaction with Allah.  Thanawi goes further in his primer The Virtues of Zakat 
in Islam by including as one of only seventeen didactic hadith, “A beggar at the door is 
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actually a gift from Allah.”  The medieval Muslim scholar al-Ghazali (1966: 30) 
represented the injunction of almsgiving as necessary repayment of the "financial 
benefits" which Allah has already bestowed on the Muslim almsgiver, just as prayer and 
fasting are gratitude in return for the "bodily benefits" of health and sustenance – I 
studied this text with a jurist in Nadwa madrasa, although he did not discuss this specific 
verse.   Moreover, many English-speaking scholars translate zakat as "alms-tax,” a 
characterization of alms as required contractual dues in exchange for membership in the 
community of Muslims (e.g. Hallaq 2009; also Sayyid Qutb discussed in Maurer 
2005:27). The sense conveyed to readers was that giving charity is a message and 
opportunity for the donor to receive reward from Allah, obscuring the actual condition of 
financial neediness of the recipient. 
Although zakat is addressed by two distinct branches of Islamic law – acts of 
worship (‘ibadat) and transactional jurisprudence (mu’amalat) (Hallaq 2009: 231) – 
Islamic reformists tend to prioritize the former.  The most famous scholar to head the 
madrasa of Nadwat ul-‘Ulama in Lucknow, Abu Hasan Ali Nadwi (d. 1999), wrote in an 
instructional text that zakat “cleanses and purifies the soul [nafs] as well as the wealth,” 
offering extensive analysis on this theme of purification (2000: 41).  This point was also 
emphasized to me repeatedly during my time researching discourses on zakat at this 
madrasa.  In a class taught by a Deobandi-educated mufti teaching at Nadwa, he 
instructed me and other students,  
Although it has a financial dimension [māli pehlū] as well...since you are 
transacting with another person, almsgiving is basically worship [asl mein 'ibādat 
hai]... [If a Muslim does not give zakat] along with his wealth his soul will also be 
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unclean because it is filled with such ingratitude and is so forgetful of [Allah's] 
favor. 
 
Here, the Mufti Anas emphasized that zakat is “basically worship.” Despite also having a 
“financial dimension,” the take-home lesson was the ritual’s importance in cleansing the 
impurities that lay in the soul of Muslims who fail to give charity.  This point was 
emphatically repeated to me during studies at the Nadwa madrasa.  If prayer and fasting 
also increase faith, why is it alms in particular which is often defined as “purification” of 
the soul? I once asked.  The mufti responded that almsgiving serves to remind Muslim 
donors that all their material blessings came from Allah (cf. Nadwi 2000: 5); people often 
mistakenly believe their money is theirs alone, and prayer and fasting do not disabuse 
them of this ungracious notion which sullies their souls, while zakat does.  
Ethnographically, as I highlighted in the above section, numerous donors that I surveyed 
in the bazaar – all of whom were not linked to new Islamic charities – identified the 
meaning of zakat as “purification.”  Many donors who gave to developmentalist charities 
also referenced zakat as purificatory and as an act of worship; however, what 
distinguished those who adhered to the purity ethic was the more-or-less exclusive 
concern with almsgiving’s spiritual benefits for themselves and lack of regard for what 
recipients did with zakat. 
Third, secrecy and visibility in almsgiving took on heightened meaning in the 
‘ulama’s project of reform.  Maulana Zakariyya in his Faza’il-i Ṣadaqah devoted pages 
to discussing the single verse in the Qur’an that warns Muslims against “reminders of 
generosity and injury” when giving charity.  He explained different ways in which 
shaming behavior might occur, such as boasting to the recipient, boasting to others, 
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demanding something in return for one’s generosity, or taunting others for begging.  
Thanawi as well made sure to include among his seventeen hadith collected in the 
“Virtues of Charity in Islam” the saying of the Prophet that exhorts almsgivers to give 
even if a beggar appears “riding on a horse [appearing as a wealthy nobleman],” because 
you can never truly know another’s situation and neediness.  Thanawi also, rather than 
encouraging organizational management methods for monitoring in the form of colonial 
welfare organizations becoming popularized in his day (e.g. registration forms, 
monitoring visits), instructed almsgivers to ultimately to “look into [his or her] own heart. 
If one’s heart says that the person is poor, zakat will be fulfilled.” (Thanawi 1999: 156).   
In the same passage, he urged particular care in giving to relatives: “They should not be 
told that it is zakat so they do not feel offended.”  In short, the efficacy of ritual zakat 
hinged not necessarily on fully ascertaining the financial neediness and eligibility of the 
recipient (despite the jurisprudential minutiae defining the threshold for “neediness” in a 
precise amount of dirhams, discussed above under Rates and Thresholds), but rather on 
the intention (niyyat) of the donor. The one exception is for non-Muslims. If a Muslim 
gave zakat to a person,  
Then later he learned that the person was rich or sayyid…or any other person to 
whom zakat is not permissible. In all these situations, zakat will be considered 
fulfilled and there will be no need to repeat the payment of zakat…[However] if 
the person finds out that the one to whom he gave zakat was really a non-Muslim 
[kāfir], he will have to give zakat again. (Thanawi 1999: 156) 
 
In the cases of mistakenly giving zakat to non-Muslims, Thanawi did attend to the 
recipients qua recipients in the zakat transaction and the efficacy did in fact rest on this 
attribute of the recipient as Muslim or non-Muslim.  The emphasis, while based on 
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certain strong Islamic juridical opinions, may be read also as part of the Deobandi 
reformists’ project of more clearly re-inscribing the boundaries of the Muslim community 
in India.   
Maulana Zakariyya’s emphasis on mitigating the injurious effects of financial aid 
went further. He took particular care to deconstruct the idea that the alms-seeker is 
actually at the receiving end of an unequal transaction at all.  Citing the medieval scholar 
al-Ghazali, he urged readers to consider the “favor” (ehsan) the recipient has shown to 
the donor, rather than view charity as a favor done for the poor. For, it is the recipient’s 
acceptance of charity that absolves the rich Muslims of their obligation to Allah and 
because the poor “become a source of purification for the rich” (Zakariyya 1991.: 6; cf. 
al-Ghazali 1966: 30). 
Ethnographically, donors sought to avoid public display of their zakat at all costs, 
terming donations to friends as additional wedding gifts but intending them as zakat or 
swiftly dropping rupee notes in a neighbor’s purse when she seemed to not be looking.  
The main exception was donors that participated in the charity distribution events of new 
Islamic charities (chapter eight) or who encouraged the monitoring of beneficiaries after 
their donations were made (chapter seven).   
Finally, the cumulative effect of Islamic reformist teachings on zakat was to 
address Muslims consistently as donors rather than as recipients.  Though the poor are 
often in a position to receive zakat from wealthier Muslims, the Qur’an and hadith (and 
particularly Islamic revivalist texts that popularize the scriptures) rarely address the poor 
as recipients of charity or comment on how zakat should be utilized by them. Teaching 
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about a well-known hadith in Faza’il-e Ṣadaqah, Maulana Zakariyya wrote,  
Even if a date is given away as sadaqah (charity) out of the lawfully earned 
property, with sincerity of intention, Allah Ta’ala grants increase in the 
recompense for it, till it becomes as large as the Mount Uhad (1991: 10). 
 
This hadith or similar variations are quoted numerous times in this instructional manual, 
(e.g. Zakariyya 1991: 6, 27). The above hadith clearly indicates that even the poor are to 
imagine themselves, not as recipients, but as potential charitable donors to those in need, 
“even if [only] a date is given.”  Two similar hadith are the first ones that Thanawi placed 
on the first pages of his short primer, “The Virtues of Zakat in Islam,” Other hadith 
reinforce this theme, also recorded in the manual of Tablighi Jama’at:  even a “smile” is 
considered charity, even “half a date” is charity, and even when a servant gives charity 
from his masters goods (because he has nothing of his own to give) he also receives 
spiritual merit despite not being the owner of the gift (Zakariyya 1991: 25, 67, 95).  
Throughout the same manual, Muslims are addressed consistently as donors of zakat, 
rarely as receivers or even as managers of zakat distribution. One passage in the Qur’an 
(9:58-60) does address Muslims as alms-takers, warning those who masquerade as one in 
need but in fact are not, that they “slander” God by their deception. However, this verse is 
not one that I came across in the writings of the Tablighi Jama’at, Ashraf Ali Thanawi, or 
other popular texts.   
 In short, major figures of the scriptural revivalist movements of the 19th century 
such as Thanawi and Zakariyya did not view the mandate of zakat as primarily a material 
concern of economic redistribution nor as a fundraising scheme conducive to activism 
(even though many Deobandi ‘ulama began to utilize it as such in practice).  Rather, they 
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linked almsgiving solely to obtaining the pleasure of Allah, as financial worship that 
activated Muslims’ belief that zakat purified the donor’s soul. Moreover, their efforts 
defined zakat even further from its ritual counterparts in Sufi Islam (such as shrine-based 
giving) and Hindu dan. In preaching that the efficacy of zakat lay primarily with the 
“intention” (niyyat) of the donor in financial worship of Allah, rather than efficacy 
derived from the prayers of others, the Islamic reformists furthered their project of 
denouncing local Indian practices of seeking intercession from the local Sufi pir (saint) or 
the practice of gift-giving which rids the donor of “poisonous” misfortune and instead 
passes it to another.87 Through emphasizing its obligation upon each Muslim individual, 
these scholarly writings constructed charity as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense.  By 
urging the inculcation of zakat as a virtuous practice, these texts aided Deobandi ‘ulama 
to activate notions of “purity” already embedded in zakat discourse (and in the very 
definition of zakat itself). As a ritual that was constructed as efficacious for the donor’s 
own sake, charitable giving appeared less as a financial transaction, and more as a project 
of moral self-transformation intended to arrest their perceived decline relative to the 
British and Hindu threats.  
                                                 
87 Deobandi ‘ulama sought to advance their project of spiritual reform among Muslims by 
emphasizing norms that they represented as scriptural over cultural norms and “custom” (raya’ij).  
One of these customs was “protective charity” (ṣadaqah-e tahfuz) or gifts made to Sufi saints (pir) 
at shrines.  Specifically, they sought to end a view of these customs being viewed as obligatory in 
Islam, when Islamic scriptures (Qur’an and ahadith) did not class these practices as obligatory.  At 
times, these reformist ‘ulama went beyond mere preaching to clarify the status of customs within 
Islamic scriptural tradition, but were even concerned with the “prevention of the means” of 
performing these dubious customs.  Thus, gifts to pir were doubly prohibited:  first, as a custom of 
seeking intercession from saints, and secondly as financial support for shrines and thus the wide 
range of shrine-based worship practices.  Ali Ashraf Thanawi, for example, wrote about the proper 
way to bring gifts to one’s pir: only with the intention of recognizing their learning, but not as an 
obligation or as reciprocal financial transaction for acquiring intercession of the saint with Allah on 
behalf of the petitioner (Zaman 2008: 94-95).  
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Asserting the Purity Ethic:  Criticisms of New Islamic Charities  
Almsgivers in Lucknow inclined to the purity ethic were aware that other 
Muslims gave according to different criteria.  Usually people respected each others’ 
slightly divergent viewpoints, but occasionally there were points of tension. During my 
survey of the twenty-six shopkeepers along the main stretch of Old City bazaar, a 
proportion of men (11.5%) said that they did not consider it important to monitor or 
follow up on recipients of their annual alms – clearly denying the developmentalist 
concern with the utilization of alms after the transaction.  One clerk, who donated to his 
relatives and local neighbors, irritably snapped, “There's no need to say or ask anything 
of them... It's his right. That's what zakat is. What is there to check up about?  If he wants 
to drink tea with it [or otherwise spend it frivolously], he can!”  Many donors openly 
criticized the public charity distribution events held by some new Islamic charities. 
Shamila was a young woman resident of my neighborhood of old city Lucknow 
who encountered the Scholarship Foundation in the course of seeking out various means 
of covering her university fees.  Talking with her about her encounter with the new 
Islamic charity, I found she was decidedly upset at the survey process. “I just didn't like 
what they do, didn't like what they asked of me. That's just not right [voh thīk nahīn 
hai],” she told me.  Clearly emotionally affected, her eyes started to well with tears at the 
memory of the Foundation's volunteers calling her house, asking questions of her brother 
and her, and pressing Shamila in particular on answers that did not match up. My wife 
and I, having known Shamila for over a year, were aware of her family's dire financial 
straits, and her eligibility for scholarships. However, we also knew of instances that she 
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had taken charity for education and applied them instead towards urgent family needs.88  
Despite searching, I never found another informant who had refused the application 
process. Yet nevertheless, Shamila's candor in speaking to me harshly about the 
volunteers who had called her for a survey – knowing that they were also friends of mine 
– came as a real surprise. Her displeasure indicated, to me, her socially acceptable 
willingness to criticize those who would want to know more about the recipients of their 
charitable assistance. A household survey of new applicants constituted the crossing of an 
ethical line, for her and presumably for others whose viewpoints I was unable to capture.   
For some, “following up” immodestly was what disqualified a donation from 
counting as zakat.  In their view, the obligatory 2.5% portion of one's wealth given in 
zakat must be given unconditionally, as what is rightfully due to the poor.   As a wife 
asserted to her husband during my interview with them, when she agreed to subsidize 
medical treatment for the poor beggars coming to the door by charging their bill to herself 
over the phone, she does not count it against the quantity of mandatory alms of zakat but 
instead as sadaqah. Many beggars will misuse money, so she pays for services directly 
when possible.  Her reasoning also lead her to believe that retention of control by the 
donor invalidates the Islamic notion of zakat as the right of the poor.  Many other Muslim 
givers echoed this definition of alms as the poor's sanctified right (cf. Benthall 1999).  
One interviewee, Brigadier Khan, explained unprompted, “I only consider 97.5 rupees 
out of every 100 that I get, as my own. The other 2.5% belongs to the poor alone. That 
                                                 
88 Muslims giving charity directly to needy petitioners made the donation with full knowledge that 
the money could be used for something besides what recipients had claimed. Organizations, for 
this reason, nearly always paid scholarship funds directly to the school administrations rather than 
students.  
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portion is Allah's.” 
Islamic scholarship taught in madrasas does not mention a role for charity 
associations.  Rather, alms are primarily the individual responsibility of the donor or – in 
the time of the Prophet's caliphate – were collected by an Islamic government. In the 
minds of some Muslims, Islamic charity associations were taking on responsibilities that 
were potentially not justifiable by shari’a. All students at Nadwa were familiar with new 
Islamic charities, but at least two students separately declaimed a more traditionalist 
view.  One younger student explained that the village madrasa where he studied taught 
that Islamic charity associations collecting zakat were not justifiable collectors.  Another 
older student was not opposed to new Islamic charities, necessarily, but cautioned that 
many do not operate Islamically. Muslims must take care to only utilize associations run 
by 'ulama, as graduates of a madrasa would understand the rules of zakat. He suggested 
that in my dissertation I perform a survey and try to catch associations who do not 
distribute alms according to the eight categories of needy Muslims specified in the 
Qur'an: “My suggestion to you, is that you ask around within these organizations where 
you volunteer, 'Where are you spending this zakat money that you are receiving? Which 
category do you distribute to?'” 
My instructor in Nadwa confirmed that there is not much in historical Islamic 
jurisprudence with which to justify Islamic charity associations, but despite this legal 
lacuna, he explained that Muslim scholars today tend to allow for Islamic charity 
organizations operating outside the jurisdiction of an Islamic state given the changed 
conditions of modern society (cf. Powell 2009). I also asked my instructor about the 
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permissibility of specific practices instituted at new Islamic charities, such as their 
process of approving and rejecting applications for receiving alms.  Critics of new 
Islamic charities, I mentioned, also had inveighed against the shaming practices of 
following up one recipients. The mufti stated that many people, especially professionals, 
have preferences for spending alms in areas of their expertise, such as education or 
health. Muslim givers may allocate their obligatory alms towards only those needy 
Muslims who have certain exam scores, as long as those recipients are truly financially 
needy and eligible.  However, he added emphatically, such donors must not direct all 
alms in this way.  They are also under an obligation to withhold a portion for whatever 
people may approach them unsolicited and in need. If everyone applied conditions to all 
their obligatory zakat, it defeats the purpose of ensuring the free circulation and 
redistribution of wealth to all those in need.  Thus, “There must be a balance (tarāzū), he 
concluded, such that the poor overall receive their just due.   
The mufti, however, did also not go so far as to advocate Islamic charity remain 
the sole province of religious leaders and madrasas. His view stood in stark contrast to 
some students at his own madrasa who criticized new Islamic charities. Rather, he 
launched an explanation that began with an Urdu proverb: 
“Look, it's said that, 'If a man tries to do everything, he will end up getting 
nothing done'...How many people are there that need madrasa education in India?  
Tens of thousands!...Some don't even know how to say their prayers...That should 
remain the main goal of madrasas and Muslim scholars.” 
 
The equanimity of this mufti, and of most of the scholars I encountered while researching 
and studying in the madrasa, was also evidence of their sound knowledge of sociological 
principles and plain common sense.  The mufti propounded a model society characterized 
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by a division of labor and channels of clear support and communication between 
religious specialists and experts in other fields. This complexity of analysis was in stark 
contrast to overly-critical sparring of people that I heard elsewhere in old city Lucknow, 
on both sides of those adherents of a purity ethic who criticized new Islamic charities and 
those critics of India’s madrasa system as outdated and traditionalist. 
Conclusions 
The traditional moral concerns of the purity ethic guided zakat in Lucknow in 
ways that did not conform to other models of reciprocal gift-giving theorized by 
anthropologists in north India.  Gifts always demand return and social obligation, Mauss 
wrote. The receiver feels a twinge, and urge to reciprocate as if,  
The gift possesses a soul [Maori: hau], and is of the soul… Keeping a gift and not 
reciprocating would be dangerous, spiritually and morally.  The thing exerts a 
hold over you. (Mauss 1960: 12) 
 
This “hold over you” is a social alliance.  Among equals, gifts may circulate around 
society, moving from one person to another on ritual occasions at regular intervals, such 
as Christmas or the Kula Ring in the Pacific, forming alliances of friendship and ensuring 
regular contact between peers or tribes.  Among those who are not equal, differentiated 
by wealth or social hierarchy, giving gifts looks more like one-way charity. With such 
norms of generosity, however, the “gift” is not returned in a material sense, but status is 
given to the giver, as in relationships of patronage.  
This is not to say that patronage by the wealthy in Lucknow did not occur.  I had 
conversations with donors who became recognized for their work, as in the women above 
who admitted them enjoy hearing “thanks” – even expect it.  But, in many cases, the lack 
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of concern for patronage or status – or even forming Maussian alliances – was clearer.  
Muslim donors who gave primarily according to the concerns of the purity ethic – 
obligation, purification, zakat as worship, economic theologies of thawab, and secrecy – 
endeavored to represent almsgiving not as an exchange that incurred a social debt.  My 
point in highlighting certain virtuous concerns that comprise the purity ethic has been to 
illustrate the ethical codes that associated alms most closely with donors – not alms-
takers. Muslim donors endeavored to represent almsgiving not as an exchange between 
haves and have-nots, one that incurred a social debt, but as a (re)payment to Allah in 
which the actual recipient of alms is necessarily occluded from the field of moral 
consideration. In place of actual recipients, donors are taught to imagine alms for the sake 
of the purificatory benefits of merely giving away wealth.  It matters less to whom the 
alms go, than what such giving away accomplishes for the soul of the donor. As I discuss 
in later chapters, the recipients’ conformity to Islamic ethics was often imagined in 
different idealized terms from the ethics enacted by donors – for laborers in terms of 
work ethic and integrity and for madrasa students in terms of their ability to effectively 
translate Islamic teachings to a contemporary audience.  But the purity ethic largely 
remains mute on this question of the recipient’s virtues. Alms-takers merely must be in 
need and Muslim to be zakat-eligible. 
 One consequence of the lack of moral consideration for who the particular alms 
recipient was, was that donors had difficulty articulating their motives for why they gave 
to a particular person at a particular time.  At times, almsgivers were consciously oriented 
towards lessening the recipients’ feelings of shame (especially when giving to a needy 
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friend), affirming their own moral commitment to relinquishment and detachment from 
wealth as a purifying act of self-discipline, or simply fulfilling the divine injunction.  
Other times, it seemed they acted mechanically and habitually – without any conscious 
motive at all, but rather as an ingrained virtuous practice.  As I quickly found while 
performing my survey of donors, they rarely were able to elaborate on their motives for 
zakat. Some, as the man in the above encounter, got upset with me for asking, when he 
said “Just follow the order. Who needs a reason?”  The purity ethic and its lack of 
reciprocal expectations upon the recipient seem to mitigate the “injury” in the gift as well 
as the public status-claims symbolized by donors’ largesse. 
However, these efforts to dispel the perception of Maussian “social debt” did not 
mean that Islamic charity did not form social bonds.  While Mauss wrote that gifts were 
the kernel of social alliances, I propose that gift-giving in Islamic charity forms a sort of 
anti-Maussian social bonds, a community-wide adherence to an Islamic ethic perceived 
as unitary and unifying.  As Laidlaw wrote of Jain alms-gifts, “the fact that the free gift 
does not create obligations or personal connections is precisely where its social 
importance lies” (2000, emphasis in original; cf. Bornstein 2012: 27 on disinterested 
Hindu dan). Instead of zakat forming an obligation to reciprocate, these spiritually 
oriented transactions reinforced Muslim donors’ identities as good Muslims.  The 
purification accomplished in almsgiving ensures that an Islamic public ethic that affirmed 
solidarity between Muslims as well as their submission to Allah’s commands, however 
variously interpreted.  Instead of Mauss’ view of alms as “sacrifice” and appeals to the 
gods to “return” blessings in place of those objects sacrificed, Lucknow Muslims were 
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also giving charity in order to restore and preserve their state of piousness – which 
ultimately forms the Muslim community as a social grouping of believers equal before 
Allah, each giving alms to maintain their relationship with the divine.    
Such charitable responses were perhaps “disquieting” for their lack of patron-
client alliances, sustainability, or attention to impact, as Bornstein observed of 
spontaneous charity done by foreigners or elites in India.  Yet, such disquieting gifts are 
nevertheless “small gestures” that “challenge people to think relationally about their 
place in the world" in new ethical ways.  As Bornstein concluded,  
That it is not rational and institutional does not make it invalid. These small 
gestures are social gestures to strangers and to distant kin, to a kinship of 
humanitarianism that brings small, often utopian, solutions to an unjust world 
(Bornstein 2012: 174) 
 
Maussian perspectives that instrumentalize giving into merely relations of alliance-
making overlook the liberating potential of spontaneous, habitualized or disinterested 
giving in spreading communitarian ethics through virtuous concerns of donors.  Zakat-
givers in Lucknow were performing submission to Islam’s commands as surely as if they 
were following other rituals, but the modality of zakat as economic exchange (with Allah) 
enabled donors to inculcate piety by way of calculations in their own seeming self-
interest.  While it remains true that in some peoples’ minds debts were incurred, there 
were also crucial effects for donors in habituating and performing virtuous concerns 
through what is otherwise viewed as a transaction of money.  Virtues as well as cash 
changed hands and accrued in people’s moral accountings of themselves. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ZAKAT ECONOMY: 
ALMSGIVING AND THE RISE OF PUBLIC FUNDRAISING IN INDIAN ISLAM 
 
In the Footsteps of Madrasa Fundraisers in Lucknow’s Bazaars 
The alms-collector Maulana Faisal, a teacher at a madrasa in Bihar, had journeyed 
to Lucknow eight hours by train. It was a sweltering afternoon in July, in the midst of the 
holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast during daylight, pray additional prayers, and 
give charity, believing that these ritual observances accrue seventy times the spiritual 
merit during Ramadan.  Because of the daytime fasting (and nighttime feasting), many 
storekeepers opened late. Maulana Faisal had visited seven shops in the bazaar between 
11am and 1:30pm when it came time for the afternoon prayer (‘asr). He napped in the 
masjid after the ‘asr prayer, simply sleeping on the open floor where he prayed.  He then 
spent the remaining hours canvassing bazaar stores for donations until sunset (maghrib) 
prayer around 6pm.  
The metal door of the Rashid Gun 
Shop creaked as Maulana Faisal stepped 
into the arms showroom and introduced 
himself to Mr. Rashid, the owner before 
sitting down to begin his fundraising 
appeal. I encouraged Mr. Rashid to not 
bother about my presence as an ethnographer but he nevertheless narrated his thoughts to 
Figure 6: Donation Receipt for the Madrasa 
of Maulana Faisal 
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me as Maulana Faisal wordlessly handed over a folder of dog-eared papers: “He has 
come pretty far, from Bihar I see, and has letters of verification (tasdeeq-nameh) from 
this Patna [in Bihar] madrasa that I’ve heard of. And from [the famous madrasa of] 
Imarat-e Shari’a in Patna.”  Maulana Faisal sat wordlessly, letting his verification letters 
speak for themselves initially, as I had seen other fundraisers do. Once he saw that Mr. 
Rashid read them approvingly and did not immediately turn him away, he pulled out his 
receipt book and pen. He then began writing a receipt (Figure 6) for the donation that he 
anticipated would be shortly forthcoming, breaking his silence with a question: 
“Rupee amount?”  Maulana Rashid asked. 
“Fifty rupees,” Mr. Rashid replied, putting the letters down. 
“Fifty rupees? [$1]” Maulana Faisal repeated in a low, pained voice. “Please give 
me fifty more.  See, we have a lot of needs [kāfī zarūraten hain]. Water has leaked 
in.” 
“Yours is a small madrasa—” 
“No, it’s not! On the ‘spectrum’ of madrasas, it’s—” 
“Where is your expense book [kharchah kī kitāb]? Bring it please.” 
“Here.” 
“How many school [branches] do you have?” Mr. Rashid asked, poring over a 
few sheets of paper that constitute the expense book. “How many students? How 
many teachers? What are salaries? How much is the water [bill]? 
“Yes, all that is written there.” 
 
“Look, I’ll give you 50 rupees only. Write the receipt for fifty. Your madrasa is OK,” Mr. 
Rashid concluded, even as Maulana Faisal continued to protest. Maulana Faisal 
grudgingly wrote “50 rupees” on the receipt, took the bill from Mr. Rashid, who turned 
away as the maulana (a term of respect for a religious scholar or teacher) gathered his 
things and left the room, moving down the street to the next storefront.  
In Muslim South Asia, waqf has been the most developed channel for funding and 
sustaining institutions serving the public good (McChesney 1990, Kozlowski 1985). By 
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contrast, Muslim scholars historically have encouraged zakat as a private matter and to be 
given secretly, arguing from Islamic scriptures (e.g. Qur’an 2:271).  Zakat was considered 
to be best distributed among networks of kinship and locality and only spent for more 
distant causes in circumstances of exceptional need (see Qur’an 2:177, 4:8, 4:36, 8:41, 
30:38; and various scholarly writings, e.g. Marghinani 2006: 294-5).  In colonial India, 
however, as a direct result of anti-British mobilizations led by Muslim ‘ulama, some of 
the first juridical opinions (fatāwa) emerged that legitimized – even encouraged – 
almsgiving for distant causes such as founding the madrasa at Deoband in the 1860s 
(Metcalf 1982: 97) or aiding the Ottoman caliph in the 1910s (Qureshi 1999: 53-59).  
These colonial encounters spurred the rise of grassroots fundraising via zakat for Muslim 
public institutions.  While the new forms of Muslim educational associations 
revolutionized the transmission of Islamic learning through madrasas in India, leading to 
a popularization of religious education and re-inscribing the “ordinary Muslim” (as 
opposed to the Muslim ruler) as the defender of Islam, the re-invention of the “modern” 
colonial Indian madrasas constituted more than merely a better organized system of 
traditional Islamic education.  This chapter ethnographically illustrates how the new 
forms of zakat-giving embedded in grassroots and publically financed madrasas engage 
the Muslim public in ways that profound shaping Islamic ethics of economic practice, 
seen in changing concerns about almsgiving.  
During the holy month of Ramadan in 2013, I interviewed eight ‘ulama with 
experience as traveling madrasa fundraisers. I followed three of them, all of whom taught 
in various small village madrasas outside of Lucknow, as they solicited alms in the bazaar 
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from storekeepers and neighborhood residents.  Such madrasa fundraisers are known as 
safeer, Urdu for “ambassadors” from the Arabic root for “travelers” (safari is a cognate). 
This chapter is an ethnographic exploration of the role of the safeer and the institution of 
grassroots madrasa fundraising in India, based on daily observations and interviews in 
Lucknow’s old city bazaar of Aminabad. In particular, I demonstrate the dependence of 
safeers’ activities on alms documents and documentation practices arising 150 years ago 
in colonial India.   
The following data offer an ethnographic portrayal of the role of text – not merely 
as a medium for the transmission of knowledge – but also as an indispensable element in 
the social construction of trust between Muslims engaged in almsgiving.  The materiality 
of documents – down to size and shape of paper and carbon paper and properties of the 
inks used – are visible, tactile assurances of religious authority.  Without such credibility 
lodged in documents, the functioning of the zakat economy and concomitant shifts in 
personal religiousity of zakat donors would not exist on the scale I describe below.  The 
documentation of zakat traces a well-known arc in the “modernization” of religion: the 
bureaucratization and rationalization of premodern charity (Weber 1978).  However, the 
role of zakat receipts has a quite different impact on individual faith than the printed word 
of Allah, although both rely on new technologies of print media.  Texts and documents 
are not merely media for scriptural knowledge at the level of discursive tradition, but are 
also materializations of linguistic discourse with a symbolic power beyond the ideas 
written on them (Messick 1993). The case of madrasa fundraising, the role of the safeer, 
and his extensive array of documentary practices utilized in contemporary almsgiving to 
  200
madrasas argues a fresh point about tradition: scriptural tradition shapes piety through its 
materiality, as well asnot only its discursivity.  Even though most studies of Islamic 
tradition examine text as a medium for scriptural discourse, the exploration of how 
Muslims regard objectified text can turn a new page in the anthropology of Islam.  
Scholars have already made productive investigations of jurisprudence and scripture as 
calligraphy (Messick 1993), Qur’an as book (mushaf; Suit 2013), and printed sermons as 
“portable madrasa” (Ingram 2014).  Just as scriptural tradition profoundly inflects 
embodied practice, even for scriptural revivalists engaged in self-study (Deeb 2006, 
Mahmood 2005), this chapter illustrates how texts-as-embodiments inflect beliefs about 
an age-old Islamic ritual.   
Talal Asad (1986: 14) is credited with introducing a method for the 
anthropologists of Islam in which we “begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a 
discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and 
Hadith.”  Asad’s forceful statement of this discursive turn, while influential, overlooked 
early groundbreaking forays that took seriously Islam’s discursive tradition as it was 
institutionalized in religious learning and scholarly authority of ‘ulama (Geertz 1960; 
Eickelman 1978; Peacock 1978).  This vein of work was more the exception than the 
rule, however.   Through the 1970s, anthropology of Muslim societies especially in the 
Middle East largely studied tribes, segmentary kinship groups, lineages of Sufi saints and 
their political leadership, authority and honor (e.g. Evans-Pritchard 1949; Barth 1965, 
Fernea 1970, Bourdieu 1977) – the illiterate aspects of Muslim societies – while leaving 
the study of urban Islamic scholars to Orientalists in an academic division of labor 
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(Lindholm 2002: 130; see also Abu-Lughod 1989).89  Besides Geertz, the other figure 
dominating the early anthropology of Islam was Ernest Gellner. His influence has 
endured, particularly in British anthropology, along with a view that “the Qur’an or, as 
Gellner [1981] has called it ‘the Book,’ shapes the urban Muslim” (Marranci 2008: 38).  
Asad has since admitted that his term “discursive tradition” contains echoes of the 
Gellnerian prioritization of Islamic scripturalism as a unitary form for cohesion and 
instead called for explicit inclusion of “embodiment” within notions of “tradition” (Asad 
2014; Scott & Hirschkind 2006: 8).  
Although embodiment was implicit in Asad’s invocations of Foucauldian (1990) 
discourse and MacIntyre’s (1988) “tradition,” it is worth making this dual nature of 
tradition explicit, given the history of Orientalist and Gellnerian influences in Islamic 
studies more generally.  My analysis also takes a view of Islam as a dual tradition, which 
is both a “scriptural tradition” comprised of knowledge, oral and written discourses, and 
debates, and an “embodied tradition” comprised of modes of physical comportment, 
bodily actions, and material practices.  In this dissertation, I explore “embodied tradition” 
as the materialization of Islamic beliefs and Muslim solidarities in zakat-giving practices 
of individuals and their associations. Each aspect of tradition, the discursive and the 
embodied, inform the other in dialectical fashion. 
The first section describes how grassroots fundraising for zakat is organized and 
has proven more effective than pre-colonial modes of madrasa financing based on waqf.  
                                                 
89 Some anthropologists of the time, as Lindholm noted, could be even characterized as averse to 
study of ‘ulama and their institutions, as “most anthropologists…naturally felt themselves to be on 
the side of the excluded and illiterate tribesmen and against elitist and lettered clerics” (2002: 131). 
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It also introduces the concern over distinguishing “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) from incorrect zakat-
giving, a concern that is heightened in modern times and arises from deep religious 
anxieties over the uncertainties in giving to strangers exacerbated by the anonymity of 
modern urban life.  The second section profiles the zakat receipt, as the document that 
most embodies the modern, revivalist form of Islamic charitable giving in India and the 
textual practices designed to ensure authenticity and trust between donor and receiver.  
The third section and conclusions discuss how Lucknow Muslims, in the course of 
ensuring this-worldly financial accountability, also utilize the receipt for their own 
“objectification” of personal piety (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996).  Documentation of 
zakat furthermore shaped individuals’ beliefs about Islamic almsgiving by facilitating a 
more precise and objectified spiritual accounting of merit (thawab) for each individual 
zakat donor, in what Mauss (1960: 55) termed an “economic theology” (cf. Mittermaier 
2014).  I analyze how the documentation of zakat illustrates a new, modern bureaucratic 
form of Islamic almsgiving that has facilitated its institutionalization, yet documentation 
also assuages individual Muslims’ new, modern anxieties about meeting the next-worldly 
obligations of Islam in an era of “fragmented” authority (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996), 
moral peril (Metcalf 1982), and “fragility of belief” (Taylor 2007).  
Givings & Mis-Givings: The Problem of Trusting Alms-Collectors 
Question: A person gave zakat to another person thinking that he is poor. Later he 
learnt that this person was rich or he was a sayyid [descendent of the Prophet 
Muhammad; ineligible for alms]. Alternatively, he gave it to someone on a dark 
night and later realized that the person to whom he had given the zakat was 
actually his mother or daughter, or any other relative to whom zakat is not 
permissible… What is the result? 
  203
Answer: In all these cases, zakat will be considered to be fulfilled and there will 
be no need to repeat the payment of zakat…  
 
[If] a person has a doubt as to whether a certain person is rich or poor, zakat 
should not be given to him until it has been ascertained whether he is eligible to 
receive zakat or not.  If zakat is given to him without ascertaining his financial 
position, the person should check with his heart and see to which side his heart is 
more inclined. If his heart tells him that the person is poor, zakat will be fulfilled. 
If his heart tells him that the person is rich, zakat will not be fulfilled and will 
therefore have to be repeated. But if he establishes the fact that he is indeed a poor 
person after having given the zakat to him, then he does not have to give the zakat 
again (Thanawi 1999: 156) 
 
 The above juridical teachings take the form of fatwas in the zakat section of 
Thanawi’s Baḥishtī Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments), discussed in the last chapter.  This 
volume was part of the colonial-era Islamic revival that sought to bring teachings of 
Islam to an increasingly literate Indian populace, in order to instruct, moralize, and 
popularize scriptural Islam over-and-above customary Indian Muslim practices.  Thanawi 
was a highly regarded scholar of hadith and fiqh, but while all his teachings in this book 
were grounded in traditional scholarship, his selection and presentation of issues speaks 
to the issues of concern to him and the Muslim public of his day (Zaman 2008).  
The passage above reflects the heightened anxiety that Indian Muslim almsgivers 
held in colonial times over the issue of “correct” recipients and procedures in 
transmission of ritual obligatory charity. The premise that a person would in fact mistake 
an alms-seeker (even at night) for his mother or daughter is of course preposterous.  
However, these cases are drawn from actual 7th century sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad. As hypothetical instances of mistakes in almsgiving, they serve to define the 
logical parameters and ethical criteria that distinguish “correct” fulfillment of the alms 
obligation for all times and places.  Yet, while in prior centuries such hadith teachings had 
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only primarily been of real interest to Muslim jurists, Thanawi and other Deobandis 
wrote primers such as Heavenly Ornaments for the Muslim masses.  The minutiae of 
medieval jurisprudence were to become increasingly important in 19th and 20th century 
India in defining the precise contours of a newly objectified, “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) Islam and 
the boundaries of the proper Muslim community (Metcalf 1982, 1992; Ingram 2014). For 
Deobandis in the 19th century like Thanawi and his followers, the anxieties about zakat 
were enmeshed within concerns over two primary threats to “correct” Islam: Indian 
shrine customs and British rule.   
 Deobandis sought to construct religious authority as based on scriptural learning 
rather than mystical practices customary of Sufi pirs (saints) at shrines, whose healing 
acts and ritual demonstrations of inherited divine grace (barakat) legitimized them as 
local Islamic authorities. Thanawi and other Deobandis criticized pirs because Deobandis 
opposed Sufism or shrines per se (many Deobandi ‘ulama were also members of Sufi 
lineages and led Sufi lodges, or khanqah), but because they sought to popularize Islamic 
learning for the ordinary believer and make it attainable by aspirants who engaged in hard 
work and discipline (rather than through miraculous or heritable barakat; Zaman 2008: 
94-95).   
A crucial component of re-orienting how the Muslim masses perceived authentic 
Islamic authority, and who held it, rested in arguments over the proper recipients of 
religious donations.  Thus, Thanawi specifically denigrated other Sufi masters who 
aggrandized their public image in hopes of gaining more followers and their funds in 
financial terms as money-grubbing “shopkeepers,” even though Thanawi ran his own 
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Sufi-style khanqah for imparting Sufi bodily disciplines next to his madrasah (Zaman 
2008: 26).  The more proper beneficiaries of Islamic donations, in his view, were 
distinguished institutions of Muslim scholarship that provided true leadership and that 
were no longer financed by Muslim rulers in the wake of British usurpation. 
Thanawi wrote with increased consciousness of the encroaching British power, 
providing even more restrictions on zakat-giving to non-Muslims than prior Hanafi jurists 
had done. Even though he constructed his authority not as an anti-colonialnationalist but 
as a reviver of scriptural Islam, his writings drew clear distinctions between the Muslim 
‘ummah and non-Muslims in India that directly served nationalist causes.  In the quote 
from Heavenly Ornaments above, Thanawi goes on to write,  
[However] if the person finds out that the one to whom he gave zakat was really a 
non-Muslim [kāfir], he will have to give zakat again. (Thanawi 1999: 156) 
 
The canonical Hidayah, the 12th-century manual that was (and is still) taught as a primary 
text of Hanafi fiqh in Indian madrasas, including Deoband, includes the “unbeliever” 
along with the “rich,” descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and direct descendants as 
acceptable recipients of accidental zakat. The Hidayah even referred to the same hadith 
as Thanawi did, mentioning the hypothetical accident of having “paid in the dark” 
(Marghiani 2006: 293).  However, in the course of this discussion, Thanawi singles out 
the case of the kāfir (non-Muslim) as one recipient to which zakat cannot ever be 
considered correctly received – thus further inscribing the boundaries of the Muslim 
community in the very practice of almsgiving.     
Anxieties that resemble those introduced and addressed by Thanawi continue to 
pepper Lucknow Muslims’ conversations on zakat today.  All of the new Islamic charities 
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in Lucknow refuse to distribute funds marked as zakat to non-Muslim beneficiaries. 
Although many of the individual charity workers in interviews expressed to me their 
private opinion that zakat could correctly be paid to non-Muslims and still count as zakat 
in Allah’s eyes, their organizational policies were such in order to not alienate any 
donors. In a computer repair shop the Muslim owner, who (in the course of preparing for 
Hajj) had become very self-conscious about his faith practices, spontaneously lectured 
me once he learned of my research topic, “It is very important to find out where people’s 
zakat is going to!” he exclaimed. “Isn’t intention [niyyat] to give zakat in some cases 
considered enough?” I replied, having recently studied this issue of giving “in the dark” 
in Nadwa madrasa.  “No!” he exclaimed, “zakat is not about only giving with the right 
intention, it is about giving to the correct recipients [ṣaḥīḥ lenewāle]!”  Anxieties over 
correct almsgiving cluster not only around accidental contributions to kafirs, but to a 
whole host of imposter alms-seekers in Lucknow.  Interviewing a group of women, they 
diverged from my question about Ramadan as the best time for giving zakat, explaining 
that marriages of poor Muslims offer a good opportunity. “But, it is very important 
[ahim] to get the zakat to the right place. You must first investigate and then give [samajh 
kar ke zakat dene chāhiye], to ensure they are deserving [mustaḥiq]!”  A donor to the 
Society for Divine Welfare explained of his brother who once gave a sadaqah donation to 
a disheveled man with hand outstretched at a train station then, suddenly suspicious, 
followed the beggar at a distance, only to find him entering a liquor store. His brother 
then dashed in to snatch and re-claim his cash from the dissimulating drunkard as he tried 
to pay. “My brother’s sadaqah would not have been recognized by Allah, if that man had 
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used it for sharāb [wine]!” he explained to me.   
Safeers working to raise funds for madrasas (especially zakat donations) have 
developed a number of confidence-building measures and practices over the past century 
and a half of formal madrasa fundraising, in order to address such fears of donors.  
Analytically, across the eight madrasa fundraisers I interviewed, I distinguished three 
separate types of appeal strategies in madrasa fundraising activities during my month of 
observation. These three were often used in combination: 
1) Obligation-based appeal 
2) Authority-based appeal 
3) Results-based appeal 
 
As in the above ethnographic vignette, two of these appeal strategies were (to a degree, at 
least) employed by Maulana Faisal with Mr. Rashid.  He began with an authority-based 
appeal in presenting his legitimizing documents, then moved on to illustrate concrete 
results from his madrasa when Mr. Rashid asked for these. Mr. Rashid throughout felt an 
obligation to donate (he was one of this bazaar’s most prolific Muslim storekeeper-
philanthropists), as I know from speaking myself with him after the interaction, which 
motivated his alms-gift once he had established the authenticity of Maulana Faisal’s 
documents.  
The authority-based appeal involves simply presenting verification letters 
(tasdīq-nameh) written by reputable heads of other large madrasas that are well-known 
among Muslims. This appeal invokes donors’ identity as Muslims who respect prestigious 
Muslim institutions. This strategy was the first that Maulana Faisal employed with Mr. 
Rashid. It had the additional benefit of allowing the maulana to sit quietly, appearing 
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unobtrusive and humble as such a petitioner should, while the verification letters spoke 
for themselves with the authority of their authors. Note that Mr. Rashid had not seen 
actual results and expense reports of Maulana Faisal’s madrasa itself, just the verification 
letters from other more famous madrasas, by the time he agreed to donate fifty rupees. 
The gravitas of these institutions was such that even a signed note from one of their 
senior leaders often was perceived to outweigh the credibility of any traveling madrasa 
fundraisers, or their results-based pitches, who were the more junior teachers and 
scholars.  
Large madrasas with printed newsletters placed “lists of traveling fundraisers” 
(ferist-e safīr) in the back page of their Ramadan issue, identifying each by name and the 
city(ies) assigned to them, so that the Muslim public had an official record of who would 
be visiting them seeking financial support on the madrasa’s behalf. A junior teacher at 
Nadwa explained:  
“A verification letter [tasdq-nameh] is necessary for those donors who would like 
to give, but who cannot come to Nadwa to verify with their own eyes.  Without a 
letter, many Muslims would not even know that Nadwa still exists, how many 
students we have grown to, or what our exact needs are!  They deserve a letter 
that explains such details.” 
 
An authority-based appeal constructs a link in the minds of ordinary Muslims between 
themselves and the bastions of traditional Islamic knowledge in India such as Nadwa, 
Deoband, and other madrasas considered to be authoritative.  It elicits a Muslim donor’s 
attachment to prestigious institutions of Islamic learning, considered preserves of Muslim 
identity and cultural distinctiveness.  
Verification letters, and thus the authority-based appeal, however, were also the 
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easiest to critique and often fell flat, in fact, as seen in the above vignette when Maulana 
Faisal’s push to negotiate a higher donation prompted Mr. Rashid to ask for further 
documentation of madrasa expenses (as I discuss below as a results-based appeal).  One 
of Lucknow’s more successful fundraisers and madrasa leader, Maulana Mustafa, was 
publically opposed to the use of such letters.  In an interview with me, he explained: 
I’m against this system of letters [tasdeeq-nameh]. I’ll tell that to anyone.  
[Donors] should trust the person, not the letter.  I’ll say to [donors], ‘You should 
trust me and not my letter.  Just come and see our work.’  They want to trust me 
based on my [prestigious] education at Nadwa and Medina [Saudi Arabia]…[But] 
I think everyone should see our work before they give. When they just trust me 
based on those letters, then the system breaks down!  
 
Maulana Mustafa then went on to echo criticisms I often heard from all quarters – 
Muslim and non-Muslim, madrasa supporters and opponents alike – that as many as 
“50% of all madrasas are useless [bekār]. They are sometimes open, not complete frauds, 
but they close [on holiday for days] often and skim (‘eat’) money for themselves [paisa 
khāte hain].”  As more than one storekeeper told me, it is best to read through the 
verification letters and then simply call up the madrasa to verify.  Most ‘ulama, however, 
still strongly support the practice of carrying signed verification letters.  
A results-based appeal solicits funds based on the impact a madrasa is presumed 
to be having.  It targets donors’ desire to know that their donations are having the 
intended effect. In the above vignette, such a results-based appeal quickly followed the 
Maulana Faisal’s presentation of the verification letters, once he realized he was not 
getting the full 100 rupee donation he anticipated, although recall that it was Mr. Rashid 
who initiated the request for the madrasa expense book. Madrasa fundraisers come 
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prepared with two sets of data: (1) numbers of students and quality of facilities, (2) 
financial accounting reports.  Results reports on students educated and facilities required 
in administering the madrasa (e.g. vehicles, hostels, classrooms, kitchens, libraries, 
presses) often included photographs.  Expense reports were generally a simple table of a 
few categories of “income” and a few categories of “expenses” as portrayed in the tables 
of the fundraising flyer (see Figure 7 below). In fact, the actual madrasa account books 
often were not more complicated than these tables, I later found while visiting small and 
medium-sized madrasas around Lucknow.   
The obligation-based 
appeal partakes of the religious 
values I discussed in chapter 
four: the paradox of obligatory 
voluntarism and the highly 
habitualized nature of zakat as 
a virtue in Lucknow.  A female 
Muslim university student said, 
“There is a saying [kahavat] 
that you shouldn't send [alms-
seekers] away. At least give 
them something.” I also have 
discussed a hadith, saying of 
the Prophet, “A beggar has the Figure 7: Fundraising Flyer for Maulana Lalji 
(Excerpts translated below) 
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right [to ask] though he may be riding on a horse [thus appearing as a wealthy 
nobleman].”90 Indeed, many donors shared this belief and alms-seekers who went 
through the trouble to approach them deserved at least a few rupees. Even beggars who 
may be not as poor as they appear should not be turned away, in this view. Donors felt: 
Who are they to judge when all Muslims are obligated to give charity? This common 
understanding of Islamic almsgiving’s obligation on all Muslims made possible the 
functioning of the entire madrasa fundraising practices – the cultural construction of trust 
based upon mere documents such as tasdeeq-nameh and expense reports might not have 
been sufficient had not the alms-collectors also been giving benefit to the donor by 
facilitating the discharge of zakat obligation. 
Obligation-based appeals clearly elicit only a minimal response from donors, who 
often explicitly told me their minimum donation – e.g. two rupees ($0.04), ten rupees 
($0.19), thirty ($0.56), fifty ($0.93), or one hundred ($1.86).  Donors’ minimum donation 
rules-of-thumb, while functioning largely to rush alms-seekers back out of the store or 
assuage the donor’s own sympathetic “impulse” to give (cf. Bornstein 2009) rather than 
turn away the needy, were also the lifeblood of public financing for small- and medium-
sized madrasas.  Fundraisers know that – even if they have not convinced a potential 
donor of the worth of their madrasa and as long as they have not appeared as a complete 
fraud – at least a minimum donation will be forthcoming. This was the implication in the 
astonished response above of Maulana Faisal, “Fifty rupees? Please give fifty more!” He 
                                                 
90 This hadith is recorded by Abu Da’ud (1984: 9:1661).  Although few ordinary Muslims knew of 
this hadith in my research around Lucknow, even when I asked about it, Muslim scholars generally 
did. One man educated at Firangi Mahal spontaneously quoted it in an interview, as did two 
students at Nadwa madrasa and the Deobandi preacher profiled in chapter eight, Maulana Jahangir.   
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knew (as I did) that Mr. Rashid was a generous donor who varied his minimum donations 
between 50 ($0.96) and 100 rupees ($1.85) at a time.   From an American perspective, of 
course, these donations seem meager.  However, in India and in old city Lucknow where 
a government job such as police constable coveted by many ordinary Indians pays a base 
salary of 3,050 rupees ($55.80) per month (Jauregui 2010: 59)91 and where a healthy and 
flavorful meal of dal or channa-puri can be purchased for 15 rupees, such madrasa 
fundraising was viewed as a sizable flow of 
money by many ordinary Indians in old city.  
My point is that small change is a big 
deal in India’s rupee economy of old city 
Lucknow, and 10, 50, and 100 rupee donations 
quickly add up to a living wage for madrasa 
staff.  Such meager donations, seemingly small 
change, are necessary for the functioning of India’s entire madrasa system – what one 
might call the big-change potential of small change.  In contrast to fundraising for 
universities and private schools (in America and India alike) that focus nearly exclusively 
on making a “big ask” and fleecing “high net-worth individuals,” my interviews 
suggested that the vast majority of India’s madrasa fundraisers depend completely on the 
remarkably meager donations of ordinary Muslim almsgivers in 10, 30, and 50 rupee 
amounts.  Most madrasas did have at least a few “big-fish” donors, known using the 
                                                 
91 Bribes, of course, are pervasive and allow constables in Lucknow and the region to increase their 
official income by 100% to 500% -- yet, even a “good” post for constables allows them to take in 
15,000 rupees ($275) per month (Jauregui 2010: 59), which is still less than $10 per day.  
“Madrasa At A Glance” 
Total Students in Residence 40 
Teachers 3 
Cooks 2 
Graduates 27 
Figure 8: Overview of Maulana 
Lalji’s Madrasa (Translation of a 
portion of the above flyer) 
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English as “sponsors,” as I discuss below.  
A second example illustrates this point in detail. One traveling maulana allowed 
me to share his full numbers for the fundraising season.  Maulana Lalji was the founder 
of the madrasa and not a mere teacher-cum-fundraiser.  He opened his madrasa in 2002, 
serving young primary school-aged children in a village three hours outside Lucknow. 
The 2012-13 yearly income totaled 491,430 rupees ($9,100), typical of other small 
madrasas. (Four lakh rupees, or 400,000 rupees, was the figure I heard as the minimum 
annual budget for running a small madrasa).  Maulana Lalji has three other teachers 
besides himself who fundraise during Ramadan; he goes to Lucknow while the other 
three fundraise locally in the district. I have given the total budget and divided it by four 
in Figure 9 below to illustrate my estimation of how much money each man must canvass 
from donors to raise annual income for the madrasa.92  Maulana Lalji and the fundraisers 
travel for the entire month, spending about 25 days in active fundraising. He estimated 
that this month of fundraising accrues 70% of the annual budget; the remainder is 
collected locally during the year or comes from loans, if necessary.    In short, fundraisers 
generated sufficient income for their madrasas by successfully soliciting donations of at 
least 50-100 rupees from about 45 donors per day. This comes to about 5 donors per hour 
in a nine hour day, which was confirmed by my observarions that a fundraiser visits 
between five and eight storefronts hourly.  This calculation per each man, is merely an 
average I estimated, while in reality Maulana Lalji made it clear that the fundraiser who 
                                                 
92 I did not follow up to see if they met their budget, but last year’s income totaled more than 
expenses and this year was expected to be the same, with the savings put aside and used to grow 
the school next year perhaps by purchasing a van in addition to the motorcycle used to transport 
staff as needed and students to the doctor. 
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canvasses the larger cities and richer neighborhoods is expected to pull higher donations.  
Regular sponsors fund a child’s annual expenses calculated at 5,000 rupees, and 
Auntie Hussain, my neighbor who introduced me to Maulana Lalji, was one such 
sponsor.  Maulana Lalji had about twelve such sponsors. Thus, each annual visit to such a 
sponsor, receiving 5,000 rupees ($96) in one visit, meant the maulana had raised his daily 
quota. Although he did not explain it to me this way, the relaxed way in which he spent 
the day at my neighbor’s drinking tea suggested it, with more than enough time to answer 
my queries and be interviewed despite the hectic schedule of other madrasa fundraisers I 
followed at other times.93  Relationships develop between madrasa teachers and sponsors 
in these regular meetings, 
and my neighbor used the 
visit as an opportunity to 
ask the maulana for 
advice on a few religious 
questions and lead us in prayer, which he did.  But such relaxed days are rare in the 
routine of a fundraiser during Ramadan. Occasionally, madrasa fundraisers can afford to 
visit only one or two regular sponsors in a day, but on most days their routine involves 
visiting dozens of shops and homes and gathering rupee notes of relatively small 
denominations from each. 
There are at least three commonly used payment structures for safeers. First, the 
                                                 
93 That day’s visit, in fact, garnered more than sufficient funds for Maulana Lalji: my neighbor’s 
daughter had begun sending her alms from income as a teacher in Saudi Arabia to sponsor a child 
at the madrasa, in addition to her parents, and I myself added a 500 rupee donation. 
2012-13 Income Rs. 491,430 
Number of Fundraisers four 
Portion of budget raised in Ramadan  
(Maulana Lalji’s estimate) 
70% 
Rs. 344,000 
Days spend fundraising  25 days 
Estimated portion raised by each 
fundraiser per day 
Rs.75 from 45 
donors each day = 
Rs. 3,400 
Figure 9: Estimated Quotas for Traveling Fundraisers 
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largest madrasas like well-known Deoband madrasa in western Uttar Pradesh or Nadwa 
madrasa in Lucknow employ full-time safeers who maintain carefully cultivated 
relationships with donors bases domestically in cities like Delhi, Lucknow, and Bombay 
and abroad in Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.94  Second, regular madrasa teachers 
(ustad) depart on fundraising forays during the academic break in the month of Ramadan, 
when students and faculty alike are generally visiting family and their home villages. 
Often coming from the ranks of junior instructors, they choose to serve as part-time 
safeers on such fundraising trips, or may be ordered to do so.95  They are incentivized 
with a contractual arrangement that doubles their month’s salary for the Ramadan month 
and provides additional travel expenses at a flat fee. If they normally make 10,000 
rupees, which is a typical junior ustad salary at Nadwa, then their salary doubles to 
20,000 rupees ($370) per month.   
Third, fundraisers for smaller madrasas work on commission.  Commission can 
vary between 20% and 40% of funds raised. None of the eight fundraisers I interviewed 
in 2013 worked on “commission” (interlocutors used the English word in Urdu 
conversations), as each of them fundraised for well-known madrasas.  Well-known 
madrasas such as Deoband, Nadwa, and their affiliates around India do not pay safeers 
commission, a senior mufti at Nadwa told me who was also educated and taught at 
Deoband.  Well-known madrasas simply do not believe that their safeers have to work 
                                                 
94 Deoband’s donor base is almost completely domestic Indian, while Nadwa receives more 
donations from private individuals and public institutions in Arab nations. I discuss madrasa’s 
budgets and foreign funds in chapter six. 
95 In some cases, differences between madrasa instructors and the administration arise over this issue 
of fundraising, as some ‘ulama find it beneath their dignity – Maulana Thanawi, for example, left a 
madrasa in Kanpur early in his career after refusing to fundraise during Ramadan (Zaman 2008: 
17-18) as did Maulana Jahangir as described in chapter eight. 
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that hard to convince donors, as their institutional reputation speaks for itself.  Smaller 
madrasas on the other hand, the mufti explained, are those that donors have never heard 
of or without a respectable affiliation, and safeers must spend a resulting significant effort 
in reviewing expenses, student details, and photographs of school buildings and activities 
– or even invite donors to visit multiple times – in order to successfully solicit donations.  
He explained,  
People don’t know them! It takes effort for them to get the job done. They are not 
[considered] trustworthy [‘itabār]. People don’t know if this is a good place 
[ṣaḥīḥ jagah] or not, or if the teachers [ustāden] are hard-working [kām 
karnewāle].  But for a large institution, there’s only so much work for a safeer. It 
gets done easily [āsānī se ho jāte hai] and they don’t need to bother with 
“commission.” It’s only those that are far off in rural areas [jo andar hain] or 
small. They speak of “commission.”  
 
Thus, commissions are an incentive for additional effort that is only required for 
unknown, rural, small madrasas.  Overall, the the payment structures for safeers represent 
a spectrum of increasingly institutionalized and regularized incentives for fundraisers, 
such that the more famous the madrasa, the more pre-established and consistent the 
safeer’s salary will be.  But, nevertheless, the mufti also added, the most successful 
fundraisers at well-known institutions like Nadwa and Deoband are compensated for 
extraordinary effort: safeers with the highest donor bases who pull in (for example) over 
300,000 rupees a season ($5,500) receive a bonus commission of 5% or 10% of the 
amount raised that exceeds the 300,000-rupee threshold. 
 Not all madrasa fundraisers are even compensated, as in the cases I heard of from 
Mr. Rashid the donor above wherein boy students of rural madrasas also accompany their 
instructors to the city in order to add pathos to fund appeals.  Mr. Rashid explained how 
  217
these alms-collecting troupes do not even bring enough money to cover their food and 
drink during their trips, relying on the generosity of mosques and locals to provide 
Ramadan dinners to them for free.  However, this is a rather rare practice in north India; 
all fundraisers I heard about (besides this anecdote of Mr. Rashid’s) are adults and travel 
alone with an adequate stipend.96  
Receipts, Receiving, & Refusing to Receive  
Alms Receipts 
The receipt for transactions was a keystone of the bureaucratic edifice known as 
the kaghazi raj (“Paper Rule”) of the British administration of India. Along with other 
documentary incarnations of colonial power such as the record, report, manual (Smith 
1985), and the file (Hull 2003), receipts were the material forms that enabled collective 
action from individuals scattered across the vast Indian subcontinent and the global 
British empire.  Receipt books for transactions in India have long been utilized by myriad 
actors from government offices to lowly village shopkeepers, and they follow a standard 
form characterized by double-record sheets (usually in white and pink), a detachable slip 
of carbon paper, and serial numbering stamped on each page. The serial numbering is a 
crucial aspect, as British officers notoriously distrusted the plethora of native clerks, and 
the numbering would reveal if sheets had been removed for forgery (Hall 2003: 293, 
299). 
                                                 
96 In Senegal, however, human rights organizations’ have issued critical reports of boys seeking alms 
for Qur’anic schools (The Guardian 2012). 
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Every charitable transaction that I 
observed being made to an organization 
involved a receipt. From wandering madrasa 
fundraisers in plain, even tattered, clothes who 
went door to door or sat in mosques after 
prayer-time, to the well-known Maulana 
Jahangir with his small charity in the bazaar (see 
chapter eight), to the largest and most 
bureaucratized educational foundation in 
Lucknow, the Shi’i charity known as Tawhidul 
Muslimeen Trust  – each one utilized the same 
format of receipts in elongated books with a 
carbon paper sheet slid under the cover.  The 
receipt, the ability to document charitable transactions, was what distinguished organized 
fundraisers from other alms-seekers – especially the ubiquitous street beggar who also sat 
outside mosques and went door-to-door as well as store-to-store.  The receipt was 
symbolic of donors’ ability to perceive almsgiving as an exchange between equals, a 
reciprocal transaction rather than a demeaning gift to the destitute and lowly that is 
unreciprocated and, as Mauss (1960) proposed, thereby “damaging” to the recipient. 
Street beggars were presumed illiterate, even ignorant of spoken Hindi-Urdu if they were 
migrants, considered disreputable, and oftentimes only ambiguously Muslim (such as 
Hindu alms-seekers masquerading behind veils or skull-caps as Muslims). By contrast, 
Figure 10: Fundraiser writing a 
receipt in Aminabad bazaar 
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madrasa fundraisers were considered by many to be highly educated Muslim scholars and 
paragons of Islamic practice.  Their paper receipts were designed to symbolize both these 
traits of elevated literacy and Islamic authenticity.  Safeers’ possessed immense cultural 
capital in old city Lucknow, even if traveling safeers were in appearance (or actuality) not 
much more financially well-off than alms-seekers who did so out of necessity.  Although 
their speech and physical bearing often evidenced such cultural capital, this thin sliver of 
paper functioned as a tangible reminder, as a symbolic barrier heavy with materiality, that 
separated traveling madrasa fundraisers from those without receipts, letters of 
introduction (tasdeeq-nameh) or other documentation: beggars, alms-seeking poor, or 
(worse) underserving scam artists.   
Donors were constantly vigilant, as a result of this potentially blurry line.  The 
bazaars teemed with anecdotal stories of fake madrasa fundraisers “eating” alms (paisa 
khate).97 One donor explained: 
There’s a ‘lack of confidence’ among Muslims in general, but especially in Uttar 
Pradesh it is ‘maximum.’ When you are collecting [chandah lene jāte hain] for a 
mosque, [the donor] doesn’t get a ‘receipt.’ He doesn’t want it.  He knows that his 
name is written up above.  But when a person goes collecting for a madrasa, when 
that collector [chandah lene wāla] comes to the house, then that person wants a 
‘receipt.’ 
 
Lucknow Muslims’ general perception was that fundraisers for madrasas in particular, 
who often traveled from elsewhere in the state or region, are particularly subject to 
suspicion. This quote also illustrates precisely where and why receipts as written 
documentation are necessary: localized giving benefits from localized networks of 
                                                 
97 Although I never met a donor with certain knowledge they had been scammed, I interviewed youth 
with friends who were scammers. Such thieves stole charity money as well as donors’ claims to 
have legitimately given their obligatory alms, potentially negating their thawab. 
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recognition and trust, while India’s nation-wide system of madrasas sprinkled through the 
rural areas around cities like Lucknow were dependent on far-flung networks of donors. 
The distances involved precluded Muslim almsgivers from verifying identities and 
authenticity without documentation. Thus, donors’ faith in accruing merit from alms-gifts 
is not merely a matter of believing (as this donor said) that Allah’s account book of merit 
(thawab) is “written up above” – alms-gifts’ ritual efficacy is embedded within the 
systems for verifying their ultimate destination, whether this system is neighborhood 
gossip channels and walking over to view a local madrasa or mosque construction site or 
is scrutinizing a receipt and tasdeeq-nameh letters for authenticity over a distance.  
Design and crafting of receipts thus took on heightened significance, more than 
mere records of payment.  They were not only records of a transaction for accounting and 
future potential auditing purposes, but were also burdened with semiotic task of 
representing madrasa fundraisers’ legitimacy as representatives of madrasas, and not 
other alms-seekers or imposters.  I once spent an hour (while waiting for another 
interviewee) in the office of a digital graphic designer who worked on crafting a madrasa 
donation receipt, and I became mesmerized watching him whip around Urdu calligraphy, 
stylized Arabic prayers, and Islamic motifs on the screen using CorelDraw software.  
With the ubiquity of digital printing, each madrasa’s administrators find it possible to 
develop their own uniquely stylized calligraphic heading. Digital printing also facilitates 
easy counterfeiting of others’ receipts, and developing a unique calligraphic heading and 
ink stamp is also critical, as a madrasa would be detected and held suspect if theirs was 
recognized as a copy of another. 
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The first few times I made nominal donations to madrasa fundraisers early in 
fieldwork, I disregarded (and even discarded) my receipts.  In interviews, however, 
donors began to impress upon me the subjective, spiritual value of such receipts. 
Functioning as akin to spiritual currency notes, the zakat receipts represented the 
transaction that had transformed donors’ material wealth into spiritual merit. Donors 
carefully filed away their receipts from traveling fundraisers often by stapling them into a 
record book, especially storekeepers with accounts close at hand, even though donors did 
not claim tax exemption for Islamic charity (as it was made along sectarian lines and thus 
not recognized in the Indian tax code). While I never saw such zakat receipt collections 
furnished as proof to any other Muslim co-workers or family members, the donors 
themselves utilized this receipt file to keep a personal accounting of the zakat they had 
given thus far in the year. In interviews, donors often showed me their receipt file. Mr. 
Rashid, to continue the example above, filed Maulana Faisal’s receipt in his account 
book, enthusiastically displaying all receipts he had collected thus far, “I get receipts for 
my [obligatory] zakat. That’s how I separate it from [voluntary] sadaqa, after I’ve 
calculated my zakat obligation with a calculator.”  Zakat receipts, which I had once 
casually discarded, seemed in such cases to be functioning as spiritual fiat currency.  
Having no intrinsic value of their own, the receipts nevertheless were symbolically 
imbued with a new social value, representing the transformation of donors’ profane 
money into spiritual merit.  This transformation, in the eyes of donors, was produced 
through the authenticating practices of the Muslim teachers-cum-fundraisers that received 
alms (qualified interpreters of Islamic law and thus perceived as legitimate conduit for 
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correctly disbursing donors’ alms).   
Receipts were also part of a process of individualizing zakat according to each 
donor.  Shari’a obligates zakat on each Muslim individual adult – man or woman (even, 
in schools of jurisprudence outside of north India, upon minors; see chapter three) – but 
in practice donations from the same family of donors are often bundled.  In pre-literate 
times and places, this made zakat-giving an unavoidably collective practice, to be 
executed by the head of household who handled the wealth in the form of crops or 
livestock (cf. Scott 1985: 10-11 on zakat of crops in Malaysia).  However, with the 
documentary materials that underpinned zakat-giving in contemporary Lucknow, the 
reality of zakat was materialized for each individual donor in the household – whether 
husband, wife, or younger brother. For example, a man donating 600 rupees to Maulana 
Jahangir received three receipts, each with a separate name in the “donor’s name” line 
(see Figure 6 at the beginning of this chapter) and written for 200 rupees given by three 
separate family members – most likely a wife, brothers, or in-laws in a joint household. 
Compiling and adding them up, almsgivers demonstrated to themselves (and by 
extension, to Allah) that they had met their annual zakat obligation. Curiously, this 
practice of writing receipts, while it arose from colonial financial auditing practices and 
appears exactly the same as those, highlighted how very much the zakat-giving ritual is 
not merely financial.  While the three separate family members all gave their zakat in one 
pile of ordinary money, it was also not just aggregable cash, nor was the receipt merely a 
transaction record. It was documentation that symbolized the zakat-giving ritual as a 
highly personal and individualized one.   Donors that I interviewed thus easily spoke of 
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receipts as personalized evidence of their own zakat – and by implication, receipts were 
also material evidence of their individualized “account” with Allah since spiritual merit 
(thawab) was also necessarily individualized, rather than collectively owned like most 
household assets of Lucknow Muslims. 
Receipts from madrasa fundraisers fulfilled this symbolic niche more than donors’ 
person-to-person alms gifts, such as those dropped in the outstretched hands of needy 
Muslim neighbors. Moreover, receipts were issued by the institutions producing and 
teaching Islamic jurisprudence. Thus they assuaged any lingering concerns that this 
financial transaction was in fact legitimate zakat – a doubt that crept into the minds of 
donors I interviewed when they donated to other Muslim organizations that were run by 
people with less knowledge of proper Islamic practices. The stylized Islamic motifs and 
Arabic sayings on receipts, etched with digital publishing, spoke to this essential 
difference from other fiat currencies backed by temporal governments such as the Indian.  
For example, Figure 11 is a close-up on the madrasa motif and accompanying Arabic 
phrase, which translates as, “Seeking Knowledge is a 
Duty Upon All Muslim Men and Women [Talab al-
‘ilm fareedat ‘ala kulli muslim wa muslima].”  
Although the script is nearly identical to Urdu, the 
Arabic here includes diacritic marks on each letter – in 
India few people, even educated Muslims, have 
studied enough to write such Arabic calligraphy with 
diacritics, and the skill is largely the province of graduates of the larger urban madrasas – 
Figure 11: Arabic calligraphic 
motif on a receipt, representing 
Maulana Faisal's madrasa 
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an obstacle to counterfeiting.  Diacritics in Arabic script, moreover, are a key marker of a 
particularly high-quality madrasa education, as many Indian madrasas prioritize Persian 
and Urdu over Arabic language instruction or do not adequately instruct students in these 
diacritics, about a dozen different marks that are not used in Urdu or Persian.  As 
Brinkley Messick observed in another Muslim context, “script, it is assumed, conveys (as 
precisely as a fingerprint) the person…While it may be difficult, it is not impossible to 
distinguish the mark of the just writer” (1993:215).  Writing can communicate knowledge 
as easily as people can; however, piety is much more difficult (if not impossible) to 
properly transmit through documents, yet is equally important in the maintenance of 
Islamic institutions of learning, law, and public administration.  
The value placed up the receipt (and other such documentation of zakat giving) 
was widespread, but not ubiquitous. For some other donors, however, receipts were less 
symbolic of the spiritual merit they had accrued through almsgiving; for these Muslims, 
paper notes were less relevant and their “ledger” was written with Allah.  Some wrote 
down their alms payments in an accounting ledger and did not bother as carefully with 
receipts as Mr. Rashid did. Other donors I interviewed merely separated out the required 
amount of obligatory alms in a special purse at the start of Ramadan and made payments 
until the purse was emptied. Instead of being spiritual fiat currency, the alms receipts 
served merely as record-keeping against double-payments for many donors.  “I only give 
alms [to a madrasa fundraiser] once I’ve looked in my receipt file, and I see that I’ve not 
given to them already!” the owner of the “button-wallah” sewing store in Aminabad 
bazaar said, “About once or twice a year I refuse someone like this.” Although not 
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technically disallowed as zakat, most Lucknow Muslims prefer not to give to the same 
safeer multiple times in the same year.  Yet for most zakat-givers I interviewed and 
transactions I observed, the documentary materials were such an inseparable element, 
that the demonstration of trust, authenticity, and personalized piety would have been quite 
differently understood without them. 
What Takers Give: “Gifting” Islamic Authenticity to Donors & the Strange Cases of 
“Refusing to Receive” 
 In my discussion thus far, I have highlighted how charitable fundraisers [chandah 
lene walle] are in fact giving as they are the takers of charity.  Receipts are the most 
common material expression of “when takers give,” as madrasa fundraisers are 
particularly empowered with legitimacy to authenticate zakat transactions as meritorious 
of spiritual benefits promised in the Qur’an.   
Receipt-giving, however, also constituted a critical juncture for fundraisers to 
withhold – the exception that proves the rule of their ability to “give” the weight of 
Islamic authenticity to donors in the course of receiving their alms-gifts). Alms-collectors 
were not afraid to negotiate, as seen in the opening vignette. Maulana Faisal initially 
refused to write the receipt for 50 rupees, thus giving him the initiative to delay while 
protesting based on the needs of his madrasa (and his unspoken knowledge of Mr. 
Rashid’s reputation as a generous donor) and asking Mr. Rashid to reconsider for 100 
rupees.  While this tactic was not common, other donors confirmed similar attempts to 
negotiate.  Madrasa fundraisers were aware of their position as legitimate and sanctifying 
conduits for donors to fulfill their almsgiving obligation.  The alms transaction was not 
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complete until the receipt was written, and such a juncture afforded fundraisers the 
opportunity to invite donors to reconsider or attempt another appeal strategy. 
Fundraisers sometimes became visibly upset over challenges to their authoritative 
role in authenticating alms transactions.  After working for months with Maulana 
Jahangir (chapter eight) I waved dismissively when he began writing a receipt for one of 
my nominal donations to his charity, saying that I trusted him and knew Allah recorded 
my gift regardless, but he insisted.  In one of the evenings I spent with Maulana Jahangir 
as he collected donations during Ramadan, I observed a man hurriedly approach and hand 
over an envelope of cash from his pocket along with a few mumbled words of 
explanation from his lips, before rushing back to his motorcycle (apparently late to be 
somewhere) while Maulana Jahangir was deep in another conversation.  Once realizing, 
Maulana Jahangir stood up and yelled down the street, “Come back here!”  With an 
avuncular chuckle, the maulana asked the man if he really believed he could leave 
without a receipt, writing out and tearing the receipt from the booklet printed for his 
Society.  Turning to me after the man left, he elaborated, “It is very unconventional 
[ghair-rasmi] to not give a receipt with zakat.  A maulana could just pocket it!”  While 
recognizing that they would likely never be audited by the government, madrasas and 
similar charities kept such records and placed value in receipts as a result of the spiritual 
significance of the alms they handled. Any appearance of impropriety would ripple 
among the Muslim community in Lucknow through informal channels of gossip that 
maintained the only real sense of accountability, besides the general faith in ultimate 
accountability to Allah that each charitable fundraiser sought to portray.  Moreover, the 
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widespread attention to receipts is encouraged by madrasas and their fundraisers, as it is 
the key materialization of their legitimacy and financial transparency (regardless of how 
real or purely constructed that legitimacy actually is), which is performatively on display 
for potential donors and the public at large witnessing the on-going zakat collection.  
In at least one transaction, a receipt documented a charitable transaction initially 
unintended as such by the man who (after the receipt was written) became the “donor” to 
an Islamic charity.98 This Islamic charity in the course of registering beneficiaries for a 
government program submitted hundreds of student applications. The charity budgeted 
an informal processing fee, as everyone in Lucknow does when dealing with the district 
government welfare office, to be paid to the clerk receiving the applications (the going 
rate was 30 rupees per applicant form, as I heard from a few organizations).  However, 
the clerk was Muslim and had interacted with this charity before.  He waived the informal 
processing fee.  “He knows me and that I’m a good guy,” the charity worker explained to 
me, “I was ready to pay the bribe. 99 That’s how things work around here, you know.  You 
have to do it. But he didn’t accept it from me. He gave it back right there.”  This charity 
worker, as a leader and fundraiser of the organization, had the authority to write receipts 
for donations. “So I pulled out a receipt from our receipt booklet and wrote it out for him 
right there.”  In short, the receipt named this interaction as “charity.” It categorized the 
Muslim clerk’s refusal to accept a bribe as a donation.  While no one considered it zakat, 
most likely (as the donor must make a particular intention to count as correct zakat), this 
                                                 
98 Given the political sensitivity of this anecdote, I avoid identifying this organization even with a 
pseudonym I have used for it elsewhere in the dissertation.  
99 This charity, while it budgets for bribes, pays for them out of an operating expenses account that is 
funded with private funds from the two wealthy heads of the charity, not from public donations.  
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donation was nevertheless a contribution indistinguishable from other voluntary charity 
like sadaqah – or, rather, it would be indistinguishable were it not for its origin as a failed 
bribe.  The receipt semiotically named and legitimized it as charity, at least in the records 
of the charity organization, which is how the story came to be related to me: an act of 
pious generosity on the part of this Muslim clerk.  
Receipts and the Capacity for Surveillance 
Receipts were not only for the donors’ benefit, to tally their alms donations as 
they made them. They had other functions for the madrasas that were performing the 
fundraising.  Beneath each receipt that I saw written, nestled underneath the sheet of the 
receipt booklet, lay a slip of black carbon paper. This carbon copy insured another 
symbolic offering that charity recipients could give to donors:  public recognition.  This 
potential recognition highlights a critical tension in Islamic charitable giving, as scriptural 
injunctions encourage almsgiving in secret (Qur’an 2:271) as much as possible.  Yet, in 
India as elsewhere, common NGO practice is to recognize donors in public 
announcements of gratitude through brochures, wall plaques, or reports.  However, these 
almsgiving records have a particular significance in India, where gift-giving is 
particularly salient; Indians commonly keep careful track of who gives donations at a 
wedding or other life-cycle rite, in order to “return” the gift (at a comparable value) later 
during another’s similar ceremony (cf. Werbner 2003, on this practice in the diaspora).  
Madrasas and Islamic charities in Lucknow kept records of their donors, at least in the 
carbon-copied duplicates of their donation receipts. Large madrasas such as Nadwa do 
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maintain careful lists of regular sponsors (although for the smaller madrasas and charities 
that I worked with, sponsors were merely noted in fundraisers’ memories).  
Although the practice of printing donor lists (Metcalf 1982: 97) was discontinued 
sometime in the decades between 1900 and today, the donor lists are still maintained in 
the internal organizational records of the madrasas. Thus, donors’ names and addresses 
are known to madrasa teachers, staff, board members, and other patrons; in villages and 
the bazaars of old city Lucknow, in particular, I often overheard discussions between 
madrasa teachers, students, and community members that kept tabs on who were 
sponsors and who were not.  
To mitigate immodest gossip of generosity and presumed wealth, some pious 
donors attempt to conceal their donations. “You’d be amazed to know how many donors 
to us don’t even want to take a receipt!” one maulana who fundraised for the Jama’at-i 
Islami and its schools told me, “They tell us instead, ‘Write in the name Abdullah instead. 
I don’t want a receipt.’”  Abdullah is a man’s name, but also translates (from the Arabic) 
as “servant of God” – thus, the pseudonym serves as a convenient marker for those 
seeking to represent solely charitable and spiritual motives.  Speaking on the same theme, 
another madrasa fundraiser who traveled as far as Saudi Arabia collecting donations told 
me, “Our donor lists are often full of mostly ‘Abdullah’, ‘Abdullah’, ‘Abdullah’!”   
A Muslim tax accountant with whom I met a few times settled my questions on 
the place of charitable donations and Muslim welfare activities in the Indian tax code. 
There is simply no financial or legal reason for donors to bother with a receipt for Islamic 
alms, he explained.  Madrasas and most charities are not registered to receive tax-exempt 
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donations.100 The application for exemption is very complex, madrasas and charities told 
me, as it requires the submission of three years of financial records by a paid accountant; 
even then, donors may deduct only 50% of their donations for income tax purposes rather 
than the full donation (as tax code allows in the USA).  Moreover, The accountant I spoke 
with above reminded me, the Jama’at-i Islami was once a banned organization (during 
the 1975-77 State of Emergency), and it is likely that at least some donors donate 
anonymously to safeguard themselves from being financially linked to the Islamist 
organization or its madrasas in the event of potential future government crackdowns.  The 
complete lack of tax-benefit for receipts lends even more to the interpretation that their 
value was primarily personalized and spiritual in nature for the zakat donors, particularly 
since they were assuming at least a small amount of risk of increased government 
surveillance in donating (often by name) to Muslim organizations in Lucknow.  
Madrasas and charities were quite aware of the political implications of their 
donor records.  In Maulana Jahangir’s charity, all receipts had to be verified by a witness 
present for the transaction. Given the amount of time I spent observing fundraising and 
distribution, I was asked to sign as a witness multiple times.  The first time, I demurred 
their invitation to sign as a witness, saying that (unlike others in the room) I was not a 
board member or charity worker. One charity worker said, “It’s OK. They’ll know you’re 
not from al-Qa’eda!” he said, laughing heartily at his own ludicrous suggestion that this 
small, obviously harmless charity would be targeted as a terrorist organization. “Anyway, 
we will take responsibility for you so you don’t go to jail,” he continued with a smile.   
                                                 
100 The relevant statute is Section 80G of the Income Tax Act of 1961, which is the closest equivalent 
to the 501(c)3 section of tax code in the USA for charitable organizations.  
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Despite his assurances, this charity was, nonetheless, briefly investigated by the police, 
although this was widely understood not as an actual suspicion of militant financing but 
rather as a scare-attempt to receive bribes, as I discuss in chapter eight. The fact remains 
that the meticulous receipt-writing and donor record-keeping is not only a practice that 
allows “takers to give,” as I have shown so far. Receipts are also aspects India’s larger 
culture of bureaucratic auditing and charity workers are aware how they might expose 
Muslim organizations and their donors to government surveillance and repression.  
Modern Zakat: Authentication of Islamic Charity in Uncertain Times 
New accounting techniques such as the alms documentation I have described have 
at least two impacts on personal religious practice.  First, of course, documentation has 
made the very role of the safeer, the traveling fundraising stranger, possible. Whereas 
almsgiving since the time of the Prophet Muhammad has long represented a 
reinforcement of local solidarities and kinship networks (e.g. Qur’an 2:177) the ritual of 
zakat in India today has come to be primarily identified with madrasa fundraisers who 
travel great distances.  Bureaucratic practices and symbolic representations of piety and 
Islamic learning facilitate donors’ trust, even when the beneficiaries are miles away or too 
far to visit.101 This man (and safeers are all men) represents a new form of linkage 
between ordinary Muslim believers and their institutions, a linkage based not upon the 
learning of “the learned” (i.e. ‘ulama) but rather upon their persuasion skills and financial 
                                                 
101 South Asian Muslims have donated funds across continents for centuries, especially for charitable 
institutions that served pilgrims (Cole 1986, Dupree 1973).  However, these charitable activities 
were primarily in the form of waqf, an endowment made once, rather than in the form of repeated 
individual donations such as zakat.  
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trustworthiness. 
Second, however, writing as a mode of communication facilitates transmission of 
knowledge and information but simultaneously constructs anonymity – thus heightening 
anxieties over potential fraud. Even as writing shortens distances between giver and 
receivers who are reside away, the inherently duplicitous nature of writing (as opposed to 
in-person speech) also lengthens apparent “distance”: introducing the slim-yet-distinct 
possibility for a counterfeiter down the street to pose as a safeer from a far-away and 
world-famous institution.  Although long-distance trade and even patronage for Indian 
Muslim scholars has been occurring for centuries between India and Arabia (Zaman 
1999b), these data suggest that the now-ubiquitous utilization of print technologies has 
transformed almsgiving for nearly all Muslim donors in Lucknow – and not just because 
of the information-transmission potential of media. Piety is becoming inflected with new, 
distinctly modern anxieties. 
By and large, in scholarly accounts of the introduction of print into Muslim 
societies, printing is first and foremost seen as a medium for transmitting Islamic 
knowledge.  Urdu scholarly works and basic primers alike serve to circulate Islamic 
knowledge to literate Muslims. As such, Muslim scholars’ use of mass printing 
techniques has been pivotal for transmission of knowledge about “correct” Islam, such as 
in universities (Eickelman 1992), basic primers (Ingram 2014) or popular hadith 
commentaries (Zaman 1999b).102 Indian Muslim publics were beset by a severe crisis of 
                                                 
102 Indeed, after the British crown seized control in 1857, Urdu printing became doubly important, as 
Urdu script itself also came to symbolize Muslim culture distinct from English and Hindu streams 
of the public sphere and rival alphabets sparked increasingly intense political dispute (King 2001).   
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identity, believing the influence of colonial powers to be a threat to the continuing spread 
and future transmission of Islam to younger generations.  Under the British Raj, “no 
longer could the Muslim ruler be regarded as effectively guaranteeing the supremacy of 
Islam…and the ‘ordinary’ Muslim emerged as the symbol of the faith” (Sikand 2005:54).  
Mushrooming numbers of reformist madrasas schooled ordinary Muslims on an 
unprecedented scale, even low-castes (ajilaf), providing them with “access to ‘high’ 
culture” (Sikand 2005:55; cf. Alam 2011).  Print not only spread Islamic learning to more 
people, but transformed individual Muslims’ relationship with their own faith as well. It 
allowed literate Muslims to engage in more personal exploration of their religious 
scriptures.  Mass education, literacy, and ordinary Muslims’ newfound access to 
authoritative scriptural texts due to the introduction of the printing press have 
transformed Muslim societies worldwide, facilitating the self-conscious objectification of 
Islam, as Islam was increasingly disseminated and debated in printed texts (Eickelman & 
Piscatori 1996:39-44). This shift has been particularly evident in Muslim scriptualist 
movements in India since the 19th century (Metcalf 1982, Osella & Osella 2008a).  
However, the ubiquity of print technologies burdened believers with new 
anxieties about authorship and authenticity.  As Francis Robinson (1993: 245) observed 
of the introduction of print in colonial India, “From now on, any Ahmad, Mahmud, or 
Muhammad could claim to speak for Islam.”  ‘Ulama and their madrasas now faced 
challenges from other educated, even modernist Muslims who interpreted the Qur’an and 
other scriptures.  However, unlike trends in Protestant Europe where the printing press 
purportedly ushered in a priesthood of all believers, the scripturalist turn in South Asian 
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Islam provided ‘ulama with new strategies of constructing their authority as interpreters 
of the Islamic tradition for the Muslim public, especially their use of the “elitist” genre of 
hadith commentary (sharh) that was a discursive method long popular in India and 
exclusively taught in madrasas (Zaman 2002: 55-57).   Through the printed word, 
Muslim scholars implored the reading public to refrain from forming their own opinions 
of correct Islamic practice only from texts and to maintain their personal ties with ‘ulama 
in madrasas along with self-study (Ingram 2014).  Person-to-person ties continue, even 
today, to be a primary basis for transmitting Islamic knowledge and authenticating proper 
Islamic authority on religious matters, although this has not prevented the modern 
tendency towards pluralization of knowledge and fragmentation of authority (Zaman 
2002: 56).  Not unlike the printed word potentially replaced person-to-person instruction 
with a teaching manual, the materialization of zakat-giving in documents also replaces 
the localized practices of giving to neighbors and relatives in prior eras (as preferred in 
the Qur’an 2:177) with a traveling stranger bearing a pink and white paginated receipt 
book.  
The above data on alms documents such as verification letters (tasdeeq-nameh), 
official listings of fundraisers (ferist-e safeer), and donation receipts (chandah ka raseet) 
highlight this dual impact of print technology upon Islamic practice. On one hand, print 
holds the potential for direct personal connection to ‘ulama, their madrasas, and to 
Islamic scriptures.  On the other hand, print technology brings along with it heightened 
anxieties about counterfeiting – yet, that anxiety can be partially mitigated with 
distinctive calligraphic practices.  Calligraphy, while being a textual medium and thus 
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suspect to falsity, also imparts at least some of the personalized, unique identificatory 
power of person-to-person communication.  Brinkley Messick (1993: 23-26, 213-215, et 
passim) detailed this medieval Muslim belief in authenticity of oral testimony over 
written texts, as well as the disruptions caused by the printing press that changed 
Muslims’ relationship to sacred scriptures and transmitting Islamic law.  Messick in 
analyzing a 20th century Islamic scholar’s commentary on “the problem of legal 
documents,” wrote: 
Writing is a ‘safeguard,’ as is permits the preservation of life, memory, speech, 
event; and yet, as becomes apparent later, it harbors the within it a separation and 
a threat of falsehood…It is both a remedy and a poison…[as the commentary 
inveighed] ‘any claimant can make for himself what he wants in the way of 
documents’  (Messick 1993: 213).103 
 
Messick emphasized that it is writing itself that harbors such suspicion of forgery, above 
and beyond face-to-face speech, most especially because in-person encounters were 
perceived as best for discerning moral character and integrity. Calligraphy and such 
stylized specialist writing as we saw in the alms-receipts and documentation, however, 
provides an additional resource to combat the “distance” (i.e. the threat of inauthenticity) 
that writing imposes between the reader and the presumed author.  
My donor interviewees repeated litanies of angst reflecting their constant 
suspicion that alms-seekers were not who they said they were, or that their alms 
donations would be made in error and potentially not accepted by Allah. For many 
donors, the larger amount of concrete, visible proof they could muster in the discharging 
of their zakat obligations, the better: account ledgers, precise calculations, verification 
                                                 
103 The commentary is by Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, published as al-Hsmahi in 1937 (Messick 
1993:212-217).  
  236
letters from madrasas, paper receipts and records, and phone calls to confirm identities of 
traveling fundraisers.   
Challenges to personal religious beliefs posed by daily life in diverse societies, in 
which myriad belief systems (including secular unbelief) jostle together in increasingly 
mult-vocal public forums, result in what Charles Taylor has called the “fragility of belief” 
(2007: 21). Such disjunctions of modernity produce a sort of anxiety or “heightened self 
consciousness” over Islam and its teachings such that “basic questions come to the fore in 
the consciousness of large numbers of believers” who then seek answers.  It is this self-
conscious construction of personal belief that Eickelman & Piscatori (1996: 38) define as 
“objectification” of Islam (and what Lara Deeb [2006] terms “authentication”).  Thus, the 
general concern over writing, and what I specifically observed as Muslims’ need to 
acquire paper receipts to certify legitimate alms, is a concern that partakes of larger 
processes observed by anthropologists in Muslim societies.  Lara Deeb’s ethnography 
also calls attention to these anxieties about authenticity, and she argues such anxieties 
ultimately are what spur pious Muslims to seek “correct” or “true” understandings and 
practices in “visible” ways as undeniably expressive demonstrations of their commitment 
to true Islam (2006: 22-24).  For Deeb, pious Shi’i women in Beirut were most “visibly” 
pious in institutionalized charities, which allowed women to modestly but effectively 
spread Islamic norms (e.g. veiling, almsgiving, Shi’i activism) in the male-dominated 
public sphere (2006: 205-219). Like the women in Deeb’s ethnography that mediated 
between the historically privatized realm of the family home and the newly public sphere 
of charity activism, I also suggest that madrasa fundraisers are the builders of crucial 
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linkages between the restricted realm of madrasa education and a newly public activism 
constructed through Muslims’ charitable engagements today.   
However, going beyond Deeb’s analysis, I also emphasize that visibility that 
imparts Islamic authenticity is not only contained in practices embodied by Muslim 
persons themselves, such as their clothing and public presence.  Visibility and materiality 
of documents are critical forms of embodied tradition for Lucknow’s Muslims.  
Moreover, zakat documentation were visibly individualized per each donor, which 
distinguished them from prior forms of de facto collective giving, and documentation 
thus facilitated an understanding of zakat as a personal obligation of each Muslim to 
Allah.  Just as knowledge of the discursive tradition of Islam increasingly has become the 
responsibility of individual literate Muslims, embodied traditions of zakat receipts are 
more common in contemporary Lucknow as materializations of pietistic practice. The 
visible and enduring nature of receipts was not primarily a publically performative act, 
but rather facilitated Lucknow’s Muslims habits of tabulating zakat over the course of a 
year of almsgiving, thus assuaging personal anxieties about the correct discharge of zakat 
ritual obligations. 
Conclusion 
Without undermining the continued relevance of print technology in transmitting 
knowledge and thereby transforming Muslims’ relationship with Islam as a scriptural 
tradition as well as an oral tradition and an embodied one, what I am pointing out here in 
this chapter is that the role of printed texts also shapes Islamic practice in other ways.  
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Documentary practices such as tasdeeq-nameh, ferist-e safeer, and chandah receipts are 
all crucial bureaucratic technologies for ensuring authenticity and accountability in the 
financial transactions obligated on Muslims in religious charity.  The material documents 
utilized by the madrasa fundraisers and almsgivers that I described above, are all textual 
forms enabled by mass printing technology, including the replication of calligraphic seals 
and distinctive Islamic motifs. These texts are crucial not for the actual information they 
convey but for the forms that script take in these documents.  Prestigious madrasas rely 
on specific elements – signatures, stamps, calligraphic designs, and the presence of 
factual contact numbers – to construct the requisite amount of authenticity that their 
traveling safeers need in order to instill trust in would-be donors.  These technologies 
now allow fundraisers to travel across India and be recognized, when in pre-colonial 
times they would be barely known outside their villages.   
Public financing for madrasas created a new mode for ordinary Muslims to 
participate in the Muslim community: as donors.  In constructing their identity as “Indian 
Muslims” in the heightened communal atmosphere under colonialism, India Muslim 
almsgivers’ role as charitable donors was equally as important as their role as recipients 
of Islamic knowledge as reading publics and as students in madrasas.  The new 
popularity of madrasas did not only create newly learned Muslim publics. They had 
another secondary effect, as madrasas spread new accounting technologies and 
documentation practices throughout the ordinary Muslim public comprised of alms-
givers from all strata of society.  
These documentary practices lend an additional degree of materialization to the 
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ritual of almsgiving, which already materialized in financial transactions.  As my data 
have shown, the presence of receipts has led donors to utilize them to tally up and 
personally document their own levels of yearly almsgiving, even if receipts’ original 
purpose was transparency and double-entry bookkeeping for madrasa administration.  
Moreover, this materialization of almsgiving has allowed it to become more visible due 
to the efforts of madrasas to certify alms-gifts through receipts and published donor lists. 
These new visible modes of almsgiving, I argue, become a broader expression of Islamic 
values and Muslim identity, offering yet another channel for Muslims to performatively 
express their piety to themselves and others.  In a manner similar to that pointed out by 
anthropologists studying prayer (Mahmood 2005), pilgrimage (Bianchi 2010), and 
veiling (Deeb 2006, Tobin 2015), paying zakat in an increasingly bureaucratized Indian 
society is yet another reminder for modern Indian Muslims that regular ritual practices 
are individual, personal responsibilities.  Such a shift to individualizing religious practice 
is re-orienting Muslim identity away from historical loci of traditional authority (e.g. the 
Caliph, shrines, mosques) towards more subjectively ethicalized forms of religiosity 
focused on a Muslim’s personal relationship with God.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
MADRASA STUDENTS IN THE ZAKAT ECONOMY:  
SOCIAL MOBILITY & ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
Introduction 
 “Before we begin [this interview],” my interviewee Zahir, a slender madrasa 
student sitting across the desk, said to me, “I want to tell you what the true aim of zakat 
is.”  I had not yet switched on my voice recorder to take another routine survey from this 
twenty-six year old student studying in his third year. Nor had I broached the topic of 
zakat. The survey consisted of life history and career aspiration interviews.  However, as 
most of the students at the madrasa of Nadwatul ’Ulama already knew, my dissertation 
topic was heavily focused on zakat and similar forms of Islamic charity. He excitedly 
continued,  
The true aim [maqṣad] of zakat in the hearts of [almsgivers] is a desire for more 
correct [ṣaḥīḥ] knowledge of Islam. Actually, they themselves don’t know this! 
They don’t realize why they are giving zakat! ...But [so then] what should our aim 
be? Those of us who are studying [at madrasas]? Because others are spending on 
us, because others are doing a favor for us [humāre upar ehsān kār rahe hain] -- 
what should [our response] be [kyā honā chāhiye] in return for that favor [ehsān]? 
We should tell them the correct [ṣaḥīḥ] things!  We should teach them, teach their 
households that this is Islam. Do this. Don’t do that. 
 
Zahir concluded, gesturing emphatically.  “Is this an idea taught in Nadwa?” I asked, 
amazed upon hearing such a well-articulated notion of reciprocity between alms and 
Islamic knowledge. “No, it’s my personal opinion [nahin, zāti khyāl hai merā].”  But the 
student was in no way an unorthodox thinker, and he went on to assert that most students 
felt as he did.  Otherwise, he continued to me in explanation, why would reformist 
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madrasas like Nadwa place such emphasis on evangelist preaching (tablīgh) as they do? 
Why would such a significant portion of their madrasa curriculum focus on fine-grained 
parsing of the “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) and incorrect ways of practicing Islam and holding 
Islamic beliefs, which were not immediately obvious to lay Muslims? “So, alms-givers 
are expecting teachings in return [tabādale mein] [for zakat] – teachings on correct 
Islam?” I clarified.  “Yes, that’s exactly right,” he replied.  
 This chapter examines madrasas, their students, and Islamic knowledge within 
what I term the “zakat economy.”104 By using this term, I highlight a rarely discussed 
aspect of madrasas: their positive contribution to social mobility and welfare in north 
India by virtue of utilizing funds garnered through zakat.  In the zakat economy of 
madrasas, youth are trained for religious occupations, salaries are paid largely from 
charitable fundraising, and Islamic knowledge is disseminated to the public as a sort of 
commodity in exchange (as Zahir put it) for zakat.  The Muslim religious sphere in 21st 
century Lucknow, in this view, is far more than an institutional setting for Islamic 
knowledge; it is a marketplace for jobs in scholarship and ritual leadership, as well as an 
economy of international proportions fueled by almsgiving.  By examining students’ 
perspectives on their education at Nadwa, I explain how they perceive a zakat economy 
in which madrasas are bridges between upper and lower class Muslims, linking village 
youth who had few educational opportunities to skills and jobs in Lucknow’s urban 
economy – and to channels for fundraising from donors in Lucknow, Delhi, and Bombay 
as well as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. While zakat in Islamic scriptures is said to 
                                                 
104 For other studies of religious alms economies in India, see Appadurai & Breckenridge (1976) and 
Parry (1994); in Sri Lanka, see Spencer & Maunaguru (forthcoming). 
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purify the donor and his soul, this chapter reveals a sharply different perspective based 
upon the life of the gift after it is given, by exploring the utilization of zakat in madrasa 
budgets.  Historical characterizations portray madrasas as having led the Indian Muslim 
community in a strategy of the “inward turn” to address societal problems by way of 
individual moral reform (Metcalf 1982: 5; Robinson 2008). Yet, this chapter illustrates 
the perspectives of Nadwa students and ‘ulama on how madrasa education integrated 
them into society at large and prepared them to participate in India’s modern economy.  
As educated religious specialists, Nadwa students gained cultural capital and translatable 
skills that led to perceived social mobility – a turn outward and upward (rather than an 
“inward turn”; Metcalf 1982: 5) that represented progress on intertwined indices of moral 
and material development conducive to spreading Islamic ethics to the modern world.   
The next section reviews literature on madrasas as preserves of Indian Muslim 
cultural identity and the rising uproar in contemporary times among concerned Indians 
who voice sharp criticisms of madrasa education and its failure to provide adequate 
“modern” training. The third section presents the role of Nadwa in impacting students’ 
social status, occupational aspirations, and expectations of worldly achievement. These 
ethnographic sections describe key ways in which Nadwa is an influential actor in the 
society and economy of urban Lucknow and beyond.  My conclusions returns to locate 
this methodological approach to the study of madrasas and “the zakat economy” within 
larger scholarship on India’s madrasas and social mobility.  
This chapter’s data stem from a survey I performed in Nadwa on students’ family 
backgrounds, educational motivations, and career aspirations.  After three months of 
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studying in Nadwa and participant observation in student residence areas during many of 
those afternoons and evenings, I had developed a sizable network of contacts. I wrote a 
survey instrument in Urdu, had it checked at the translator agency nearby Nadwa, and 
defined a sample of 25 student interviewees by using a stratified convenience sample. 
This stratified sample was representative105 of the general student body of 3,000 students 
according to (a) socioeconomic status, i.e. fee-paying/scholarship-recipient, (b) year, i.e. 
senior/junior students, (c) caste, i.e. upper/lower106.  The Nadwa administration 
generously granted me permission to do the survey, as no other researchers had ever been 
able to do, but only for this size of a sample.  
Madrasas and Muslim “Backwardness” 
During colonial times, the notion of “community” in South Asia became 
increasingly one of ritual and religious difference, reconfiguring and transcending prior 
notions of belonging grounded in locality, jati (subcaste) and extended kinship, and 
language (van der Veer 1994, Dirks 2001, Jalal 2000). As the religious nationalism of the 
early 20th century culminated in the creation of “Muslim” Pakistan and “Hindu” India 
after Independence in 1947, Indian Muslims’ status as a religious minority cemented their 
                                                 
105The sample was representative of fee-paying/scholarship students, which are 55%/45% in the total 
student body. As Nadwa does not have statistics on the general student body overall for the other 
dimensions of stratification, my “representative” sample was compared with the respective 
estimates of one knowledgeable senior administrator and the head of the student association.  
106 I decided to include caste in my survey as a direct question in keeping with common Indian 
survey practices, despite the shame associated with public discussion of caste. In response to the 
caste inquiry, seven students (28%) took the option I presented to “refuse” answering. Another 
three students (12%) gave me answers within the recognized government categories of “backward” 
Muslim castes in UP. If “refused” are included as low-caste, as Indian anthropologists and senior 
madrasa students who checked my survey form recommended, this makes for 40% lower caste 
respondents, which equaled the 40% responses coded as higher-caste (another 20% of responses I 
was unable to categorize).  
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status as the archetypal Other against which mainstream Indian nationalism was 
constructed (Pandey 1999) and which Hindu majoritarianism targeted in the 1980s and 
1990s (Hansen 1999). In this respect, the walls of madrasas have long contained more 
than simply studious pupils, ‘ulama imparting scriptural knowledge, and Qur’anic texts 
and lessons; they also serve as an important preservers of Indian Muslim identity. Many 
other institutions and voluntary organizations aim to reproduce Islamic norms and 
practices107 -- especially the shrine (dargāh)108 – yet madrasas occupy a certain pride of 
place. 
Even more than in Muslim-majority societies worldwide, in India the role of 
madrasas in “preserving Islam” is all the more urgent for Muslim Indians. Muslims in 
independent India have not controlled dominant institutions of mainstream society such 
as the state, a national press, or industry. Madrasas since the 19th century in India have 
                                                 
107  For example: preaching societies (Tablighi Jama’at, Sunni Da’wat), cultural efforts of 
Muslim organizations (Jam’iat al-’Ulama-i Hind, Jama’at-i Islami, and Shi’a Moharram anjoman 
[societies]), and law-focused organizations (All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, All India Shi’a Personal Law Board). However, madrasas retain a distinctive role as the 
fertile institutional soils from which most Muslims organizations grew. As degree-granting 
institutions that certify Muslim religious scholars known as ‘ulama, madrasas continue to produce 
the men (and they are all men) who take leadership positions within these organizations. (The 
Muslim League, now defunct on India’s national stage, was one exception, as is Aligarh Muslim 
University – both have been symbolically significant as bastions of Indian Muslim identity that 
rivaled madrasas in this regard.) 
108  Shrines are central in the anthropology of Muslims in South Asia (e.g. van der Veer 1998, 
Ahmad & Reifeld 2004, Flueckiger 2006, cf. Ernst 1992).  Yet, this other dominant institution on 
the religious landscape of Muslim India - the shrine – is not known for preserving a sense of 
authentic “Muslim-ness,” in the way I discuss here for madrasas.  In fact, it is criticized by many 
reformist Muslims for doing just the opposite: facilitating the entry of “un-Islamic,” customary, or 
even “Hindu” elements into Muslims’ religious practice. Proponents celebrate shrine culture for 
similar reasons, such as the syncretic bridging of communal divides (see Osella & Osella 2008a for 
an overview). Putting aside debates over Islamic reformisms for the time being, the shrine in India 
in general has long been a site of localized salience for worshippers that cut across modern 
religious boundaries such as Hindu or Muslim.  By contrast, pursuant to my point here, madrasas 
have represented translocal and distinctively religious identitarian differentiation into social 
groupings of “Hindu” and “Muslim,” and further sectarian divisions (Jones 2011, Alam 2011). 
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been vibrant grassroots organizations that maintained diffuse and localized networks 
throughout small town India while retaining a strict focus on Islamic scriptural study, 
especially of the hadith. As such, madrasas in India have been significant to society in a 
very different way (and perhaps to a greater degree in some senses) than those in the 
Middle East. Shibli Nomani, one of the first principals of Nadwa, himself noted this point 
on a visit to Arabia in 1882. Shibli even considered the madrasas of India at the time to 
be “far superior” to those in Mecca in which he studied (Zaman 2002: 73-74). Also 
unlike madrasas in the Middle East, Indian madrasas have not had to contend with a 
Muslim-majority government, nor rival claims of an “Islamic state,” which would pose 
symbolic contestations in the form of a “statist Islam” to the madrasas’ own Islamic 
teachings and interpretations (cf. Zaman 2007; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Hefner 
2000). Madrasas in India are thus particularly distinctive – vis-à-vis Islamic education 
elsewhere in the world – because of their autonomy from the state and mainstream 
society and because they are a key cultural touchstone for Muslims to access their shared 
history and tradition.  Indian Madrasas’ predominant strategy for the preservation of 
Islam has been termed an “inward turn” – exemplified by Deoband in the 19th century – 
seeking and finding solutions by recourse to the scriptural “core” of Islam, Qur’an and 
hadith. Moreover, the problems threatening the Muslim community, whether political or 
economic in origin, were “invariably interpreted as religious,” with the solutions 
advocated by ‘ulama as accordingly ritual in nature (Metcalf 1982: 5-11).   
Dar al-’Ulūm Nadwat al-’Ulama was constructed in Lucknow in 1906 on the bank 
of the river Gomti in Lucknow, wedged between what is now new city and old city. Its 
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founders envisioned an institution that would bring traditional Islamic learning into the 
modern world.  Their hope in this regard was two-fold. First, Nadwa would “synthesize 
the profitable past with the useful modern” (Moosa 2007) by training ‘ulama in the 
Islamic sciences combined with modern topics such as English-language that would 
enable them to interact with the world as ambassadors. Second, they imagined that 
Nadwa would rid Indian Islam of sectarianism by incorporating ‘ulama of all groups into 
its “conclave” (nadwat).  In the heady environment of 19th century revivalism that 
spawned numerous Islamic reform movements, Nadwa’s founders sought to unite them 
and, especially, to bridge the dualism between the modernist Muslim education at Aligarh 
University and the excessive traditionalism of Deoband (Sikand 2005: 79). The 
madrasa’s official history (tar’ikh-i nadwa) details its founders’ efforts to bridge the 
religious and the secular (Zaman 2002: 69).  However, Nadwa’s leadership failed to 
achieve “as much reform as intended,” and most observers view Nadwa today as nearly 
indistinguishable from Deoband as a traditional madrasa (Zaman 2002: 72).109  
Today, however, Nadwa’s link to Muslim tradition is much less respected in 
Lucknow. Many forward-thinking Lucknowis view this madrasa as clinging to an 
                                                 
109 Though the distinction between Aligarh Muslim University as the “modernist” pole and Deoband 
as “traditionalist” is often made in characterizations of Muslim education in South Asia, these two 
institutions are more connected than many think.  Sayyid Ahmad Khan the founder of Aligarh 
Muslim University was deeply pious yet kept his personal faith out of university matters, and one 
of Deoband’s founders was appointed Dean at Aligarh in 1983 (Lelyveld 1978: 192, Jeffery et al. 
2004). Barbara Metcalf’s analysis of the donors to Deoband found them to share “exactly” the 
professional and family backgrounds of donors to Aligarh (2004: 10).  Nadwa had even closer 
links to Aligarh than Deoband, one of my informants who studied in both institutions told me. 
Shibli Nu’mani taught Persian at Aligarh after aiding in the founding of Nadwa (Sikand 2005: 
83), numerous Nadwa graduates continually join Aligarh faculty in Arabic and Islamic Studies 
departments, and the current head of Nadwa, Maulana Rabey, regularly gave lectures to the 
Aligarh student body during my fieldwork.  
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outdated way of life and values. Those who were not students or faculty of Nadwa rarely 
entered; one of my businessmen contacts at Itehad Foundation regularly teased me for 
researching and studying there, “You spend so much time there! What’s the point?” he 
exclaimed in English one afternoon. Recent concerns over militancy among radical 
Muslim groups (while unfounded) only heightened suspicion of Nadwa and what it 
symbolizes, such as in the 1995 nighttime raid on Nadwa by police hunting for suspected 
terrorism links (Sikand 2005: 288-289) or the crude bomb thrown at Nadwa’s gate by 
unknown persons in May 2013 while I was researching there. Suffice to say, for many 
ordinary north Indians, the madrasa and the “traditional” Islamic identity it is perceived 
to represent seem increasingly out-of-place in 21st century There has been a rising clamor 
in India’s media and public discourse that identified Nadwa and other madrasas not as a 
treasured bridge to Indian Muslim identity and tradition, but as a “burden” upon Muslims 
seeking to fully participate in India’s modern economy.  The Sachar Committee Report 
(2006: 17) found substantial evidence for “a general acceptance of an urgent need for the 
modernization of madrasas” and numerous government schemes have been launched.” 110  
India’s news media perennially publish articles repeating characterizations of madrasas as 
“medieval” or keeping the Muslim community in a “backward” mindset.111 This growing 
consensus among India’s Muslims (shared by non-Muslims) is not unlike observations of 
                                                 
110 To name a few by way of example, the national government welfare schemes targeted at madrasas 
include the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and the Area Intensive and Madrasa Modernization 
Programme, as well as more recent 2014 additions: Scheme for Providing Quality Education in 
Madrasas (SPQEM), the Infrastructure Development in Minority Institutions (IDMI), and the 
Maulana Azad Talim-e-Balighan (education for adults) scheme. Many state-level schemes also 
exist. 
111  See for example, Mohammad Wajihuddin. 2011. “The Price of Moderation,” Times of India, July 
31, 2011. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/The-price-of-
moderation/articleshow/9427018.cms, Accessed January 14, 2015. 
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madrasas in Morocco through the 20th century made by Dale Eickelman (1992: 163) that 
"studies in a mosque-university ceased to be an effective means of social advancement,” 
and that Islamic education remains today more of a “valued collective memory instead of 
a contemporary practice" (Eickelman 2007: L408), although the Moroccan experience is 
not analogous to other societies such as Egypt or Iran.112 
This critique is emerging even from within the Muslim community itself (Alam 
2011:1-3. One part of the critique is that ritual preoccupations make modern life difficult 
or impossible.  When I interviewed Farid, a member of Itehad Foundation from a 
prominent madrasa-educated family in Lucknow, he lamented that opinions circulated by 
‘ulama run counter to “the law of natural justice” that he believed was central to Islam’s 
teachings:  
Earlier we used to refer to this book called Bahishti Zewar [Heavenly Ornaments] 
by Ashraf Ali Thanwi. That used to be the guiding force, every time there was 
something in the family, Bahishti Zewar used to be taken out… But as I was 
reading it [again as an adult], I found things that were contrary to the law of natural 
justice! And I questioned it, and thought about Islam which has talked about natural 
justice at all times, I thought, This cannot be right, is not right. For example, there’s 
a thing about halal meat. It says a meat is halal but it should at all points of time 
have been in the custody of a believer [mu’min], and if it leaves the custody of a 
believer for even a minute then it becomes unpermitted [na-jā’ez]. Now, that I 
found in today's world to be too narrow-minded. Because if you process halal food, 
and send it from here to Bombay it is definitely left out of the custody of a Muslim 
believer. Now it was maybe ok hundred years back. But today, that needs to be 
changed. 
 
A second aspect of the critique is that Islamic education itself is outdated and inapplicable 
in competitive economic times.  “Now, times are changing.  People are saying, ‘I have no 
use for the madrasa system.’” a businessman from a prominent Muslim family told me in 
                                                 
112 Page numbers prefaced with an “L” in citations refer to e-book Locations in the Kindle e-book 
edition. 
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Lucknow, “because [students] study there [in madrasas] for eight years and still get no 
‘service’ [jobs].”  Instead, this man and many other wealthy Muslims are using their 
status within the community to re-direct Muslim students to study in English-language 
private schools, even offering scholarships for children in low-income needy families 
(see chapter seven).  He, and many other Muslims I spoke with in Lucknow, represented 
madrasas a relic of the past which the Muslims in the 21st century were having difficulty 
severing ties with.  He explained, “My parents used to give to madrasas…all over India. 
Up to ten years ago, I also paid [donations] to madrasas…Because there was no 
alternative!”   Now, modern Islamic private schools and new Islamic charities are 
cropping up all over the city, representing a potential competitive challenge to madrasas 
as both recipients of zakat and as preserves of Indian Muslim identity.   
Madrasas in India has occupied an uncertain place in these criticisms. As the 
institution charged with preservation of Islamic knowledge in India, madrasas appear as a 
clear marker of religious distinctiveness and not of class. Indian madrasas have embraced 
secularism in order to preserve religion within a private sphere autonomous from the state 
(Zaman 2002; Sikand 2005: 70-75; Hartung 2006: 20), although India still has less 
disestablishment of religion than in the US (Bhargava 1998).  Institutionally and 
financially, madrasas are differentiated from government education in India, being 
supported by private donations in a way that “threatens the state’s monopoly on 
education” and fosters among authorities a “fear…of foreign interests” (Hartung 2006: 
20).  Madrasas have long fallen outside the debates over development and welfare in 
India.   
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However, in recent 21st century calls for development targeting India’s Muslims, 
critics have set their sights directly on madrasas.  Ending madrasas’ role as “religious” 
institutions is a consistent undercurrent in debates over “modernization.” As Jan-Peter 
Hartung (2006: 20-21) noted of the moments following the September 11, 2001 attacks in 
the USA,   
[Indian] public media and political authorities [made] repeated allegations that dini 
madaris [madrasas] would provide a fertile ground for radical and even militant 
ideas…[but] in almost the same breath as the allegations they demanded sudden 
reforms. 
 
But, the Indian government thus far has been unsuccessful in implementing reforms and 
grants for madrasas (Hartung 2006, Shariff 2012: 141, 155-160), due to madrasas’ 
historical differentiation from the mainstream society and state, which has granted them 
autonomy to run their own affairs by constitutional right. Nadwa and Deoband also refuse 
government funds as a matter of institutional policy.113  By contrast, many madrasas in 
north India run by the Barelwi maslak (sect), representing the views of a majority of 
Sunni Muslims in India, generally accept government grants, as Nita Kumar observed in 
a study in Varanasi (cited in Metcalf 2007: L1476).  In addition, over 90% of madrasas in 
Kumar’s study offered secular education that met the state standards, one of the criteria 
for receiving public funds, thus receiving a solid mainstream education along with their 
religious education (Metcalf 2007: L1480).114  Corrupt dealings plague the disbursal of 
government grants, even as prominent madrasas refuse them, with some funds 
                                                 
113  Nadwa senior instructor Mutfi Anas reported their refusal of government grants in an interview 
with me (April 4, 2013). On Deoband, see Siddiqui (2013). 
114  However, it is not the case that all madrasas receiving government grants are merely fronts for 
profit-generating commercialized schools.  I spoke with students who graduated from many 
madrasas, both in and outside of Lucknow, which taught the government curriculum and received 
government grants.  
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misdirected to commercialized schools offering non-religious education but registered as 
madrasas.  In an interview with the Minority Welfare Department officer in Lucknow 
(who administers such grants) and a concerned community member in April 2013, I 
learned that, for example, a commercialized secondary school in Husainabad 
neighborhood received funds towards educational improvement for over 170 Muslim 
“madrasa” students, and another network of commercialized private schools across the 
city gleaned between 5-6 lakh rupees (~$9-11,000) through madrasa grants.115  
In summary, the criticism of madrasas is thus linked with a broader narrative that 
decries “Muslim backwardness” as socioeconomic disparities between the Muslim 
community and the Indian mainstream are increasingly blamed on outdated attachments 
to religious education and traditions (Jodhka 2007).   The changing collective identity of 
India’s Muslims has undergone a shift as an Other distanced from the mainstream 
primarily by religious difference to one based on socioeconomic deprivation – a process I 
termed (an)Othering and outlined in chapter two – and this chapter highlights the effects 
of this shift in the institution of India’s famous Nadwa madrasa.   
Yet, despite widespread perception of their declining usefulness and refusal to 
modernize, madrasas across India are increasing in number, size, and budgets.  Nadwa in 
Lucknow now educates nearly 4,000 students, in addition to its dozens of affiliated 
branches across India.  Madrasas in India are estimated to number between 30,000 as 
government records show (Sikand 2005: 95) and 500,000 (Metcalf 2007: L1413) and 
                                                 
115The Husainabad school, at least, has been investigated by the Minority Welfare Department, I later 
learned. However, the school is known in the Husainabad community to be providing adequate 
education at low cost (perceived to be higher quality than the local government school) 
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more are being opened annually in rural areas around Lucknow (as I observed) and 
elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh (Jeffrey et al. 2004).  Craig, Patricia, and Roger Jeffrey (2004: 
36) attributed such continued growth to the increased demand among all Indians for 
formal education, to increased income among rural Muslims that correspondingly 
increases donations to madrasas, and of course to increasing population. In the north 
Indian region that includes Uttar Pradesh and Lucknow city, 7% of all school-enrolled 
Muslim students in 2002 attended a madrasa as opposed to a private or government 
school (Sachar 2006: 76), and given the fact that a vast majority of madrasas are for boys, 
this proportion could be as high as between 10-13% of Muslim boys attending madrasas 
full-time (on girls madrasas and their rarity, see Winkelmann 2005).116  As both forms of 
schooling are free of fees for deserving students, these data clearly suggest that thousands 
of Indian Muslims continue to select a full-time madrasa education over government 
schools. What explains the continuing vitality and growth of Indian madrasas – especially 
in north India – amidst such skepticism about their value?  
Valuing madrasas – Students’ views on employment & societal mobility 
Educational opportunities for low-income families in a time of state failure 
 North Indians, particularly those from lower classes and castes, embrace 
education as a means to social mobility, even fetishize schooling for its cultural capital 
and apparent role in “development” (Jeffrey et al. 2008).  The Constitution of India 
guarantees education as a right free of cost for all children provided – at a minimum – by 
                                                 
116  Madrasa attendance rates are significantly higher in north India than in other regions. The Sachar 
Committee reported as follows: East 3.5%, South 1.5%, West 3.5%, and all-India 4%.  
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the government. While continuing educational value of madrasas is due to some intrinsic 
merits, as I discuss below, its widespread and enduring popularity is also very much a 
result of alternatives for Muslims.  As Corbridge, Harriss, and Jeffery (2013: 53) wrote, 
“The Indian state’s failure to satisfy this Directive [of the Constitutional right to 
education] is perhaps the most damning of its failures in the post-Independence period” 
of all the state’s efforts at development for the nation.   
 Moreover, the liberalization of the Indian economy in the late 1990s strongly 
impacted education, as the government granted massive numbers of certifications to 
private schools and universities that now make up the majority of educational institutions 
in cities and towns, even as government spending dropped (Gupta 2012:29-31). This shift 
is part of a larger trend, as India’s government increasingly defers responsibility for 
welfare services from public to private domains (Dreze and Sen 1995; Harriss-White 
2003: 41-44).  However, despite the gains that private educational entrepreneurs have 
made in opening new private schools, their profit-driven motive and fee-based structure 
essentially shuts out lower-income students from such opportunities.  Private schools 
were also rare in Muslim areas of Lucknow (cf. Metcalf 2007: L1514), and the ones that I 
visited were of very low quality and I heard numerous stories of corruption.  As many of 
my interviewees other contacts at Nadwa pointed out, people may criticize madrasas but 
they are rarely worse than the comparable local government school.   
Students at Nadwa do not speak openly about the school’s program of free 
education and scholarships, but this aspect of the madrasa is present just beneath the 
surface of many people’s thoughts. The administration reported to me that 60% of 
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students receive scholarships. Education at Nadwa is free for all students, rich or poor, as 
the school charges no tuition fees.  The only fees are an application fee and fees for room 
and board.  For deserving students, these administrative fees were also forgiven through 
scholarships.  Over half of the students in a small survey I performed were receiving a 
complete scholarship (wazifah) from Nadwa (13 of 25; 52%), and this percentage in the 
survey’s stratified sample is comparable those reported for the overall student body 
(60%).  The scholarship included room and board (costing 730 rupees per month, $13), 
sets of clothes tailored on-campus, and a small, 100-rupee stipend for “pocket change” 
(jebi kharchah). Four other students (12%) were receiving half-scholarships of 350 
rupees discount off the total. Scholarships were distributed on the basis of family need, 
which was determined through an informal survey by a Nadwa representative visiting the 
student’s home.   One of the senior instructors at Nadwa emphasized its role in social 
mobility as well as education provision,  
If your research is on charity in Lucknow, madrasas are also part of that system 
[madāres bhi us nizām mein hain]. They feed and house many poor children and 
provide them with training for later employment. For example: here at Nadwa.  
 
While this view of madrasas as part of the welfare safety net for poor Muslims was not an 
oft-discussed theme in Lucknow, it came up occasionally.  A senior Nadwa student told 
me in a mix of Urdu and English:  
Maulana Rabey [the president of Nadwa] had a kind of Q&A session afterward 
when a student asked him, ‘Why is Nadwa going backward these days? It seems to 
be worse today that it was in the past.’  
 
Maulana Rabey said to him, ‘We are trying. We’re working on this. But you also 
must remember that mostly our goal is dīnī tehlim [religious education]!’   
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And, you know, he’s right.  Even though students expect more from Nadwa – better 
English and whatnot…what they are doing is really good.  At least Nadwa is 
providing education free to students!  So many students are poor. Really poor.  I 
know, because I feel bad for them a lot. Some of the poorest I know, I buy them 
breakfast if they’ve run out of money.  These students would just go to some 
crappy government school – or not go to school at all.  
 
Even when religious education was explicitly recognized as Nadwa's mission, its role in 
providing free basic education remained at the forefront of both students' and 
administrators' views. 
The results of the stratified convenience sample I took of the student body are 
illustrative, showing the impact of Nadwa's offering of free education.  Over a third 
(35%) of Nadwa students' parents had no formal schooling. Most of those 35% of 
students had parents who were farmers or manual laborers.  Over 50% of Nadwa students 
had parents with an education of 12th standard or less. These students are the first in their 
family to receive an education above Post-Matric (12th standard; i.e. finishing secondary 
school).  Many Nadwa students that I interviewed, despite these humble origins, would 
soon be proud holders of a BA or MA degrees, obtained through equivalency 
credentialing exams once they finished Nadwa’s ‘alimiyyat (BA) or fazilīyyat (MA) 
degrees. While in my interviews with students and faculty at Nadwa, they reiterated that 
the point of religious education is not necessarily to achieve wealth and material success. 
Nevertheless, many students have notable non-religious employment opportunities. 
Zahir was a 26-year old 3rd year student at Nadwa who came from a small village 
near the Nepal border and was receiving a full scholarship for his studies. He related his 
caste as “vegetable seller” (sabzī farosh) though his parents and uncles were farmers. His 
  256
father died when he was quite young, and as an orphaned117 boy he left his mother and 
enrolled in a small village madrasa near Gorakhpur and subsequently won admittance 
into Nadwa.  A diminutive young man with an intense gaze, Zahir explained, “I began 
madrasa for two reasons. First, I didn’t want to have an entirely worldly (dunyavī) 
education. Second, I had no money. They’re not supposed to take fees but many 
government school teachers do.” His older brother had already been sent to a Hindi-
medium school an hour journey from his home, which expended his uncles’ funds such 
that there were none left for Zahir’s education. But Zahir refused to join manual labor or 
farming work, “Our village had basically no literate people! There was a madrasa 
operating in the next village over, but ours had no school at all. It’s a very backward 
[pasmāndah] place.”  Capitalizing on the opportunities for language study at madrasas, 
he had learned Hindi up through 5th standard and was currently energetically engaged in 
his Arabic studies at Nadwa. He had won six awards in Nadwa’s speech-giving society 
for spoken Arabic. Throughout, he also studied in Urdu. “[Nadwa] is the best madrasa in 
India. In others, there is only religious studies [dīnī ta’līm] but here there is both,” he 
explained, presumably referring to the English classes and General Education course 
which covered the basics of the government school curriculum in one class. He planned, 
along with many other Nadwa students, to sit for the government exam that certified 
madrasa graduates with a “matric” (matriculation) degree, or 10th standard equivalency.  
He plans to parlay his madrasa schooling into other, divergent opportunities such as a 
bachelors’ degree.  
                                                 
117   Children without a father are often known as “orphan” (yatīm) in north India, even if their 
mother is still alive because she is assumed to not have earning power.   
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 For Zahir, as many other madrasa students, the religious educational track was an 
important part of their spiritual development but also a necessary stepping stone into 
India’s mainstream university system, which had been denied to their parents and to them 
up until this point.  The language instruction at madrasas, such as basic literacy in Hindi 
(taught at the primary level in all madrasas) and the additional languages whether Urdu, 
Arabic (as in Nadwa), or Persian was clearly the most transferable credential for entry 
into the university system.  In my interviews with scholarship recipients, many had 
stories similar to Zahir that began with a childhood in a village or family where most 
people were illiterate, but once these students gained entry into Nadwa they saw 
expanded horizons. At a minimum, all students knew they could avoid manual labor and 
join the educated classes as the prayer leader in a mosque or teacher at a madrasa.  At 
best, many believed they could become university-educated professionals. One 
perceptive student, Ehsan, confirmed this view of his class fellows: 
People from Bihar [from humble backgrounds], they study here only to get 
earnings [afterward]! They are so brilliant. They work so hard…They don’t have 
much money, not even enough for continuing studies. That’s why they came to the 
madrasa in the first place, because everything was paid for. Even if they don’t do 
well in their studies, they at least will receive a job at a mosque. 
 
In the view of these students, and their families that supported their entry into madrasa, 
Nadwa graduates were essentially guaranteed employment of some sort – which was not 
a sure thing in the economy at large, as urban unemployment hovered around 29% in UP 
(NSS 2013: 277).  As another student put it, “Every Nadwi student who worked hard, at a 
minimum, can get a job as a translator,” referring to the vibrant printing enterprises that 
distributed books in English, Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, and Persian. Muslims I spoke with 
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outside of Nadwa had similar views, sharing stories of Nadwa graduates who worked in 
Lucknow’s travel agencies, universities, newspapers, and even as accountants in 
construction companies.  
Nadwa students sometimes spoke of madrasas as merely a steppingstone to 
conventional university educations and requisite non-religious occupation, but a majority 
of graduates aspired to religious occupations. This view was common even among 
students, such as Zahir above, who received non-madrasa credentials already but 
nevertheless aimed to teach in a madrasa himself, albeit he preferred to start his own.  
Research by the Jefferys (2004: 974) uncovered similar sentiments among Muslim youth, 
many of whom “saw nothing shameful about having collected mainstream qualifications 
and wanting to do religious work.”  A senior student whose grandfather, uncles, and 
some cousins were Nadwa graduates related to me his experience as we chatted in 
English: 
Government schools here are crap.  You learn virtually nothing there. My uncle 
teaches at one. His students won’t get a job as anything but a rickshaw driver.  
 
Madrasa graduates, though, they can make a minimum of at least 10,000 rupees a 
month for teaching “tuitions” [lessons in Urdu, Arabic, or Qur’an]. You’ll get at 
least 1,000 per family.  Maulanas will tell you they only make 300 rupees per 
family to be modest, but that’s not really true – most pay more and everyone knows 
it.  
 
An ‘alim [madrasa graduate] can always get a job.  There are new mosques being 
built all the time.  Look around Lucknow and you can see them.  The prior ‘alim is 
often moving out as the preacher [imām] of the mosque to other things – to go get a 
BA, to teach in a new Islamic school, or teach in a madrasa – so there’s jobs. 
 
Religious occupations, as this student related, were constantly opening up especially in 
urban areas.  Being the imam of a mosque certainly did not pay well, being based largely 
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on donations from the community board of the mosque and collections at Friday 
congregational prayers when a box or bag was passed around the rows of worshipers.  
Nevertheless, it was a very stable job with a regular income, unlike agriculture, daily 
wage labor, other manual work or even many white-collar jobs that were difficult to find 
and hold (Jeffrey et al. 2004).  As the student described, as well, every imam could also 
supplement their mosque-income with private tuitions for wealthy Muslim families who 
wanted their children to learn the Qur’an and Urdu script at home, even as they attended 
private English-medium schools during the day.   
Occupational opportunities in the religious sector in India overall do seem to be 
growing, rather than contracting, even as the Indian economy modernizes and globalizes.  
Craig, Patricia, and Roger Jeffery’s (2004) discourse analysis of education narratives in a 
western region of UP uncovered steady, if low,118 levels of popularity for religious 
occupations for youth educated in madrasas. “Interviews suggest that this form of work is 
becoming more popular” (Jeffrey et al. 2004:93).  Moreover, occupations in the urban 
Islamic sector were in fact perceived by Muslims as more “modern” than the village-
based occupations, as the growth of mosques in recent decades has created a remarkable 
rise in urban-based opportunities for youth whose primary goal is to migrate from home 
districts.    
                                                 
118   In western UP, the vast majority of the Jefferys’ (2004: 973-974) respondents engaged in 
agricultural, artisan, or wage labor. Equal numbers of respondents entered “business” and 
“religious” (mosque and madrasa) employment. 
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Status Gains among Students in Nadwa 
Across all interviews I performed, students responded that they perceived a 
difference in how their families and home communities perceived them once they began 
their studies at Nadwa. Completing even a year of studies in Nadwa invariably increased 
students’ perceptions of their own status in their communities and the world at large.119 
This perception of increased status was true even for students with peers of high 
socioeconomic positions in society and higher caste students.  
One sunny day, I met a senior student in the Nadwa tea house, Wasi, for a chat. 
Other students rudely pushed ahead of us in line as we reached for teacups, eliciting a 
glare, then a sigh, from Wasi.  He confided in me once we sat down, “Students from rural 
(dehoti) and poor (gharīb) backgrounds are taking over Nadwa. It’s not as fine (sharif) of 
a madrasa as it used to be.”  Putting aside Wasi’s haughty air aside for a moment, his 
remark reflected an actual demographic shift occurring in the Nadwa student body.  In 
interviews I conducted, Nadwa faculty and students alike agreed that there had been a 
shift in recent decades in the student body composition, as Indians from lower societal 
strata entered the madrasa in greater numbers. Nadwa over the years has also allowed its 
numbers to swell (as has Deoband, although Nadwa recently grew to become the larger 
of the two; Zaman 2002: 160) from 600 students in the 1980s to over 3,000 students 
today.120 The absolute number (and also proportion) of lower-strata students have 
                                                 
119   The question arises, were respondents answering this way for a foreign researcher and to best 
represent their choice of school? Twenty-two interviewees gave enthusiastic responses, providing 
me with additional affect or detail, such that I considered their answers largely genuine with little 
to no response bias.   
120 Mufti Anas, personal communication, April 4, 2013 
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increased.  Mufti Anas was a senior jurist (muftī) in Nadwa’s Office of Juridical Opinions 
(dār al-ifta), which issues fatwas (Islamic scholarly opinions).  Among students he is 
regarded as one of the top five most senior instructors at Nadwa, he has taught at the 
madrasa for over thirty years, and he was my instructor in fiqh and Islamic studies 
(Islami’yyat) for three months.  He believed this shift in the student body, the increase in 
students from more humble (gharīb) backgrounds, is due to the increasing demand for 
education among the “public.”  While he did not discuss this point in caste terms, he 
emphasized that, “When Nadwa began there were mostly wealthy people’s children 
attending…Now, it has become more public (awami).” 
Other interviews, however, indicated a caste dimension to this demographic shift.  
Muslims in Lucknow mention often how Islam lays a strong emphasis on equality across 
racial and ethnic boundaries, and many educated Muslims would claim to me “caste does 
not exist among Muslims.” As my fieldwork progressed, however, I observed occasions 
in which Muslims attended to boundaries of caste-like communities, most overtly of 
course in marriage arrangements (cf. Basant & Shariff 2009: 4-5).121  A few interviews 
with Nadwa students, confirmed that madrasas were also one institution for transcending 
caste boundaries.  Answering my interview question regarding an increase in perceived 
social status (‘izzat, ehtarām) upon returning to his home village, one student said, “Yes, 
I did [notice increased status] because everyone sees Nadwa as a good opportunity to 
become a defender of Islam. Now anyone can study in Nadwa – it’s very democratic 
                                                 
121 Regarding caste among Muslims, at least one study, however, has empirically illustrated how 
caste among Muslims is more fluid over time, constituting a form of “elective ethnicity” (Ali 
2002) while others chronicle lower-caste “dalit Muslim” political assertion (Sikand 2006).    
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[jomhūrī].” 
For example, Asif is a younger student from Mewat district, belonging to the Meo 
community122 who is studying on full scholarship at Nadwa. His parents are unschooled, 
but while his father was on a preaching journey (jama’at) with the Tablighi Jama’at he 
was convinced of the importance of educating himself and his sons, both of whom now 
attended Nadwa. “He still hasn’t gone to school yet, though,” Asif admitted, “but we 
teach him things.” His hometown of Mewat is highly segregated into Hindu and Muslim 
groups, following riots during his grandparents’ time and his Meo community has been 
designated part of the “Other Backward Classes” (OBC) and thus eligible for 
reservations.  Partly because of this backward designation, he said, the Hindu 
administration of the local schools (except one) have become antagonistic and strive to 
bar local Meo Muslims from studying in them.  However, when I asked him my standard 
survey question of what changes he perceived in how his hometown received him after 
his Nadwa studies began, his face broke into a wide smile: 
First my older brother, and now me, have studied at Nadwa…There were no other 
madrasa-educated people (‘alim) in the whole village! It’s amazing that after so 
long there haven’t been others who became ‘alim.  Only these days, people are 
realizing the importance [of Islamic education]. 
 
Many people are not OK with madrasa education. They think, ‘Madrasa graduates 
[madārse-wāle] can’t do anything in the world. They’re like OBCs: backward in 
everything.’   
 
But, I’m going to give da’wah [evangelize] the world and show the world that I can 
do anything in this world easily! I may not have as much education, but I know that 
I can qualify for anything easily. Those jobs that others can’t get easily, I can get 
                                                 
122   For a fine-grained ethnography of the Meo Muslim community, see Jamous (2003).  Mewat is 
also famous as the town where the Tablighi Jama’at (“preaching society”) was founded by 
Mohammad Ilyas (Metcalf 1993, Sikand 2001).  
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easily! The head [sarkār] of the government school in my hometown already 
offered me a job as an Urdu teacher when I finished secondary school. 
 
I probed and asked him if he had ever led prayer in the masjid at home. “Usually, I 
didn’t, but I have begun to do it. The imam asked me to. He also asked me to give the 
[Friday] sermons!”  Volunteering his emotions, he went on and divulged: 
The first time [he asked], I hesitated. I felt weird. If I mess up, I thought, then their 
prayer [of the Muslims following behind him] won’t be accepted [by Allah]. I’ll 
have to answer in the hereafter [akhirat]!  
 
He now leads prayer in the masjid every time he returns home on break.  The imam there 
was not madrasa-educated but rather has merely memorized the Qur’an. However, Asif 
proudly concluded, “[that imam] respects me in his heart.  He said, ‘Give the sermon and 
lead prayer as long as you are here. People will be pleased to be able to pray behind an 
‘alim.’”  
Arshad, another student from a low caste background (he refused to answer which 
caste) spoke openly about Nadwa’s environment of freedom and equality among castes 
and across other social divisions. When I asked if he perceived an increase in his 
relatives’ pride and esteem of him, he replied: 
So much so [bahut essa hai]! I’ve seen it.  Actually, whoever’s child is a 
memorizer of the Qur’an [ḥāfiẓ] or – even better – studies in a madrasa, they get 
respect everywhere they go, especially for the sake of [the student’s] parents who 
get so much respect from others, ‘His son is the one studying in that madrasa, 
getting the religion [dīn], gaining knowledge [‘ilm]. Everyone basically wants 
their children to become an ‘alim!  
 
When I came to Nadwa – in particular – I saw that Nadwi graduates are people 
who can stand on any stage [and give speeches] in front of anybody, and in any 
language.  I’ve seen many Nadwis speak and work throughout society and they 
gain people’s approval. 
 
Nadwa’s aim is to keep Muslims united – unity [itehād] is the goal.  There’s no 
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ideological disagreement [iktalāf] here.  Just as there is complete equality in 
Islam, I see that equality here, too. All sects [masālak] are [represented] here.   
All types of people.  It’s that sort of unity. 
 
Madrasas in contemporary India constitute a key forum for reworking social statuses and 
de-linking them from customary caste hierarchies, as Arshad Alam has demonstrated in 
his study of caste groups and the politics of madrasa leadership. “The importance of 
upward mobility is most radically felt in the symbolic domain,” he wrote, “A young boy 
belonging to one of the many low castes and a first-generation learner…leading the 
Islamic prayer disrupts many social solidarities of the old order…most importantly, 
caste” (Alam 2011: 204-205). As the opportunity to study in madrasas reaches more 
students in remote villages, and even local madrasas offer a route to the elite, nationally 
renowned madrasas with which they are affiliated, they also become sites of “low-caste 
Muslims’ aspirations to find a place within the textual tradition of Islam” (Alam 2011: 
202).  I did not discuss directly this issue as a question during my in-depth survey with 
the madrasa students among which I researched, nor did they (usually) volunteer direct 
quotes in interviews.  However, based one participant observation during three months of 
part-time study in Nadwa, observed interactions, overheard conversations, and similar 
implicit messages, my own data corroborate Alam’s conclusions.  Yet caste by no means 
is disappearing as a relevant cultural mark of distinction in India.  While the decline of 
the hierarchical system founded on pollution and purity is well underway, castes are 
increasingly seen as more “horizontal” arrangements in society.  Caste groups retain a 
sense of identity and solidarity through continuing mutual support and inter-marriage, 
even in cities, even as lower castes are gaining in parity (Corbridge, Harriss, & Jeffery 
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2013). Instead, castes are becoming arranged “horizontally” on the basis of different 
cultural identities.  
For higher caste students, as well, status gains were significant. One sayyid 
student elaborated in response to my question about what his family thought of his entry 
into Nadwa: 
My relatives are nearly all university-educated – professors, electrical engineers, 
bachelors-degree holders.  They checked out Nadwa on the internet. They were so 
pleased [khush] to see that it had a good international reputation!  …I’m the only 
ḥāfiẓ [memorizer of the Qur’an] in the family…My brothers in Dubai, the US, 
London, who are engineers and doctors, they like to ask me about hadith or 
[Muslim scholars’] biographies…I don’t feel embarrassed [sharm] speaking with 
them. 
 
Madrasa students regularly spoke of an “inferiority complex” (in English; or, in Urdu, 
ehsās-i kamtarī) that others assumed they would have, because they had not obtained 
conventionally respectable credentials such as English, engineering, or medical degrees. 
By and large, however, students and graduates of Nadwa explained that because of its 
elite status among Indian madrasas as an internationally renowned center of Islamic 
learning and Arabic, they had maintained equal social footing with their peers. 
The moral authority attributed to madrasa graduates comprises one aspect of this 
elevated status. In this respect, madrasas have an institutional role in Indian society as 
sites of educational and social reproduction, even beyond the realm of religion, as Alam 
(2011) has argued. Another student fought his father, a university-educated government 
clerk, in order to study at Nadwa: “Dad prevented me from coming. He always said, ‘I 
want you to be an engineer or a doctor.’ When I was ten years old, I insisted to him that 
this was my wish, and…he let me come.”  He explained that it was his strong desire to 
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further study the Qur’an and its language, Arabic, so he chose Nadwa, the leader in 
Arabic-language instruction in India.  I probed for further motivations, and he responded 
by alluding to the moral character of the religiously educated as opposed to other Indians: 
I always saw the hafiz and the ‘alim in our city, and they seemed such serious and 
calm people. In normal society, there are all sorts of unsavory activities: swear 
words, etc. The hafiz couldn’t stand to see those people and such behaviors. I 
always liked that.  
 
Given the close association between religious education among Muslims and correct 
behavior (adab; Metcalf 1984), ordinary Muslims historically have shared the view of 
this madrasa student that moral education in a madrasa results in a perceived status boost 
in many social circles. Another rural student, Omar, enthused: 
“[Nowadays, at home] when I arrive at gatherings, people say ‘Oh! A maulana has 
come!’ Before, with only my graduation [bachelors degree], they just would say, 
‘Oh, a B.Com [bachelors of commerce] has come, a [university] graduate. They 
praise me at weddings [even when I’m not there] to my mom, saying ‘He’s done 
‘alim’īyyat [madrasa BA equivalent] studies.’ ” 
 
My point in singling out this student (the only one to have received a university education 
as well as madrasa schooling) is to illustrate the comparisons that students themselves 
make between status associated with both forms of education. A counter-hegemonic 
discourse among Muslim communities in north India still perceives madrasas as offering 
as good (or better) an education, for achieving dignity and status in society.  Students’ 
perceptions, which have yet to be tested in the post-graduation job market and adult life, 
are not a sure indicator, but they and their perceptions of their families’ reactions do 
represent a portion of Muslims’ views.  Furthermore, although such cultural capital 
(“praise” in the above quotes) is by no means the only stepping-stone to real material 
progress or socioeconomic advancement, cultural capital retains significant value in the 
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anonymous social realm of urban India where snap judgments about class and caste often 
determine one’s fate (Froystad 2006, Dickey 2013; cf. MacLeod 2009 on the USA). 
Thus, another clear reason for the continuing, if not increasing, utilization of 
madrasa education by Muslims in India is the status attributed to the “elite” madrasas of 
India and their graduates, particularly Deoband and Nadwa but also the Dar al-’Ulūm in 
Saharanpur and others. Alam (2011) provides an in-depth examination of the 
reproduction of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977) in madrasa education, usefully 
delineating “social fields” in which such cultural capital is most salient.123 As one explicit 
marker of the salience of such societal status, madrasa graduates continue to affix 
“Qasmi” (signifying a Deoband pedigree) or “Nadwi” after or in place of their last 
names, a practice that I observed even among those who joined businesses or took 
university positions in Lucknow.  This theme is also illustrated in many of the interviews 
I did with students, discussed below, even those who came from middle-class, land-
owning, or otherwise already high-status family backgrounds. However, beyond the 
cultural capital of a specifically “elite madrasa” education, it is also true that the basic 
literacy and instruction in multiple languages and literatures is still a rarefied commodity 
for many children in north India. The Jefferys have argued that education in north India, 
particularly literacy and schooling for white-collar pursuits and including madrasa 
education for Muslims, is highly fetishized and perceived as an overdetermined marker of 
social status that accrues from personal “development.” In this way, India is a stark 
                                                 
123 This is an important point to keep in mind: cultural capital is always confined to its relevant social 
fields, and the immense respect that madrasa graduates receive among many Muslim communities 
who value religious education must be balanced by more negative views among circles of secular 
Indians. 
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contrast to other youth counter-cultures globally which remain more cynical about formal 
education (Jeffery et al. 2008).  
Arabic Learning in Nadwa and International Ties 
In mosques across India, it is common practice during Friday prayers for the 
prayer leader to give a sermon in Arabic, if possible.  Usually this Arabic sermon is 
shorter in length, due in part to the rapidity with which the imam speaks it (since no one 
in the congregation is understanding it), and it follows the Urdu sermon and is expected 
to address the same topic.  I also noticed that parts of the Arabic sermon are filled with 
repetitions of standardized Arabic prayers (e.g. multiple honorifics following the mention 
of Allah).  Furthermore, many preachers in masjids I attended merely read from small 
booklets in which a variety of Arabic sermons were arranged topically. In short, 
knowledge of conversational Arabic, of the sort spoken in the Middle East, is not 
necessary to give such a sermon that one often hears in the masjids of north India.   
Nadwa graduates, however, were distinguished by their intensive study of Arabic. 
Their lessons included classical Qur’anic Arabic, but also required them to become 
familiar with a variety of dialectical variations:  non-Islamic Arabic poetry, 
conversational Arabic, formalized Arabic of the news media, and the genre conventions 
of Arabic sermons.  Many Nadwi instructors themselves have lived or traveled in Arab 
nations.  I find it notable that Indian students from the south on the Arabian Gulf coast 
still attend Nadwa in large numbers. Those students whom I asked, replied that they all 
considered Nadwa’s Arabic instruction superior to that of the government-supported and 
private Arabic-language college system in their home states (on Kerala’s Arabic colleges, 
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see Osella & Osella 2008b).   
The classroom curriculum was supported by numerous clubs that fostered an 
environment for Arabic proficiency.  A speech club (an-nadi al-‘arabi) held weekly 
events for students to give Arabic sermons.   Students ran Arabic conversation and study 
groups daily in the mosque.  A student-run journal printed articles in Arabic by students.  
In the dorms and administrative buildings, Arabic newspapers, magazines, and journals 
were laying around for consumption; at least one, I saw, is printed at Nadwa and 
circulated among its donors and supporters (Arab and expatriate Indian alike) in Arab 
nations.  Most Nadwa students in interviews, in response to my standard question about 
how their home community perceived them and their Nadwa studies, cited knowledge of 
Arabic as a key achievement. One said: 
People respect me more when I go home now. I give sermons on Fridays. There 
have been imams in my village for years, but they don’t give Arabic sermons! I am 
the youngest ‘alim of all of them, and I am the one that leads tarāwīḥ [long 
Qur’anic readings during Ramadan] and sermons. I give these sermons without 
preparations! They were so impressed. They’ll say, ‘Look! This boy grew up in this 
very village and is now giving speeches in Arabic!’ 
  
A high-quality madrasa education provides alternative tracks to employment outside of 
one’s home region, even abroad in the Middle East, due to the relative demand for a 
small number of Arabic speakers.   In this regard, Nadwa provided a form of education 
only available within religious schooling.  The appeal of Arabic-language and Islamic 
instruction has a pull on Muslim students and their families from all strata of society who 
would not otherwise have access to such chances for travel and rarefied learning.  As 
such, many upper-class students gain skills in Nadwa not available at government or 
private schools, and it would be a mistake to consider madrasa schooling as a tool of 
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social mobility only for the underprivileged. 
Students who graduated Nadwa with 
particular skill in Arabic appeared to make 
even further use of Nadwa’s contacts, 
especially for international fundraising.  
Two preachers that I knew in Lucknow who 
had graduated from Nadwa both showed me 
their fundraising materials printed in India 
for use when they traveled to Saudi Arabia.  
The glossy pages between clear plastic 
covers and a spiral binding contained color photographs of “modern” madrasas for which 
these two graduates fundraised.  One had already begun construction on an educational 
campus that would contain separate Islamic schools for girls and for boys that taught the 
government curriculum as well as Islamic sciences from primary school through college, 
with additional plans for a health clinic and dispensary.   
Nadwa has long been known as north India’s institution most closely linked with 
Islamic scholarly circles in the Arab Middle East (Hartung 2006; Zaman 2002). Dr. 
Khalid Bin Ali al-Ghamidi, one of the men known as Imam-e-Ka’ba (leader of the Ka'ba) 
who lead prayers at Mecca’s most sacred mosque, paid a visit by invitation to Nadwa 
during my research in May 2012.  Students overheard him discussing a prior visit to the 
madrasa campus when he had asked why the mosque was so hot, then proceeded to 
donate sufficient funds to line the walls and ceiling with air conditioners (within each 
Figure 12: Interior of Nadwa Mosque during 
Night Prayers. Credit: Nihal Ahmed Khan 
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archway in Figure 12). Visitors from Mecca had great respect for Nadwa and often made 
financial contributions to the school, in cash, during their visits, other senior students 
confided. While not large enough donations to constitute a significant portion of the 
budget, they enabled Nadwa to make certain improvements.  
Arabic language skills led many students to fundraise beyond India, utilizing a 
linguistic talent and cultural capital not obtainable in universities. I personally met two 
madrasa graduates in Lucknow who had recently began residential madrasas, and 
fundraised about $10,000 apiece from urban donors with glossy color reports in Urdu, 
English, and Arabic.  The Arabic reports are for visiting Muslims from the Emirates or 
Saudi Arabia who occasionally toured Indian madrasas, curious about these institutions 
of higher learning whose fame they have read about in their home countries and 
sympathetic for the (comparatively) poor conditions for Indian students studying there.124  
A third interviewee, Omar, was one of the tallest madrasa students at Nadwa, although 
still bone-thin, and he stuck out in the crowd outside the mosque when I approached him 
and asked for an interview.  Omar like many other students at Nadwa felt that madrasa 
education was a (necessary) complement to university degrees, not a replacement for 
them.  Omar planned to finish his studies at Nadwa, and then return to Lucknow 
University for an MBA program, explaining, “My family had a condition for me, ‘Until 
you get admitted to a Bachelors of Commerce [Business] program, you can’t go to 
Nadwa.”  
                                                 
124  For example, instructional texts on hadith that were penned by Nadwa’s most famous director, 
Maulana Sayyid Abu’l Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi (d. 1999) are still taught in Saudi Arabian seminaries 
and recognized as classics in the genre of hadith studies (Zaman 2002: 162). 
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Despite these impressive educational credentials, however, he maintained his 
aspiration for an occupation within the religious sector: he was founding a new madrasa.  
He did not attend madrasa for purely personal spiritual reasons, as some students did who 
enjoyed being a religious authority in their family, neighborhood, and personal life but 
secured conventional office jobs that did not directly utilize their religious education.  
Omar was a business student, and his pedigree evidenced itself in the way he spoke and 
envisioned his future, but his ultimate goal was firm:  
I want to work in service to Islam [khidmat-i dīn], after I receive an MBA, and 
open a ‘high-tech’ madrasa.  Universities are so beautiful, with the best tiles and 
buildings, and we should have more madrasas like that, because this is where the 
Holy Qur’an is taught! …It will be in the model [numāna] of a university, with 
carpets, cushions, nice-looking, so that others will see that madrasas can be built 
like a university. 
 
His MBA education was an important aspect of this plan.  Omar was sanguine enough to 
know that without training in management and organizational planning, he would be 
unable to realize this dream.  I asked him, “But why do you need an MBA to open a 
madrasa? People open them all the time [without one], no?”  
They will teach me ‘management.’ Madrasa teachers are capable enough of Islamic 
education [dīnī ta'līm ke qābal] but not management – how much to spend on this 
or that…There’s a hāfiz [a respectable scholar] in my family who runs a madrasa 
with no management: no curriculum, no set textbooks, no [executive] committee. 
He just takes decisions on his own, which is not as good as four or five people 
deciding. He ordered too much rice and it went bad!  He has piles of wood left over 
from construction.  
 
His business strategy was particularly sound when he began applying what he already 
had learned in college classes on business: 
I’ll make a ‘proforma’ [business plan] which I can give to wealthy people. I’ll 
fundraise for an extended period and build it up in a trust account that is not in my 
name, but with some accountant the business community will trust.  My proforma 
  273
will show the best parts of the university-style madrasa I have planned, with 
photos, and highlight the special parts.   
 
I’ll contact partners in other cities like Mumbai and in the Emirates online to get 
their support. Mostly the rich madrasa donors are there, each one with eighty lakh 
rupees [$14,800] to give in zakat! They are very concerned that it should be spent 
in the right [ṣaḥīḥ] place. There are enough alms-givers for sure.  But everyone 
wants to see the results [natījeh]!  We will have to show results. 
 
Omar was correct in thinking that wealthy Muslim donors in large cities and abroad 
responded to colorfully illustrated business plans and evidence-based annual reports with 
“results” (natījeh).  In my interviews with Muslim philanthropists who supported 
Lucknow's madrasas and welfare associations while living in Delhi and abroad, most had 
concerns about false charities.  I heard multiple times the specific complaint that, “There 
is no place, there are no trusted people to whom we donors [zakat dene wāle] can give 
our charity.”  
These media-savvy madrasa graduates were not the majority of students, but they 
reflected a broader awareness that did exist among all students that madrasa donors were 
members of society at large.  As businessmen, engineers, and the like, such donors 
undoubtedly had concerns that needed to be addressed, if ‘ulama were to continue to 
successfully appeal to them for funding. As fundraisers and leaders of new madrasa 
initiatives, tech-savvy MBA-aspiring students such as Omar stood a head and shoulders 
above their fellow young scholars. Others merely carried printed photos for their 
madrasa, had not included evidence-based reports on students’ numbers or account 
spending, or had only prepared Urdu text in the reports. Omar exclaimed, “Some madrasa 
fundraisers [chandah lene wāle] don’t even give [printed] receipts in return for people’s 
donations! This is so important; you must have [a receipt],” marveling that other madrasa 
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graduates were not even organized and financial savvy enough to institute this century-
old practice. 
Worldly and Religious Education: “Like the Two Eyes of Your Face” 
Nadwa ‘ulama retained a strong sense of education as holistic, ideally combining 
both worldly and moral instruction instead of prioritizing one over another. Nadwa 
agreed with its critics that a madrasa education is not sufficient for success in the 
contemporary economy but, nevertheless, viewed the provision of moral education also 
as a modern necessity – in contrast to other secular schools in India.  A father of a Nadwi 
student I knew, who is madrasa educated himself, emphasized to me:  
“Religious education (dīnī ta’līm) and worldly education (dunyavī ta’līm) are like 
the two eyes in your face; you need both to see the world for what it is” 
  
For all students, Nadwa education was perceived as another path in the diverse landscape 
of schooling opportunities – equally valid for seeking job skills or cultural capital as were 
free government schools and many private ones. Yet, for many other students, Nadwa 
credentials were sought for the personal spiritual development a student attains through 
becoming an Islamic scholar, even if he then serves as an accountant (after additional 
schooling). Many students that I met, and three in interviews, described to me how they 
were prepared to pursue a university-only educational track (or were pressured by parents 
to do so), but it was their personal and spiritual affinities led them to join the madrasa. 
Teaching Islamic ethics to the secularizing world was a clear mission of Nadwi 
students, perceived as a sort of “return” for the donations of alms that flowed in from 
ordinary Muslim families. As the student quoted to open this chapter exclaimed, “because 
  275
others are doing a favor for us, …we should tell them the correct (ṣaḥīḥ) things!  We 
should teach them, teach their households.” The students in Nadwa madrasa that I 
describe here view Nada itself as “modern” because of (rather than despite) the 
prevailing view of madrasas as out-of-place in an increasingly secularized society.   
As Qasim Zaman (2007) has noted, emphasis on proselytization (tabligh) is a 
hallmark of modern Islamic education, a break from madrasas of the medieval past which 
had less motivation and resources for proselytization, and a characteristic which unifies 
intuitions of Islamic learning in modern times, despite vast differences in sectarian 
orientation and dispersal in societies as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, or Indonesia.  
Madrasa education must remain relevant to modern times, in Nadwa students’ view, as 
these data overwhelmingly show. But modern and relevant Islamic education is meant 
not only to guide students to religious occupations and worldly employment outside their 
communities, but – crucially – helps further propagation of the faith, as well. The 
majority of students interviewed cited the need to learn English as motivated by a desire 
to speak of Islam with non-Muslims and to proselytize.  
The principal of Nadwa, Maulana Syedur Rahman, exhorted students to all forms 
of knowledge in his graduation speech in 2010, now that they had begun with madrasa 
schooling, “Study worldly subjects (khariji mo’atala)! We aren’t restricting you! Move 
yourselves forward. Nadwa has given the freedom to study what you want; there are 
many non-religious texts in the library.”  The principal knew that many students sought 
to parlay their madrasa credentials into university equivalency and go on for higher 
studies, “We know you are going to study in universities.”   
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Islamic knowledge, however, remains necessary for success in this world as well.  
As I argue in chapters seven and eight, many reformist Muslims in Lucknow believe that 
economic woes are not simply derivative of larger economic forces or some sort of 
financial crisis for Muslims in India, but rather have a root cause in a spiritual crisis 
brought on by the lack of Islamic ethics in modern society.  New Islamic charities are 
working to expand ethical practices such as accountability and self-discipline among 
laboring classes, charitable giving among wealthier Muslims, and honest business 
practices – all in hopes of advancing the socioeconomic status of Muslims in India 
through the application of “correct” Islamic ethics in economic practice (cf. Rudnyckyj 
2010, Osella & Osella 2009). This is a key point of agreement between reformist 
madrasas and new Islamic charities. As Nadwi students and other reformist Muslims see 
it, as well, what is holding Muslims back, and indeed other Indians, from realizing the 
fullest benefits from 21st century life is an obstruction caused by their lack of moral 
education, which particularly means (for many) knowledge of “correct” Islam.  Thus, 
graduates in my survey saw it as a point of pride – and not a compromise – that they 
began their educational career within the madrasa system.  Even those that sought to stay 
within the religious sector, and work in masjids or madrasas, believed that it was their 
mission to instruct others without madrasa education in such ethical economic practices, 
moral character (adab), and spirituality.  It is not merely the lack of English or computer 
skills that precludes “success” as a modern Indian Muslim, in their view. It is the myopic 
view that English, IT jobs, a Western lifestyle, or (most broadly) money and material 
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success are all that are desirable and necessary for wrestling with the myriad of 
challenges that modern life brings.  
Conclusion  
Modernization and the Modernity of the Madrasa 
There is a paucity of scholarship on contemporary madrasas in India, and a near 
lack of ethnography.125 Much of recent social science has remained mired in policy-like 
questions of “modernization” reform of South Asian madrasas and whether these have 
succeeded or failed (e.g. Hartung 2006b; Sikand 2006; Bano 2014; Malik 2007; cf. 
Sikand 2005; Winkelmann 2005; Alam 2011).  The approach of this chapter is to take a 
different tack and to investigate how madrasas already are “modern” and emplaced 
within contemporary Indian society and economy.   This chapterargues for a view of 
Nadwa as part of modern Lucknow and its urban economy, rather than perceiving 
madrasas as historical burdens upon Lucknow Muslims in modern times. “Whatever its 
roots in Islamic tradition, the madrasa is now thoroughly embedded in the modern world” 
and is responsive to the sweeping societal transformations of our times, as Robert Hefner 
(2007: L76) observed of madrasas in Muslim communities.  As such, I build on a wealth 
of historical work on Indian madrasas and their role in shaping notions of modernity.   
Rather than “modernization,” the thrust of historical scholarship has emphasized 
the “modernity of tradition” (Rudolph & Rudolph 1967) as embodied in Indian madrasas 
                                                 
125  Brannon Ingram (2011) in a recent literature review observed that ethnography of Indian 
madrasas, what few studies there are, are of low quality (for exceptions, see Winkelmann 2005; 
Alam 2011; Sikand 2005).  
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(Metcalf 1982, 2007; Zaman 1999a, 2002; Ingram 2014).  These historians have parsed 
the differences between what madrasas say they do (and what the public perceives that 
they do) versus what madrasas actually accomplish in social reality. For example, in 
India, the avowed mission of the well-known Dar al-’Ulūm madrasa at Deoband, Uttar 
Pradesh has been the revival of Islamic knowledge from “traditional” sources (Metcalf 
2004: 10).  As a former director of Deoband claimed, “in a time of change, we did not 
change’ (cited in Metcalf 2004: 10).  However, as Barbara Metcalf (2004) said of her 
own (1982) study of Deoband,  
It provided one of the many examples of how the very concept of 'traditional' 
becomes part of the self-definition of modernity. It also showed how what is often 
taken as tradition turns out to be a relatively recent product of the colonial past.” 
   
Many of these changes were instituted by men who had experience working with the 
British (Metcalf 1982: 93-97).  While claiming to preserve the traditional of Islamic 
education, Deoband instituted a codified madrasa curriculum and exams in place of 
personalized tutorship (Metcalf 1982: 93), compartmentalized learning by subject in 
place of serially taught texts, and capitalized on mass education through print media in 
place of person-to-person oral transmission (Robinson 1993, Ingram 2014). Metcalf 
(2007: L1444) observed that madrasa reform movements “were modern” for their times 
for their “embrace of modern institutional forms.”  The continued growth and vitality of 
Nadwa madrasa in Lucknow similarly attests to their enduring institutional strengths.  
Alongside the often feeble school system of the Indian government, Nadwa and other 
madrasas operate on private religious alms-donations – not costing Indian taxpayers a 
rupee – in order to extend basic literacy and advanced literary and humanities education 
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to upwardly mobile Muslims. 
Madrasas in the Zakat Economy  
My data illustrate that students view madrasa studies as one credential among 
many that are available in modern India.  They take for granted that the contemporary 
Lucknow economy is comprised of highly differentiated divisions of labor, including 
growing jobs in religious occupations, explicitly rejecting the (widespread) myopic 
public perception that becoming a doctor or engineer is the best path to employment. This 
religious credential is often sufficient for achieving students’ goals in the modern 
economy, in the world beyond their village and beyond the calm of madrasa walls: it 
brings cultural capital among urban educated Muslims which they lacked earlier, social 
status in their home villages, escape from remnants of caste prejudice, a back-door into 
university education via government credentialing exams, Islamic learning and Arabic 
skills that open the doors to geographical mobility to other regions and, indeed, other 
countries.   
At other times, this religious credential was insufficient for their goals.  Nearly all 
students lamented the low quality of English instruction at Nadwa.  Many sought 
additional MA, MBA, and PhD degrees from universities, even concurrent with their 
madrasa studies although this went against Nadwa’s policies. Other students declared that 
their prior education in rural schools did not prepare them, and Nadwa studies were a 
critical intermediary step for university, which also brings BA-equivalency upon 
completion, and told me in detail of their plans to gain acceptance to the Lucknow 
University that was tantalizingly adjacent to the grounds of Nadwa.  
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Instead of highlighting differentiation or modernization, this approach to the study 
of madrasas in India entails a focus on exchange – how Islamic education is perceived as 
a commodity that is of “value” in contemporary society for Lucknow’s Muslims.  This 
place of the madrasa as an institutional site of exchange in the urban societal and 
economic milieu has been largely unexplored by academicians (cf. Adelkhah & Sakurai 
2011: 9). These data on Nadwa emphasize its place with the urban economy of 
Lucknow's religious sphere that links wealthy Muslim donors in India and abroad to 
channels of upward social mobility, in order to represent the larger relationships of 
exchange in which madrasas are embedded and co-create. This religious labor market of 
Lucknow captures a less-studied aspect of socioeconomic development in north India, as 
a flow of alms and wealth with substantial impact on lower-class Muslims of Lucknow.   
Such a rationalization of religion has not necessarily led to the withering away of religion 
from the public sphere, as Max Weber (1978) proposed, but rather to an advanced 
division of labor between mutually interdependent sectors and sub-economies – including 
clerical occupations and religious education. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
NEW ISLAMIC CHARITIES: THE DEVELOPMENTALIST ETHIC IN ZAKAT 
 “If factors other than discrimination are contributing to the backwardness of any 
community then too it is the responsibility of the state for removing such 
backwardness…[P]roductive utilization of monies available through traditional 
systems of charity like Zakat for education and health…would help the [Muslim] 
Community in a significant manner.” 
-- The Social, Economic, and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in 
India: A Report by the Prime Minister's High Level Committee, “The Sachar 
Report,” 2006 
Introduction  
The Sachar Committee Report of 2006 galvanized policymakers at both the 
national- and state-level governments, leading (after some delay) to a host of new 
government schemes targeted at religious minorities, especially Muslims.  The Sachar 
Report was the highest-level political recognition for a newly shifted characterization of 
Indian Muslims:  as a community beset by socioeconomic “backwardness.”  In dry 
bureaucratic analysis, the economists and policy-makers who formed the committee 
identified the key points of failure and places for possible state intervention in improving 
the condition and reducing discrimination for Muslims in India.  However, as seen in the 
quote above, this report also explicitly highlighted a notion that had not been 
promulgated in Indian government publications before:  Islam and its ritually sanctioned 
welfare institutions could play a role in the socioeconomic development of the minority 
Muslim community.  “Traditional systems of charity like zakat” and “better utilization of 
waqf properties” were both cited in the Sachar report (2006: 26) as private interventions 
to be encouraged which – along with the efforts of the Indian government – would help 
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ensure the welfare and rights of all citizens.  The report statistically aggregated indicators 
for various groups of Indians the report termed “socio-religious communities” (SRCs), 
and thereby compared Muslims with dalits and with Other Backward Castes (OBCs, the 
historically laboring castes). Both dalits and OBCs receive state-mandated affirmative 
action in public jobs and educational institutes, while Muslims do not. Many education 
and socioeconomic indicators for Muslims nationwide were roughly on par with or worse 
than those for OBCs.   While there was still debate over whether poverty and 
“backwardness” among Muslims is sufficiently low enough to warrant further 
government intervention (Ahmed 2014, Basant & Shariff 2009: 14-20), Muslim public 
spokespeople in India had taken these statistics as evidence of a full-scale “crisis” facing 
their community. While Muslim leaders debated whether and how to engage government 
officials and accept state welfare assistance, there was nevertheless unanimous 
acceptance of the crisis of “backwardness” and the urgency for action at least at the level 
of civil society and community networks.  
The sense of “crisis” was particularly acute among Muslims in Lucknow.  Once 
ruled by a line of nawab (“governors”) who styled themselves Mughal princes and 
professed Shi’a Islam, Lucknow’s Muslim elites felt the sting of the comparison to dalits 
particularly sharply.  Moreover, Luckow was the seat of provincial government and 
hosted India’s first dalit Chief Minister. The city’s Muslims have witnessed first-hand the 
surprising strategic successes of lower castes in building within-group solidarity that lead 
to their electoral and socioeconomic gains (Omvedt 1994).  The traditional network of 
age-old caste associations for dalits facilitated cadre-based mobilizations of voters and 
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grassroots movements, which boosted political parties representing dalits and other 
backward castes (Jaffrelot 2003).  In short, lower castes appeared to be advancing quite 
rapidly in contemporary India, most visibly in Lucknow.  While Muslims in India have 
certainly come to accept their status as a political minority, the Sachar Report made the 
sense of neglect (particularly their socioeconomic decline) into a statistical reality.  
Muslims in India invariably welcomed the Sachar Report as evidence of the (Congress 
Party) government’s increased recognition of their plight.  However, there was a 
corresponding increase in alarm at the prospect of Muslims becoming the most 
impoverished and uneducated socio-religious community in India, which offends many 
Muslims’ sense of dignity to be “ranked” statistically so low in society alongside dalits.  
After a brief overview of the new Islamic charities with which I volunteered from 
July 2012 through July 2013, spending roughly two months with each one, I present their 
views on the political and economic crisis facing the Indian Muslim community as a 
“spiritual crisis.” The second section Intervention details the efforts of new Islamic 
charities to address the crisis that has been transformative in shaping the ritual of Islamic 
almsgiving itself and aiming to shape the beneficiaries of charity by inculcating in them 
new moral subjectivities in line with their visions of Islamic ethics.  In particular, zakat 
was symbolically represented as a “solution” to the crisis facing the community, as a 
mode for financing programs in education, job training, general human capital 
development of Lucknow’s poorer Muslims.  In the scholarship and academic coaching 
programs of new Islamic charities, the rhetoric and performances of zakat as funds that 
must be donated by Muslims and utilized for Muslims institutionalized almsgiving in new 
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ways, reflecting the concerns of what I term the “developmentalist ethic.” I conclude by 
placing these cases within the larger body of work on “market Islam” (Sloane 1998; 
Hefner 1998; Osella & Osella 2009; Rudnyckyj 2010) and suggesting that existing 
scholarship has overlooked some of the deepest articulations between Islam and the 
contemporary economy.  
Joining New Islamic Charities  
In the upstairs of a government bank’s four-story building Itehad Foundation 
shared an office suite with an advertising agency and an educational NGO named FEED.  
Space was tight, and the charity had one room to itself, which was crammed with couches 
(each couch crammed with four volunteers apiece during the charity’s business meetings) 
and a folded Islamic prayer rug.  Itehad is a Perso-Arabic word meaning “unity” or 
“solidarity.”  Tahir, the General Secretary of Itehad, was also the owner of the advertising 
agency and head of the educational NGO FEED, which does teacher training and 
advocacy projects for UNICEF and the Indian government.  Tahir is a consummate 
epicure, born and raised in old city bazaar but now one of Lucknow’s elite cosmopolitan 
citizens – businessman, community leader, philanthropist, poet, and even a one-time film 
director. Tahir was also my neighbor, living below the apartment my wife and I rented 
just outside Lucknow’s old city bazaar. When he agreed to have me volunteer in his 
Islamic charity, I was under the understanding that FEED and Itehad were the same 
organization, until Saturday came. Five days a week, Tahir’s office is an advertising 
agency and secular, registered NGO known as FEED. But every Saturday (a workday in 
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India), it is the office of the Muslim charity Itehad Foundation.  On Saturday, the staff of 
Tahir’s NGO and his advertising agency devote their workday to Itehad -- including the 
Hindu manager and Hindu receptionist.   
 Itehad Foundation, begun in 2004, is an educational scholarship organization 
devoted to paying the school fees and expenses of needy students, with a stated mission 
as a “literacy initiative for Indian Muslim students.” In its first year Itehad consisted of 
fifty educated Lucknow Muslim donors who pooled 2,200 ($40) to fund one student at a 
local private school.  Many Lucknow residents were already funding local students and 
thus the Itehad Foundation was an effort to institutionalize and aggregate these efforts.  
Itehad applied for status as a Registered Charitable Society in 2008 and obtained official 
registration in early 2012, just before I began volunteering there (registration as a charity 
requires three years of annual budgets to be submitted, so Itehad’s experience is not 
unusual).  The most current (2012) annual budget for Itehad totaled 168,000 rupees 
($2,171). A general fund of 120,000 rupees ($2,100) went towards school fees for 678 
primary and secondary students, with an additional 4,000 rupees ($71) a month 
supporting one promising medical student.   
 “New” Islamic charities like Itehad with a stated focus on education offer full 
scholarships that cover school fees, uniforms, and books to students studying in local 
private schools – ideally English-medium schools – in order to reduce Muslim families' 
dependency on free-of-cost government schools (or madrasas) which middle-class 
Muslims view as ineffective for providing social mobility.  Each volunteer that I met was 
a self-made entrepreneur somehow, working in construction, real estate, IT, or marketing, 
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or educated professionals from humble origins.  Thus, members have sufficient flexibility 
in their schedules to devote hours on hours per week to their charities. Additionally, as I 
argue below, they are ideologically committed to entrepreneurial ideals of “soft 
capitalism” (Thrift 1997) such as the value of hard-work, efficient management, personal 
responsibility and accountability, and limitless individual potential.  
 Around 2007, there was a minor disagreement between volunteers in Itehad 
Foundation, and a few of them split off to form an organization called Scholarship 
Foundation. I volunteered first with Itehad (July – October 2012, and intermittently 
thereafter) and later with Scholarship Foundation (February – March, June – July 2013), 
but for clarity and brevity’s sake I keep the ethnographic examples in this chapter to 
Itehad as much as possible. My analysis of new Islamic charities applies to both groups 
equally (as well as a third related charity, Taraqqi Foundation) and to the subsequent case 
study with differences noted in chapter eight.  
Both “Islamic” and “Secular” 
New Islamic charities such as Itehad occupy an ambiguous place in the Muslim 
community, and their relationship with madrasas, the ‘ulama, and ordinary Muslims is 
still being continually negotiated.  One Saturday’s weekly “business meeting” of the core 
volunteers highlighted this ambiguity.  After the usual agenda items were covered, 
discussing how much fundraising the volunteers would need to perform through the end 
of the year to meet all scholarship commitments, one member rose an issue that bothered 
him:  the wintertime government schools’ schedule conflicted with the madrasa evening 
lessons for scholarship students.  “These Muslim kids, the impoverished kids (gharīb 
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bachchhe), their parents are strictly telling them that they must study in madrasa and are 
taking them out of school early,” he complained.  His solution: “Either talk to the parents 
and tell them to keep their kids in school or talk to madrasas and tell them to change their 
timing!”126 Immediately, many other volunteers vituperatively disagreed, “Urdu study is 
important!”  “Religious education [dīnī ta’līm] is important!” “This is their place [in the 
madrasas] as well!”  In a few short minutes, however, conciliatory voices prevailed with 
admonitions to leave it be: “This is a private matter” for families to decide themselves. 
The volunteers decided not to stick their noses into this issue. Instead, their noses 
disappeared into their teacups as chai and candies were served by office staff and the 
argument rapidly gave way to laughter and socializing.  Shortly thereafter, however, the 
same volunteer, Itehad’s Vice President who rarely attended meetings, proposed a second 
idea to the group:  that Itehad approach all the religious clergy in area mosques with their 
pamphlet on the importance of “education” (using the English, meaning “modern 
education”) and ask them to preach a portion of their sermon “no more than fifteen 
minutes” exhorting Muslim children to join modern schooling.  This idea was shot down 
as “too much work.”  This issue had been discussed at earlier meetings, I knew, and most 
other volunteers considered these Vice President’s suggestions a nuisance.   
This discussion, nevertheless, brought to light important aspects of new Islamic 
charities such as Itehad.  The volunteers, as Muslims and members of Lucknow’s elite 
classes, had high-level connections throughout the city – the Vice President proposed that 
                                                 
126 During the winter months, government schools which all have no central heating shift the school 
day two hours later into the middle of the day.  Madrasas often begin their part-time evening 
lessons for school-going children at 3pm when the school day generally ends.   
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he personally call the cellphone of the head of Lucknow’s largest and oldest masjid, to 
rally support for this “sermons on education” idea.  Another volunteer, Nahid the 
treasurer, was an heir of the prominent Firangi Mahal family (Robinson 2001), who 
controlled Lucknow’s “Eid Mosque” (Eidgah).  Yet none of them were madrasa-educated 
themselves, having received their religious education by private tutoring in the home.  
Proposals to dialogue with ‘ulama lost steam as quickly as they did because Itehad 
members, for all their upper-class status and pedigree from established Muslim families, 
lacked the requisite credibility (i.e. madrasa degrees) to mobilize common religious 
clergy in crumbling neighborhoods of the old city bazaars where their students came 
from.   
The Itehad Foundation is a prime example of an Islamic charity striving to be at 
once both Muslim and “secular,” the term used by my informants to signify the public 
face of their organization they wished to present was not discriminatory, fundamentalist, 
religiously inflammatory, or otherwise “communalist.”  The name “Itehad” is Arabic, but 
only recognizable as such to educated, astute observers; their offices are devoid of 
Islamic materials except a stray prayer rug largely unused by the Muslim staff and 
volunteers; two staff attend Friday prayers but I am not sure how many volunteers do so; 
the mission statement submitted to the government mentions targeted beneficiaries as 
“minorities,” which is generally a bureaucratic idiom for Muslims (14.2% of India’s 
population) but which technically also applies to Christians (2.3%), Buddhists (1%), 
Sikhs (1.9%), and others.  Only by word of mouth do people learn that Itehad works only 
for Muslims, or collects zakat funds.   
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The vision from the start was not necessarily 
to start a faith-based charity, but that is how these 
charities have evolved in their early years.  The new 
Islamic charities Itehad and Scholarship Foundation 
(as well as a related charity: Taraqqi Foundation) 
began as one organization run by a group of 
business associates, which later split into three 
around 2007. Before the split, the group had not 
originally intended to fundraise for zakat specifically, believing that individuals generally 
prefer to direct their Islamic alms on their own.  However, they soon realized that, as 
donors drawn from their friends and business associates began to trust them to give 
charity only to needy, local Muslims (thus, fulfilling the standard requirements for zakat), 
almsgivers were contributing their annual obligatory zakat to their new Islamic charity. 
This note then became a part of their fundraising pamphlets and pitches: “We accept 
Zakat” (see, for example, Figure 13).  Currently, the vast majority of their donations is 
understood to be obligatory alms money.   
As I sat in the Itehad office one hot, humid Saturday, Tahir’s Hindu secretary 
Pooja interrupted to say that an applicant had arrived to speak with him.  This young 
woman shyly answered Tahir’s inquisitive barrage, revealing her acceptance to medical 
school in a month, her high exam scores, and finally her poverty and inability to pay the 
medical school tuition.  Tahir then asked her name.  “Manisha,” she replied.  “Oh, you 
are not Muslim [musalmān to nahin ho tum]!?” Tahir exclaimed, “We actually don’t help 
Figure 13: Excerpt from English 
fundraising pamphlet of Itehad 
Foundation 
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non-Muslims.” “Really?” the girl sat silently, confused.  “No, we really can’t help non-
Muslims,” Tahir said without offering an explanation. Although, I myself knew the 
reason: zakat is valid for Muslim poor only, in most of their donors’ opinion.  Then, 
Tahir inquired about her caste. “Gao is my family name” she replied. “OBC? [Other 
Backward Caste, shudra]” “No, SC [Scheduled Caste, dalit]” she replied.  “Oh-ho!” 
Tahir exclaimed, his face splitting into a wide smile, “Then you can get your fees paid, 
for sure!  The government is helping your people [tumare log] quite a lot!” He reassured 
her, “You will become a doctor,” still smiling paternally while he ushered her out the 
door. By Indian law, registered charitable societies are not allowed to serve only persons 
from one religious community or caste (in the U.S. by comparison, private charities may 
do so), but in practice many charities are established for and run by members of one 
community, such as Muslims.   
There remains a degree of ambivalence about Itehad’s overt mission of aiding 
only Muslims, in the hearts of its businessmen volunteers even as they fundraise for 
Islamic alms and cater to Muslim almsgivers.  Tahir grew up in a very religious family (I 
encountered his parents at their neighborhood mosque or praying at Tahir’s home 
numerous times) but he himself endeavors to present a “secular” face to his business 
associates and his Muslim and non-Muslim friends, as do most of the other Itehad 
volunteers.  For example, he got frustrated with me more than once for asking detailed 
questions about why his Islamic charity helps only Muslims such as, “Do you encourage 
them [your students on free scholarships] to help someone in the future in their own 
community, to pay it forward?” “Yes,” he replied. “In the community of Muslims,” I 
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emphasized. “No,” he replied, getting visibly frustrated,  
“See basically we are targeting Muslims now, because this – um – was, this was 
the whole idea. But later on in one hundred years, maybe Muslims won’t be the 
most needy in India.  And I will say, let’s help someone else.” 
 
Itehad Foundation is a peculiar case, as are similar businessmen-led Islamic charities, for 
as an Islamic charity it is also expending great effort to represent itself and operate in a 
manner that is indistinguishable from other welfare associations and NGOs in India’s 
realm of civil society, which in the social imaginaries of government regulators and many 
citizens is both secular and democratic.  My point here is not to conclude that Itehad 
accomplishes some remarkable feat by straddling both identities, as an Islamic charity 
which also presents itself as nearly indistinguishable from other registered, secular civil 
society organizations.  Rather, I argue the opposite:  Itehad’s ambivalent identity as both 
an Islamic and a “secular” organization was in fact completely unremarkable, as I found 
during the course of my fieldwork, given the current political culture in India shaped by 
the Sachar Report which has already demarcated Indian citizens into religious 
communities which are also bureaucratic distinctions in government discourse and has 
already identified the low socioeconomic conditions of Muslims, in particular, as a cause 
for national public concern.  
I. Crisis 
While the government’s Sachar Report sought and identified historical and socio-
structural causes for these disparities, many Lucknow Muslims envisioned these societal 
problems within a broader, religious framework.  Islamic charity volunteers during my 
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research agreed with the report,127 but a majority of Muslim donors interviewed in 
Lucknow (84%) also placed these socioeconomic causes within the larger arc of a 
perceived “spiritual crisis” afflicting Indian Muslims (dīn se doori, “distancing from the 
faith,” as discussed in these interviews). Proponents of this view, the new Islamic 
charities in particular, consider the political and economic crisis that is evident in the 
declining socioeconomic condition of Muslims to be a result of the separation of religious 
ethics from economic practice (cf. Rudnyckyj 2010; Tobin 2015).  In their view, this 
disjunction has led to harmful effects at all levels of Muslim society – among both the 
rich and the poor.  Certain Indian Muslims continued to build effective businesses and 
attain unprecedented economic success in India’s liberalizing economy.  However, the 
overall socioeconomic decline of the Indian Muslim community was seen by charity 
activists as a real and urgent concern, despite the successes of a few. Indeed, it was 
because of the successes of a proportion of upwardly mobile Muslims (it seemed 
everyone I spoke with, no matter how ordinary, could name at least on relative who was a 
successful professional) that the crisis was perceived as most acute – clearly, the 
purported age-old networks of solidary and redistribution were crumbling. The retreat of 
Islamic ethics in ordinary economic life was seen part of a trend that also has led 
wealthier Muslims to lapse in almsgiving, effectively severing one of the material links of 
solidarity within the community even as they remain nominal Muslims who even pray 
and speak out in public against Muslims’ marginalization.   
                                                 
127 For example, in my in-depth interviewing of thirty Muslim donors in Lucknow, 87% cited 
political marginalization since Independence and 90% cited lack of education (either due to lack 
of access or motivation) as primary causes of declining conditions among Muslims in India.   
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In the remainder of this section Crisis, I detail these efforts of new Islamic 
charities, as they seek to revive the age-old practice of almsgiving utilizing contemporary 
tactics of appealing to potential donors.  Second, I describe how wealthy Muslims are not 
the only ones implicated in accusations of ethical decline.  The new Islamic charities 
perceive that the separation of Islamic ethics from economic practice has led poorer 
Muslims into lives of sloth, dependency, and cynical deferral of responsibility for their 
economic ills, only exacerbating the overall crisis. Moreover, the poorer classes were 
often made into the primary targets for intervention, alongside constant fundraising and 
awareness raising efforts aimed at increasing the rates of zakat-giving among the upper 
classes.  In the upcoming section II. Intervention, I turn to the charities efforts to utilize 
their Islamic charities for the purposes of managing and instructing alms-recipients in 
order for them to better succeed as Muslims – and as productive workers – in India’s 21st 
century economy.  
“The Faith of Our Community is Falling” 
One cool winter day, I sat with an executive board member of the Itehad 
Foundation, Asif Khan, whose primary role is in outreach and fundraising sat in the 
construction company offices and discussed his perception of the current condition of 
Muslims in India.  This MBA-educated man sat behind his laptop wearing a collared 
shirt, sprinkling his Urdu with English sentences (although he was also fluent in English). 
“What do you see as primary causes of Muslims’ bad economic conditions?” I asked. 
After excoriating corruption in the political system and the lack of redistribution in 
general, he explained what he saw as the root of the specific economic ills plaguing 
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Muslims today:  
Asif: See, also, being a ‘Muslim’ and being a ‘believer’ [mu’min] are two 
different things. The problem is that the faith [aqīda] of our people is 
falling.  
Chris:  You mean, that it used to be better? 
Asif:   Yes, and we now also should be full of belief and be following Allah on 
all things. We should be paying attention to these other things: education, 
English [language learning], as well as the issues [ma’amlat] of Islam. 
OK, see? Then, God willing [in shā’ Allāh], we’ll have no problems.  [But 
now] we are all looking down, towards the world, and not looking to 
Allah. 
 
There are two points I want to highlight within Asif’s assertion of the spiritual crisis, or 
declining levels of belief, among Indian Muslims, which is representative of many such 
conversations I had. First, he described simply his perception that many Muslims are 
nominal Muslims, belonging to the community in name only or merely following cultural 
practices associated with Indian Muslims but not having aqīda or “belief’ (which can also 
mean “creed” in Urdu and Arabic, signifying adherence to the fundamentals or root of 
Islamic orthodox doctrines).  Below, I will argue that for the new Islamic charities one of 
the most important aspect of Islam are its ethical teachings on the economy.  
Second, however, he illustrated his belief that belief in Islamic doctrine and 
modern education (i.e. English-language education) somehow go hand in hand in 
contemporary India.  Here, I wish to point out that the views of new Islamic charities fit 
squarely within India’s strong currents of modern Islamic reformism such as Deoband 
(Metcalf 1982), Nadwa (Zaman 2002), and Jama’at-i Islami (Ahmad 2009). As 
Eickelman & Piscatori (1996: 38-42) have written of Islamic reform movements 
generally, the new Islamic charities express their agenda through a particular 
“representation of historical [Islamic] tradition,” question as un-Islamic certain customary 
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practices of today’s Muslims, even challenge traditional Islamic “authoritative 
discourses” and scholars, and rapidly adopt contemporary modalities of communication 
(whether print or digital) to spread their ideas.128  
“Muslims are just not paying their zakat”  
In the businessmen-led charities, most of the modern-educated volunteers besides 
Asif preferred not to talk as much about their faith and endeavored to represent 
themselves as “secular” despite the fact that they ran an Islamic charity and fundraised 
for alms – which accounted for the aversion of Nahid the treasurer and others to my 
direct questioning.  However, although many interviewees could not articulate it when I 
asked about their perceived “spiritual crisis” in the community, their narratives of zakat 
indicated what they otherwise left unsaid: they believed that the idealized system of zakat 
in Islam was far from being realized due to deficiencies in the piety of wealthy Muslims..   
“Muslims are just not paying their mandatory alms” (musalmān log apne zakat 
nikālte nahin) was a lament I often heard in conversation Lucknow’s old bazaar, both 
with charity workers and other Muslims.  This lament was not intended as a wholesale 
accusation that Indian Muslims were leaving the fold of Islam for other belief systems 
such as Hinduism or secularism.  On the contrary, I heard many times that the mosques 
were as full as they had ever been.  “The Tablighi Jama’at [preaching society] has 
worked very hard, and now you can see the mosques are full of worshipers [namāzī],” Dr. 
                                                 
128 I do, however, diverge from Eickelman & Piscatori’s (1996) application of the term “Islamist” to 
such reformists, who at least in my cases do not insist on incorporating Islam into all aspects of 
life – political, social, economic, cultural – but rather do retain a sense of privatized religion (see 
Osella & Osella 2008a for an excellent discussion of the term “Islamist” in the South Asian 
context).  
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Jamal, a madrasa-educated Urdu poet and local intellectual in his fifties, told me as we 
sat in a bazaar print shop – yet in the same interview he bemoaned the severe lack of 
proper almsgiving. Maulana Jahangir, the Deobandi preacher in Lucknow’s old city 
bazaar profiled in chapter eight, when I told him about a recent Pew Foundation (2012) 
study which found that more Muslims worldwide report giving ritual charity than 
performing daily prayer, responded thoughtfully,  
I think that survey must have different results in different countries. In Saudi 
Arabia, they give zakat more and pray less…In India, there’s more prayer and 
Muslims give less zakat.129  
 
His usually somber visage then broke into a hearty smile, “Here, we have very stingy 
Muslims (kanjūs sāḥib-e niṣāb) these days!” 
 Muslim charity workers were faced with the glaring reality of the worsening 
socioeconomic condition of their community, relative to other groups in India, yet all of 
them came from families that had partaken in Islamic revivalist movements in India (e.g. 
Deoband, Nadwa, Tablighi Jama’at, Jama’at-i Islami). It was clear that levels of 
religiosity were high.  The problem instead, in their view, was that numerous wealthy 
Muslims failed to understand or adhere to those teachings of Islam specifically related to 
Islamic charity. Nahid, the treasurer of Itehad, told me in an interview in English, 
I think that if all Muslims started giving zakat – giving their proper zakat  - there 
will be no poverty anymore, at least among Muslims.  My main point, here, is that 
out of all the Muslims who have the capacity, many of them are not giving.  This 
is the main reason for the poverty [of Muslims]. 
 
To Nahid and many others, it was not necessarily general impiety among wealthy 
                                                 
129 The Pew Foundation study, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, did find varying rates of 
ritual charity across countries. Despite claiming to be a worldwide survey of Muslims, the 
researchers actually performed no surveys in India, citing political obstacles (Pew 2012: 5). 
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Muslims, but instead was merely the fact that many shirked their mandatory alms, as a 
“main reason” contributing to systemic poverty in the community.  Many of these 
wealthy Muslims, of course, were themselves, their family, and their friends. Thus, it was 
a delicate issue for charity workers to address as activists.  “Do you judge other Muslims 
who you know don’t give zakat?” I often asked in interviews. Responses were invariably 
polite, claiming that sort of thing was others’ personal business, and you have to assume 
the best of Muslims who outwardly seem to be practicing; perhaps they gave secretly.  In 
the individualized, privatized, and secularized social world that these Muslim 
businessmen imagined, the proper response to declining impiety was not direct 
confrontation but rather public advocacy for Islamic almsgiving, awareness-raising, and 
growing the size and scope of their Islamic charity organizations.  
 As my research progressed, I learned that the businessmen-led Islamic charities, 
when they embraced the notion of a “spiritual crisis” afflicting the Muslim community, 
perceived this crisis as a specific failure of what they imagined as Islam’s idealized 
“system” of zakat. Not all Muslims imagined Islamic charity as a “system” but these 
businessmen did.  Moreover, anyone who accepted that zakat was an obligation upon 
Muslims but who failed to understand it as an all-encompassing economic system, was 
missing some deeper truths inherent in Islamic teachings.   
After five months volunteering part-time with Itehad Foundation, in December 
2012, I learned just how elaborated this idealized system of zakat was among volunteers. 
I had stayed late after one of their weekly Saturday business meetings held in the upstairs 
of a Bank of India building in Lucknow’s old bazaar. The volunteers lingered after the 
  298
meeting in the office of Tahir (my neighbor and closest acquaintance in Itehad) who 
worked there, discussing recent news about social problems among Muslims such as riot 
violence, illiteracy, and increasing divorce. Joking with the other volunteers Mahmood, 
Talal and Irfan, my neighbor Tahir said, “Well, brothers, Prophet Solomon130 [hazrat 
Suleiman] provided for the entire [Muslim] nation [qowm] in his time, but we can’t do 
that!”  The others disagreed, and a debate burst open as Mahmood, a senior board 
member, and Talal faced Tahir: 
Mahmood: Illiteracy, dishonesty, thievery, family troubles – all those [social] 
problems are not separate! However many evils are in society, they’re 
caused by ‘disparity of economy.’ If zakat would increase, then it would 
end the ‘disparity of economy’! If you go ‘online’ and define ‘disparity of 
economy’— 
Talal:  (interrupting) Yes, Tahir, he’s right. ‘Disparity of economy’ can be 
corrected through the proper [ṣaḥīḥ] implementation of zakat.  This is a 
‘principle of economics’: zakat! If everyone in the world, irrespective of 
whether he is a follower of Islam or not, followed this as a ‘principle of 
economics’ [then] after a cycle of 39 years the ‘per capita income’ would 
actually become uniform throughout the world. Look, let me explain— (he 
pauses, in search of a pen) 
Mahmood: Bring him a pen and paper! 
Irfan:   (laughing) Here’s the ‘professor.’ He’s going to give us a lecture [bayan]! 
Tahir:   Look, there’s no need to write it down. I get what you’re saying— 
 
Nevertheless, Talal launched into drawing a diagram of the “principle of economics” 
behind the system of zakat. This diagram involved forty wealthy Muslims and forty poor 
Muslims. The wealthy donors gave mandatory alms (one-fortieth of their assets) in 
charity to one poor person.  That person then became rich enough to be a 41st donor the 
next year. Talal invoked the well-known Islamic concept of nisab, or “threshold” above 
which a Muslim was considered wealthy enough to be ineligible for receiving charity and 
                                                 
130 The Old Testament figure of King Solomon is, of course, also part of the Islamic tradition, 
mentioned in the Qur’an as the prophet Suleiman (e.g. 2:102, 4:163). 
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to be obligated to instead give charity. The next year, another member of the poor group 
received enough charity to become a 42nd donor, so Talal scratched out another poor 
person whom he moved to the wealthy Muslims’ group, leaving 38 people in the group of 
the poor, and so forth. Talal explained that, if this process repeated, all forty poor 
Muslims would become rich. He concluded victoriously, “So, at the longest, it would 
take 40 years to eliminate all the poverty. Maybe it will take 39 years, or even less 
because the number of donors increases each year!”  Mahmood and Irfan enthusiastically 
chimed in with their agreement.  
 Putting aside the possible gaps in the Talal’s econometric logic for now, the key 
theme that I emphasize is the group’s perception of zakat as a “principle of economics.”  
Even Tahir did not object to this basic point; he merely had doubts (he later said) whether 
all Muslims giving their charity was a realistic expectation.  After Talal finished, Irfan 
picked up the thread to reiterate the link between alms and economic circulation, “One 
additional point, whoever is being given alms, they shouldn’t hold it and keep it. They 
should…spend (kharch) it! It should return to the economy. This is a “basic economic 
principle.” Economies require that money will keep on circulating [chalta rehega]. ”  
Mahmood chimed in, speaking English, “No hoarding!” which was a direct reference 
everyone knew to a particularly memorable (and painful-sounding) Qur’anic verse.131  
The group’s understanding of charity’s economics is clearly rooted in Islamic scriptures 
and the Qur’an’s teachings on charity, on one hand.  One must first accept the basic truth 
                                                 
131 Verses 9:34-35 of the Qur’an state, “Those who hoard gold and silver and spend it not in the way 
of Allah [i.e. give charity] - give them tidings of a painful punishment. The Day when it will be 
heated in the fire of Hell and seared therewith will be their foreheads, their flanks, and their backs, 
[it will be said], ‘This is what you hoarded for yourselves, so taste what you used to hoard.’ ” 
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of this revelation to accept what Talal and the others are arguing about zakat. On the 
other hand, accepting Islamic revelation is not enough – Muslims who simply pay their 
zakat (such as Tahir) are missing the elegant, systematic nature of zakat as a “principle of 
economics.”  
I briefly want to draw parallels between this charity discussion and Islamic 
banking, the phenomenon that emerged in the late 20th century.  This spontaneous 
discussion upstairs to the Bank of India, after their charity volunteers’ meeting, partook 
of similar discussions among educated Muslims over the basic economic principles 
drawn from scriptures and later Islamic scholarship, particularly related to lending 
without usurious interest.  This parallel between these Islamic charity workers’ debate 
and Islamic banking scholarship is not very surprising, given that Nejatullah Siddiqi132 
was a professor for decades at India’s famous “Cambridge of the East” Aligarh Muslim 
University (AMU), located in the same province as Lucknow, and AMU was also alma 
mater to most of these businessmen.  Even though India has not opened any registered 
Islamic banks due to governmental regulations (despite their rapid growth outside of 
India) these men were all familiar with the concepts and principles.   
                                                 
132 Anthropologist Bill Maurer (2005:27) in his study of Islamic banking called Dr. Siddiqi “perhaps 
the most widely cited Islamic economics scholar in the world…because of his sheer output” and 
one of the seminal founders of Islamic banking as a scholarly endeavor. For an early example of 
his scholarship see M. Nejatullah Siddiqi’s (1983) Banking Without Interest. For discussion of his 
life and thought while at Aligarh Muslim University, see chapter three in Haneef, M. A. (1995). 
Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought: A Selected Comparative Analysis. Kuala Lumpur: S. 
Abdul Majeed & Co. 
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II. Intervention 
Raising Donations 
Soon after I began volunteering in Itehad in July 2012, I found myself bicycling 
down the avenue of Lucknow’s Hazratganj bazaar in old city, on my way to a gigantic 
public-relations event that Itehad held in an effort to attract more donors – specifically 
doctors and medical professors with deep pockets.  They organized this “Interaction 
Event” as a dialogue, designed to be a public forum where invited community members 
(such as the doctors) could offer advice to the Itehad volunteers distributing the 
educational scholarships.  As I bicycled to the event – staged in the restored palace, or 
Safed Baradari (“White Palace”), of the nawabs – I caught a glimpse of the Central Drug 
Research Institute (CDRI) of India, an imposing biomedical research laboratory which 
has discovered 11 out of the 16 pharmaceuticals invented in India.  I watched a cycle 
rickshaw driver collect a few rupees from a researcher as she dismounted the passenger 
seat and walked into CDRI’s gated laboratory.  The potential donors invited to the event 
inevitably were medical researchers at CDRI, or perhaps the King George’s medical 
university (first established by the British) down the street.   
Inside the palatial Safed Baradari, potential donors, supporters, and volunteers 
were seated around a long conference table as Dr. Imtiaz, a medical professor and 
volunteer of five years with Itehad, gave his keynote remarks in Urdu. “It is true that 
things are going well for many people in India. Many [Muslims] in our community, too,” 
he began, before saying later: 
But, if you look “in detail,” conditions (ḥalāt) in our “community” are also very 
bad.  Many Muslims are going to school, more than before, but many more are 
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dropping out [before graduation].  The [Muslim] “community” has the highest 
dropout rate in primary and secondary school [out of all socio-religious 
communities]. Sachar Report put it at 70%! We are all travelers together 
(hamsafar)….We have to help our own “community.” Doctors have some 
advantage in society, and more responsibility (zimmedāri) than others as a 
result…Charity is also obligatory (farẓ) upon us [as Muslims].   But we don’t 
give! 
 
Dr. Imtiaz emphasized the deplorable conditions of the community, largely linking 
socioeconomic advancement to education, which was the primary mission of Itehad as a 
scholarship organization.  Secondly, he castigated Muslims for not giving charity, their 
“obligation.”  Moreover, he continued his speech with a story of a non-Muslim (ghair-
musalmān) friend of his who gave a significant portion of his wealth to a local private 
school for the poor each year.  By drawing an explicit contrast with a person (Hindu or 
Christian, I am not sure) whose faith did not stipulate mandatory almsgiving, he appealed 
even further to the audience’s sense of shame – as wealthy citizens of India and as self-
identified Muslims.   
 The effort to attract more wealthy professional donors was seen as a success 
(although I noticed from financial reports that Itehad’s budget did not grow substantially 
from 2012 to 2013). Nahid the treasurer told me afterward in English, “Many of them had 
not known about Itehad. They came for the first time. Once we show them our facts and 
figures, they get impressed and start contributing.” 
 This event, the keynote speech targeted at educated professionals (particularly the 
archetypal educated professional for many Indians: the medical doctor), and the overall 
public-relations efforts of Itehad throughout the nearly three months that I volunteered 
there were explicitly designed to raise levels of zakat giving among educated Muslims.   
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Besides merely increasing the base level of almsgiving among Muslims, however, the 
Itehad Foundation volunteers had three further goals as well, both related to what 
happened to zakat after it was given:  1) Provide an alternative channel alongside 
madrasas, for almsgivers to donate to education and development, 2) Raise the level of 
transparency in Islamic charity sector by operating a model organization according to 
contemporary standards of financial management and reporting, 3) Reform zakat by 
making donations more effective and efficient for economic development.  In short, they 
wanted to make zakat “work” better. They wanted zakat to be not merely about handouts 
or indiscriminate and impulsive charity but about premeditated social investment with 
high dividends for recipients and the Muslim community as a whole. It is to these deeper 
goals of Itehad that I now turn.   
The Developmentalist Ethic:  Making Zakat “Work” 
What I term the developmentalist ethic in zakat differed from the purity ethic in 
key ways.  Adhering to a purity ethic, many almsgivers not connected to new Islamic 
charities believed giving in secret was preferred to giving in public, especially to preserve 
the modesty of the recipient. Muslims in Lucknow who donated in more traditional ways 
– to madrasas and to local needy individuals – discussed their zakat as a practice focused 
on themselves as donors.  In such interviews with such almsgivers, if recipients were 
mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of overlooking their shame at being in 
poverty or merely highlighting the extreme neediness of Lucknow’s Muslim underclass 
and how deserving they were of welfare.  Moreover, the ubiquitous presence recipients in 
the bazaar – from family and neighbors, to beggars, to organized orphanages and 
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madrasas – ensured that Muslims were never at a loss for places to contribute alms, and 
donors motivated by purity ethic’s concerns were generally less discriminating about to 
whom they donated and about investigating how they used those zakat funds. 
Purification, protection, and such blessed benefits accrued to the Muslim who offers alms 
whenever approached by a Muslim in need, these donors emphasized to me. Finally, 
intention (niyyat) was taken as a crucial definitional element in Islamic jurisprudence on 
ritual alms: if the donor's intention was pure, to give alms to a recipient who appears 
eligible, then it was considered valid zakat, which for many donors eliminated anxieties 
that recipients were not as deserving as they appeared. 
The businessmen-led Islamic charities that I profile in this chapter, however, were 
by and large dissatisfied with the way many Muslims gave alms – and especially with the 
way recipients were perceived to be handling alms.   Asif, a volunteer at Itehad, when I 
asked to whom he observed most Muslims giving alms, told me in English, “Giving to 
relatives is very important. That’s in the scriptures.” But he quickly moved on to lament, 
“But there are many people who are a bit more lax. They don’t pay attention…They just 
take out their zakat and give it to the madrasa, or whoever.”  One concern was creating 
dependency, especially among regular alms-takers and beggars. Asif continued,  
The average person in Lucknow, if he’s a literate person…whenever they get 
money, then they drift away from [relatives and] closer ones…They are thinking, 
‘If I give 20,000 rupees to a relative of mine, then next year he will also come 
knocking! 
 
These businessmen volunteers often spoke of how the underlying purpose of zakat was to 
lift the recipients out of poverty (seen in the vignette above of the diagram of alms as a 
“principle of economics).  Other Muslim givers that I interviewed, who did not donate to 
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these new Islamic charities, donated to the same roster of alms-takers every year who 
annually appeared at their door, and – notably – the almsgivers seemed pleased with how 
easily this arrangement allowed them to discharge of their obligation.  
Muslim givers of a developmentalist mindset are focused on the life of the alms-
gifts after they leave their hands. The focus of alms-gifts rotates from the giver (and how 
her soul and her wealth are purified) to the receiver: How will the charity be utilized by 
the recipient? Will she, the recipient, work hard to invest it and utilize it? Or, will it make 
her lazy and dependent? Most importantly, will it lift poor Muslims out of poverty? 
These new Islamic charity organizations’ efforts to improve the lot of the poor included 
modern management practices, such as: fundraising pledges, recipient application forms, 
recipient eligibility criteria related to 'work ethic', bundling financial aid with sermons 
and 'coaching' intended to discipline the poor as hard-working productive members of 
society, monitoring visits, and bureaucratic surveillance. Their efforts parallel a larger 
gradual shift away from madrasas as the preservers of Muslim identity by virtue of how 
they continue to the transmission of Islamic knowledge (Shibli Nomani, as quoted in 
Zaman 2002:73-74) toward newer forms of Muslim organizations concerned with Indian 
Muslims' socio-economic development (Sikand 2006) and participation in India’s 21st 
century liberalizing economy.   
The developmentalist ethic was characterized by a set of concerns, which had 
their origins in certain long-held interpretations of Islamic scriptural teachings on zakat, 
but which were being institutionalized and emphasized by new Islamic charities more 
than ever before. The scholarly and popular discourses on zakat were multi-layered and 
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far-ranging, incorporating diverse concerns over what the ritual of zakat was and how it 
should be practiced.  Muslims in Lucknow pragmatically always emphasized some 
virtuous concerns over others.  Five moral concerns in particular comprised the 
developmentalist ethic.  First, new Islamic charities mentioned the obligation (farẓ) upon 
all Muslims to give zakat in their person-to-person awareness-raising, although this 
discourse did not appear in their materials or presentations that I saw – most donors in 
Lucknow’s upper-classes felt it expedient to assume in public that the audiences they 
addressed were fulfilling their pious duty. Going beyond emphasis on zakat as farz, 
voluntary giving was encouraged (even beyond the 2.5% proscribed for Sunni Muslims) 
and what was particularly highlighted was the profound neediness of deserving Muslim 
families in old city Lucknow (see Figure 14).   
Second, in contrast to teachings that highlighted secrecy and anonymity in zakat, 
these new Islamic charities 
disseminated records on the 
identities of their scholarship 
recipients (if not the donors) 
and held public functions at 
which beneficiaries were 
photographed.  The Qur’anic 
verse (2:271) on giving charity 
modestly reads: “If you disclose 
your charities, they are good; Figure 14: On the neediness of Muslims, except from 
English-language pamphlet of Itehad Foundation 
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but if you conceal them and give them to the poor, it is better for you.”  Supporters of 
developmentalist giving that was more visible, rather than less, often replied to me that 
the first line of this verse clearly allows giving in public (“disclosing” it).133  Moreover, 
as Maulana Jahangir explained to me, ‘ulama have long held that public giving is 
completely justified as long as the goal is to encourage other Muslims to maintain (or 
increase) their fulfillment of Islamic injunctions (farẓ) to service and charity.  As 
described above and in chapter eight, the public events held by new Islamic charities 
were in fact a key component of their public relations and awareness-raising campaigns 
about their education and job-skills creation programs.   
Third, the issue of who were truly the “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) recipients was the most 
overarching concern of those animated by a developmentalist ethic.  Especially in the 21st 
century urban context of old city Lucknow, a bazaar area flooded with Muslim migrants 
from other districts and villages, the anxiety over which Muslims were in fact fit the 
Qur’anic categories of “the poor” (al-fuqara) and “the needy” (al-miskin) was 
predominant.  Indeed, this concern was what of the founders of Itehad Foundations and 
Scholarship Foundation told me led them to establish their new Islamic charities: their 
worries over whether charitable giving was reaching the most deserving beneficiaries.  
The concern over recipients was also facilitated by charity workers’ skills in modern 
modalities in management.  In the more bureaucratized operations of new Islamic  
                                                 
133 Maulana Zakariyya’s Faza’il-i ‘Amal, the central text of the Tablighi Jama’at discussed in chapter 
four and which was referred to me by many reformist Muslims in Lucknow, included a long 
discuss comparing the merits of giving zakat anonymously in avoidance of “showing off” versus 
giving publically, ultimately emphasizing “not necessarily every good deed done in public would 
amount to ‘show’” (Zakariyya 1991: 6).   
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charities, it was actually 
possible to gather and 
analyze biostatistical data 
on potential recipients in 
accurate and efficient 
ways.  New Islamic 
charities developed and 
advertised their methods 
of “surveying” applicants 
for scholarships to 
investigate their neediness ahead of disbursing funds (see Figure 15).  Donors to new 
Islamic charities cited this as the main benefit of giving to an organization, which had the 
time and resources to investigate alms-seekers in the city more than any individual donor 
could do.  This concern became more elaborated in the discourses of new Islamic 
charities, beyond even the definitions of “the poor” and “the needy” in traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence, however, to incorporate elements of defining which recipients would 
leverage zakat in the most efficient ways for “development” (taraqqi) and which had the 
most potential for upwardly mobility.  In short, new Islamic charities sought recipients 
that gave almsgivers – and by extension the zakat resources of the Muslim community as 
a whole – the most bang for their rupee.  
Fourth, the concern over recipients had a particular focus for new Islamic 
charities – zakat-collectors (Qur’an 9:60 al-‘amilin, Urdu: safeer, chandah lene-wāle) 
Figure 15: On Surveys of applicants, excerpted from 
pamphlet of Itehad Foundation 
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were categorically 
excluded as a proper 
type of recipient.  In 
this case, “collectors” 
meant the organizations 
and their staff that collect and utilize zakat.  This concern was motivated by the 
widespread skepticism over NGOs and welfare organizations of all types in north India, 
perceived as nearly uniformly corrupt by Indian donors in contrast to “the corporate 
sector [with its] model of accountability” in India (Bornstein 2012: 62-65; cf. Gupta 
2012: 75-77, 80-99).  It was also what distinguished them from the traditional madrasas 
that many developmentalist almsgivers criticized, which were seen as (over)paying 
ineffective instructors and other staff partly through zakat funds.134 New Islamic 
charities’ public materials such as PowerPoint presentations made at awareness-raising 
events and in emails to the donor list-serve emphasized their operations as “zero-
expense” with “office expenditures…are borne by the members voluntarily” (see Figure 
16). Each of the three new Islamic charities constantly reassured me (and current and 
potential donors) that their budget and disbursal records were available for review at any 
time.  
Fifth, new Islamic charities were very conscious of the idealized systemic nature 
of zakat.  These charity workers recognized that there was no Islamic government in 
                                                 
134 The three new Islamic charities discussed in this chapter (Itehad Foundation, Scholarship 
Foundation, and Taraqqi Foundation) were led by businessmen and university-educated 
professionals. By contrast, the Society for Divine Welfare was a developmentalist charity that did 
pay its staff.  
Figure 16: On operating expenses, excerpted from a 
pamplet of Itehad Foundation 
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India legitimately empowered to re-distribute zakat, although nearly all Muslims I spoke 
with in Lucknow did not believe that in fact an Islamic government was a necessary – or 
even desirable – goal (Ahmad 2009), after seeing what they perceived as a failed 
experiment in Pakistan.  Nevertheless, new Islamic charities generally believed that zakat 
was instituted first by the Prophet Muhammad as a centralized system, rather than 
person-to-person almsgiving being the only option for disbursing zakat, and were not 
prepared to discard this notion or defer it to a later time when an Islamic government may 
indeed come about.  The businessmen and professionals at the forefront of these new 
Islamic charities, moreover, were buoyed by recent advances in Islamic finance, 
especially by Nejatullah Siddiqi at Aligarh University where many of them studied (e.g. 
Siddiqi 1983), a field which also described in contemporary terms how Islamic teachings 
on the economy and ethics constituted a reworking of aspects of the financial system. 
Overall, adherents of the developmentalist ethic went to great lengths to realize 
the perceived underlying purpose of zakat: as transformative for the recipient. This 
concern involved bringing in Islamic teachings on other matters, such as the importance 
of hard work and earning a halal income and Islam’s accentuation of education as a moral 
duty.  In short, they saw zakat as a means of shaping an Indian Muslim community in 
crisis into a workforce of halal-income earners, in contrast to haram income from 
begging, or what I term the production of halal human capital. Donors to new Islamic 
charities were convinced that many of the ills that plagued the Indian Muslim community 
were the result of ineffective community welfare practices, and the anxiety over 
“dependency” came up often in my interviews with them. The opposite of dependency 
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was “development” (taraqqi), for the donors to new Islamic charities, and this distinction 
impelled a greater focus on the recipient.  If recipients utilized charitable donations in 
ways that imparted income-generation skills, inculcated a sense of independence and self-
discipline, or otherwise aided in lifting them out of poverty, this entailed an effective use 
of Islamic charity.  With this general shift in focus of Islamic almsgiving from the donors 
(and how they and their wealth are purified) to the recipients came two additional, more 
specific shifts. First, almsgiving went from being a largely secret and private ritual 
practice to a public one in which the recipients were clearly identified, registered, and 
monitored by the new Islamic charities.  Second, developmentalist-minded donors were 
not satisfied with merely any needy Muslim as a recipient of alms. Instead, certain sectors 
(and not others) were singled out as focus areas – namely, education – and certain 
individual recipients were selected as others were turned away, if they did not fit criteria 
designed to achieve maximum development impact.  
“Forms” of Deserving Poor  
 Pooja waved a single form in her hand, loudly yelling “Who’s next?” as I came 
into the office one Saturday in June 2012 as the Itehad office was crowded with new 
applicants for the upcoming school year.  Not finding a seat elsewhere, I sat with the 
applicants to wait and watch while one of Itehad’s volunteers, Mahmood, came in 
periodically and randomly pointed to someone, curtly asked them to explain the direness 
of their situation to him, and either asked them to leave the office (being somehow 
ineligible, cf. Gupta [2012] on care-giving in India as “arbitrary”) or requested that they 
fill out an application form with Pooja, the office secretary.  Most applicants (the parents 
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of students, and occasionally the students themselves) were illiterate in English or 
assumed to be.  The forms were in English.  So, Pooja questioned each applicant the 
questions on the form, recording responses.  
Name? 
Referred by?  
Do you have a job? What is it? 
Where does your son attend school? 
 
The questions were designed to determine the applicant’s religion (almost always 
identifiable by their name), family income (Itehad rarely assisted anyone making over 
8,000 rupees a month, $150, although exceptions were made), other siblings in school, 
the student’s own school, and other such personal information.   
This was a simple application form.  However, it also speaks volumes as to the 
form of poverty that new Islamic charities found to be constitutive of “deserving poor.”  
By interrogating this form filled with its own interrogatives, we can elicit a better 
understanding of the conceptions of deserving poor as operationalized in Itehad’s office 
and embedded in the implicit, un-written conditions placed upon applicants (cf. Riles 
2006). First, the applicants must be Muslim, as in the vignette of Tahir turning away a 
(Hindu) scheduled caste woman named “Gao.”  New Islamic charities I worked with did 
very rarely fund Hindu students, if funds could be raised for them from donors, but this 
was only the case for about four Hindu students in Scholarship Foundation and none in 
Itehad. The form of personal information prevented applicants from dissimulating their 
religious identity by merely entering the office wearing Muslim dress (as many beggars 
did while sitting outside mosques).  Applicants at some point were required to show 
grade reports from the school, with their child’s printed name, an official documentary 
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record of their name and address as additional bureaucratic surveillance.  On screening 
surveys and home visits volunteers also inquired with locals to double-check applicants’ 
basic information.  
Second, the new Islamic charities in this chapter are all run exclusively by Sunni 
Muslims. Unlike other Muslims, the volunteers in Itehad and Scholarship Foundation 
were genuinely open to offering partnerships and aid to Shi’a Muslims in Lucknow. But, 
as Shi’a operated their own charities, these Sunnis told me privately that they avoided 
funding Shi’a students. In particular, the paper forms of Itehad also facilitated 
discrimination on this basis, at least as far as volunteers could identify Shi’a by their 
distinctive names (see Susewind 2014 on Shi’a-Sunni naming and identity in Lucknow).   
Third, only students studying at a fee-based local private school were eligible, and 
those studying at madrasas were not (“Farheen School?  Is that a madrasa?”), although 
this was not a stated policy. New Islamic charities’ founders envisioned them as a viable 
alternative to the traditional madrasa schooling in the Muslim community.  While 
members of new Islamic charities often spoke respectfully of madrasas in public and kept 
their criticisms to themselves, from private conversations with me and others, I knew of 
their skepticism that madrasas provided effective education and job skills for the 
contemporary marketplace. However, despite these views, many of the volunteers in the 
new Islamic charities were still supportive of madrasa education, if only for the 
circumscribed reason of furthering religious learning and traditional Islamic scholarship.  
While most of them did not view madrasas as a means to securing a well-paying job, they 
donated regularly to the better-managed ones and supported Islamic education in other 
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ways as well. 
Two conditions on the recipients were overtly specified in organizational policies 
of both charities, restricting which students are eligible to receive scholarships.  A key 
condition of new applicants is that they submit report cards which evidence the student's 
attendance rate as above 80%.  A second condition on new applicants was that students 
were required to provide grade reports showing standardized exam scores as above 60%.  
One day when I poured over the grade sheets provided by the schools to Scholarship 
Foundation with one of their volunteers, I commented that most of the Foundation’s 
students’ grades hovered around 60s and 70s – just above the cutoff. Iqrar, the volunteer, 
remarked that this was actually comparable to most Hindu students in those schools, as 
well, “These are depressed areas of the bazaar, Chris,” he said, “these kids’ parents are 
probably illiterate themselves. This is actually quite good performance!”  These 
conditions upon applicants have not changed throughout the life of the organizations, 
according to my interviews with executive committee members. Thus, Muslim students 
who apply to such scholarship organizations must fit the mold of model scholastic 
achievers and disciplined school-goers to be considered for funds.  
The organizations' volunteers annually monitored these standards on students, 
even after they were receiving scholarships.  Volunteers re-interviewed students' families 
or contacted their respective schools annually to obtain continuing documentation of 
attendance and academic performance records for each student in the scholarship 
program.  The members informed families that their students were required to remain 
above the thresholds of 80% attendance and 60% exam scores. Scholarship Foundation 
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even takes the further step of sending the academic and attendance records of all students 
to all donors on its email list, and Itehad Foundation did so sporadically when volunteers 
had the time to compile them (while always inviting donors to come see for themselves in 
the office records).  One volunteer explained to me that this transparency was expected 
by the donors he knows, who are mostly comprised of his classmates' and business 
contacts' circles.  The volunteers are interested in students' academic performance to such 
an extent that the highest performing students are also marked on the Scholarship 
Foundation's roster, even though they receive no extra benefits but are simply recognized 
among the donors as high-performers.  I many times overheard donors congratulating 
students whom they remembered as high-performers, when they came back in to renew 
their applications.  
 Unlike government or corporate scholarship programs, the Muslim scholarship 
organizations utilized these conditions not as strict cut-offs, but rather as opportunities to 
counsel and engage under-performing students.  Each organization, however, handled 
monitoring slightly differently, yet both imagined themselves as conduits for mentoring 
as well as financial aid.  Members emphasized to me and to others in their public 
materials, that their associations were not merely a bridge of funding between upper-
classes and needy Muslims, but also served as conduits to pass on life-skills, good study 
habits, and networking and employment opportunities.  If a student received a below-
60% exam score, he or she was actually not dropped from scholarship, as long as 
attendance remained at 80%.  Rather, members would attempt to discover the causes of 
low academic performance through phone calls and visits, addressing them through 
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engaging parents and the school.  The emphasis on forgiving poor academic performance 
in light of regular attendance (and not the other way around) illustrates these Muslim 
givers' concern that students – first and foremost – apply themselves and inculcate a good 
work ethic and virtues of self-management and discipline. A student with high grades and 
poor attendance presumably would be threatened with losing the scholarship according to 
the charity’s stated policy, as an executive member speculated in an interview, although 
this sort of case had not occurred in recent memory.   
Donors and volunteers in new Islamic charities are, of course, ultimately 
committed to seeing financially needy students succeed and become upwardly mobile.  
The new management practices they utilize in their charities, drawn from their 
backgrounds in business, not only reflect their desire to make the system of Islamic 
charity more efficient.  These forms and other practices of bureaucratic surveillance also 
illustrate their conception of the need to develop human capital by means of zakat, by 
defining the most “correct” recipients as those which have certain capacities and virtues 
the volunteers believe are necessary for advancement in today’s economy. Moreover, 
there remains a structural emphasis built into each organization's practices and policies 
about how to succeed: individual hard work, study within a “modern” school (not a 
madrasa), and solidarity amongst one’s faith community are the keys to a bright future in 
contemporary India.   
The Gift of Self-Discipline 
 The desire to not only monitor student performance, but also teach self-discipline, 
was exemplified by regular counseling sessions held for students by the businessmen 
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volunteers in both Itehad Foundation and Scholarship Foundation. These mentoring 
sessions occurred within the schools a few times a year.  The Scholarship Foundation, 
however, also selected some students for special mentoring in a program called the 
“Brilliant Grooming Mission.” This program selected a half-dozen of the over 500 
students receiving scholarships, singling out those who had received the highest exam 
scores (known throughout India as “toppers”). Members considered these “toppers” in the 
Brilliant Grooming Mission program to be the most promising students and most worthy 
of their personal investment of time.   
 These mentoring sessions occurr every three months or so in each organization.  
At one session of the Brilliant Grooming Mission in July 2013, I also taught a short 
lesson on time-management to the students in Urdu. Most sessions involved at least three 
adult volunteers running the two-hour mentoring for the middle-school aged students 
who in this session were all boys (but other sessions had girl attendees). The instruction 
directed at the students consisted of personal strategies for self-discipline and 
studiousness. After lessons in study habits and self-management, there were opportunities 
for the students to ask questions on science of the doctor and engineer mentors (e.g. “Can 
you help me understand atomic numbers?”).   The students relished this opportunity for 
individual tutoring on difficult science topics, it seemed to me, but also genuinely 
listened during the study habits discussions.  For example, after brief opening lessons on 
time-management, the format of the session entered a discussion phase in which the adult 
mentors asked each school-child to verbally summarize their daily routine, taking 
particular care to note homework time, sleeping hours, and professional academic 
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coaching sessions. The students then intoned narratives of their daily routine in a low, shy 
voice, accompanied with foot-shuffling and downcast gaze in the presence of an equal 
ratio of degree-holding adults. Their shy demeanor was typical of students I saw in 
numerous other schools during my volunteering with the six charities I studied around 
Lucknow. What was different, however, was the passion of the adults in the room. 
Mentors interjected with excited clarifying questions to determine the exact contours of 
the students' study habits, subsequently offering gentle but sober admonitions to increase 
homework time or effusive praise when daily studies stretched late into the night. “You 
should sleep less and study more,” was one adult's response to one student. “One hour of 
TV is enough to relax and then you should begin your studies,” another said, addressing 
the youth collectively.   
 Adult mentors took it as a foregone conclusion that each student was a 
demonstrably hard-working student, in these Brilliant Grooming Mission sessions, 
consistently reminding students that they had all topped the standardized exams.  
Therefore, the overall tenor of the session was to weed out bad habits and overcome 
specific obstacles that prevented students from realizing their innate potential, such as 
one mentor who repeatedly inquired, “Does anyone have difficulty in obtaining their 
books?” or effective coaching, or venues for practicing English (although the entire 
mentoring session was in Urdu).  The overwhelming lesson was that students should 
believe in the conscious application of raw willpower to attain success, now that socio-
structural impediments to education, such as school fees or access to networking 
opportunities, had been removed.  Although volunteers considered the “toppers” most 
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worthy of their time, Itehad and Scholarship Foundation also each ran general mentoring 
sessions for all their students, held in the schools they attended. In short, needy 
scholarships recipients are being gifted twin gifts, the scholarship itself and the gift of 
ideological instruction in the values of self-improvement and work ethic, drawn from 
volunteers' experience as businessmen and women in India's contemporary capitalist and 
globalizing economy.  
Conclusion 
As I described at the outset of the chapter, public concern in India is growing over 
the deplorable socioeconomic indicators of Muslims, which recently became the focus of 
a government report (Sachar 2006). Muslims themselves are alarmed at the evidence of 
discrimination within mainstream society and marginalization from India’s rapidly 
expanding market economy. Many even experience this political and economic crisis as a 
“spiritual crisis,” perceiving that their brothers and sisters in the faith are failing to apply 
the truths of Islam to their economic practice. In particular, these concerned activists feel 
that Muslims of sufficient means are not ensuring the circulation of wealth through the 
Muslim community and through the economy in general. Such Muslims fail to heed the 
stern admonitions of the Qur’an against “hoarding” when they squirrel away investments, 
violating even Islam’s prohibition on making usurious interest. Activists who would 
reform Islamic charity not only seek to remind Muslims of their obligation to give alms, 
they are focusing particular attention on the recipients of charity and how they utilize 
Islamic alms to further integrate themselves into India’s liberalizing economy rife with 
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individual opportunity in such fields as medicine, biomedical research, IT, and 
telecommunications engineering. In short, the separation of Islamic ethics from Muslims’ 
economic practice is crippling their participation in the market, precluding the Muslim 
community – and India as a whole – from realizing its productive potential.   
My main goal in this chapter has been to closely examine transformations in 
Islamic charity from its roots in scripture and traditional practice as a purificatory ritual 
for the donor, to its present-day institutionalizations geared towards “modernizing” and 
“developing” the Muslim community in India.  What I am calling the “developmentalist 
ethic” in Islamic almsgiving in Old City Lucknow is effecting reforms in the way 
individuals perform ritual almsgiving and in the way that Islamic charities manage those 
alms.  Yet these reforms are not just along the lines of financial accounting or mere 
importation of “western” management theory in local Indian associations.  In aligning 
with a more developmentalist ethic, these new Islamic charities are distributing more than 
just money. Along with alms, they disseminate attitudes towards employment, values of 
self-discipline, ideas about the “deserving poor” and who are the proper recipients of 
Muslims’ sympathy and largesse – thus inculcating new ethical subjectivities in poor 
Muslims.  This developmentalist ethic was framed in explicitly Islamic terms – the 
obligation (farẓ) of giving zakat, Islam’s prohibitions on “hoarding” wealth and usurious 
interest, the “correct” (ṣaḥīḥ) use of alms for truly the poor and needy, the ideal nature of 
zakat as a “system” (nizām) instituted first by the Prophet Muhammad, and the prime 
importance of intra-Muslim (and, at times, intra-Sunni) solidarity in the ‘ummah. The 
overarching message of the new Islamic charities was that the socioeconomic decline of 
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the Indian Muslim community had been accompanied by moral decline, and this 
separation of Islamic ethics especially from economic practice necessitated changes in 
the way Muslim citizens managed local welfare.  As a project to articulate and define 
aspects of Muslim faith in public and didactic settings, these practices re-orient notions of 
“correct” Muslim subjectivities, I argue, towards the (perceived) requirements of the 
contemporary Indian economy. 
 Such compatibility, even fusion, between developmentalist practices which 
objectify Muslim faith and seek to inculcate modern work ethics have been described by 
scholars such as Patricia Sloane on Malay entrepreneurs (1998), Filippo and Caroline 
Osella in south India (2009), Daromir Rudnyckyj in Indonesia (2009, 2010), and Robert 
Hefner's (1998) earlier work among Indonesian traders. A common theme among these 
works is the compatibility between “western” business practices and the globalizing 
market economy, on one hand, and localized notions of reformist Islam.  These Muslim 
businessmen take the good from “western” management theory and business principles, 
while drawing on reformist Islam.  
Most significantly for my purposes here, these studies point to a new 
interpretation of the relationship between the "Islamic economy" as articulated with the 
capitalist one, rather than in opposition to it (Tripp 2006).  Namely, that Islam is being 
instrumentally utilized to facilitate entry of Muslims into the contemporary global 
economy, rather than presenting a view of the Islamic moral economy at odds with – or, 
at least, at an arm's length from – capitalism's organizing rationales of profits and 
productivity.   Filippo and Caroline Osella's work with Muslim entrepreneurs in Kerala 
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points to their ethical emphasis on “moral connectedness” with the Muslim community at 
large and on public service as the duty of business leaders. Furthermore, studies of 
market Islam analyze the “modern pious” Muslim businessmen as both seeking to reform 
personal Islamic practice and seeking to align piety practices with the demands of 
contemporary life (Osella & Osella 2009; cf. Deeb 2006), but analyze this figure as 
basically refuting the political Islamist position that "all that is good comes from Islam" 
(Hefner 2012).  This body of work is thus a correction to study of political Islamism as 
ideological opponent of the West, suggesting that there is more to the story and more 
diversity within revivalist Islamic religiosity and that “Islamic capitalism” is perhaps 
supplanting oppositional Islamist politics (Nasr 2010). 
My work constitutes at least one major update to Daromir Rudnyckyj’s work on 
market Islam. Rudnckyj's book-length study Spiritual Economies described how the 
spirituality of Muslims in an Indonesian steel plant became a "site of management 
intervention,” as human resource managers ran seminars on Islam that emphasize work as 
a "form of worship.”  These three-day seminars involved re-framing of business 
management principles in the Islamic idiom, for example, asserting “that the fourth pillar 
of Islam, the duty to fast during Ramadan, is a model for self-control and self-
management” and acting out the hajj pilgrimage in ways that encouraged intra-worker 
solidarity and taught ideals of customer service (2009: 190).  Zakat was invoked to 
represent the management principle of “win-win,” as the foundation for good customer 
relations. These factory managers “sought to create a responsible, accountable, self-
managing subject who acted according to the norms of the free market” and “norms of 
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transparency, productivity, and rationalization” for the purposes of succeeding in 
business (Rudnyckyj 2009: 197, 105). 
However, trainings in the steel plant for Muslim workers primarily involved a 
curriculum which was in substance comprised nearly entirely of management theories 
and self-help principles (Rudnyckyj mentioned Dale Carnegie’s Principles of Highly 
Effective People as a particularly strong influence) which were merely framed according 
to Islamic idioms, Muslim history – as well as a liberal sprinkling of Indonesian folk 
culture and American pop culture. For example, nowhere in Rudnyckyj’s cases were 
Muslim workers actually encouraged to engage in ritual almsgiving or adhere to their 
religion’s macro-economic teachings (such as in Islamic banking) beyond simply 
avoiding graft.  In fact, the madrasa-educated Islamic scholars nearby the steel plant were 
skeptical of the managers’ Islamic training programs.  They and other conservatives 
viewed it as “progressive (or even radical) because it represented a completely new way 
of practicing Islam” (Rudnyckyj 2009:187).   
By contrast, the new Islamic charities in this chapter received the approval of the 
Islamic jurist at Nadwa madrasa, a conservative seminary otherwise known for its 
opposition to matters such as allowing women-initiated divorce under India’s Muslim 
Personal Law statues. Despite departing as much as they did from traditional almsgiving, 
the new Islamic charities remained within the fold of acceptable Islamic practice. 
Moreover, the new Islamic charities were not merely imitating the ritual obligations of 
Islam, such as the reenactments of hajj or metaphor of fasting in the Indonesian steel 
plant’s trainings.  They were literally performing zakat.  Rudnyckyj’s (2009: 191) 
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analysis is not of the performative ethics of Islamic ritual per se as much as it is of idioms 
of Islamic ethics (what he terms “dubbing culture,” following Tom Boellstorf  2005).  My 
work extends Rudyckyj’s flattened view of market Islam by illustrating that the forces of 
market Islam can be far more than “dubbed” versions of Islamic discourse.  Instead, new 
Islamic charities promote the normative prescriptions linked to shari’a by reviving age-
old Islamic rituals themselves, while doing so according to distinctly contemporary, 
practical ways informed by new modalities of management.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
ZAKAT ETHICS AND THE PRODUCTION OF HALAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
In a hadith, the Prophet Muhammad said: After faith and prayer, the next obligation is 
earning income in a halal way [īmān aur namāz ke ba’d, ḥalāl kamānā farẓ hai]...So, this 
is a purpose of zakat, also:  It is for the poor to stand up on their own [and earn]. Do you 
see?...Otherwise some of them go to Hell. 
-- Maulana Jahangir Qasmi, head of the Society for Divine Welfare 
 
“…Otherwise some of them go to Hell,” these words said to be by the preacher 
Maulana Jahangir echoed in my mind as I rode my bicycle down the serpentine alleyway 
into bazaar of Aminabad in old city Lucknow, on my way to the charity distribution event 
run by his Society for Divine Welfare. The room when I arrived was already packed with 
people – the Society had become very well-known over its thirty-year history of utilizing 
alms-gifts to increase employment among Lucknow’s poorer residents.  Some wealthier 
local Muslims were there to observe, and perhaps become encouraged to donate in the 
future.  Others were there to receive, wiry men who applied for a free rickshaw in order 
to earn an income by pedaling their passengers through Lucknow’s congested streets and 
women swathed in black cloth veils who applied for sewing machines to perform piece-
work from the privacy of their home.  The audience was entirely composed of these 
seated recipients, waiting in mute silence for the charity distribution to begin, 
apprehensively shifting and trying not to look at one another but rather keep eyes 
downcast.  Behind the tables set up at the front of the room, opposite the crowd of 
recipients, sat a dozen men (mostly the organizers and volunteers) surveying the 
donations and the crowd with sharp eyes to ensure that everyone had arrived and things 
would go smoothly.  The charity distribution event was about to begin. 
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This event was a modal example of what I term the “developmentalist ethic” in 
Islamic almsgiving, and it constitutes the ethnographic foundation for this chapter.  In 
chapter three, I illustrated how many donors give according to what I termed a “purity 
ethic,” being primarily concerned with the aspects of almsgiving that make it efficacious 
for the donor, who is thereby fulfilling a ritual obligation and performing a ritual of 
financial and moral purification.  A developmentalist trend in Islamic almsgiving in 
modern India, however, reflects a divergent set of concerns from those that historically 
animated Islamic almsgiving. The new Islamic charities I discuss in the last chapter and 
this chapter engage in practices and circulate teachings that re-orient the ritual of zakat-
giving within a moral framework that highlights different criteria.  
In this chapter, I describe the efforts of the Society for Divine Welfare to provide 
business opportunities to underemployed Muslims in the informal economy of 
Lucknow’s bazaar.  Entrepreneurial self-employment was emphasized, and the Society 
provided start-up capital and occupational equipment aimed to launch poor Muslims into 
new income-generating activities.  However, this chapter is primarily concerned – not 
with the material means for employment – but with how these developmentalist processes 
are predicated on very particular formulations of Muslims’ moral selfhood.  As moral 
teachings, they are communicated through sermonizing and everyday informal preaching, 
but also communicated through implicit symbolisms reflected in the charity distribution 
events.   
In the course of attending distribution events, Muslims are the subject of Islamic 
teachings that are intended as “gifts” of moral discourse alongside the gifts of charity.  
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These ethical teachings consist of Islamic injunctions related to work ethic, self-
discipline, accountability, and economic responsibility, presented by the preacher during 
his thundering sermons.  Such moral discourses were supposed to function as cultural 
mechanisms for holding recipients accountable to divine authority and societal pressure 
in ways that conditioned them as virtuous subjects with habits conducive to modern 
employment – theorized in contemporary anthropological literature as “technologies of 
the self” (Foucault 2010; Rose 1999).  Virtues are more than mere modalities of 
neoliberal governance, however, and my analysis concludes with investigation of moral 
discourse as inculcating a communitarian ethic that fosters solidarity and a sense of 
assuaging the moral “crisis” facing the Indian Muslim community.  Virtuous “concerns” 
(Barth 1993) such as zakat-giving that places greater responsibilities on individuals are 
also processes by which people learn, re-interpret, and come to own and internalize the 
public ethics inherent in larger traditions  (Taylor 1990; Faubion 2011). 
This chapter situates new Islamic charities within a growing literature in 
anthropology on “market Islam,” particularly due to their role in seeking to shape the 
labor market.  As a case study of a Muslim charity association led by a preacher, this 
chapter offers fresh data on 'ulama who are not employers but engage in similar activities 
(cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, Keane 2007 on colonial missionaries). As M. Qasim 
Zaman astutely observed of 'ulama in South Asia in relation to their tradition, “Many 
[changes] are the paradoxical product of the ulama’s very effort to conserve their 
tradition in a changing world” (2002:187).  I argue that remaking Islamic tradition 
ironically occurs despite religious leaders' claims to be preserving an unchanging Islam. 
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Economic Problems as Spiritual Problems: Founding the Society for Divine Welfare 
The Society for Divine Welfare (Anjomān falāḥ-e Darain) is an Islamic charity 
organization located in the heart of Lucknow's Aminabad bazaar, with a mission to 
provide welfare for the needy residents of the bazaar, particular the unemployed, 
disabled, and widowed. The Society was founded in 1992 and by a Muslim preacher who 
is a graduate of the madrasa at Deoband, Maulana Jahangir. It is worth noting that all of 
the charity associations that I encountered in Lucknow, particularly the developmentalist-
minded ones, have been founded since the 1990s as well. Maulana Jahangir and his 
Society are identified closely with Muslim ritual life in the bazaar, being led by a 
madrasa-educated Muslim scholar and operating out of the tiny, back-alley mosque in 
which Maulana Jahangir leads prayers. The Society has developed a reputation as an 
identifiably “Muslim” organization, and in this way it is quite distinct from the Islamic 
charities that I profiled in chapter seven, which were run by businessmen.   Given the 
Muslim public’s general skepticism in the management capability of madrasa-educated 
scholars (justified by the fact that few receive much training in or exposure to 
management), the steady growth of Maulana Jahangir’s Islamic charity is somewhat 
contrary to expectations.   Whereas the businessmen of chapter seven applied their 
university-educated expertise, business acumen, and elite connections to driving growth 
of their organizations, the success of the Society is otherwise. In fact, I argue that the 
growth of the Society is precisely due to the fact that it is run by an Islamic scholar and 
preacher, not a businessman, who can skillfully incorporate Islam’s ethical teachings on 
the economy (particularly zakat) into a larger critique of economic disparity.  However, 
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this strategy came with risks, as well. The preacher faced competition for alms-donations 
from madrasas run by other ‘ulama. The Society in managing Muslims’ zakat must also 
walk a fine line between ensuring best practices in modern management, on one hand, 
and adhering to Islamic prescriptions on administering zakat, on the other. 
 Maulana Jahangir, now age 50, grew 
up in a Calcutta slum and attended madrasa 
from an early age, achieving the honor of 
becoming a memorizer of the Qur'an by 
adolescence. He received his training as a 
young man in the main campus of the 
madrasa at Deoband. Afterward, he traveled 
to Lucknow to continue research on Sunni-
Shi’a sectarianism, studying in the Shaukat 
Ali madrasa in Chowk bazaar, one of a 
number of Lucknow madrasas associated 
with the cosmopolitan scholarly lineage of 
the 'ulama of Firangi Mahal (Robinson 2001).  Along with research, he also taught youth 
in the madrasa (similar to a post-doctoral fellow in a university).  His scholarly 
credentials in madrasa education are thus impeccable, even though he never attended a 
secular secondary school or university.  
Around 1990, however, a disagreement erupted between him and the head of the 
madrasa.   The head of the madrasa had instituted an initiative for Lucknow’s Sunni 
Figure 17: Maulana Jahangir giving the 
sermon at Friday prayers 
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Muslims to stage raucous celebratory processions for the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, 
akin to the processions (jaloos) held by Shi'a Muslims in Lucknow since the colonial 
era.135 The head of Shaukat Ali madrasa sent his teachers out to fundraise among 
Lucknow Muslims for these processions.  “I don’t believe that [the Prophet’s Birthday] 
should be celebrated with a procession, and I refused [to fundraise],” Maulana Jahangir 
related to me, “so [the head of the madrasa] asked me to leave.”  Recognizing the 
Prophet’s birthday with any celebrations or extravagance beyond a lecture is considered 
an unorthodox practice by the reformists of Deoband, even though it is common among 
India’s Muslims.  Moreover, religious processions have long functioned in India as an 
occasional political strategy for local leaders to fan animosity between Muslims and 
Hindus (Hansen 1999, Brass 2003) or between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims (Freitag 1989: 
142; Cole 1988: 93; Jones 2011).   This procession initiative of the early 1990s similarly 
came at a time when Hindu right-wing activists were staging public demonstrations for 
militant Hindu causes, culminating in activists’ destruction of a Muslim mosque in 
Ayodhya 50 kilometers from Lucknow (Varshney 2002: L2164-L2248).  
Maulana Jahangir described those years as a period of “awakening” (bidari) for 
India’s Muslims – some religious leaders responded with public assertions of religiosity, 
such as street processions, while a few others like Maulana Jahangir engaged in welfare 
work.  Whatever his various motives, Maulana Jahangir ultimately emphasized that he 
believed that religious fundraising could be much better utilized to assist Lucknow's 
                                                 
135 Justin Jones (2011) cataloged the emergence of jaloos and other public rituals of Moharram 
among the Shi'a sect of Lucknow Muslims during the colonial era, as part of a Shi'a revival 
directed to a large degree within the Muslim community, as assertion of upper-class Muslim 
identity as well as Shi'a distinctiveness against the Sunni majority.  
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swelling ranks of urban migrants (on socioeconomic history of Lucknow, see Mukerjee & 
Singh 1961; Verniers 2012).  As a result of his stance, he left his teaching post to go and 
found the Society for Divine Welfare in the heart of old city Lucknow’s Aminabad bazaar 
in 1992. 
I myself observed that Maulana Jahangir, a staunch Sunni, occasionally 
collaborated with Shi’a organizations and was highly respected by Hindus in the 
neighborhood and I suspect that his aversion to religious sectarianism also led to his 
decision.  A Hindu friend of mine in Aminabad told me that, even among her circles in 
the neighborhood, Maulana Jahangir was highly respected. Hindus and Christians alike 
would occasionally seek him out because of what she described as his “spiritual [dīnī]” 
character, his worldly life “experience [tajrubah],” and his “learning [parai].”  For 
instance, I also observed two Hindu men who approached him for insight on a vexing 
problem related to sexual misconduct between a wife and her brother-in-law in their joint 
household. 
The Muslim public is often skeptical of the management capabilities of madrasa-
educated scholars like Maulana Jahangir, especially in administering the relatively large 
flows of funding needed for a charity organization. But he based his early appeals for 
support upon slightly different grounds. Once he became the preacher (imām) of a local 
mosque in the Aminabad bazaar of Lucknow in 1988, he began preaching intensively 
about societal issues, especially the baleful effects of growing poverty in the old city 
neighborhoods.  Utilizing his authority as a preacher, he spent five years raising 
awareness of social ills, before formally announcing his intention to start a welfare 
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organization.  He spoke on economic issues as if they went hand-in-hand with religious 
issues, leveraging his moral authority as a preacher to garner support for eventually 
founding his charity organization. In particular, the status of zakat as a ritual practice in 
Islam, as well as a means of charitable fundraising, provided facile means for the 
preacher to establish credibility as a societal critic and social worker.  By preaching the 
religious obligation of zakat while simultaneously highlighting the obvious wealth 
disparities in the city, Maulana Jahangir in those early years articulated the economic 
needs of the Muslim community as – in fact – religious failings.  
For example, he described the widespread poverty in the urban neighborhoods of 
Aminabad bazaar in Lucknow as his initial impetus for starting a charity organization to 
collect and distribute Muslims’ zakat:  
Since I came to Lucknow, I’ve seen that there are many rich, and many poor…and 
so few in between…So that’s why I started this work [collecting and distributing 
charity], to make sure that something from these [rich] people is given to those 
[poor] people. 
 
In response, Maulana Jahangir gave 
sermons on the importance of Islamic 
almsgiving and its centrality in Islam.   His 
sermons often address all Muslims as 
potential donors (even the poor) to highlight 
the universal nature of this obligation. At 
one Friday prayer he thundered, “It doesn't 
matter how much you give! Even if it's only 
 
 The Issue of Alms ('masa'el-e zakāt') 
“For the glory of Allah, alms are obligated on 
every sane adult, man and woman. In the Qur'an, 
there are strict warnings for those who do not pay 
alms. Allah declared: 
'Oh Prophet! Whoever has gathered and kept 
gold and silver and does not keep the 
obligation of alms, explain this vision of 
painful torment to them:  Their gold and silver 
[heated and] glowing red-hot will [be used to] 
burn that sinner on all sides, front and back.' 
(Qur'an) 
 
Figure 18: Quotation from the pamphlet 
of the Society for Divine Welfare, 
translated from Urdu 
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two rupees, give charity (sadaqah)! Give sadaqah!,” and without even mentioning to 
whom the charity goes, he moved on to discuss the multiplication of rewards in Heaven 
when Muslims give on holy days such as in the month of Ramadan.  He also wrote 
pamphlets introducing zakat and distributed them to the public from a storefront in the 
bazaar, which could be considered an indirect fundraising strategy. For example, one 
recent pamphlet presented upfront a definition of zakat, in which the central subject is the 
obligation of alms upon all Muslims of sufficient means and the dire punishments for 
avoiding it (see Figure 18).   
 His sermons aimed to revive and encourage Islamic almsgiving among the 
increasingly upwardly mobile Indian Muslim middle-class, and he used to give guest 
sermons in mosques around the city.  After two decades of successful preaching and 
fundraising, however, many Muslims around Lucknow had heard his message, obviating 
the need for him to preach economics from the pulpit as often as before.  Most of his 
donors now sought him out, dropping by his mosque to give their annual alms.  But I 
nevertheless regularly heard in private conversation express his view that Muslim donors 
in Lucknow in general were lax in their religious obligation to give.  As he said of the 
Pew Center study, “In India, everyone prays but no one gives zakat. Here, we have very 
stingy almsgivers! [yahan, bahut kanjūs sāḥib-e niṣāb hain!]”  References to almsgiving 
also still peppered his sermons.  For example, in one weekly sermon on honoring one’s 
parents he mentioned, “You all must be giving your zakat” (āp zakat dete hoenge), as 
parents must have taught.  I also heard him preach about zakat twice during Ramadan and 
at least three other times during the year.   
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More specifically, Maulana Jahangir believed that the system of zakat as a whole 
was not quite effective at multiple levels and needed reviving.  Even if individual 
Muslims were meeting their personal ritual obligation, the distribution of zakat, selection 
of the best recipients, and how they utilized the alms-gifts were all significant concerns 
for Maulana Jahangir and his Society. “People here [in Aminabad] were so uneducated. 
They knew little of religion (dīn) and little of the world (duniyā),” he told me, 
communicating his perspective in those early years.  He continued: 
[The poorer people] had no ability to “stand,” no businesses, no way to educate 
their children. I began giving sermons, explaining how people need “skills.”  
Make an income! Educate your kids!  This is your responsibility (zimmedāri)! I 
kept giving sermons for five years, so that I could form their minds (tā keh zeḥn 
bane).  
 
Being employed was a crucial component of also being a good Muslim, in Maulana 
Jahangir’s view.  Referencing scriptures, he continued to expand upon his viewpoint that 
such means of economic stability went hand-in-hand with spiritual development and 
salvation: 
In a hadith, the Prophet said, ‘After faith and prayer, the next obligation is 
earning income in a halal way [īmān aur namāz ke ba’d, ḥalāl kamānā farẓ 
hai] ...So, the purpose of zakat is for the poor to stand up on their own. Do 
you see?...Otherwise some of them go to Hell 
 
This hadith was an oft-repeated favorite of his, a metonym for his theological perspective 
on charity.  When I once asked him why his organization places so much emphasis on 
employment, he replied, “If a Muslim's stomach is empty, he won't be able to worship!,” 
in further explanation of this viewpoint.  This of course is not literally true during the 
many Muslim days of fasting. But "not being able to worship on an empty stomach" 
instead points to his idea of poverty as a possible cause of impiety. He went on to 
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elaborate the variety of social ills that fester in the absence of a halal income: begging, 
dependency on others; lying, cheating, and thievery to make ends meet; broken homes 
and a cycle of economic poverty and spiritual impoverishment inherited by the next 
generation. “If your income is not halal, then your prayer is also not accepted [even if you 
pray regularly],” he said, giving another example of how Islamic ethical injunctions are 
not restricted to ritual practice alone.  
Competition in the Zakat Economy 
In the early years of the Society’s founding, Maulana Jahangir took particular care 
to cultivate numerous ties to bazaar traders and local businessmen.  He gave guest 
sermons at mosques around Lucknow. He consistently has presented the main mission of 
his charity as “business development,” or increasing means for livelihoods (rozi-roti) and 
employment (rozah-gar). He is not - nor has he ever been - a businessman, yet the 
ideological thrust of his organizational mission overlaps with the values of the bazaar-
based Muslims that have become his patrons over the years.  His appeals met with 
positive results, and the Society’s budget has increased each year.  In 1992, he recalled 
that he raised and distributed 46,000 rupees ($770; equivalent to $1,280 in 2014 
currency).  In 2012, the annual budget of the Society was roughly 175,000 rupees (nearly 
$30,000). This budget is notably larger than each of the three businessmen-led 
organizations profiled in chapter seven.   
The Islamic charitable sector, while much less lucrative than the financial gains 
made by Muslim politicians or businessmen, is nevertheless a site of intense competition 
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at times.  Madrasas since the 1800s have dominated the alms-collection market in north 
India.  Until recently, other Muslim organizations did not compete much with madrasas, 
generally being founded instead by a sole benefactor or by a princely ruler, often through 
waqf.  In the past two decades, however, new Islamic charities have cropped up in 
Lucknow that also fundraise among individual citizens, such as Maulana Jahangir’s 
Society.  His fundraising successes, however, also created friction between his Society 
and other ‘ulama and madrasas in Lucknow – particularly the madrasa for which he 
earlier refused to fundraise.  He attributes their animosity to the competition his Society 
posed, as his fundraising cut into the traditional financial support for local madrasas.  
Some neighborhood religious leaders even had contacts within urban gangs, and a few 
tried to intimidate the fledgling charity workers. “The first five years were the toughest 
years of this Society,” he said to me in one of our many conversations, “other madrasas 
didn’t want us fundraising (chandah lene) in these neighborhoods and I would get threats 
to stop my [charity] work…’You put an end to this work, or we’ll put an end to you’ they 
said.”  In the early 1990s, Maulana Jahangir was even targeted once by gunmen.  As he 
told me the story, one afternoon: 
I was on my way to give a speech [at a mosque near] Medical College in Chowk, 
and as soon as I came out of [my] mosque, there was ‘firing’ [gunshots].  Allah 
must have saved me!  I didn’t get injured at all. They just shot out some of the 
windows [of the mosque] and rode away on a motorcycle.  That only happened 
once. 
 
Around the same time as this attack, the head of the Shaukat Ali madrasa, his old 
employer, also filed a court case against Maulana Jahangir, in which Jahangir was 
accused of not having been officially appointed the preacher of his mosque and living 
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there illegally. The case was dropped after three years, however.  I interviewed one of 
Maulana Jahangir’s early supporters to gain an understanding of how the tide turned in 
his favor.  
My family started going to his house often. Met with others on his behalf. His 
opponents began to see that he had high-profile supporters like us, so they backed 
off.  They had thought that because he was from [Calcutta] and without local 
support, that they could intimidate him. To stop the charity [baytul māl].  My 
father was an army officer who knew the police, and he helped convince them to 
drop the court case. 
 
Like this patron whom I interviewed, and the Society counted many other influential 
individuals among its long-term donors.136  He, along with his early supporters, 
approached urban youth organizations in Lucknow, such as the Sunni Youth Federation, 
who were known for social activism and electoral organizing, and their statements helped 
the Society gain widespread popular support. The rivalry soon died down.  Maulana 
Jahangir has not received threats since those early years.   
 My point in relating the early tribulations of this Islamic charity organization is to 
emphasize that while almsgiving is a ritual obligation in Islam, it also is generative of a 
“zakat economy,” which is at times a market for intense competition in addition to its 
welfare functions.  Competition is made all the more stark by the increasing perception 
among the Muslim publics that madrasa education is simply not as effective in providing 
Muslims with job skills or other knowledge relevant to these times, and some donors seek 
new avenues for their donations, particular zakat.  An organization such as the Society, 
which emphasizes employment and job creation among poor Muslims, has become an 
                                                 
136   Influential donors that I interviewed or knew of included: an editor of the major Sahara Urdu 
newspaper, a member of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, and many owners of 
successful wholesale distributers in the bazaar.   
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attractive option for many Muslim middle-class donors – whether they are bazaar traders, 
self-made entrepreneurs, or university-educated professionals.  Yet madrasas still attract 
the majority of alms donations. In my interviews with over fifty donors in Lucknow, 
nearly all still gave a portion of their zakat to madrasas; most donors gave primarily to 
madrasas, after giving to needy neighbors and relatives. 
Islamic Revivalism in India: Piety and Economic Development  
 As recent entrants into the zakat economy, new Islamic charities represent a shift 
in the historical arc of Islamic scriptural revival movements in India.  While revivalists 
once focused on individual piety, new Islamic charities incorporate a focus on 
socioeconomics.  Maulana Jahangir and his Society for Divine Welfare are a particularly 
illustrative example of the continued evolution of Islamic reformist thinking in India.  
Maulana Jahangir is a graduate of Deoband and his sermons also illustrate the reformist 
preoccupation of Deobandi ‘ulama with ritual practices of individuals, the importance of 
obtaining “correct” Islamic knowledge from scriptures, and the rootedness of all worldly 
problems in “moral corruption” and spiritual life.  As quoted above, Lucknow Muslims 
who “know little of religion” are a real concern for this preacher.  In his own mosque, he 
regularly preached on the rewards of prayer, fasting, and ritual sacrifice when I attended 
weekly congregational prayers.  For example, “when you repeat Allah’s name in 
remembrance (zikr) after prayers, make sure to pronounce every syllable clearly,” was the 
theme of a sermon I heard him teach during a guest lecture at another mosque.  
Furthermore, his opposition to Sufi practices, such as the celebration of the Prophet’s 
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birthday, is clear evidence of his reformist orientation.   
However, his charity activities and the sermons he made to promote them also are 
evidence that his efforts to reform the Muslim community in Lucknow by and large 
constitute an economic intervention.  He consistently frames issues in religious terms, 
bolstering his credibility as a social worker with his authority as a preacher – yet 
especially when he invokes zakat and other economic teachings of Islam, the stark 
difference of Maulana Jahangir’s approach from the earlier strategies of 19th and 20th 
century pietistic Islamic revivalists can be more clearly seen in the ethnographic details 
of its operation, which are the focus of the next section.   The preacher shares many of the 
same concerns as many other ‘ulama educated at Deoband.  But Maulana Jahangir’s 
sermons related to Islamic charity are not only for the sake of impressing upon Muslims 
“correct” Islamic beliefs and their scriptural origins, nor for the mere betterment of 
Muslims’ own souls (although that is also a motive, when he links material poverty and 
moral turpitude). Maulana Jahangir’s charitable Society operates according to a 
framework within which employment leads to income-generation for local Muslim 
families, which in turn leads to the education and advancement of this and future 
generations of Indian Muslims.  As such, the Society is making a very different sort of 
contribution to the old city bazaar of Lucknow than the madrasas run by other Deobandi 
‘ulama, despite the fact that they all share the same goal of reversing the perceived 
societal decline of Muslims in India.  
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The Gift of Work Ethic: Distributing Islamic Charity 
Like the developmentalist charities profiled in chapter seven, the Society had 
some features that distinguished it from more traditional charity distributions such as the 
delivery of meat to the poor on ‘Eid al-Adha or individuals’ almsgiving.  These included: 
application forms required for beneficiaries to receive charity, a survey of the recipients' 
household to verify their poverty, a sectoral focus in charity distribution (i.e. business-
development), controlling the mode of distributed alms (i.e. rickshaws for income-
generation versus traditionally given grain staples or cash), and sermons to inculcate 
proper work ethic in recipients. The overall result of the developmentalist ethic is to focus 
attention on the recipient of Islamic charity and the life of the gift after it is given.  In this 
case study, however, let us zoom in the ethnographic lens to bring into focus two of these 
practices in the charity distribution event: the mode of alms distributed and moral 
teaching through sermons. 
The following detail is drawn specifically from one activity held about three or 
four times a year by the Society: a charity distribution event.  A typical charity 
distribution event of the Society is orchestrated as a small ceremonial performance in the 
empty storeroom rented by Maulana Jahangir, adjacent to a vacant lot where neighbors' 
goats graze. The central activity involves the Maulana calling deserving recipients and 
handing over the charitable donations to them one by one, in front of a small audience 
composed of beneficiaries and a few local dignitaries and donors. I attended two 
distribution events in October 2012 and February 2013 and interviewed association 
donors and community members to ascertain representative elements across these regular 
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events. 
The October 2012 distribution event began promptly at 2:30pm, notably on-time, 
giving an overall tone of professionalism and organized discipline to the event, a tone 
absent from raucous charity distributions that occurred during traditional festivals.  
Maulana Jahangir began speaking immediately after a Qur'anic reading. He began his 
sermon with a theme typical of Islamic reformists in India: the decline of the Muslim 
community. 
Muslims ruled over the other communities [qawm; meaning, Hindus, Buddhists, 
etc.] in this country for 800 years. But today it is our community that is the 
victim. 
 
Early on in his sermon, he also referenced government statistics on Muslim poverty:  
We have responsibilities [zimmedāri] for the whole community.  We need to wake 
up [bidari hona chāhiye] to these responsibilities.   
 
Hey Muslims! Are you sleeping?! Today, our condition has gotten so precarious 
[khatarnāk], so bad, so much so that the Hindustani government itself even 
reported that 70% of Muslims are uneducated [jāhil] and impoverished...What 
poverty is ours is also yours.  Even if we’re living in poverty, we should help our 
sisters.  The  Prophet instructed [in a hadith], ‘Believers [mu’minīn], eat one half 
of your bread [roti] and give the other half to someone else.’  ‘No one is too poor 
to give to another. You cannot be a true [pakkā] Muslim if your neighbor has an 
empty stomach! 
 
He thus began by framing his project as one addressing a community-wide problem – 
when some Muslims are impoverished or uneducated, it brings down the entire 
community.  However, Maulana Jahangir exhorted the audience to recognize that the 
solution is also society-wide and economic, in contrast to Islamic reformists in piety 
movements that sought to reform society by reforming the moral corruption and un-
Islamic practices of individuals.   
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Note how this project of moral reform also 
views individuals as the primary actors, even as 
the overall aim of the Society is to make a 
socioeconomic intervention.  Correct Islamic 
practice is not only a matter of executing correct 
ritual prayer and fasting. Rather, as the preacher 
forcefully reminded the audience, being a “true” 
(pakka) Muslim also entails interpersonal financial 
responsibilities and mutual aid for others.137  
Transparency, Accountability, and Moral 
Persuasion  
About a dozen donors and guests 
(including myself) sat in the audience listening to 
the sermon, as well. We were invited by the Society to witness the transfer of donations 
to the beneficiaries (see Figure 19: three guests are seated just to the right of the preacher, 
as current or potential future donors; note also the pyramids of packaged currency notes 
stacked in front of the preacher).  Their presence was reflective of how a certain level of 
transparency was critical to the popularity of the Society. Most Muslim givers in 
Lucknow lack faith in the ability of charity associations to operate cleanly until they see 
                                                 
137   Given that the audience was composed of beneficiaries of charity as well as donors and potential 
future donors, his emphasis on the obligation of almsgiving in Islam serves two functions. First, 
reminding Muslims of their obligation to give alms (“even if we’re living in poverty”) is a sort of 
fundraising appeal and an inducement to maintain flow of transactions the charity economy.  But 
emphasizing the obligatoryness of alms upon the donor also serves to reduce the connotation of 
beneficent largesse that accompanies voluntary charity and can potentially shame the recipient. 
Figure 19: Opening sermon of the 
charity distribution event.  
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it with their own eyes. Invited guests might constitute future donors, or were merely local 
dignitaries who would spread the word and vouch for the trustworthiness of the Society.  
Maulana Jahangir told me he had learned over the years that his Society could not 
function as a professionally managed charity without such transparency.  His donors also 
confided as much to me in interviews, saying that they supported the Society because 
they trusted it to deliver their zakat and other charitable donations honestly – a few had 
also gone to the charity distribution event to see it with their own eyes, while (most) other 
donors I spoke with said they would not attend a public distribution event.   
Application forms were required for all would-be recipients, which were then 
followed up with a household investigation (janch or “survey” in Urdu) to visibly verify 
their neediness.  At least one respected person was also required to vouch for a potential 
recipient and sign their form.  Local Muslims who were deemed as sufficiently needy 
were selected to receive aid,138 specifically (and more importantly) those who were able 
and willing to apply the welfare aid towards placing themselves in a stable occupation.  
For example, the Society turned away drunks (sharābī) and others who were likely to not 
spend the aid as intended, as I observed in one encounter with an obviously inebriated 
man while Maulana Jahangir sat collecting donations during Ramadan: 
Man:   Can you give me some aid [emdad] too? 
Jahangir:  Let’s talk later, after Eid.  You didn’t get a good “report.”  That’s 
why I didn’t give you a “application form.”  [The man protested.] 
Look, I have to consider what Allah wants and I have to answer to 
Allah.  
                                                 
138    Like the Scholarship Foundation and other new Islamic charities, Maulana Jahangir had not 
established a precise threshold for defining “sufficiently needy” recipients.  However, in 
discussions with him and other volunteers, I gathered that the families receiving aid all made less 
than about 4,000 rupees per month.   
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Maulana Jahangir continued to defer the man’s request, repeating himself multiple times 
until he left. He then turned to me, “We never give to drinkers (pīnewāle). It will ruin our 
organization. He’ll just drink it away, so I just tell him ‘Let’s talk later.’ I have to answer 
to Allah.”  His mention that “it will ruin our organization” illustrated his constant 
awareness of donor pressures on the Society to operate with a sense of transparency and 
integrity.  Moreover, his reminders about “answering to Allah” affirmed his awareness 
that the zakat he administered entailed certain prohibitions against misuse in Islamic 
jurisprudence, above and beyond his obligations to donors.  Transparency practices were 
thus motivated for both financial and spiritual reasons. 
The public nature of the event, for ostensible purposes of transparency, however, 
had a great impact upon the recipients of aid.  The Society required embodied 
performances by the beneficiaries, which served to socially define their poverty as visible 
– and them as visibly “needy” 
subjects. The recipients were 
expected to wait until called by 
name, present themselves in front of 
the audience's gaze, and sign their 
name for the amount of their 
recorded charitable disbursement. 
Then, they consentingly froze for a 
photograph. Notably, the ritual anonymity usually associated with Islamic almsgiving 
was reversed by these embodied performances of the recipients intended to instill a sense 
Figure 20: Seller cart gifted in the distribution 
event along with its warranty being presented to 
a recipient 
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of accountability.  
Such professionalized and organizationally “clean” procedures of transparency 
demanded by developmentalist-minded Muslims were of great consequence to forming 
recipients' moral subjectivities – both subjectivities as “Muslims” and as “laborers.”  The 
semi-public nature of the event ensured that recipients felt watched, even if only by a 
dozen other locals.  The sermon identified ethical traits that Maulana Jahangir (and 
presumably, other local leaders) expected the beneficiaries to inculcate.  These ethical 
traits were contained in certain social identities mentioned in the sermon:  hard-working 
laborer, responsible parent, pakka Muslim, trustworthy Muslim, and so forth.  Moreover, 
these traits of ethical selves were not merely rhetorically encouraged, but the action of 
calling each recipient, by name, to the front of an audience of local observers from the 
community served to further affix the social identities to the individual recipient who 
performatively enacted their acceptance of the charity donations (and the expectations 
accompanying them).  
Each item to be donated was an instrument of self-employment. Sewing 
machines, pushcarts for street selling, cycle rickshaws, and a milk-steamer for chai tea 
stalls were cluttering the room. Each was marked with the words "The Society for Divine 
Welfare" (“Anjoman Falah-e Darain”) hand-painted in cursive Urdu (see Figures 20 and 
21). The items were all hand-made or assembled in the local bazaar. The Society had 
acquired them after soliciting quotes from local businesses. Each item came with a 
warranty negotiated with each seller by the Maulana, to provide lifetime repairs when 
beneficiaries presented their receipt from the Society, which named them as the owner. 
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The Maulana emphasized the warranty in his speech. Sturdily made, the solid iron body 
of the sewing machine and rough-hewn wood of the pushcarts declaimed their 
practicality, durability, and ease of repair. Each item was accompanied by a stack of rupee 
notes, for purchasing raw materials such as cloth or tea ingredients, intended as the start-
up grant for the recipients’ entrepreneurial activities.  
All these elements combined - 
the Society's moniker, warranty, 
durability - conveyed the Maulana's 
ultimate intention that incentives for re-
sale be mitigated as much as possible. 
His concern was real. Barter thrived in 
the Old City bazaar and even trash was 
traded daily for a handsome price. The speeches he made during distribution events 
covered other themes, but his sermons addressed his concern that beneficiaries see the 
charitable donations not only as a free gift, but also as a means of self-employment. He 
articulated this in a lengthy appeal at the end of his speech: 
I'm on my knees asking you not to misuse these machines...not to sell them. If 
you're not using it, find another poor woman. Give it to your poor Muslim sister, 
she at least will make some money...A few years back we spent 8-9,000 rupees 
[each] on rickshaws for these regular mosque-goers [namazi], for Hajjis. I won't 
say their names. They were poor. …After a month of driving it, one guy sold his 
8,000 rupee rickshaw for 2,100 rupees! After only a month! And mosque-goers! 
Hajjis!… 
  
These are loans entrusted to you from Allah! [yeh Allah ke amanat hai!]. Not a 
grant [jagir nahin]…We want you to treat it as Allah’s loan [amanat] that your 
taking, not something that – for example – if your child gets a fever or a cough, 
you’d sell it for eight or nine thousand rupees!... 
Figure 21: Sewing machine for the charity 
distribution 
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The word amanat literally means “trust” and implies multiple meanings: a security-
deposit, an object given in trust, or a financial guarantee.  Here, the contrast is of course 
with a “free gift” or “grant” (jagir).  The preacher is making a direct reference to the 
well-known Islamic teaching that “all wealth belongs to Allah,” a maxim often connected 
with zakat.  Sermons and Islamic manuals (e.g. Nadwi n.d.: 5) regularly reference this 
notion as inducement to Muslims to give their wealth in charity, as in zakat, in 
recognition of the principle that humans never own wealth but merely hold it in trust (as 
amanat) by the grace of God.  However, in this sermon, the preacher is highlighting the 
notion of amanat as inducement for recipients of charity to act responsibly.  He went on 
to elaborate: 
If you sell it, what answer would you give to God? ...You're promising me that 
you won't sell it. And if you're lying, and you sell this, that means that you are 
betraying Allah. I won't be able to hold you accountable. You're taking up this 
loan [from Allah]. This [alms] is your right. I won't be able to expect any favor 
[ehsan] from you. However, it's important to note the purpose (maqṣad) with 
which this was given to you. Use it as it was intended.”  
 
With this warning of divine omniscience, Maulana Jahangir concluded his appeal for the 
beneficiaries to take an oath against re-sale, as a sort of condition of receiving them. The 
maulana was requesting the audience to adopt his perception of these donations as 
instruments of self-employment rather than see them for their inherent value in the barter 
economy of Old City bazaar.  The maulana's attempts to forestall the re-sale of the 
distributed items, however, also seemed to contradict an idea of the donations as freely 
and unconditionally given. Note his statement that, “This [alms] is your right.”  Islamic 
scholarship holds that zakat is the right of the poor and full transfer of ownership must 
take place for transactions defined as proper zakat (Qur'an 70:19-25 and 30:38; al-Hidaya 
  348
2009:291), a popular view among many other zakat donors in Aminabad bazaar. While 
the right of those in need to receive charitable aid unconditionally was well-established 
ruling in Islamic jurisprudence, his sermon simultaneously implored and cajoled 
recipients to agree (under oath) to the conditions upon these donations.  
 In private conversation, I pressed Maulana Jahangir, asking if his extraction of a 
promise to not re-sell the objects does not, in fact, contravene Islamic teachings on zakat 
as the right of the poor and he explained, “Look, the donations are still the recipients' 
once they are in their hands. I cannot actually prevent then selling anything, nor would I.” 
His answer constitutes a pragmatic resolution of this apparent conflict, in which 
ownership of the donations is indeed transferred to recipients, but I would argue against a 
view of his sermonizing as mere empty words. On one hand, his assertion was a correct 
(in my view) statement of the fact that his association's practices were not contravening 
Islamic jurisprudence as himself and most Lucknow 'ulama understand it. On the other 
hand, he did not admit the influence of his position as a religious leader or that of the 
divine sanction he invoked. The framing of the donations as means of employment (rather 
than a free gift) constituted a powerful sanction upon the poor Muslim beneficiaries.  
First, as Marcel Mauss (1960) famously observed, the giving of a gift instills in the 
recipient a sense of “indebtedness,” which Maulana Jahangir implicitly invoked when he 
asked of them (in return) only that recipients “use it as it was intended.”  Second, the 
sermon's prohibition against re-sale was accompanied by a litany of the “responsibilities” 
of a good (pakka), honest Muslim. Not only are they owners of new property, but this 
property originated as zakat, which the Qur’an states are the symbolic dues of wealth to 
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Allah, as repeated during the sermon. The maulana invoked such a notion of omniscient, 
omnipresent divine supervision intentionally, knowing full well that in the absence of 
material means of enforcement the recipients largely would have to regulate themselves. 
Such beliefs underpin an “audit society” increasingly important within societies bereft of 
traditional forms of solidarity and atomized by forces of industrialization and 
urbanization (Power 1997).  Yet in this case it is a spiritual audit society, in which 
sporadic sanction (such as when locals did uncover and circulate gossip about misuse of 
charity) combined with powerfully active beliefs about divine supervision serves to 
condition recipients' subjectivities as self-managing Muslims. Though disciplining the 
audience as subjects with new responsibilities for self-governance, this spiritual reform 
also represents the hope for new forms of moral society despite the liberalizing and 
atomizing tendencies of urban India. New social identities (replete with responsibilities) 
are being publically ascribed to the beneficiaries, through the discursive force of the 
sermon.  These new social identities constitute “gifts” of their own parceled along with 
the alms.  Beneficiaries are now publically recognized as Muslims and expected to be 
“true (pakka) Muslims.” As such, they are expected to behave in such appropriate ways: 
as a Muslim entrusted with material wealth given by other Muslims, as a potential self-
employed entrepreneur, and as a potential breadwinner in the family and contributing 
laborer in the community.  Yet, in aiming to re-make beneficiaries as effective laborers in 
the bazaar, the Society also sought to inculcate virtues of integrity, personal 
responsibility, and accountability (to the community and to Allah) that were embedded in 
a broader public ethic that would reform the Indian Muslim community at large. 
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 Supporters of the Society, in defense of transparency measures such as these, 
pointed to the rampant misuse of charity funds and perceived laziness of recipients, in 
justifying these safeguards against re-sale – for the recipients' own good. According to 
these proponents of the developmentalist ethic zakat was a system with a redistributive 
function, not merely an obligation to Allah.  This system of zakat would suffer if it was 
not well-organized and if it allowed charity to be mis-used, at a time when the position of 
Muslims as a minority in India was already precarious. 
Working for Islamic Ethics & The Islamic Ethics of Work 
The sermon preached the importance of a proper work ethic, as well as framing 
the items not as free gifts but as means for employment.  His sermon aimed to forestall 
begging, effectively promoting institutionalized charity (such as his own) as the best form 
of welfare.  “Use these items to make money, so that you won’t go out in the streets with 
your hands outstretched [to beg],” he repeated more than once.  In other moments, 
Maulana Jahangir directly instructed the audience recipients to be hard-working. To one 
man who approached the front to receive his donations, for example, Maulana Jahangir 
wagged his finger while I overheard him instructing, "This money that we're giving you, 
use it and work hard. Don't spend it on the wrong things." He also shamed the audience 
with a story of a Chamar woman who worked her way out of poverty to educate her 
children. “If she can do it, so can you,” implicitly contrasting the Muslim community 
with India's dalits whose development is quickly making Indian Muslims into India's 
most disadvantaged group.  After appealing to their sense of shame, he also appealed 
conversely to their sense of ancestral and familial pride:  
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Think about your own lineage [nasl]. Think about how to improve the honor of 
your family. Your only responsibility is to your children, and their education. Try 
to educate them. If you do this, then God willing [in sha'Allah] you can spend 
your old age resting peacefully. 
 
In another negative example of those lacking self-discipline, the sermon dwelled briefly 
on local women who are “always chewing pan [betel-nut or tobacco snuff], giving 
yourselves cancer, making yourself into a tuberculosis patient.” He instructed women 
save their pan money and spend it instead on education for their children.  
This repetitive insistence on work ethic was the clearest theme of the event. The 
maulana combined direct exhortation, 
invocations of shame and pride in the community, 
and fear of punishment in the hereafter along 
with appeals to heed his own authority and the 
authority of Allah.  This combination of 
emotional appeals and scriptural quotations all 
ran together in one 15-minute speech.  His 
sermon was essentially an affective cocktail of 
rhetorical persuasion.  The emphasis on work 
ethic is certainly intentional, as well. I later 
interviewed Maulana Jahangir about his conducting of these distribution events. “All of 
our [Society's] work is important, but getting Muslims to stand on their own feet 
financially – this is the most important!” he explained. Although his Society for Divine 
Welfare runs diverse activities which also provide aid and education – offering pensions 
to the elderly and widows, financing medical care, teaching the Qur'an to the children of 
Figure 22: Maulana Jahangir 
speaking with a woman recipient as 
she "signs" for her donated item with 
a thumbprint 
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illiterate parents – he prioritizes business development and activities that prepare 
Muslims for long-term employment, through inculcating job skills. The business 
development activities consist of the distribution of machines for self-employment and 
have become the primary focus of the Society, comprising 60% of its budget. In the 2012 
annual report circulated to donors, for example, 132 of the 454 beneficiaries of the 
Society received business development aid.  Business development was often the first, 
and sometimes only, activity Maulana Jahangir described to others when I overheard him 
introducing the Society.  
It is also worth noting, that to some people in Lucknow other than myself, the 
charity distribution event had a patronizing air.  A prominent legal rights activist and 
feminist in Lucknow shared her view with me. As a secular feminist generally critical of 
Muslim clergy, she began with a critique of Maulana Jahangir's views on women, 
speaking in English, “Women are sitting covered in burqas, and men [who are donors] are 
'saving them' by giving them these sewing machines! I just don't like that.”  But, 
significantly, she also praised what she termed his “rights-based” approach that focused 
on business development, and was thus better than the mere handouts of other Muslim 
charities.  I actively sought out critics of the Society for Divine Welfare (as I did for all 
the organizations I volunteered with and profiled) during my eighteen months of 
fieldwork in Lucknow, and this woman’s feminist view was the only critique of the 
Society that I elicited.  Ultimately, it was in fact surprising that the Lucknow Muslims I 
spoke with otherwise had unequivocal approbation for the Society and its work, which 
they viewed as both reviving an important Islamic ritual of zakat and bolstering 
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socioeconomic opportunities for the Muslim community.   
Another critic leveled the accusation that, as a scheme for development, the 
objects of self-employment that the Society handed out may not always represent true 
social mobility.  Making a pun on the name of the Society for Divine Welfare, he 
exclaimed jokingly, “Get a handcart [thela]!? How can a handcart bring you “welfare” 
[falāḥ]? Can you ride it to the next world [akhirat]?!”  While not a formal, white-collar 
form of employment, the sort of membership in the enterprising classes of petite 
bourgeoisie was the best that many old city Muslims could manage.  Given the lack of 
actual comprehensive public welfare programs for these migrant laborers, zakat-funded 
self-employment through handcart street-selling was a desirable end.  The critic (a friend) 
moreover also harbored a grudging respect for Maulana Jahangir, I knew from his joke, 
because of the way the preacher flipped the traditional role of the ‘ulama in providing for 
ordinary Muslims’ “divine welfare” and sought to provide for their this-worldly welfare. 
 Moral Self-Fashioning for the Labor Market 
Social scientists have focused on the experiences of urban laborers and labor 
migrants in India (Gooptu 2001, van der Veer 2005), especially their relationship with 
politics and the state (Hansen 2001).  Applied researchers and development 
anthropologists seek to “evaluate” the impact of development.  The perspective taken in 
this chapter is different, in that I examine the social norms and forms that enable 
participation in Lucknow’s urban labor market. I am not arguing that the distribution 
event, or the Society’s sewing classes and other activities, actually turn the local residents 
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of Lucknow’s old bazaar into different types of laborers.  Rather, I focus attention on the 
intended effects of these activities and the ethical teachings along with which they are 
bundled.   
To anyone familiar with the broader welfare sector in 21st century India, these 
developmentalist activities are barely remarkable – in many ways they approach “best 
practices” of community NGOs across the contemporary world, packaged in concepts 
such as financial transparency, beneficiary education, record-keeping, and public 
relations.  However, Islamic jurisprudence has inscribed zakat within larger bodies of 
legal scholarship, especially guidelines for almsgiving as ritualized “financial worship” 
(‘ibadat; Benthall 1999) and rules for regulating economic transactions (mu’amalat).  
Thus, for many Muslims in Lucknow the introduction of zakat into a charity 
organization’s finances changes the game.  On one hand, the Society operates not unlike 
other Indian welfare organizations.  However, this simple read of the Society as an NGO 
which happens to work for Muslims misses a critical point: Maulana Jahangir and his 
Society are known to collect and distribute zakat, and thus they also are administering the 
performance of a ritual act central to Islam.  As such, this distribution is a performative 
act that partakes of the scriptural importance of zakat in Islam, and therefore is 
particularly powerful in inscribing certain Islamic ethical teachings (and not others) 
within the social milieu of Lucknow– and the Muslim community at large in India, 
perceived as in dire need of development.  The Society’s beneficiaries were not only 
being asked to adhere to a certain financial propriety as recipients of others’ material aid.   
They were asked to consider their responsibilities “in front of Allah” when accepting 
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zakat, as a “loan [amanat] from Allah.”  Moreover, Maulana Jahangir himself – as a 
madrasa-educated religious leader – provide a highly visible and credible authority on 
what being a “good Muslim” entails.  
The Aminabad bazaar of old city Lucknow is the site of market transactions, but 
alongside the market economy is a parallel charitable economy.  In this bazaar, wholesale 
distributors fill many storefronts, not only serving the local Lucknow shoppers but also 
traders from the region around the metropolis, thus accruing more wealth on average than 
a typical shopkeeper.  Wealthy business owners and shoppers alike habitually provide 
charitable handouts to the numerous mendicants plying Aminabad’s narrow streets.  
Traditional Islamic teachings reinforce such unconditional, mechanical charity, and from 
shopkeepers I heard oft-repeated sayings such as “Never turn a beggar away; at least give 
them something.”  Ritual food distribution by Muslims occurs at festivals such as the two 
Eid holidays and iftar dinners throughout the month of Ramadan.  Beggars gather outside 
mosques during the daily Muslim prayer times to receive offerings from worshipers.139  
The Society for Divine Welfare, however, is a very different sort of intervention in 
this charitable milieu, even though it lay within the same tradition of Islamic almsgiving.  
The Society did not distribute the Islamic charity it collected so informally and 
unconditionally. The Society’s activities did not merely redistribute some wealth from the 
rich to the poor in Lucknow; they also sought to re-orient local Muslims’ subjectivities 
and behaviors towards the perceived requirements of the contemporary market economy.  
                                                 
139   And the Muslim charitable activities happen alongside an even greater number of Hindu 
charitable distributions:  some temples distribute food weekly to the public and Hindu holidays 
are accompanied with ritual feasting and distributions as well.  
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While any needy person could successfully accrue charitable offerings from worshipers 
by sitting outside a mosque (as long as they were not obviously inebriated), the Society 
institutionalized practices of surveillance and record-keeping to determine which 
applicants might misuse or sell disbursed items, or drink away financial aid.  It is worth 
mentioning that the Society did not engage in practices of monitoring or follow-up, as 
other new Islamic charities did.  Nor did the Society institutionalize penalties for 
recipients who misused aid; such dishonest Muslims were merely never again made 
recipients of the charity and were publically shamed (as seen in Maulana Jahangir’s 
portion of the sermon devoted to the “Hajji” men locally who sold their rickshaws for 
cash).  However, this sermonizing and more implicit ethical teachings of the charity 
distribution event, I argue, functioned as cultural mechanisms for holding recipients 
accountable to divine authority and societal pressure – theorized in contemporary 
anthropological literature as technologies of the self (Foucault 2010; Rose 1999).  
In fact, such ethically rooted technologies of the self are at times more effective 
than “negative” regulatory measures that are characteristic of bureaucratized formalized 
power (Foucault 1979: 25).  Individuals subjecting themselves to moral codes for self-
governance “are not merely ‘free to choose’, but obliged to be free, to understand and 
enact their lives in terms of choice” (Rose 1999: 87, emphasis in original).  When 
Maulana Jahangir preached to the beneficiaries of his charity organization, “[receiving] 
this [alms] is your right,” he emphasized a sort of morality characteristic of neoliberal 
individualism in which it is up to the recipients to choose whether they will “betray 
Allah” or “use these items as they were intended.”  While preaching about the nature of 
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the welfare in form of start-up capital and tools for self-employment, the sermon framed 
the Society’s economic aid in terms of the being a “pakka Muslim” – shorthand for the 
ideal type of moral self to which the listeners were presumed to aspire.  
Beneficiaries were also the subjects of Maulana Jahangir’s efforts aimed at the 
moral reform of the whole Indian Muslim community.  Handing out zakat was also an 
occasion for handing down moral lessons on the virtues of being a “good (pakka) 
Muslim” for its own sake and the sake of the community. The sermon at the charity 
distribution event, while short in duration, framed two important modalities of ethical 
selfhood: an employed laborer and a good Muslim.  The idealized form of the “employed 
laborer” was constructed as a moral category, not merely a participant in the market 
economy of the bazaar, through phrases such as:  
We have responsibilities for the whole community… 
...We need to wake up to these responsibilities… 
...Think about how to improve the honor of your family…  
...Your only responsibility is to your children, and their education…  
...Use these items to make money, so that you won’t go out in the streets [to beg] 
 
Begging, in particular, is considered unethical and discouraged in Islam by all Lucknow's 
Muslims, including by alms-recipients themselves who spoke of avoiding the shame of 
asking for aid except in necessity. In reality, of course, begging is quite common in urban 
India, including Muslim areas, with the implication being that it is justified by necessity.  
I heard Maulana Jahangir preach against public begging as shameful, saying as well that 
financial dependency and sloth lead to sinful behaviors.  Thus, this category of an 
“employed worker” was represented as the moral norm despite the fact that historically 
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whole categories of urban Muslims in Lucknow have not worked to receive a steady 
income.140    
 Remarkably, the Sachar Committee Report contributed to this elision of standards 
of economic behavior into moral standards.  He began his sermon citing statistics that 
represented the Muslim community as a whole as one that is outside the norm by 
referencing government statistics, “the Hindustani government itself even reported that 
70% of Muslims are uneducated [jāhil] and impoverished.” 
His use of the word jahil, which I translated here as “uneducated,” is significant. 
It is an Urdu word loaned from the classical Arabic term in Islamic scriptures to describe 
the period of ignorance and polytheism (jāhil’iyyat) in Arabia before the coming of Islam, 
highlighting Islam as a faith that celebrates knowledge. It does not mean only “illiterate” 
(or at least there are other words for that). The word jahil is thus ambiguous, but this 
ambiguity serves his purpose. The substance of his claim is not that 70% of Muslims are 
spiritually jahil, ignorant of their religion, or else he would not cite the government report 
on education and socioeconomics.141 But his use of jahil to refer to the lack of secular 
education and unemployment aids in constructing an ethical and Islamic category out of 
socioeconomic data on labor and schooling.  To verify, I later asked him why he feels that 
the government-reported illiteracy of Muslims is a source of “shame” (another theme of 
                                                 
140   Many women of status stayed at home according to purdah (veiling) traditions (Wilkinson-
Weber 1999). Many men and families in general received pensions (wasil, wazifah) from the 
Mughal courts or from British, on account of their social standing or political importance (Shahrar 
2001, Joshi 2001). 
141   His use of Hindustani is not a surprise, but neither is it the inevitable word choice. He could 
have said “Indian” government, (using the English word) leaving out the reference to “Hindu,” or 
left it unspecified as “the government” (sakari) report. His choice adds polemical edge to his 
critique: even the Hindu-majority government is concerned enough about impoverished Muslims 
to launch statistical efforts, while many Muslims remain indifferent. 
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his speech). He looked almost surprised, and explained – as if it was obvious – that 
without a basic level of education, how will Muslims further study the Quran and hadith, 
the scriptural roots of their faith.  I interrogated further:  weren't Muslims in the first days 
of Islam (including the Prophet Mohammad himself) up through today's pious rural 
Muslim villagers “illiterate” (parhe-likhe nahin)? Surely Jahangir can't fault the Prophet 
and illiterate companions as spiritually deficient (jahil) Muslims? He agreed, but also 
mentioned modern Muslims’ increasing use of mobile phones to access hadith and 
religious knowledge. The maulana believed that new opportunities for being Islamically 
literate exist in contemporary times and that, in his view, Muslims have a religious 
responsibility to pursue this knowledge to the fullest extent (cf. Eickelman & Anderson 
1999). This is a sort of Islamic revivalism which prizes the attainment of a baseline of 
success in modernity as a precondition of Islamic piety, where material and spiritual 
success go hand in hand, and being the best Muslim is predicated on being modern (Deeb 
2006).  Maulana Jahangir’s critique of Muslims and their relative decline does not depend 
on citing this government report. Yet I argue that it is precisely Maulana Jahangir’s 
decision to frame his moralizing sermon using the government’s statistical perspective, 
when he could have made the same speech without it, which highlights his sermon’s 
construction of “employment” as a moral norm as well as an economic category. This 
sermon thus echoed the larger discourse among Lucknow's developmentalist Muslims 
that the crisis facing their community is at once economic and moral – as is the solution.  
 Jahangir's re-working of the government's statistical report into a moral yardstick 
illustrated how the exercise of biopolitics in India is influencing the activism of Islamic 
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reformists. The colonial-era “crisis” that India's revivalists sought to address was 
preceded by the fall of the Mughal rulers (Metcalf 1982, Sikand 2005) and the caliph in 
Istanbul (Minault 1985, Qureshi 1999).  Today's crisis facing the Muslim community has 
been galvanized by aggregated data on “the Muslim community” as an entire population 
never before represented statistically in such comprehensiveness, portrayed as below the 
“norm.”  While Lucknow's Muslims rarely attended to other government economic data, 
the Sachar Report had pervaded even religious sermons.  As Foucualt wrote, the 
“normal” becomes “the prescriptive” in the move from collections of diverse individuals 
to statistically knowable “population” (2003: 253; Gupta 2012:14-16). Motivating 
Maulana Jahangir’s preaching on this point was the sting of shame of the Muslim 
“backwardness” that the gaze of the non-Muslim state has publically trumpted as a newly 
visible “problem.”  While Lucknow residents have long been aware of local poverty, 
statistics had enabled the telling of new stories – stories with new morales and new 
morals.    
Islamic teachings on making a halal income and the merit of employment framed 
his general views on charity, as well.   When I asked him why the most important goal of 
the Society is business development, he quoted a favorite hadith on the obligation of 
making a “halal income” as second only to obligatory prayer and fasting, as I discussed 
above.  This implied that the “purpose” (maqṣad) of zakat is also “for the poor to stand 
up [on their own].”  Teachings such as these present a view of Islam as a faith which 
pervades the entirety of behavior, necessitating ethical self-regulation not only for prayers 
and rituals but also in everyday economic activities. In this view, how a person makes 
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money - such as through productive work and not begging – comprised a crucial element 
of being a pious Muslim.  
 In receiving the charity disbursements, recipients were expected to be generally 
“good Muslims.”  As the local preacher, as well as the head of the Society, Maulana 
Jahangir invoked particular religious authority when he said, “if you're lying, and you sell 
this, that means that you are betraying Allah.”  My point is that, even beyond his 
expectations that Muslims become employed workers, the sermon exhorted the audience 
to aspire to values of honesty and self-accountability merely as Muslims in front of Allah. 
The sermon and implicit ethical teachings play upon the moral norms already seen as 
powerful and morally desirable among residents of the bazaar.  The beneficiaries that I 
was able to speak with, along with general popularity of the Society across Lucknow, 
attested to their desire to inculcate the morals referenced in the sermon.  These were not 
merely externally imposed ethical injunctions by the preacher, but rather part of a 
morality that he had himself adopted from over thirty years of being a resident in the 
community and gaining the respect of the locals. Although some needy Muslims were too 
proud to accept charity from anyone, those that had decided to seek aid were very pleased 
with the Society’s activities.  Grants from the Society averaged over 7,000 rupees (about 
$150), which surpassed (for example) a government policeman’s monthly salary and 
were sufficient to launch a person into employment.  The logic behind the Society’s 
programs was viewed as vastly preferable to smaller “stipends” (wazīfah) that 
characterized the relief of other local charities.142  Although attempts to obtain long-term 
                                                 
142  Actually, the Society also had a program of offering such stipends.  But these were restricted to 
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government welfare were seen in Lucknow as quite acceptable behavior (even by 
scamming oneself past eligibility requirements; see Gupta 2012 on corruption in welfare), 
no one considered it as anything but immoral to live off of private charity of others when 
one was capable of work.  
Such technologies of a self embedded in a religious community itself defined by 
its relationship with and submission to God’s commands are powerful in the way that – 
rather than confining the individual – they address people according to things they are 
presumed to already desire. In contrast to the other new Islamic charities in chapter 
seven, which included regulations for monitoring and (if need be) dropping students who 
under-performed at school or who misused scholarship funds, the Society did not monitor 
its beneficiaries directly. Rather, the ethical teachings and sermons that were “gifted” 
along with the disbursed items serve a disciplinary purpose, which Foucault theorized as 
often more effective than “concrete systems of punishment” (1979).  Yet although the 
Islamic teachings in this case were disciplinary and in the service of boosting 
employment in the informal economy, the activities of Maulana Jahangir nevertheless 
contribute to the formation of a broader public ethic rooted in Islamic understandings of 
moral community, even as they inculcated individual Muslims as more effective self-
governing subjects. 
                                                                                                                                                 
those whom it determined could not work: widows, the elderly, handicapped, or others on a case-
by-case basis.  
  363
Conclusion 
Public Ethics and the Production of Halal Human Capital 
The new Islamic charities led by Muslim businessmen in Lucknow closely 
resemble other studies in market Islam.  Although I distinguished them from “spiritual 
economies” in which Islamic ritual was merely “dubbed” as an idiom onto what were 
essentially Western human resource practices (Rudnyckyj 2010), those businessmen-led 
charities were characterized by the blending of registers of spiritual and material success 
in Muslim market ethics. This chapter, as well, invites further reconsideration of the idea 
that Islamic ethics are somehow opposed to capitalism and its rationalities.  The Society 
for Divine Welfare is a vivid case study of the construction and promotion of a new 
Muslim public ethic in Lucknow, that was responsive to the overall crisis and moral 
decline perceived as facing the Indian Muslim community.  As a preacher-led 
organization, the Society illustrates explicitly the emerging contours of this public ethic, 
as seen in Jahangir’s public persona, his sermons, and other discourses of the Society. 
The central point I argue here is that most studies of market Islam, when centering 
on employers, have been susceptible to the cynical critique that developmentalist Islam 
and such neoliberal “spiritual economies” are clearly in their proponents’ economic self-
interest. As such, Islamic ethics appear in these studies as in the service of neoliberalism 
and globalized forces of capital. For example, Rudnyckyj's (2010) Spiritual Economies 
describes how the spirituality of Muslims in an Indonesian steel plant became a "site of 
management intervention,” as human resource managers run seminars on Islam that 
emphasize work as a "form of worship.” These factory managers hope to inculcate an 
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ethic of self-management and accountability that speeds up factory production, by 
framing neoliberal moralities of individual productivity in Islamic idiom. His conclusion, 
and I quote from the last page of the book, is that such neoliberal projects enlist religion 
(here, Islam) “to make economic calculation the organizing principle for human life.”  
His analysis does try to mitigate against this conclusion somewhat: Rudnyckyj goes 
through particular pains to emphasize in his analysis that the steel plant workers' 
motivational seminars are just as much an enhancement of personal Islamic faith as they 
are an inducement to self-management and accountability on the job. In the final analysis, 
however Islamic ethics in Rudnyckyj's case are employed in a project that was reducible 
to the rationalities of the capitalist marketplace – oriented towards a utilitarian ethics that 
fostered competitive efficiency – wherein trainers were hired by the company.  
Maulana Jahangir's developmentalist charity activities, on the other hand, were 
not reducible to economic logic of utilitarian ethics to the same degree. The maulana was 
not a company owner or human resource manager; the Muslim poor in which he 
endeavored to instill work ethic were not employed by him, nor will they ever be. The 
maulana did speak of economic indicators and engaged in socioeconomic 
developmentalist practices according to an explicitly spiritual rationale. But Maulana 
Jahangir's charity work also forestalled the cynical observation that Islam as being 
instrumentally leveraged to accomplish reforms that increased profits in the global 
neoliberal economy.  The Society appears geared towards “developing the faith” of 
laborers similar to Rudnyckyj’s Indonesian factory – however, I argue that the causal 
arrow could in fact also be reversed. Rather than utilizing Islam instrumentally in the 
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service of neoliberal ethics, The Society’s programs utilize neoliberal ethics of self-
governance for the ultimate end of knitting ordinary Muslims more closely into the 
‘ummah.  Maulana Jahangir’s own claims are that his preaching (which utilized 
socioeconomic data and neoliberal moralities) is in the service of making them more 
ritually observant, making them “good Muslims.”  Given that he was not an employer of 
those he exhorts, in this case, the question of whether market Islam was merely a 
religious tool of economic globalization – or the other way around – is not so clear-cut as 
Rudnyckyj and other studies in the anthropology of neoliberalism would have it.  
While Muslims in Lucknow discussed how new Islamic charities were 
transforming the tradition of zakat, with many approvingly saying that more Muslims 
were paying and receiving zakat as a result of their activities, this was not their primary 
impact.  The monies circulated were less significant than the moralities which circulated.  
Nevertheless, the enterprising virtues that recipients inculcated and the associated Islamic 
ethical teachings in fact resulted in new forms of economic/moral conduct – economic 
valuations linked to the market and moral values derived from Islam were deeply 
imbricated, and at times one and the same.   
In chapter three I outlined the paradox of “obligated voluntarism” for donors 
inherent in zakat ethics, which made alms mandatory on all wealthy Muslims but 
imparted to them a deep sense of personal choice and charitable goodwill in the course of 
picking and choosing when, how, and to whom to perform philanthropy.  As for the 
recipients in this chapter, many of them rural migrants from villages around north India, 
the notion of liberty and moral obligation is similarly enmeshed.  While perhaps less 
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egalitarian that relations of mutual aid and peer reciprocity that existed in village India’s 
gift economies, these new developmentalist channels of zakat bound them within new 
relationships of social and moral obligation – as “good Muslims,” honest laborers, and 
self-governing urban citizens.  But everyone in Aminabad knew Maulana Jahangir and 
the principles for which he and his Society stood.  This welfare aid was a relationship of 
hierarchical, nonreciprocal exchange, but still it was a relationship that recipients had 
learned about, applied for, and chosen on their own.  Being “obliged to be free” (Rose 
1999: 87), individual alms-recipients were voluntarily receiving financial aid (which 
would in turn was intended to liberate them further as enterprising, income-generation 
urban street-sellers).  Their choice placed them within a moral community that had 
steadily grown around the Deobandi preacher, his mosque, and his Society for Divine 
Welfare for over twenty-five years in the thriving commercial center of Aminabad bazaar.  
This transformation resembles and partakes of neoliberal governmentality. 
However, contra Rose and other theorists of neoliberalism in a Foucauldian vein, my data 
illustrate how the ultimate disciplinary imperative is neither merely the market in service 
of state governance nor the faceless yet inexorable exploitative powers of market 
capitalism.  Zakat was being distributed in a context that emphasized personal moral 
duties and further enmeshed Lucknow’s poor within the frameworks of Islamic public 
ethics propounded by the new Islamic charities.  As such, relations of exploitation may 
have remained strong in the informal economies of Lucknow’s old city bazaars – yet this 
simplistic narrative of material exploitation does little to capture the full cultural reality.  
Families receiving aid from the Society for Divine Welfare undoubtedly still struggle 
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today with a heartbreaking lack of stable employment, healthcare, or prospects of 
adequate formal education.  However, they are still left with strong solidarities of moral 
community and reconstituted networks of aid that replace village-level systems of mutual 
aid and reciprocity.  Moreover, they are encouraged to inculcate a new self-governing and 
enterprising spirit, more characteristic of 21st century urban India than was found in prior 
times and less fast-paced spaces.  The growing anthropological literature on 
humanitarianism in the current neoliberal age of increasingly privatized public services 
contains similar observations of public moralities constructed through citizen-led welfare 
rather than state discourse (Muehlebach 2012, Osella & Ramaswamy forthcoming, 
Bornstein 2012). 
Thus, it is this intertwining of Islamic ethical teachings and efforts to foster job 
skills among the underemployed that I term the production of “halal human capital.”  
Through the market-oriented behaviors of providing start-up funds and job skills training, 
more and more of Lucknow’s Muslims were engaging with public moral discourses of 
‘ulama like Maulana Jahangir.  Although framed in terms of economic gain and self-
interested upward social mobility, the new Islamic charities’ welfare projects also gifted 
new constructions of Indian Muslim selfhood intended to address the crisis facing the 
community.  These particular constructions of self-interested behaviors – such as 
providing for their own families or performing well at school or at work – were re-made 
into communitarian ethical activities, as the duty to make a halal income, work honestly, 
and more generally perform labor as good Muslims. By combining notions of moral 
development with socioeconomic development, all in the context of an obligatory ritual, 
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the Society garnered a wider audience for Jahangir’s sermons as a result of its welfare 
work and also layered the force of moral sanction upon recipients of its handouts.  
Lastly, I reiterate how such ethnographic cases illustrate my conception of the 
“moral self,” in ways that differ from others in anthropology whose studies emphasize the 
relations of power – whether religious traditional authority, patriarchy, the state, the 
market, corporations, or neoliberal forms of power (e.g. Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 
2006; Rudnyckyj 2010).  Selfhood is indeed constructed as an “effect of power” 
(Mahmood 2005: 33) but the self is also the effect of moral pursuits.  Disciplinary forces, 
self-interest, and imbalanced distribution of resources and authority do play crucial roles 
in the formation of subjectivities in society – however, these are not the only 
subjectivizing processes.  In other words, power is not the only game in town when it 
comes to moral self-formation.  Moral sentiments deserve consideration in and of 
themselves, even when moralities articulate with modalities of power, in analysis of the 
formation of selfhood.  While anthropology’s focus on oppression and “suffering 
subjects” has been – and remains – urgently needed and fruitful, so is the consideration of 
“the moral” and “the good” as indications of culturally inflected ideas about what humans 
most value (Robbins 2013).   
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CHAPTER NINE:  CONCLUSION 
ETHICAL ENTREPRENEURISM & MUSLIM CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA 
 
As shown in the preceding chapters, pious Muslim social reformers in Lucknow 
have proven to be entrepreneurs in multiple ways.  Whether members of Lucknow’s 
historically Muslim elite or its rising middle-class, whether university-educated or 
‘ulama, they have achieved worldly success by leveraging their education and networks 
in India’s globalizing economy.  Iqrar obtained his bachelors’ degree in IT in the USA 
before opening his own computer server export company, for example, and Tahir utilized 
consumer electronics to produce advertisements in Lucknow and sell video clips to 
regional television networks. Until two decades ago, such entrepreneurial niches were 
nonexistent in India’s economy.  How these zakat entrepreneurs have utilized their 
surplus wealth as a form of social re-investment, however, is all the more entrepreneurial, 
transforming the very modalities of pious Muslims’ almsgiving in north India.  Their new 
Islamic charities and strategies of management have reinvented zakat as an intervention 
for reform of Indian Muslims.  The reform they seek to effect, moreover, is one that 
simultaneous economic and moral.   
Such businessmen are joined (even upstaged) by ‘ulama who are just as 
entrepreneurial.  ‘Ulama who launch new Islamic charities are leaving behind madrasas 
as their traditional organizational homes in order to target moral education and 
sermonizing at Muslims who seek job skills for 21st century markets, illustrating that it is 
not just successful businessmen who are social entrepreneurs in the old city bazaar. In the 
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Lucknow case, Maulana Jahangir illustrated how when ‘ulama are at the helm of 
associations, they have the potential to even upstage businessmen-led charities in terms 
of budget and visibility.   
Zakat entrepreneurs, ‘ulama or not, are also ethical entrepreneurs.  They are 
exploiting openings in the Indian economy, finding niches that are created by economic 
crises facing Indian Muslims, in order to innovate Islamic ritual practice in distinctly 
moral interventions.  By re-imagining and re-presenting economic crises facing Indian 
Muslims as in fact reflecting the deeper moral failings of the community, these “ethical 
entrepreneurs” – as do all entrepreneurs – fit their new Islamic charities into a new niche.  
This niche, furthermore, is an exploitable opening created by conditions of scarcity – a 
blended economic/moral scarcity.  Zakat entrepreneurism (as the re-invention of an 
Islamic tradition that always already elides values of spiritual and market exchange) was 
seen as the natural solution for meeting this economic/moral scarcity in the Indian 
Muslim community (cf. Zignon 2007 on moral breakdown and ethical demand).   
Zakat entrepreneurs thus represent a new generation of Islamic revivalists in India 
who are proponents a distinctly contemporary view of what is “authentic” Islamic piety: 
moral progress of the community that is predicated on (at times, even indistinguishable 
from) socioeconomic progress (Deeb 2006; cf. Osella & Osella 2000 on dalit moralities 
and social mobility in Kerala).  Socioeconomic backwardness among Indian Muslims has 
placed the community at risk of moral turpitude and eroded its guiding ethics, potentially 
succumbing to the threatening forces of either radicalization or of Western materialism.  
Prior Islamic revivalist movements were perceived to have failed by emphasizing the 
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obligations of prayer, fasting, and correct moral conduct while neglecting to properly 
institutionalize the system of zakat.  As seen in the example of madrasas, this “failure” of 
Islamic reformism was often attributed largely to institutional variables, such as lack of 
management acumen or inadequate (or irrelevant) education, rather than to failings of 
theological interpretation.  By contrast, the zakat entrepreneurs of Lucknow are distinct 
from their fellow Muslims in the way they have facilitated new modalities of 
organizational and self-management that inculcate Islamic virtues and publically express 
piety.  Their new version of modern Islamic reformism is making headway in Indian 
Muslim society precisely because they are entrepreneurs who have applied lessons from 
their success in today’s market economy and whose organizations are so visibly 
successful at fundraising as a result.  Zakat entrepreneurs were perceived to combine two 
entrepreneurial identities: as “social entrepreneurs” they are revivalists reforming Islamic 
tradition for societal good and as “entrepreneurs in the economy” they have the resources 
to become educated income-earners better able to avoid vices of the poor and to learn, 
practice, and instruct others in “correct” Islam through their associations.  This pairing of 
twin entrepreneurial identities is, interestingly, not unlike the example of the Prophet 
Muhammad himself in his roles as both “social reformer” and successful Arab trader, as 
Farid’s quote in the opening vignette of this dissertation implied.    
In this final chapter, I consider the wider implications of the zakat revival 
occurring in Lucknow and elsewhere in India. The first section addresses the 
transformation of zakat itself, which has come to supplant other institutions of Islamic 
philanthropy and patronage such as waqf in the wake of their decline.  The second section 
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addresses the transformation of India’s Muslim minority in the past decade and their 
relationship with the state.  I also offer reflections for scholars to re-think analyses of 
political Islamism within a trope of zakat as a counterbalance to the widespread trope of 
jihad for understanding Islamist political parties relationship with their interlocutors.  The 
third section invites reconsideration of our notion of “the economy” as a realm primarily 
for self-interested market behavior.  Lucknow Muslims imagine the local bazaar economy 
as one where profit-making and moral obligations such as zakat are inextricably linked. 
But I discuss the bazaars of old city Lucknow as home to a “zakat economy” layered 
upon a market economy – with symbolisms, moralities, and meaningfulness embedding 
market-oriented transactions – in a way that expands on existing anthropological work on 
“market Islam” and “moral economies.”   
Re-Thinking Islamic Charity 
When I began research for this dissertation on Muslim welfare associations most 
people assumed that it was focused on waqf.  Waqf indeed has formed the budgetary 
foundation for madrasas and public institutions in Muslim societies for centuries.  
Although, the origins of this tradition are “disputed,” presumably arising after the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad rather than being spelled out in the Qur’an itself as zakat was, 
leading contemporary Muslims to begin re-evaluating it as less authentic than the system 
of zakat (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2007: 31-32; Arjomand 1998).  Zakat (including 
related forms of person-to-person almsgiving: khums and ordinary sadaqah) has rarely 
been a topic, much less the focus, of studies within both anthropology and Islamic studies 
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(but see Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2007; Atia 2012; Mittermaier 2014).  Although not 
disappeared or irrelevant in the social sector (Kozlowski 1996), nor made irrelevant by 
modern economic transformations (Geertz 1979; Maloney 2000; Benthall & Bellion-
Jourdan 2007: 35-36; Kuran 2012), waqf is perceived by Indian Muslims as in decline or 
at best co-opted by the state.  Zakat donations are a financial mainstay in the budgets of 
nearly all modern Muslim social associations today.  Scholarship should address the 
comparative study of contemporary Islamic almsgiving more carefully. The 21st century 
will only see a more rapid rise in zakat-giving and its salience as incomes rise, awareness 
of zakat obligation spreads, and channels for giving are opened by technology.143   
Most importantly, as we have seen in the Lucknow cases, the way Muslims give 
zakat is also undergoing changes on at least three levels: organizational, ethical, and 
ritual.    Organizationally, the networks of Islamic almsgiving throughout history have 
been based on locality and kinship.144  New Islamic charities, however, promoted and 
institutionalized zakat-giving in ways that led donors to look beyond immediate 
networks. Their specialized programs even allow giving with certain sectors of the 
economy in mind, such as education or business development, which represents a shift 
from a ritual that once re-inscribed traditional solidarity to one that re-affirms economic 
interdependence, a shift that echoes the mechanical and organic solidarities Durkheim 
                                                 
143 On Muslim incomes worldwide, see Pew’s  (2011) report The Global Future of the Muslim 
Population.  Regarding the lack of awareness of zakat, Benthall’s (1999: 31-35) research in 
Jordan and Palestine revealed that most ordinary Muslims thought only of zakat al-fitr (the small 
gift at Eid al-Fitr) rather than the annual alms given on wealth, zakat al-mal, discussed in this 
dissertation. 
144 The Qur’an itself enjoined giving charity first to relatives and neighbors (see Qur’an 2:177, 4:8, 
4:36, 8:41, 30:38; and various scholarly writings, e.g. Marghinani 2006: 294-5) while scholarly 
observations also confirmed the salience of kinship and locality (Scott 1985, An-Na’im & Halim 
2007, Matteson 2003: 40, 44).   
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described.   
Second, at the ethical level, zakat has been emphasized in scriptural and popular 
Islamic teachings as a ritual act of humility and relinquishment that is morally 
transformational for the donor.  Yet the emerging focus on the recipient incorporates 
another ethical actor subject to their own particular moral constraints as alms-taker.  
While not replacing the moral transformation of donors, this additional focus on 
recipients at times compromises the Islamic mandates related to anonymity and secrecy 
in almsgiving as well as the prohibition against “monitoring” “following up” on acts of 
generosity.   
Third, as a ritual tradition in Islam, zakat and the distinction I have drawn 
between the purity and developmentalist ethic reflects Lucknow Muslims’ divergent 
views of Islamic “authenticity” of tradition and ritual. The purity ethic exemplified a 
deontological concern with the letter of the divine law, which addressed all Muslims as if 
they are donors and described the zakat ritual as complete once the transaction is made.  
New Islamic charities viewed the ritual in its most authentic form as a system, with the 
ritual complete and efficacious only when Muslims gave in aggregate.  Paralleling the 
insights of 20th century Indian scholars on Islamic finance as the rationalization of 
Islam’s basic prohibition on usury, zakat entrepreneurs envisioned this “system” (nizām) 
of zakat as authentically Islamic only “if all Muslims would pay their zakat, then there 
would be no poverty.”  The Sachar Report’s identification of the crisis of “backwardness” 
among Muslims, in this regard, was proof that zakat needed reviving – despite the irony 
that this report produced worldly statistics and originated with a government led by non-
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Muslims.  The businessmen’s preoccupation with the zakat proportion one-fortieth 
(2.5%) as a divine “principle of economics” instigated new modes of attempting to 
implement such a system. This nizām al-zakat required contemporary modes of data-
gathering and monitoring of recipients with paper forms but also digital spreadsheets that 
enabled a few charity workers to manage hundreds of beneficiaries.  In the course of 
these contemporary modes of institutionalizing zakat, the ritual came to diverge from 
how it was described in Islamic scriptural commentaries of ‘ulama from prior centuries 
(as I discussed in chapter seven).  Although new Islamic charities were in a sort of 
competition with each other and with madrasas in the zakat economy, both the ‘ulama 
and other workers in new Islamic charities were determined to downplay this competition 
in their joint efforts towards the broader revival of zakat.  The realization of an authentic 
system of zakat, as I was told by the Mufti Anas in Nadwa and others, depended on 
numerous associations run by Muslims with diverse civic interests in order to address 
Muslims’ needs across all sectors of the economy.  My identification of two modalities of 
Islamic almsgiving does not preclude others. Indeed, the institution of zakat within an 
Islamic state has been attempted by Muslim activists worldwide (and a tiny minority in 
India; Ahmed 2009), with varying degrees of success.  This “statist ethic” of zakat 
emphasizes the authenticity of the tradition according to the collector: a legitimate 
Islamic state empowered to collect from donors and distribute to recipients according to 
its own authoritative interpretation of zakat’s moral concerns.  By and large among 
Lucknow Muslims, however, support for government according to shari’a receives little 
support, with Pakistan’s attempt perceived as a failed one.   
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New Islamic charities today are institutionalizing zakat with a systematicity never 
before seen in Muslim India.  How are we to reconcile zakat entrepreneurs’ claims that 
21st century modalities of management are instrumental for realizing a 7th century Islamic 
tradition of the “system” (nizām) of zakat?  This process seems to mirror Weber’s 
analysis of the rationalization of religion in modern times, as prophetic ideals come to be 
routinized according to contemporary institutional forms.  Yet the moral value of zakat on 
the basis of the generous act itself have not given way to instrumentally rational-directed 
valuation based on its consequences as Weber predicted for philanthropy (1978: 24-26, 
585; cf. Bornstein 2009).  The institutionalization of zakat has incorporated an increasing 
focus on calculative rationality and knowability of the effects of zakat gifts after they are 
given.  But my research findings suggest that this is not only a form means-end 
rationality that merely takes efficiency or effectiveness as an “end” valued by humans 
that is reorienting conduct. Instead, the ultimate “end” for reformers of zakat is rooted in 
what Weber termed “irreducible” values  -- values which Lucknow Muslims regularly 
ascribe directly to Qur’anic revelation and Islamic tradition as it has been interpreted and 
passed down via madrasas, bazaar preachers, prior kin, and others.  Zakat entrepreneurs 
may be better organized, but their telos remains rooted in their visions of shari’a 
normativities – visions often shared by modern ‘ulama with whom they collaborate.  
Such prioritization of value-rational modes of religious action have only been 
strengthened by the zakat revival in Lucknow, as the efforts towards spiritual reform seek 
to re-orient the subjectivities of both donors and alms-seekers to Islamic virtues 
prioritizing submission to their obligations to Allah as believing Muslims.  The 
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“disenchantment of the world” heralded by Weberian approaches to modernization has 
not come to pass in Lucknow.  New Islamic charities have facilitated fresh collaborations 
between businessmen and ‘ulama, a rising visibility of religious leaders and Islamic ritual 
in public life, and even more individualized and internalized piety practices according to 
zakat’s “economic theology” of thawab.   
Re-Thinking Political Islamism:  Muslim Rights and the State in India 
Generalizations that hold for Muslims across India are impossible, given their 
staggering diversity.  Although comprising only 14.2% of the national population, Indian 
Muslims comprise a population of around 170 million and span a linguistic and ethnic 
diversity that spans, for example, from Balti-speaking Noorbakhshia-Shi’a of Ladakh, 
Kashimir to Malegawi weavers in Maharashtra.  Lucknow alone is home to dozens of 
linguistic and caste groups professing Islam. Yet despite the impossibility of generalizing 
from this diversity, the category of “Indian Muslim” in public discourse has remained 
surprisingly stable – a marker of India’s largest minority and its archetypal Other.  In the 
past half-century, Hindu-Muslim relations have become internationalized because of 
tensions with Pakistan, further re-inscribing “Muslim” as a marker of Otherness.  Gyan 
Pandey argued that the Muslim Other was so formative of early Indian nationalism that 
there remains continued doubt over the question of “Can a Muslim be an Indian?” (1999).  
With the discourse on “Muslim backwardness,” socioeconomic difference is 
increasingly layered upon religious difference – a momentous shift that has placed 
Lucknow’s wealthy Muslim elite in a very tricky predicament.  This discourse has been 
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fed by the convergence of two larger narratives.  First, India’s political culture at the turn 
of the 21st century has moved away from earlier religious nationalisms (van der Veer 
1994) to a form of economic nationalism based on development and market growth.  This 
shift was due in part to the growing disillusionment with communal militancy through the 
1980s and 1990s as it came to pose a critical threat to national unity. The election of 
Narendra Modi as Prime Minister has been analyzed as part of Hindutva activists’ 
reinvention of the movement as oriented towards “development,” despite his ties to 
religious riot violence (Bobbio 2012).  Second, the rise of India’s new middle class has 
had a hegemonic effect upon political discourse, with nationalism increasingly 
symbolized by figure of the “consumer-citizen” and their central role in India’s policies 
of economic liberalization (Fernandes 2006). Yet this middle class politics is one that 
sharply class-ifies Indian society, distancing themselves from lower classes, through 
consumptive performances and “middle class moralities” (Savaala 2010).    
The wealthy Muslims of Lucknow view the discourse on “Muslim backwardness” 
ambiguously.  On one hand, the Indian government’s welfare policies are viewed as a 
boon that is necessary to counteract structural biases.  On the other hand, the Sachar 
Report’s aggregate data comparisons circulated a view of Indian Muslims as defined by 
its most underdeveloped members.  The Sachar Report comes uncomfortably close to 
equating “Muslim backwardness” with “backward Muslims,” the term for their lower 
caste co-religionists.  Many Muslims are uneasy in also granting the government with the 
responsibility for the solution to the problems identified in this report.  In response to 
widespread calls for affirmative action in the form of “reservations,” especially by 
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Muslim politicians, a zakat donor in Lucknow inveighed in English:  
The Sachar Committee Report has one purpose, to my mind: to tell Muslims, 
‘Look here! You are downtrodden! Now, remain that way!’  It belittles them. It’s 
insulting…When you have such data that is demeaning to the entire community, it 
has an impact on the community’s spirit.  
 
Although few leaders openly refute the need for reservations for Muslims (Kalbe Sadiq 
from Lucknow is one), I encountered a widespread view among members of new Islamic 
charities that the crisis facing their community was one that is in their own hands.  A 
proper citizen-led response would collaborate with government and not refuse balanced 
policies of state aid for Muslims, but dependence on state welfare was ultimately 
perceived only as dangerously disempowering for the strong networks of Muslim 
institutions and almsgiving already at work.  A follow-up study by Basant & Shariff 
(2009: 14), two leading members of the Sachar Committee also found very little 
agreement on the precise merits or ideal form of potential reservations for Muslims, even 
though a significant portion of Muslims expressed support for them.  Almost no Muslims 
saw reservations as the only remedy.  
This process is one that India has already faced – with the dalits.  The 
transformation of a religiously marked Other with the additional layering of 
socioeconomic (an)Othering occurred as dalit communities went from ritually impure 
“outcastes” to a category enshrined in the Indian Constitution as socioeconomic, as I 
outlined in chapter two.  As Anupama Rao (2009: L300) explained, dalit leaders invoked 
modern notions of liberty based on slavery and class “to reframe caste in idioms of 
exploitation and inequality rather than the religious.”  The Indian Constitution contained 
no definition of untouchability, instead defining caste inequality only implicitly through 
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Article 46’s directive that “The State shall promote with special care the educational and 
economic interests of those weaker sections of the people and in particular the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes…and shall protect them from injustice and exploitation” 
(Rao 2009: L2291, emphasis mine). With such a broad concept of caste injustice 
expressed in “class-like terminology” as the “economic interests…of those weaker 
sections,” caste was transformed from a ritual category perceived to that indexed purity 
among Hindu groups into a category of status-hierarchy that reified “untouchability” as 
an aspect within the new notion of “backwardness.”  In other words, despite the aim of 
eliminating untouchability from society, it came to frame the Indian state’s primary mode 
of dealing with societal inequality (Rao 2009: L2252-2315).   
The state thus reified the very hierarchies it intended to dispel, in making the 
project to end caste part of the Indian nation’s constitutional foundation.  Welfare and 
entitlement policy even in 21st India retains the hue of upper-caste apologetics, and statist 
development efforts are still far from ending the historical effects of the caste system.  
This dissertation has theorized a parallel yet distinct trajectory for the Indian state’s 
embrace of the Muslim minority, as seemed to be heralded with the release of the Sachar 
Report, the subsequent Misra Report, and ensuing discussion of legislative 
implementation of the latter report’s recommendations for reservations.  But can 
observers view Muslims as India’s “new Untouchables”?   
The government of India has yet to legislate reservations for Muslims or address 
systemic problems of Muslims’ underdevelopment, although various states have passed 
their own affirmative action laws.  Despite the revelation that indicators of Muslim 
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development are often as low as those for dalits, and improving much less rapidly, the 
government remains hesitant to offer interventionist entitlements on the same scale as 
dalits (a hesitancy that mirrors the unease among Muslims themselves).  Discriminatory 
attitudes cannot be ruled out.  However, I also suggest that Muslims and their leadership 
prefer a strategy of citizen-led development, given the recent example of the state’s 
embrace of dalits with welfare policies and given Muslims’ unease with the undertones of 
caste purity inherent in Indian notions of “backwardness” and “weaker sections.”   
Finally, in certain limited ways, zakat entrepreneurs in this study resemble 
Islamists, although they did not view Islam as “the solution” to all problems nor were 
they engaged in activism to re-organize political life or overthrow the state in the name of 
Islam.  They universally felt that the “crisis” facing the Indian Muslim community had an 
Islamic solution: revival of the system of zakat.  “Muslim backwardness” was ultimately 
a set of problems that could be analyzed and solved with reference to Islam. Notably, this 
Islamic solution required the leadership (or at least tacit approval) of ‘ulama like Maulana 
Jahangir and Nadwa graduates.  Zakat entreprenuers, moreover, squarely situated 
themselves within the Islamic tradition they perceived themselves (and were largely 
perceived as) reviving, despite their innovative steps at implementing zakat.  It is not a 
society where “because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an 
economist, or a jurist are all ‘ulama,” as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood wrote 
(quote in Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 43), and Lucknow Muslims of the old city bazaars 
by and large still maintain strong respect for madrasa-educated ‘ulama, their leadership, 
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and their traditional scholarly crafts.145   
In other words, zakat entrepreneurs in Lucknow diverge from political Islamists in 
multiple, crucial ways.  Most importantly, the Islamic reformers of this study are working 
in a Muslim social milieu where the notion of an “Islamic state” or “Islamic revolution” 
has no traction.  Roy and Bayat have analyzed Islamists in the Middle East and elsewhere 
who attempted (and failed) in making Islamist political parties and governments into 
effective vanguards of their Islamic reform projects, theorizing the resulting devolution 
into societal and welfare activism as “post-Islamism” (Roy 1994, 2004; Bayat 1996, 
2013).  However, post-Islamism is subject to the cynical critique that projects of Islamic 
societal reform emerge only when “political Islamism” has “failed.”146  This study takes 
seriously the idea that Indian Muslims have been rejecting state-oriented Islamist politics 
but also working for social reform since at least the turn of the 20th century.  For example, 
the largest organization of ‘ulama, the Jamiat-ul-‘Ulama Hind (JUH) joined Gandhi to 
consistently lobby for a unified Hindu-Muslim India and against the creation of Pakistan 
as a homeland for Muslims (Ahmad 2009: 20-21; Minault 1982).  Zakat entrepreneurs 
such as Iqrar, Tahir, and Maulana Jahangir (himself a member of JUH) thus resist cynical 
characterization that their motives for welfare are linked to electoral goals of Islamist 
                                                 
145  Indian Muslims combine a deep respect for traditional Islamic authority with the recognition that 
other moral codes exist. Without at least the tacit approval of ‘ulama, the new Islamic charities run 
by businessmen would have quickly foundered in old city Lucknow where most people value 
linking Islamic practices to authenticated sources in the traditional ways.  However, nor is the 
Islamist belief that all societal problems have an Islamic solution a belief common among Indian 
Muslims, who regularly draw inspiration from a range of moral discourses from Gandhian ideals 
to dalit notions of social justice in order to address contemporary issues in ways informed by 
diverse ethical traditions.  See Sikand (2006) on Indian Muslim perspectives on inter-faith thought 
and dialogue.   
146 See Mandaville (2014) on the relevance of post-Islamism as a theory even regarding the Arab 
Spring uprisings. 
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political parties (Clark 2004, Burr & Collins 2008).   
This study of zakat associations and their construction of public ethics in dialogue 
with government and Indian political culture suggests a reorientation of scholarship on 
political Islamism.  I suggest that scholars further interrogate modern India’s unique form 
of political Islam as one that is founded on welfare politics and entitlements. This 
dissertation is one example of analysis that interprets Indian political Islam via a semiotic 
of zakat – demands by Muslim citizens (even a minority portion of them) on behalf of the 
“right of the poor” to redistribution and other constitutional entitlements – rather than 
through the dominant tropes often applied to Islamists’ contentious politics, especially the 
trope of the “Islamic state” that purportedly is the aim of so many political Islamists.  
Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004: 16) in his sweeping review of Islamic activism bemoaned 
that “a great deal of research has focused on politicized movements that seek to create an 
Islamic state,” noting that in most cases “the core imperative of Islamic movements is a 
desire to create a society governed and guided by shari’a.” Such a trope of the Islamic 
state as the stated aim of many Islamists (or presumed by analysts when unstated) can 
overlook the actual valued ends that may undergird their motivations.  These 
preoccupations with the Islamic state arose due to 20th century Islamists’ tendency to 
identify Islam as a systematic and disciplinary power that mirrors their perception of the 
modern state.  In particular, this vision of the “Islamic state” is a distinctly modern 
invention modeled upon the example of the early modern colonial state, as Irfan Ahmad 
(2009b) has traced its genealogy in India.  At the core of movements focused on 
formation of an Islamic state often lie efforts to “implement shari’a.” Such 
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implementation, however, is a proposition is fraught with insurmountable complexities, 
given the “ijtihadic plurality” or “internal diversity of shari’a” normativities (Hallaq 
2009: 449; Hefner 2011: 11; cf. Messick 1993).  Nevertheless, Islamists call for 
etatization of shari’a to be codified as “law” and more-or-less directly applied from 
simplified juridical rulings (Hefner 2011). Calls for the “Islamic state” represent Islamists 
preoccupation with the perceived power of the modern state, far more than they recall 
any historical precedent of caliphate rule.   
Given that Islamic activists ultimately desire an increased public role for guidance 
that partakes of shari’a normativity, examining their goals as merely state power misses 
the point.  Moreover, Islamists in the 21st century increasingly look to the “market” rather 
than the “state” for inspiration for their projects and movements.  As Humeira Iqtidar 
(2011) has observed of Pakistan’s Jama’at-i Islami, the market has emerged for Islamists 
as “a potentially more significant – yet under-recognized – disciplinary force.”  As such, 
the approach of viewing Islamism through a trope of zakat rather than a trope of the 
Islamic state could point the way to different examinations of Muslim activists’ 
relationships with the state, with the market, and with shari’a normativity.  As the 
preceding chapters have illustrated, zakat entrepreneurs do not merely seek to 
“Islamicize” the entire market economy.  They may propose the further systematization 
of zakat, but only as one economic system among many others.  This zakat economy is a 
sub-economy articulated with others. However, it also remains a realm of exchange that 
fosters the ideals they value and furthers the habituation of perceived “correct” Islamic 
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virtues. This analytical project is most suited to an anthropology of moralities rather than 
mere political analysis.   
Re-Thinking Islam & Capitalism 
Despite the increasing usage of the term “moral economy” across anthropology to 
indicate anti-capitalist (often anti-economic globalization) movements animated by 
indigenous or local moralities (e.g. Edelman 2005; Sivaramakrishnan 2005; Scott 2005; 
Griffith 2009), I argue for a conceptualization of “moral economy” that is more 
encompassing and useful, in which moralities are taken to provide additional layers of 
exchange, means of redistribution, and (ultimately) webs of meaning that permeate and 
embed market practices.  Zakat and Islam’s ethical teachings circulate in old city 
Lucknow in ways that can be termed a “moral economy” – but it is a “moral economy” in 
a quite different sense than the formulation popularized by James Scott (1985).  I instead 
pivot off of anthropological work on economics and moralities by the Jonathan Parry and 
Maurice Bloch (1989) and Robert Hefner (1983) to argue that Lucknow’s zakat economy 
should not be taken as moral resistance to the spread of market-oriented behaviors as 
much as complementary (even congruent) with them.  Proper theorization of human 
economic behavior requires moving beyond the modern Western social imaginary rooted 
in “the economy,” in which we imagine that “our sense of agency should be entirely as 
individuals” and thus society is only an aggregation made possible by “doctrines of 
harmonious [individual] interest” (Taylor 2003: 75, 165).  The zakat economy, by 
contrast, suggests that an analysis of human economic behavior is possible, which takes it 
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as directly analogous to moral behavior.  Humans are not merely self-interested rational 
actors in this social imaginary informed by zakat ethics, but have moral characters 
comprised of ethical virtues that link oneself with collectively held ideals – which 
ultimately also guide financial transactions and exchange.   
This dissertation provides case studies and ethnography from old city Luckow 
that illustrate how Islamic ethics guide Muslims’ in financial matters: the sense of 
rootedness in the ‘ummah or “moral community” of Muslims in India, their pursuit of job 
skills and income-generating opportunities, importance of work ethic and economic self-
sufficiency, the proper uses of accumulated wealth, ethics of relinquishment, the 
righteous ways for Muslims of different classes to interact and offer financial aid, and the 
proper means to establish systems of fair and just redistribution. Significantly, these 
Islamic ethics addressed market-oriented behaviors sanctioning the self-interested pursuit 
of wealth by entrepreneurs as well as guiding their philanthropic practices to target the 
employability and productivity of others.  These cases go beyond scholarly portrayals of 
Islam’s purportedly anti-capitalist “moral economy.”  The preceding chapters illustrate 
how Lucknow Muslims’ activities of wealth accumulation and wealth distribution are 
linked, as the profits of the wealthy are permitted, purified, and even sacralized through 
zakat-giving as it is represented as a form of re-investment in society by those who have 
become rich.  
Moreover, zakat exists as a moral calculation beyond its role in developmentalist 
aid, bound up in economic theologies of thawab and divine grace, as prior chapters 
illustrated.  Zakat is not only a different form of financial transaction than buying, selling, 
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loaning, or interest-making, but it also is culturally constructed as a different form of 
money itself (cf. Shipton 1989; Maurer 2005).  Parry and Bloch, by comparison, 
examined the cultural construction of money in Western society.  Given the 
individualistic foundations of our society, money as an otherwise empty signifier of 
value(s) comes to be identified with impersonal, amoral, and calculatively economic 
relationships. Money is inappropriate as a gift, and “our ideology of the [moral-laden] 
gift has been constructed in antithesis to market exchange” (Parry and Bloch 1989: 9; cf. 
White 1994: 157).   
Trust is intrinsic to the nature of money.  Whereas hard currency exists today as 
fiat currency backed by governments and the construction of social trust among exchange 
partners, zakat exists as a form of “spiritual fiat currency” that – when given with proper 
intention – symbolizes Muslims’ submission to and trust in Allah to provide rewards in 
the Hereafter (see chapter five).  As in the quote by Brigadier Khan in chapter three, 
ordinary money is one’s own property but zakat only the property of Allah, “I only 
consider 97.5 rupees out of every 100 that I get, as my own. The other 2.5% belongs to 
the poor alone. That portion is Allah's.”  Pious Muslims have long held this belief in 
Allah as the ultimate “Owner” (al-malik) and “the Generous” (al-karim) source of all 
worldly property, but in Lucknow these ideas about zakat achieved new levels of 
promotion and publicity in the fundraising pitches of new Islamic charities. When 
circulated as money in aid to others perceived as members of the same moral community, 
zakat within the ‘ummah simultaneously reinforces social trust and spiritual trust in 
Allah’s divine mercy and guidance. As I outlined in chapter one and chapter eight, James 
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Scott’s (1985) study in Malaysia was a significant contribution to scholarly 
understandings of everyday zakat practices, which he termed “rituals of compassion” and 
associated with a “moral economy” that resisted the encroachment of capitalist social 
relations, but it undertheorized the moral effects of zakat on the economy and upon 
individuals.  Parry and Bloch (1989) offered a conceptualization of morality and money 
that offers a more nuanced idea of moral economy that signifies the interconnected nature 
of market exchange and ethically based exchange, rather than their opposition. Parry and 
Bloch’s review of the meaningfulness of money across cultures showed money to be not 
an amoral, empty signifier of “value” but rather deeply incorporated into the wider 
cultural matrix of meanings.  This “zakat economy” of Lucknow – the circulation of 
wealth according to motives and ethical rationalities distinctly different from formal 
economic models – is best analyzed as similarly incorporated into a wider web of beliefs 
and moral performances that combine market imperatives with moral imperatives, 
according to an ethical telos different from that of a mere unenchanted market economy.  
Nadwa madrasa maintained its reputation as India’s premiere Sunni institution of Islamic 
education, while also molding students that sought to ply Arabic and Islamic knowledge 
in the global marketplace as well as supplement their studies with a university education, 
so that their efforts to spread Islam’s teachings could be better packed for modern, 
worldly Muslims.  Moreover, Nadwa students and other madrasa fundraisers were very 
aware that their ability to raise donations was dependent on their success in making 
Islamic teachings seem effective and relevant to the broader public. New Islamic charities 
were even more organized and explicit about the urgency of orienting zakat-giving 
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towards the perceived requirements of the contemporary economy.  They had launched 
programs for “coaching” Muslim students for success in English-speaking, white-collar 
jobs seen as newly available in India’s globalizing economy and projects that conditioned 
the underemployed as halal human capital away from the vices of begging towards 
informal service occupations that promised to reward work ethic and honesty with 
income.   
Were they becoming more self-interested as neoliberal forces transformed charity 
(and other social realms)?  My analysis pivots on what Hefner (1983) has termed “the 
problem of preference.”  Although both disciplines have “always shared a common 
interest in the problem of human needs, values, wants, or preferences” it is characteristic 
of economic analysis to take an individualistic view in which preferences are taken for 
granted.  Human behavior can be approximated with axioms of rational action as the self-
interested pursuit of those preferences.  Anthropology – in stark contrast – inquires into 
origins of preferences within the ecological, political, and symbolic contexts, asking how 
culture conditions individual values (Hefner 1983: 669).  The preceding chapters 
incorporated such attention to the formation of individual preference, with a careful eye 
to how Lucknow Muslims have derived diverse moral concerns from Islamic teachings 
that guide their individualized ethical choices.  Zakat transactions were only one type of 
transaction in the variegated trafficking of money and morals between people that were 
generative of socially significant ethics (Barth 1993).  Moreover, drawing on virtue 
ethics, I showed how zakat ethics were learned and inculcated in households, madrasas, 
and bazaars that gave rise to the preferences and values that came to define Muslim 
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donors’ moral/economic subjectivities.  Parry and Bloch (1989: 2) describe the 
“strikingly” universal symbolism of money as a semiotic bridge linking the individual to 
his or her society, with beliefs about monetary exchange concerned with “the relationship 
between a cycle of short-term exchange which is the domain of individual – often 
acquisitive – activity, and a cycle of long-term exchanges concerned with the 
reproduction of the social and cosmic order.”147  However, in this dynamic of “short” and 
“long-term” modalities of exchange, however, the latter is clearly the stronger force for 
social reproduction.  Parry and Bloch’s view partakes of a more Durkheimian view of 
society in which the individual is socialized and one’s agency subsumed in adherence to 
the “social and cosmic order.”  Zakat ethics are rooted in calculative rationalities that 
foster moralities of self-interested (even material) gain for individuals, particularly those 
oriented towards the purity ethic.  Almsgivers in Lucknow bazaar who donate the 
required amounts, or exceed limits through generosity in sadaqah, can watch the zakat 
receipts pile up in their desk drawers, calculating their personal spiritual merit in thawab 
as I described in chapter five.  I stop short of theorizing this as “trading with God” 
(Mittermaier 2014), given that Lucknow almsgivers rarely if ever believed they could 
make credible claims regarding their accounts with Allah.  Nevertheless, the activist 
efforts of zakat entrepreneurs to institutionalize almsgiving as a modality of ethical self-
fashioning were not ubiquitous nor uniformly successful.  Islamic ethics in Lucknow 
incorporate a permissive stance towards the entrepreneurial and profit-oriented 
acquisition of wealth during the course of the year while also mandating longer-term 
                                                 
147 Jenny White (1994: 156) has shown that Parry and Bloch’s framework, while derived from pre-
capitalist societies, also has clear applicability to urban capitalist contexts. 
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cycles of non-market exchanges in the form of zakat on an annual basis or – at a 
minimum – by the end of this lifetime.  Moreover, while not elaborated in this 
dissertation, I observed how gains in social distinction were inevitable by-products of 
Lucknow Muslims’ generosity despite attempts towards modesty. In short, spiritual gain 
and material gain for individuals cannot be ruled out as short-term, self-interested 
motivations.  For some, their intentions may have started and ended there.  Yet I argue 
that it is this alignment of self-interest with larger societal interest that most effectively 
fosters ethical self-formation of Lucknow Muslims as Muslims and civic actors.  The 
ethical entailments of Islam in Lucknow were so inescapable for many Muslims, 
precisely because the social construction of the self as part of a moral community is so 
very closely aligned with self-interested calculations even as these remained matters 
shaped by individual choice.     
While many approaches theorize Islamic ethics as a moral economy that is 
oppositional to the expansion of capitalist relations (although, ultimately succumbing to 
them in observed reality), my analysis of the zakat economy illustrates how which money 
exists as embedded within traditional moral values and not necessarily resistant to them.  
As Christopher Alan Bayly wrote of pre-modern north India, “the widespread existence 
of markets…was not incompatible with the persistence of pre-capitalist mentalities in 
material culture…Money itself could not transform relationships” (Parry and Bloch 1989: 
8).  The expansion of 21st century markets in Lucknow has similarly proceeded within the 
larger frameworks of public ethics that circulate in the old city bazaars.  Moreover, these 
public ethics are not static contexts of codified moralities, divine commands, or religious 
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“law,” but rather are themselves marketplaces of moral codes and diverse virtuous 
concerns that circulate along with the exchanges of money and goods, as in the zakat 
economy I have described. 
Zakat and the Future of Islamic Public Ethics in the 21st Century 
The rise of zakat ethics in old city Lucknow represents a contemporary and highly 
particular manifestation of Islamic public ethics.  I represent the new ethics promoted by 
zakat entrepreneurs as particular to the north Indian context because the context differs 
so markedly from Muslim societies elsewhere in the world.  In India, the statistical 
representation of Muslim “backwardness” in the Sachar Report has been layered upon 
Muslims’ own visceral encounters with poverty and inequity in Lucknow’s old city 
bazaars.  Lucknow’s wealthy Muslims must contend with characterizations of their 
community as “backward” made by their non-Muslim government and neighbors.  
India’s fast-growing economy has also created numerous opportunities launching 
entrepreneurs within this generation of Lucknow Muslims to positions within the global 
circulation of capital that create local economic disparities on a greater scale than ever 
before, as some in Lucknow must live on $1 a day while others zip around in Italian-
made Fiats speaking on Android phones via Bluetooth as readily as any global, 
cosmopolitan citizen.  These experiential encounters with others both within and without 
their community are what have spurred zakat entrepreneurs to revive and re-invent 
almsgiving as a tradition that not only is purificatory for themselves but also 
transformative for their own Indian Muslim community, seeking societal reform by 
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targeting reforms at zakat-takers as potential halal human capital and targeting reforms at 
those Muslims who do not give (enough) zakat with vigorous faith-based fundraising.   
Lucknow’s new Islamic charities are also quite contemporary in their promotion 
of a zakat ethics of socioeconomic justice.  Despite their claims to a ritual practice 
instituted first by the Prophet Muhammad, zakat entrepreneurs in their organizations, 
their partnerships, and the associated ethical teachings are promoting a new moral 
discourse unprecedented in the history of Indian Islam.  As Michael Cook (2003) has 
written of Muslim public ethics in medieval eras, the moral codes of shari’a have 
historically encouraged Muslims to rebuke one another, but not for “private” matters such 
as the best use of one’s wealth or promoting specific ideas of who is most needy when 
Muslims give zakat.  Moreover, the primary Islamic injunction to “command right and 
forbid wrong” has historically included “no concern…for what we might call social 
justice” in practice (Cook 2003: 99).  Discourses of socioeconomic justice have been 
remarkably rare among Indian ‘ulama, as Qasim Zaman (2012) has written, despite the 
vast array of socioeconomic teachings in Islam and stark poverty in South Asian 
communities.  The ‘ulama most critical of economic inequality have inevitably been 
sidelined by mainstream Islamic scholars in South Asia, or have diluted their economic 
critiques, in the course of their relations with other Muslim elites or prioritization of other 
religious issues (Zaman 2012: 221-260). 
While this dissertation relies on particular and contemporary cases from 
Lucknow, I suggest that the processes described will become less particular, and more 
generally applicable worldwide, as well as more urgent to the contemporary moment as 
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the 21st century progresses.  Muslims globally are already increasingly susceptible to 
narratives of victimhood, whether victimization is at the hands of military and political 
oppressors (Devji 2009), or this victimhood is viewed as marginalization due to more 
amorphous forces of capitalism and globalization. Wherever problems are glossed in 
terms of economic development or progress, in communities that also demand the 
authenticity of rootedness in Islamic tradition, the revival and institutionalization of zakat 
along the lines described in this dissertation will likely be an attractive prospect. Yet zakat 
entrepreneurs – as with all entrepreneurs – will inevitably respond to very specific niche 
opportunities that emerge in their respective economies and religious marketplaces.   
Notably, it is more important for new Islamic charities to stick relatively closely to the 
fiqh of zakat than to fully re-invent Muslim social welfare in 21st century forms.  The 
zakat entrepreneurs of Lucknow imagine their programs as direct extensions of Indian 
Muslim tradition, professing to stay within (or at least not contradict) the regnant 
interpretations of ‘ulama commentaries in determining “correct” recipients and modes of 
giving, rather than explicitly engaging in active intellectual projects to alter the traditional 
ways ‘ulama produce fiqh such as those of European Muslim intellectuals (Ramadan 
2009), theorists of maqasid- or principle-based approaches (Auda 2008), proponents of 
literary analysis of the Qu’ran and scriptures (Soroush 2000), proponents of secular and 
rights-based approaches (An-Na’im and Haim 2007, An-Na’am 2008), or Islamic 
feminists (Mernissi 1992, Wadud 1999). This is due largely to Lucknow’s zakat 
entrepreneurs’ desire for continued reconciliation with the strong authority of Indian 
madrasas and their curriculums established during the 18th and 19th centuries and 
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protected through accommodations with the secular Indian state.   New Islamic charities, 
however, seem to be just the beginning of an arc of reform that has been supplanting 
historically significant Muslim institutions such as waqf, court patronage, and even the 
madrasas with new forms of zakat associations. This is only a beginning.  This arc of 
reform initiated by reformers such as Lucknow’s zakat entrepreneurs appears likely to 
stretch far into the future as Muslim incomes rise along with the valuation of Islamic 
ethics.     
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